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10X (Swallow)
10XN (Wave) Air Launched Cruise Missile
16X (Surf) Air Launched Cruise Missile

In the history of the creation of cruise missiles in the Soviet Union there are many bright pages, but perhaps the most dramatic - the first. The 10XN missile was built on the basis of the German V-1, but even in the 1950s this type of weapon was so ahead of its time that it nearly broke the fate of Vladimir Nikolayevich Chelomey, one of the main creators of the USSR nuclear missile shield. The military-industrial company "NPO Mashinostroenia", founded by him, is also known as the leading developer of cruise missiles for the fleet.

Soon after the end of World War II, the Cold War began, a new, even more powerful, potential adversary-the United States, possessing atomic weapons from the end of the war and having plans to use it against the USSR. At the same time, the main threat to our country came from the World Ocean. It should be stressed that if on land the Soviet Union was militarily inferior to the United States and its NATO allies, then at sea their rule was complete. In early 1946, the USSR had 54 surface combat ships, 170 submarines, while the United States had 615 large surface ships, including 30 attack aircraft carriers and 263 submarines. The basis of the US Navy's strike power was multi-purpose aircraft carriers.

The United States continued to improve its Navy. Since 1952, the program for the construction of new strike aircraft carriers of the Forrestal type has been adopted, and since 1958 the nuclear carrier aircraft have been adopted. These new aircraft carriers became carriers of attack aircraft with atomic weapons. Amphibious forces also developed, which indicated the aggressive nature of the US and NATO fleet.

The Soviet military and political leadership was well aware that the main threat to the country would come from the ocean, but the country could not carry out the accelerated construction of a fleet comparable in type and number of ships to the US and NATO fleet, it had to restore the national economy, create new industries. It was necessary to find directions on which it was necessary to build a fleet capable of resisting a powerful surface fleet of a probable enemy. For this confrontation, our fleet needed to enter the World Ocean. These requirements were largely met by nuclear submarines and combat aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles.

At the same time, in contrast to the missile bases surrounding the USSR, the rearmament of the Navy with cruise missiles made it possible to launch retaliatory strikes against ground targets located thousands of kilometers from the USSR borders on the coast and in the enemy's rear, turning it into the most important strategic factor, and sometimes decisive influence on the planning of possible military operations. The share of the Navy in the Armed Forces of the country has increased enormously.

The Fi-103, which later gained fame as the V-1 (V1 - from Vergeltungswaffe - a weapon of retaliation), reached a range of 250 kilometers. Its warhead, which had a maximum yield of 500 kilograms of TNT,was intended to hit targets such as large cities. Their dispersion was tens of kilometers. The V-1 was the brainchild of aviation and the V-2 was the weapon of the infantry troops.

It is curious that the first meeting of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on the fact of the use of new weapons by Germany took place on the evening of June 13, 1944. At what speed at that time the top management reacted to the events. And a month later, July 13, 1944, Stalin received a personal message from Churchill. The British Prime Minister warned the ally that in the vicinity of the Polish city of Debice, which was soon to be released to the Soviet troops, is a testing ground for Germany's newest weapons. When inspecting the test site, Soviet specialists found several incomplete V-1. And in September, Churchill sent Stalin a new gift: the fragments of an unexploded missile with pulsating air-jet engines (PWRDS).

There is no final clarity on the origin of the reproduced material. According to a number of documents, the V-1 came from England. However, some Rursian historians thought it was unlikely that such a big "fan" of communism as Winston Churchill provided the Soviets with a means specially designed to bomb England from bases on the continent and successfully tested at the facilities of "foggy Albion." Perhaps it was the extraction of partisans or scouts from the territory of Poland where the German ranges were located. The confrontation between the Ludovoi Army and the Krajowa Army, as well as the tense relations of the latter with the Soviet Army, created a background on which they could consider for the benefit of presenting the "V-1" a gift from John Bull.

The first domestic pulse-jet was created under the leadership of Vladimir Chelomey in 1941. Unlike the turbojet engine (TRD), neither the compressor nor the turbine was used in this type of powerplant. The air was compressed by a flowing stream in the air intake, and then through special valves it was fed in portions into the combustion chamber. Hence the name of the engine - a pulsating, as well as a characteristic, similar to the shots of the rumbling during its operation. The simplicity of the device allowed Chelomey to finish the development of the PWRMM much earlier than the workable turbojet engines appeared in the USSR. Not surprisingly, the creation of the first Soviet cruise missile 10X, which was a copy of the V-1, was commissioned precisely for him.

As a trophy, the Soviet Union received several V-1 rockets while occupying the territory of the test site near Blizna in Poland. There was a corresponding decision by the State Defense Committee [VPK]. On the night of June 14, 1944, Shakhurin, the People's Commissar, and Marshal Avtovikov, and along with Chelomey went to the Kremlin to Malenkov - he was in charge of the aviation industry. "Can you make such an airplane?" Malenkov asked Chelomey. "I made the engine back in 1942," Chelomey replied.

After this dialogue Chelomey delivered a brilliant speech, in which he outlined the great future of the PWWRD. Shakhurin and Novikov listened to him in complete amazement. Malenkov was fascinated by the 30-year-old designer. Soon, under the leadership of Chelomey, the former design bureau of the "fighter king" Polikarpov was already working.

At the beginning of the work on the reproduction of the "V-1" Chelomey, who was almost the only specialist in the pulsating engines in the USSR, was considered only as an engine developer. Within a few months, this scientist showed himself as a born organizer. Chelomei's appointment to the leadership position ensured the concentration of efforts on copying the V-1.

At the end of the summer of 1944, Chelomey completed the preliminary design of the projectile with its PWRD D-3, which was named 10X, and on September 19, 1944, he was appointed chief designer and director of the plant #51 NKAP. Previously, this plant was engaged in the design and manufacture of experimental aircraft under the leadership of Chief Designer NN Polikarpov, who died on July 30, 1944. Thanks to almost round-the-clock work, on February 5, 1945, the first production model of a cruise missile was manufactured.

The samolet-snaryad (airplane-missile) was a further development of the German V-1. But, with the Germans everything was fundamentally simple, and with the Soviets it turned out considerably more complex. To begin with, Chelomey was reproducing the V-1. Some people were smart enough to say that nobody needed it any more. Then he suspended the airplane-missile from a real airplane, modified the engine, and achieved a speed of 800 kilometers per hour instead of the Germans 600.

The XM designation cropped up, and in shop slang it became eksem. The Russian pronunciation of the Latin letter X is iks and not eks, hence the confusion. Chelomey used a designation system for his cruise missiles that used a number followed by the letter X format, e.g., 10X or 16X. When Soviet engineers would describe these systems, they would have normally said 10-iks or 16-iks but in this case said 10-eks or 16-eks.

In contrast to the V-1, 10X were intended to be launched not only from ground positions, but also from aircraft and ship-based installations. Initially it was intended to launch from the ground on ground targets, like the prototype, but, due to low efficiency, such an application was rejected. The modified version was intended for arming the carrier aircraft to destroy enemy targets at a significant distance from the launching point from the aircraft.

Factory flight tests began on March 20, 1945 in the Golodnaya Steppe on the basis of an expedition to Jizzakh. To determine the accuracy of the shooting, 18 machines were launched. However, only six of them managed to fly to the destination, five of which fell into a given square 20x20 km in size, located 170 km from the point of discharge. The reason for the failure was partly due to severe climatic conditions.

Already in the spring of 1945 at the plant - 125 in cooperation with other factories on the technical documentation of the plant #51, serial production of 10X airplanes began. Before the suspension of works in connection with the end of the Great Patriotic War, 300 vehicles were built.

About two hundred and 10X was brought and prepared for control plant and state tests, which took place from December 15, 1947 to July 20, 1948 at the State Central Range of the Ministry of Armed Forces. If on machines tested in 1945, the type of wing and stabilizer and power regulator remained the same as the German prototype (V-1), then on the projectiles in 1948 they were replaced by more sophisticated domestic ones. The PWRD thrust increased from 270 kg to 325 kg. Of the seventy-three projectile aircraft, 64 machines were tested in full with inert equipment, including four with landing gear; under the full scheme in combat equipment - three vehicles and six more - in incomplete scheme in combat equipment. During the 10X tests, a number of improvements and improvements were made. In particular, the metal wings were replaced by wooden wings due to unevenness of their surface and different twist.

The 1948 airplane in its characteristics significantly surpassed the German V-1 and the 10X model of 1945 by the characteristics. The probability of getting 10X to the target increased from 36% (1945) to 88% (1948). According to Soviet documents, for the V-1 it was about 70%. The deviation of the average trajectory of the course decreased from 335' to 0.2 degrees.State tests of 10XN in complex with ground equipment took place from December 17, 1952 to March 11, 1953. Chelomeevskie machines were first tested in the cold season and new climatic conditions were not slow to affect. Of the 15 launched aircraft, the flights of the three ended in a premature fall, and the flight regime of the four did not match the target: in two cases, height and speed, one altitude and one speed. The cause of the accident was the failure of the propulsion system and control systems for use in winter conditions. Despite the improvements made to the engine and control system equipment, which improved their performance, it was not possible to achieve a completely reliable flight.

As early as 1946, Chelomey designed an aircraft missile 14X with two more powerful pulsating D-5 engines. Aerodynamic scheme 14X normal flight. The combat unit is the same as that of the 10X. The control system is inertial. Considered the option 14Xc system for the conduct of the project "Comets", but soon it was rejected. And the rocket 14X died quietly, the question of its acceptance for weapons was not even raised.

May 7, 1947 issued a decree of the Council of Ministers No. 1401 on the development of the 16X missile. Outwardly and constructively, 16X differed little from the 14X. Aerodynamic scheme - normal aircraft. The carrier could be Tu-4 (2 missiles) and Tu-2 (1 missile). (Figure 36) Modifications of the 10X and 16X missiles Chelomey appropriated 10XM and 16XM indices. In English, "X" sounds "ex", as a result of the Chelomei rockets, the name "ex-us" - "eczema-10", "eczema-11" 1 was stuck. During the tests of the 16X missile, various pulsating engines were mounted on it: D-5, D-312, D-14-4 and others. During the tests at the training ground in Akhtubinsk from July 22 to December 25, 1948, the maximum speed increased from 714 to 780 km / h. In 1949, with the D-14-4 engine, the speed reached 912 km/h.

Between August 2 and 20, 1952, joint tests were carried out on the 16X missile and the Tu-4 carrier, during which 22 rocket launches with an inertial control system were conducted. The commission considered the test results to be successful, for the allowed circular deviation was considered to be 8 km.

However, on October 4, 1952, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Marshal K.A. Vershinin stated that it was impossible to adopt the 16X because of non-compliance with the requirements for accuracy of shooting, reliability, and so on. Vershinin proposed to carry out tests of an experimental serial batch of 15 16X airplanes before the end of 1952, and in 1953, having formed a separate squadron of Tu-4 carrier aircraft in the Air Force, to test a military battalion of sixty 16X, from which twenty must be in combat equipment.

Up to 1953, the activity of the whole OKB-51 was focused on the development of the line V-1. There appeared a variant 10KN with a solid-fuel start accelerator intended for launch from mobile ground launchers. By equipping the projectile with a solid-propellant rocket launcher, it was possible to abandon the heavy and complex catapults used by the Germans. For aviation, an advanced version of the 16X was developed, equipped with two pulsating motors instead of one. In addition to the successfully tested projectile aircraft with autonomous control on the basis of the autopilot, modifications of 16XH with various homing heads were worked out: radar, thermal, television.

For seven years, during which OKB-51 was headed by V.N. Chelomey, this design organization failed to successfully complete any of the topics assigned to it. Despite the fact that as a result of years of testing, an acceptable level of reliability, accuracy and flight-tactical characteristics was achieved, the customers refused to accept the airplanes for armament, bringing to them all new, initially not specified requirements. They could be understood: for the varied appearance of the Chelomeev products, it was easy to see the same German design conceived back in the early 1940s. and became increasingly vulnerable in the conditions of the rapid progress of air defense in the early 1950s.

A meeting with Stalin in 1952 nearly broke Chelomei's life. Viktor Nikiforovich Bugaysky, a Deputy to Chelomei who retained fierce hatred of his former boss in his heart, describes this event: "Representatives of the Air Force command and a test team from the test site were invited to the meeting. Vladimir Nikolaevich reported in optimistic tones about the results of the tests and boasted by showing photographs of successful hits of missiles at the target and a scheme for distributing the points of their fall into a given circle on the ground in the target area. All this convincingly testified to the high efficiency of the missiles. Stalin asked representatives of the test team to speak at the test site.

"A major came out and said that all the successes that VN Chelomey said were taking place, but on his scheme he showed only successful launches. And there are few such launches, the bulk of the missiles tested either did not reach the target, or the points of their fall lie far beyond the given circle. Then he presented his scheme with a completely unoptimistic picture of the results of the work.

"Stalin asked the generals who were present whether this was really the case, as the major reported. Those confirmed the rightness of the major. Then Stalin summed up the results of the meeting: "We to you, Comrade Chelomei, have given us great confidence, instructing us to lead the work in such an important field of technology for us. You did not justify the trust. In my opinion, you are an adventurer in technology, and we can not trust you anymore! You can not be the leader!"".

The opinion of the state leader was still decisive. In early 1953 Chelomei's OKB-51 was liquidated, the territory, with the buildings and most of the employees transferred to OKB-155 of A.I.Mikoyan. Failed party leaders and ministers were waiting not for prison cells, but comfortable apartments for Soviet embassies in the capitals, as a rule, far from great powers. And the department of leading aviation and rocket institutes became a natural refuge for the main designers, where Chelomey seriously sheltered. He went to teach at the MVTU N.E. Bauman. Often he even personally lectured, amazed students with various paradoxical experiments invented by him, demonstrating the depth of the wonderful world of fluctuations. In particular, he demonstrated the amazing phenomenon of the "reverse" of Archimedes' law: In a vibrating glass with a liquid, denser bodies emerged and the lungs sank. Perhaps, the scientific and pedagogical activity was considered by Vladimir Nikolayevich as a kind of intellectual which did not allow "the soul to be lazy ..."

But on March 5, 1953 Stalin was dying. Malenkov became the head of the Soviet state, and Khrushchev was the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and on May 19, 1954, the government issued a decree on taking 10XN to supply the army in the training and training variant. And in August 1954, OKB-52, the future of "NPO Machine Building", one of the leading developers of cruise missiles in the USSR, operated under the leadership of Chelomey on the territory of the Reutov Mechanical Plant.

After the death of Stalin, the prospects of VN. Chelomey looked far from hopeless. In 1954, the collective of Vladimir Nikolaevich was recreated again. By the decision of the government of May 19, 1954, the plant #475 MAP was assigned the task of producing 100 aircraft-projectiles 10XN in the training version. In November 1955, the size of this lot was reduced to 50 machines, the production of which ended in December of the same year. According to the general opinion of the Ministry of Defense and the State Committee for Aeronautical Engineering (GKAT), the 10XN missile did not meet the requirements for modern weapons, and could not reliably operate at negative temperatures. The machines that were released serially were decided to be used only as training and training purposes in the air defense and air defense system.

In the postwar period, VN Chelomey developed several more rockets based on 10X ( 14X and 16X ), but in the early 1950s, developments were stopped, and the design bureau that developed them was closed.

The fiasco involving the work on airplane-missiles threatened to create enormous problems not only for the NII-885 leadership, but also for Chelomey himself if it got to the point of an investigation under Stalin. Stalins death removed the threat of severe punishment, but the work gradually came to an end.

Stalin was displeased with the results of the 10X tests, the first domestic cruise missile. CB Chelomey was transferred to Mikoyan, and the designer himself was excommunicated from the practical work. However, one of his fantasies was so intriguing to the leadership of the Soviet Navy that, right after the death of the leader of the peoples, Chelomey was returned to the design work. And at the end of August 1955 he received a call from M.V. Keldysh also said that a decision was made to implement his proposals.

In 1955, Chelomey succeeded in reassembling a team of cruise missile enthusiasts in an organization named OKB-52. Unlike the Air Force, leaders of the Navy showed more attention to airplane-missiles. Chelomey took considerable pains to arm submarines with cruise missiles (as they started calling airplane-missiles). The more modern Russian term for cruise missiles derives from the phrase krylataya raketa, which literally means winged missile.

10X 10X 10X 10X 10X



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