Comrade Stalin sent a telegram to Kuibyshev to the directors of the factories M.B.Shenkman and A.T.Tretyakov.
“You have let down our country and our Red Army. You have the nerve not to manufacture Il-2s until now. Our Red Army now needs Il-2 aircraft like the air it breathes, like the bread it eats. (This plant) now produces one Il-2 a day…. It is a mockery of the Red Army…. I ask you not to try the government’s patience, and demand that you manufacture more Il-2s. This is my final warning. Stalin.”
Aircraft Production - Great Patriotic War
|1921-8 - New Economic Policy [NEP]|
excludes a few German designs
|1928-1933 - First 5-Year Plan|
|U-2 / Po-2||32528||1930||1949|
|1933-1937 - Second 5-Year Plan|
|MDR-4 / MTB-1||15||1936||1937|
|1938-1941 - Third 5-Year Plan|
|KOR-1 / Be-2||12||1939||1940|
|PS-84 / Li-2||4960||1939||1953|
|GST / MP-7||22||1939||1940|
|Yak-2 / -4||1940||1941|
|Pe-2 / -3||11425||1940||1945|
|Yer-2 / DB-240||462||1941||1945|
|KOR-2 / Be-4||49||1941||1944|
|Polikarpov Po-2 / I-2||33,000|
|Ilyushin DB-3 / Il-4||5,256|
|Yer-2 / DB-240||462|
|TB-7 / Pe-8||93|
The most difficult situation was in the most complex knowledge-intensive industries - engine building, instrument making, radio electronics. The Soviet Union could not overcome the backwardness of the West in these areas in the prewar and war years. Too great was the difference in the "starting conditions" and too short a period, given the history. They were unable to establish during the war years the serial production of turbochargers and two-stage superchargers.
No less serious restrictions made it necessary to use wood, plywood and steel pipes instead of scarce aluminum and magnesium alloys. The overwhelming severity of the wooden and mixed construction forced the Soviets to weaken weapons, limit ammunition, reduce fuel and save on armored protection. Nevertheless, the progress of Soviet aircraft building in complex war years is undeniable.
The task of increasing the amount of aluminum used in the USSR was without a doubt a priority and had, without exaggeration, a strategic significance. Aluminum must be evaluated first and foremost as the most important strategic raw material, necessary primarily for aircraft construction. It was the presence of aluminum in many ways that determined and limited the capacity of aircraft production. Aluminum was actively consumed by other industries, but, undoubtedly, the aviation industry was one of its most active consumers.
Despite the fact that aluminum smelting rose from 15,000 tons in 1936 to 34,000 tons in 1939, "the use of aluminum to replace copper and tin, as well as the widespread use of light alloys in aviation, that at the beginning of the war, no less than 60,000 tons of aluminum were required per year, that is, almost twice as much as was produced at that time," noted historian G.S. Filatov.
|Type||to 22 Jun|
|1942||1943||1944|| to 09 May|
|TOTAL (less Po-2)||6893||19722||28201||29808||11896||96520|
Even after eight decades there is no consensus on the extent of Soviet losses in the first days of the war. By October 1941, the Wehrmacht armies approached Moscow, cities were occupied, supplying components for aircraft factories, it was time to evacuate factories and Sukhoi, Yakovlev and others in Moscow, Ilyushin in Voronezh, demanding the evacuation of all factories in the European part of the USSR. The Soviets were able to move much of their aircraft industry eastward out of German range during the summer and fall of 1941, By mid-1942 the planes were again coming off the production lines.
With the beginning of hostilities, Soviet aircraft construction had many experimental designs in developing new types of aircraft for assault aviation.
Marshal Georgi Zukov recollected: "From archive data in the period 1 January 1939 to 22 June 1941 the Red Army acquired 17,745 combat aircraft, 3,719 new type planes. Before the war, old aircraft were in the majority. Approximately 50-80% of these aircraft performed inferior to the same types of German aircraft. At the start of the war the breakdown of the types of aircraft was: bombardment air regiment - 45%; fighter air regiments - 42%; assault, intelligence and other air regiments – 13%. Only a few regiments received intense training and no more than 15% of pilots practiced night flying. Throughout the war the VVS went through a period of wide reorganization and equipment upgrades."
During the long and arduous war with Germany, the Soviet Air Force had evolved as a kind of flying artillery, linked organically to the army, and deployed for cooperative interaction with the ground forces. To perfect this role, the Soviet aircraft industry had been mobilized to manufacture vast numbers of tactical aircraft. Because of this wartime emergency, four-engine, long-range bombers were not produced, except for a small number of Pe 8s (only 79-93 built). By contrast, Soviet aviation plants manufactured over 36,000 Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmoviks.
There is something of a jumble as to the numbers on Soviet aircraft production during the war period - the total number was surely greater than 100,000, but probably less than 200,000. By one account, by 1940 the industry was turning out around 7,000 planes a year, but another erport places the total at nearly 11,000 per year. One evident source of ambiguity is whether the totals are only combat aircraft, or military aircraft of all types, including trainers and other auxiliaries, which were quite numerous. The definitive answer to this question was probably provided by the 2011 publication, The history of the domestic aircraft industry. Serial aircraft construction 1910-2010
During the Great Patriotic War, the famous Yak-7, Yak-9 and Yak-3 fighters were created, which together with the Yak-1 accounted for about 60% (over 36 thousand copies) of the Red Army Air Force fighters and were among the best aircraft of their own class. They were distinguished by an optimal combination of speed, armament and maneuverability and played an important role in defeating the Luftwaffe. By another account, In total, during the war years they were built more than 23 thousand, that is, almost a third of all aircraft that fought on the Soviet-German front. The remaining two-thirds consisted of fighters of more than ten types, including foreign ones.
The generalized linear model and particularly the logistic model are widely used in diverse fields. Suffice to say it looks like a smooth curve that ramps up quickly at one end, but then levels off in a long, asymptotic approach toward its maximum value on the far end. The theory of the Long Tail is that the modern digital culture and economy is increasingly shifting away from a focus on a relatively small number of "hits" (mainstream products and markets) at the head of the demand curve and toward a huge number of niches in the tail. At one time Google made most of its money off small advertisers (the long tail of advertising), and eBay is mostly long tail as well - niche and one-off products.
Goodness-of-fit tests for these models are popularly used to describe how well a proposed model fits a set of observations. In data analysis in many fields, the logistic regression model or another generalized linear model are the most widely-used statistical modeling methodologies. The logistic regression model was originally developed when the large observational studies began to mature. More recently, it has been used extensively in the medical and social sciences as well as marketing applications such as prediction of a customer’s propensity to purchase a product or cease a subscription.
A generalized version of the inverse tangent function is devised and found to yield a decent enough fit to the top 15 aircraft produced during the Great Patriotic War epoch - a cumulative total of about 150,000 reported and predicted. The decline of a logistic curve gradually trails of into a "long tail". Production data on less popular aircraft are rather hard to come by. But the logistic curve predicts that the most popular 50 Soviet aircraft during this period would have a total aggregate prodcution run of 200,000 aircraft, which is probably outside the bounds of reported production.
Soviet aircraft production during the Great Patriotic War probably had a bimodal distribution, with a relative small number of models [no more than two dozen or so] producted in the thousands, with hundreds of other designs proceeding no further than small numbers of prototypes.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|