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The Army of Louis Napoleon

When Louis Napoleon became President of the Republic, his first thought was to gain the goodwill of the Army. It may be remembered that he gave banquets and gratuities to the soldiers, and made his presence among them to be looked upon always as the forerunner of some indulgence or other. But he could not gain the goodwill of the natural military leaders. It was long before they came in at all, and then only in scanty numbers, and with ideas of reform - such reform as was incompatible with the Imperial system, for it involved the gathering tighter the reins of discipline, and the substitution of real work as the only road to promotion, instead of subserviency to the claims of the dynasty.

The Army and the nation were gradually prepared for the law of 1855, by which the fall of military service from the high position it had formerly held was recognized. It enacted that men drawn by conscription might buy exemption for a sum of money paid to the State. Instantly agencies sprang up throughout the country, to lend money for such purposes, and a soldier serving in the ranks began to be regarded in a commercial age as a man not only without money hut without credit. Frequent promotions from the ranks to the grade of Officer kept down the tone of the commissioned, and the French Army was evidently pursuing a downward career.

France became possessed with the desire of having Algeria as a dependent colony, both as commanding the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and as, forsooth, a school of war. At first it was a good military ground, fertile in marches and combats. Certain Officers were noticed for their bravery and skill, and deservedly rewarded. But when French power was once established, the school became a playground, or, even worse - a place of practice for intrigue. Life there was a condition of peace, with the disorder of war, and without sufficient danger to check the demoralising effect of occupation by conquerors. Discipline became lax there, as it did in India under similar conditions, but there came also a gradual sinking into terrible demoralization and vices, which are still called in France "Algerian," because no one dare otherwise name them. Thus the Army steadily degenerated, and the few men who dared to send forth notes of warning were speedily crushed by popular opinion. Who can wonder that such an Army showed itself untrustworthy in 1848, and proved a broken rced to the hand that leant upon it?

The first step to promotion was to gain the interest of some Court favourite; the second, to be sent to Algeria and perform some feat of arms against undisciplined native warriors, so that the name of the aspirant might be brought before the public. The luxury of the Court became reflected in the Army. The Generals, often risen from the ranks, used their comparatively high resources for self-indulgence. The junior Officers and men followed the evil example as far as their means allowed. Luxury must be comparative, and it is not to be supposed that the pay of the French officer enabled him to purchase any refined pleasures, unless the theatre be considered so; but each one in his own sphere learned to prefer self-indulgence to manly self-denial, and Algerian vices became fatal to all self respect.

The outside appearance of the Army was fair in seeming, but outpost duties, gaining intelligence, and all the severer work of soldiers were neglected. The reports from Paris of Military observers belonging to armies of other Powers were as unfavorable as those from Berlin were the reverse; and this even after 1866, when France was avowedly preparing for war. The Emperor himself endeavored to introduce certain reforms in organization and tactics, but the military hierarchy on whose support his throne rested, were not to be easilv moved and he dared not offend them. They, like the Germans, considered themselves to be in the preseuce of an enemy, but unlike the Germans, they despised their antagonists. Nothing can be more fatal, than unreasoning confidence in success, because it scems impossible that one's pride may have a fall, yet this was exactly the condition of the French Army under Napoleon the Third.

In the state in which it was left by the reductions of November 1865 - or, more truly, in the state in which those reductions should have left it, the infantry of the French army was composed, as before, of guard and line infantry.

The infantry of the Guard consisted of: 1 regiment of Gendarmes. 3 regiments of Grenadiers. 4 regiments of Voltigeurs. 1 regiment of Zouaves. and 1 battalion of Rifles. After the reductions of 1865, the regiment of gendarmes of the Guard had two battalions of 6 companies, each company having 3 officers and 83 men. Each regiment of Voltigeurs and of Grenadiers had three battalions of 7 companies of 3 officers and 92 men each. The regiment of Zouaves retained its two battalions of 7 companies with the same establishment, the battalion of Rifles 10 companies of 3 officers and 79 men each.

In 1866 the infantry of the line consisted of: 100 regiments of Infantry of the Line. 20 battalions of Rifles. 3 regiments of Zouaves. 3 regiments of Algerian Skirmishers (Turcos). 1 Foreign Regiment. 3 battalions of African Light Infantry. 7 Discipline Companies. 2 Veteran Companies. 1 battalion of Sapeurs (Pompiers), and 1 regiment of the Municipal Guard of Paris.

The mass of the infantry consisted of the 100 regiments of the line. Before the reduction of 1865, every line regiment of infantry consisted of twenty-four companies, which formed three peace battalions of eight companies each. Of the eight companies of a peace battalion, the first was a Grenadier company on the right of the battalion; the second, composed of the elite of the small men of the battalion, was called the Voltigeur company, and was on the left; the remaining six were the 1-6 Fusilier or centre companies. On mobilisation, the fifth and sixth center companies were separated from their battalion, and these separated companies from the three peace battalions formed together the depot battalion of the regiment. The regiment then consisted of three field battalions, of one Grenadier, one Voltigeur, and four center or Fusilier companies each ; and of one depot battalion of six Fusilier companies, who were to garrison the fortresses, train the reserves, and perform other similar services. Through the reduction of 1865, the fifth and sixth centre companies of the third peace battalion of every regiment were abolished; the regiment, therefore, retained twenty-two instead of twenty-four companies.

The French army, on the normal war footing of 1868, could thus place in the field 285,000 men, infantry and cavalry, with 984 guns; having in the second line, as depot troops, 91,000 men, infantry and cavalry. On a peace footing, the army could muster about two-thirds of these numbers; and as the calling in of the reserves was, in spite of the amendments introduced in 1868, not to be easily accomplished, the fact had to be accepted that, in case of the sudden breaking out of the war, only about 200,000 men, infantry and cavalry, would be disposable for active service.

Prussian troops were centrally equipped to a standard pattern of generally more sober cut and appearance. The mounted arm retained some of its traditional spendour. Even the various allied contingents followed the Prussian pattern to a great degree with some exceptions appearing here and there. The one obvious exception that this uniformity was provided by the large Bavarian contingent whose blue coats bring relief to the ranks of field grey.