Project 1164 Atlant / Slava class - Origins
Convincing the Soviet leadership that the Navy needed to be strengthened and balanced, and our ocean surface ships needed to be given shock functions to increase their combat stability and expand their capabilities by rapidly building the potential of anti-ship missiles to the fleet, the Navy leadership already issued the task to the Northern PKB (creative team led by VD Rubtsov) to work out options for the military-industrial complex of project 1134B, which by that time began to be built. The idea of the studies was to use the basic version as platforms on which to create a system of mutually supporting ships: anti-submarine, attack (with anti-ship missiles) and collective air defense ships (with anti-aircraft missiles).
The hull and power plant were saved by the project, the changes concerned only the aft part of the superstructure ship, and the weapons on the percussion version were replaced with 12 launchers for the P-500 Basalt complex, which looked into the stern. Anti-aircraft missiles of the Kvant vertical launch (later “Fort”) were to be installed on the air defense variant. It turned out quite good ships capable of acting as part of the anti-submarine search group as full-fledged military-industrial complex, and missile ships covering some sort of escort ships of the CUG (the Americans called such ships frigates). Worked out options with and without a helicopter. It turned out quite good ships capable of acting as part of the anti-submarine search group as full-fledged military-industrial complex, and missile ships covering some sort of escort ships of the CUG (the Americans called such ships frigates). Worked out options with and without a helicopter. It turned out quite good ships capable of acting as part of the anti-submarine search group as full-fledged military-industrial complex, and missile ships covering some sort of escort ships of the CUG (the Americans called such ships frigates). Worked out options with and without a helicopter.
Later, already in 1986, in a truncated form, the “Fort” air defense missile system was installed on the military-industrial complex of the project 1134B “Azov”. In principle, our Navy came close enough to the implementation of the classic shipbuilding concept: the base hull and energy weapons of various types, which would allow building ships of fairly large displacement faster and less costly, load the industry more evenly, vary the strength of ship connections, simplify the development of new crews. .. Recall that in the 50s this concept was brilliantly implemented on the destroyers of the project 56.
The studies were approved and the development of the technical project began; it was assumed that, starting with the construction number C-2007, a missile version would be launched. Because of this, the laying of the BOD "Tallinn" was delayed, the crew was formed several times, then disbanded, they began to call it a "flying Dutchman" in the fleet, as a result, the ship was laid and completed according to the original design, in the anti-submarine version. Suddenly, the oscillations and delays were mainly due to the fact that a powerful “rocket bomb” project 1165, armed with cruise missiles and the new anti-aircraft complex “Fort” S-300F enhanced configuration for highly efficient collective defense, was created, “even better”. and protection against low-flying cruise missiles.
Preference was just given to him, but in August 1971 the work on the "Fugas" was stopped due to the high cost (the cruiser was supposed to be atomic) - as often happens, they hacked up a good idea, did not realize a better one, and as a result were left with nothing. When the fleet refused to build mutual support ships on one hull (which was welcomed by the Ministry of Justice and Industry), then B.E. Botoma said: "As always, they themselves do not know what they want!"
In order to at least have something, we decided to return to the studies of the Northern PKB, on the basis of which it was decided to create a simpler and less expensive missile cruiser (out of three one) of the third generation on the basis of technical solutions 1134B.
In October 1972, the Northern PKB was issued a tactical technical task for draft design 1164 (code “Atlant”), AK was appointed chief designer. Perkova, the main observer from the rank 2 Navy-Captain A.N. Blinov. With a total displacement of 10,000 tons, the ship’s armament was to consist of the Basalt anti-ship missile system (12 launchers for two 6 missile volleys), the Fort (8 x 8 vertical launch launchers) and the Osa anti-aircraft missile systems (2 paired ), two 100 mm AK-100 cannons, AK-630 self-defense automatic rifles, RBU-6000 bombers, two 5 pipe torpedo tubes, a ship-based helicopter.
There was an option (later rejected) with recessed into the hull PU for the main missile complex, with two 130-mm single-barrel guns (which later became two-barrel at the request of the Commander-in-Chief), which caused the ship to extend to almost 200 meters and an unacceptable increase in displacement. It was necessary to take into account the capabilities of the factory builder, so the dimensions of "sting", some of the premises and rockets were kind of "squeezed out" to the top.
In December 1972, a review of the draft design materials took place, according to the results of which the Commander personally instructed to add four more launchers to carry out two full eight-missile volleys, and replace two AK-100 artillery mounts with one double-barreled AK-130. Everything was fulfilled. Strengthening the impact power has resulted in an increase in displacement, a decrease in the speed of travel (from 34 to 32.5 knots), and the limitation of the angles of attack on the nose gun.
In general, the cruiser in the conceptual design looked more beautiful, and the armament was more balanced and thoughtful. Two artillery towers were better in combat than one, especially since the weaving was more reliable, and there was more ammunition for them. (2000 shots instead of 720). In addition, the ship departed further and further from large anti-submarine ships, less and less interaction was expected with them, more and more independence was given to it.
Constructive armored protection on the cruiser was absent, since its implementation would require an increase in displacement of at least 1000 tons. It was a minus, to which the customer closed his eyes to demand the introduction of armor then it was simply not fashionable, especially for the ship of a limited displacement, even the new American missile cruisers in those years did not have such. It was believed that the ship was supposed to have only the ability to withstand "non-combat" operational emergency damage, fires and flooding, and therefore its survivability should be evaluated without taking into account the impact of weapons. Now this opinion has departed and the ships (starting with the TFR) are being designed taking into account possible damage from modern and even promising combat weapons. And it is illogical, in fact, to equalize the survivability of a warship with any cargo ship.
At the request of the observing the minimum thickness of the cruiser skin, no less than 8 mm were adopted, which increased the service life of the ship and increased its overall strength.
The anti-submarine capabilities of the cruiser looked modest enough, especially against the background of the long-range projected GAK: but the elaboration of the installation option for the newest automated sonar complex Polynom showed that the displacement growth would be up to 1,500 tons, and therefore decided to limit it to the new PJSC Platina, which already passed tests. The detection range under normal hydrological conditions was at least 15 km, with adverse conditions of at least 1 km. Thus, the idea of creating a leader for antisubmarine groups, as it were, began to die without joining weapons and equipment complexes, without being able to perform the functions of a full-fledged flagship of such a compound, the cruiser began to become a ship that “walks by itself”.
By the way, for the first time, the Soviet Union felt the impact of the global energy crisis, so the designers were tasked with achieving fuel economy by increasing the efficiency of the installation, which was implemented by introducing a heat recovery loop. These are the main reasons that caused the design of a new generation of cruisers and influenced their appearance.
Technical project 1164 was approved on August 21, 1974. Until 1979, the chief designer was A.K. Perkov, then he was replaced by V.I. Mutihin.
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