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V-1 / Fieseler 103 / FZG 76

The result of years of research and development, the Fieseler 103, later FZG 76 and, finally, V-1 (for vengeance), was an unmanned, pulse-jet-powered flying bomb. Only 25 feet long with a wingspan of 16 feet and a 1,000-lb warhead, its maximum range was initially about 160 miles. Launched from a ramp, the missile flew along a preset trajectory to a desired distance, which was determined by an onboard windmill, then dove on the target below.

The history of development of the buzz­bomb (V-1) is quite interesting. The Germans first considered "flying bombs" in the 1930s. While two German companies, Askania and Siemans, did some work in the field, an independent inventor, Paul Schmidt, achieved success. He began work in 1928 on a pulsejet, received a patent on the device in 1931 and, beginning in 1933, received modest government support. In 1934, along with G. Madelung, Schmidt proposed a "flying bomb" powered by a pulsejet. The next year, he received a development contract from the Air Ministry for an intermittent jet motor ; and four years later, he demonstrated a pulsejet-powered pilotless bomber. The work proceeded slowly.

While the German Air Force (GAF) wanted such a device, it shelved the project because of range (a 350-mile range requirement exceeded the state of the art), accuracy, and cost problems. Nevertheless, the Argus Company began work on the pulsejet in 1938 ; two years later, the Air Ministry brought Schmidt to Argus. About November, 1939, Diedrich, of the Argus Motor Company, who had been working for the Air Ministry on exhaust pipe jet-propulsion nozzles, began work on intermittent combustion in an open pipe. In 1940, the Air Ministry brought Schmidt to the Argus Company and combined the developments.

A number of factors encouraged development of what would become the V-1. First, the capture of France in 1940 reduced the distance to England, thereby ending the need for some form of radio control which experts thought to be necessary over the much longer distances between Germany and Britain. Second, the war depleted and dispersed the Luftwaffe's ranks by 1942, making the pilotless bombers more attractive. Third, the bombing of Germany infuriated Hitler. He demanded a terror weapon for retaliation against Britain. Finally, interservice rivalry entered in-the Air Force wanted a weapon to match the Army's V-2.

About that time the ground forces development of the large V-2 rocket, which was started at a very early date, was delayed. Since this weapon was considered extremely important for the outcome of the war, an official of the Air Ministry proposed the use of a combination of small airplane with intermittent jet motor as a substitute for the same purpose. The V-1 was thus conceived and became a development of the air forces. Its code name was originally Kirschkern (cherry pit) because it was merely to be spit out against England.

The first successful motor was completed in 1941. This motor development itself was intended for use in aircraft. In June 1942 Erhard Milch, GAF production chief, gave the highest priority to a proposal by three German companies to produce a pilotless bomber constructed from cheap materials: Argus the engine, Fiesler the airframe, and Askania the guidance system.

The development tests were made at the Air Ministry laboratory at the Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt Hermann Göring, Braunschweig, in the 2.8-m high­speed wind tunnel. The original model of the V-1 was not very good, the net thrust of the motor being zero at 380 mph. About 60% of the operating time of this wind tunnel was needed for nearly a year to bring the development to its present stage.

Magnetic compasses, a timer and a system of gyroscopes guided Buzz Bombs along a preset course and distance at an average altitude of 3,000 to 4,000 feet. When the course was complete, the 1-ton warhead armed automatically and the engine shut off. The bomb then free-fell onto its target. The V-1's unique pulse-jet engine gave the Buzz Bomb its nickname: Louvers opening and shutting rapidly near the intake made a distinctive buzzing noise as the engine's "pulsating" thrust gave the V-1 a cruising speed of about 360 mph.

The V-1 was launched from a 200-ft. inclined ramp using a steam-powered catapult. Launching accelerated the missile to about 250 mph, fast enough for the winged bomb's jet engine to operate. Since the V-1's range was only around 150 miles, launch sites were set up on the French coast in order to bombard London.

The first V-1 attack was not a total surprise to Allied leaders; British intelligence had received surreptitious reports about Germany's secret weapons for years. The first reconnaissance photograph of the V-l was taken by the British at Peenemünde in April 1943, and bombing made Peenemünde uninhabitable by August 1943. Discovery of a new type of German construction on the French coast was made by aerial reconnaissance on 24 October 1943. In response to reports from agents in the Pas-de-Calais a close photographic cover of the area around Yvrench-Bois-Carre revealed a series of concrete structures, the largest of which were two curiously shaped buildings, each nearly 300 feet in length, resembling gigantic skis laid on edge. The installation at Yvrench-Bois-Card was designated as the “Prototype Ski Site.” By the middle of November, twenty-one ski sites had been identified.

As Allied reconnaissance of the French coast continued with unremitting effort a significant relationship among the ski sites became apparent: the alignment of all the ski sites in the Pas-de-Calais indicated an orientation directly on London. It was impossible for British intelligence to escape the conclusion that the closely integrated and rapidly growing network of installations was to be used for some type of concentrated long-range attack against the world’s most populous city - and the heart of the staging area for the forthcoming invasion of the continent.

A few military and civilian analysts regarded the whole series of ski sites, together with the seven large sites, as a gigantic hoax by the Germans, a deliberate fraud of the first magnitude to frighten or divert the attention and effort of the Allies from their attempt to invade the coast of France. General Spaatz, for example, was not convinced even in February 1944 that these installations did not represent an inspired German feint.

A larger number of scientists and technicians, however, were of the opinion the large sites were being prepared to launch huge rockets weighing as much as 100 tons and that the smaller ski sites were to send vast numbers of the Peenemunde pilotless aircraft, estimated to weigh as much as 20 tons, against the civilians of London and against troop and supply con~entrations.

Rumor added other interpretations. The Germans, it was reported, were preparing to bombard London with huge containers bearing gruesome and fatal “Red Death”; the Germans were preparing to shoot enormous tanks of poison gas to destroy every living creature in the British Isles; the Germans, even, were preparing a gigantic refrigerating apparatus along the French coast for the instantaneous creation of massive icebergs in the Channel or for dropping clouds of ice over England to stop the Allied bombers in mid-air.

An early estimate of the situation by AAF Headquarters had suggested the extreme possibilities of biological warfare, gas warfare, and the use of revolutionary explosives of “unusually violent character”.

One hundred and fifty ski sites were projected and surveyed by the Germans. Of this number, 96 sites were brought to some stage of completion; 74 were more than 50 per cent completed; 22 were totally completed. Each ski site contained half-adozen steel and concrete structures, some with walls 8 to 10 feet thick; the two ski buildings at each site, constructed of concrete and steel, were nearly 300 feet long. The ski sites were, as Allied intelligence had quickly decided, intended as firing sites for V-1’s.

Reconnaissance photos of the secret Nazi facilities at Peenemünde confirmed the extent of the programs and prompted an Allied response. On the night of 17 August 1943, nearly six hundred RAF heavy bombers attacked Peenemünde. The attack resulted in heavy damage to the Peenamünde facilities, but the RAF lost 40 aircraft and 240 men. Allied photo intelligence then located and confirmed several suspicious launch sites in northern France, Normandy, and the Pas de Calais.

The permanent ramps were bombed by Allied air units in Operation Crossbow from December 1943 until early spring 1944, when Allied leaders were convinced that the V-1 threat had been minimized. Although the Allies did not begin their bombing attacks in earnest until December 1943, by 10 June 1944 the Allies estimated that they had knocked out 82 of 96 sites attacked. Between 1 December 1943 and 12 June 1944, the Anglo- American Air Forces, flying 25,150 attack sorties, dropped a total of 36,200 tons of bombs on the sites.

This bombing effort cost the Allies 154 aircraft and 771 crew members. The Allied bombing of the sites was expensive and, as it turned out, ineffective. Intense political pressure, however, forced the airmen to pulverize the sites. While none of the bombed sites went into action, the bombing diverted vast amounts of Allied bombs from other targets and did not prevent the Germans from building alternate launching sites. The Germans constructed prefabricated launch sites that could be moved and quickly erected for V-1 attacks.

The "Buzz Bombs," as they were called, could be intercepted by radar-cued fighters and targeted by antiaircraft fire as well. Allied countermeasures included bombing launch sites, antiaircraft fire, barrage balloons with wires to snag the missiles, and fighter interception. The Allies dropped some 98,000 tons of bombs on V-1 launch and manufacturing sites. Combined defenses in England and on the continent destroyed a total of 6,176 Buzz Bombs, and an estimated 25 percent of V-1s launched crashed due to malfunction or manufacturing defects.

The first operational use of the V-l was on l2 June 1944, one week after the Allied landings in Normandy, when Hitler unleashed this new kind of weapon on England. A single Luftwaffe Flak (antiaircraft) regiment launched all Buzz Bombs in combat. These specially chosen troops had good technical skills, and they trained at Peenemunde and other sites for months before setting up V-1 operations on the coasts of France and later Holland. Each of the 64 original V-1 units consisted of 55 soldiers and could usually launch one missile in an hour.

Some V-1s were also launched from Heinkel He 111 bombers, but this effort was mostly unsuccessful. the first recognizable air launch against England on 09 July 1944. A bomber carrying one missile flew towards England at about 300 feet altitude and 160-170 mph until, about 60 miles off the coast, it climbed to several thousand feet and launched the V-1. The GAF air-launched about 90 V-1s prior to the defensive redeployment, and a further 310 between then and 5 September 1944. With the withdrawal of German forces from French launching sites, these air-launched weapons became the chief air threat to Britain in the closing months of the war. During this entire operation, the Germans lost a total of 77 missile-carrying aircraft, including 16 to Allied fighters.

Germany launched 10,492 V-1s against Britain [not just London] during the next 13 months, 7,488 of which reached England and 2,419-2,420 hit London, killing 6,184 people and injuring another 17,981. Between June and September 1944, during which London was the main target, V-1 raids caused £48 million in damages (including lost production). When the weapons reached their programmed distance and nosed over, fuel starvation caused their engines to quit. As a result, both the approach and the impending impact of the V-1s were communicated to the populace below.

The Germans used obituary notices in the London newspapers as one source of target intelligence. In July 1944 the authorities plugged this source, a wise move as a German plot based upon this data put the mean point of impact one and one-half miles west of the actual impact point, certainly much closer to the truth than other information available to the Germans. The British also reported to Germany through captured German agents in the "Double Cross System," that their weapons fell beyond the target, thereby encouraging their foes to shorten the missile's range. The lack of German aerial reconnaissance permitted these deceptions to work.

The Anglo-Americans employed their first operational jet, the Meteor, against the V weapons. The Meteor became operational on 27 July and claimed its first V-1 on 04 August 1944.

Germany produced more than 30,000 V-1s in 1944-1945, half the 60,000 planned. The Germans launched anywhere from 7,400 to 9,000 V-1s against targets on the continent, with about 4,900 aimed at the key port of Antwerp. For their part, the Allies deployed 18,000 troops to man 208 90mm, 128 3 .7-inch, and 188 40mm guns.In addition, the defenders initially used 280 balloons which, in time, grew to 1,400. The Allies did not employ any fighters in the defense of Antwerp.

The Germans also attacked Liege with about 3,000 V-1s. The Allies defended this city from 23 November to 11 December when the German offensive in the Battle of the Bulge pulled the defenders out. V-ls killed a total of 947 military and 3,736 civilians on the continent, and wounded an additional 1,909 military and 8,166 civilians. Antwerp suffered 10,145 (1,812 military, 8,333 civilian) of the total 14,758 V-1 casualties on the continent.

In all, the Germans fired 10,492 V-ls against Britain, all but 1,600 launched from ramps. About 2,000 of them crashed shortly after takeoff. The defenders observed 7,488 missiles. and downed 3,957 (52.8 percent). The fighters received credit for 1,847 kills, the guns for 1,878, and the balloons for 232. The defenses downed 69 percent of the V-1s launched during daylight, compared with 65 percent at night.

To put the lethality of the V-1s into perspective requires comparison with other German weapons that killed and maimed British civilians during World War II. German bombing killed 51,509, V-2s killed 2,754 and long-range guns killed 148.

A wartime British study went into great detail analyzing the costs of the Allied campaign to counter the V-1. Using the German costs as unity (based upon an estimate of 8,000 launched), the study concluded it cost the defenders 1 .46 for damage and loss of production, 1 .88 for the bombing, .30 for fighter interception, and .16 for static defenses, for a total ratio of 3.80:1 . Adjusting these figures for the continental defensive effort and the total German costs would lower this ratio only to about 3 :1 . Economically then, the V-1 more than paid for itself. But it must be emphasized that the Allies could afford the cost, the Germans could not.