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2nd Empire Army - Artillery

Bonaparte had used his artillery whenever possible. His success at massing and concentrating his artillery often depended upon the type of terrain and the accuracy of his shells at a range of about 300 yards. But later the French failed to adopt, not only universal conscription, but also various other technological and organizational developments within their military organizations.

The use of artillery to provide the best possible advantage had been a French tradition established during the campaigns of the first Napoleon. During the war of 1870, however, the artillery seemed, as did some of the other arms of the French military, to rest more upon its past history and tradition than upon its developing precision. Not only were the guns themselves imperfect weapons, but target practice had been badly neglected. These two facts, combined with the third fact that the French lacked a competent artillery commander who could gain maximum effectiveness by maneuvering for greater concentration of fire power, left the French at a distinct disadvantage within the area of artillery.

On the other hand the French artillery, had the good qualities of quickly coming into position ana commencing to fire very early. These facts were negligible in 1870 because the French artillery had broken from the Napoleonic tradition of massing the guns behind the infantry in order to cripple various enemy positions of infantry and gun emplacements. Instead, the artillery spread its weapons hoping to hinder the enemy from deducing the proper range for its own gun emplacements. This meant that the enemy could not find the correct range of the French artillery, but it also meant that French fire power could not be direct and concentrated when it was most needed.

The matériel adopted in 1827 consisted of 12-pounder and 8-pounder guns, and 6-inch and 24-pounder howitzers. A six gun battery was composed of either four 12-pounders and two 6-inch howitzers, or four 8-pounders and two 24-pounder howitzers. The carriages and ammunition wagons were also improved, so that the detachments could be mounted on them, and the mobility thus much increased. A new mountain artillery equipment was also adopted; a powerful 12-pounder howitzer, but weighing only 220 lbs., was introduced, the carriage and ammunition boxes being carried on mules; and this equipment proved very serviceable in the Algerian campaigns.

In 1852 Napoleon III, when president of the Republic, did much to simplify the matériel, and introduced a 12-pounder shell gun, intended to fire solid shot or shrapnel shell. Louis Napoleon had always made artillery a special subject of study; and the great work on artillery commenced and mainly carried out by him is a standard work on the subject. In 1858 rifled guns, 12-pounders and 4-pounders, were adopted in the French service, and used with great effect against the Austrians in the Italian campaign of the following year.

The artillery was considerably reduced in 1865. After the reductions, it consisted of the artillery of the Guard, of 1 regiment of field artillery of 6 batteries, 1 regiment of horse-artillery of 6 batteries, 1 squadron of artillery-train of 2 companies, and of the artillery of the line of 5 regiments (Nos. 1-5) of footartillery-i.e., of garrison and siege artillery of 12 companies; 1 regiment of pontoniers (No. 6) of 12 companies, 10 regiments of field artillery (Nos. 7-16) of 9 batteries ; 4 regiments of horse-artillery (Nos. 17- 20) of 7 batteries, and 6 squadrons of artillery-train of 4 companies.

Shortly after the reduction had been completed, 2 batteries of each regiment of foot artillery were equipped as field artillery - in all, 10 batteries. During the Luxemburg crisis, a new battery was added to each of the 14 field and horse artillery, regiments, and at the same time 5 instead of 2 batteries from each regiment of foot-artillery were converted into field artillery.

Finally, on the 13th of May 1867, an entirely new organisation of the artillery was instituted, and it was arranged as follows :-

Guard.-
• 1 regiment (field) of 6 batteries.
• 2 regiments (horse) of 6 batteries.
• 1 squadron of train of 2 companies.
  Line.
• 1st to 15th regiments, each of 8 field and 4 foot batteries.
• 16th regiment, pontoniers, with 14 companies.
• 17th to 20th regiments, each of 8 batteries of horse-artillery.
• 2 regiments of artillery-train, at first of 12, afterwards of 16 companies.

By this organisation of 1867, a total of 164 batteries was established, of which 38 were horse-artillery. After the mitrailleuse (25 - barrelled) had been adopted as an arm that must be entrusted to the artillery, these 164 batteries, each of 6 guns, were thus distributed: 38 horse-artillery batteries with rifled 4-pounders (piece de quatre). 72 field batteries with rifled 4-pounders. 24 mitrailleuse batteries. 30 reserve batteries, 12-pounders.

Because the Prussian breechloading artillery pieces were accepted as being far better than the French muzzle loading cannons, the French tried to counter-balance this advantage with the use of a new weapon called the "mitrailleuse" [from French mitraille, "grapeshot"). This weapon, a forerunner of the modern machine gun, had thirty-seven barrels that fired simultaneously.

Due to the French fear that the new weapon might fall into Prussian hands, a great secret was made of the mitrailleuses. Only sworn officers, and the few artillerists who conducted the experiments on the range at Meudon, knew anything of the terrible weapon. Observers could relate, out of their own experience, most laughable anecdotes concerning this, if it were possible to laugh at all in this crisis for the whole of civilised Europe. The equipped batteries of mitrailleuses were carefully guarded in the fort of Mount Valerien. When men talked of them to the initiated, and suggested that it was somewhat remarkable to entrust these weapons in the moment of danger to people who were utterly ignorant of their use, it was answered that the range-tables were worked out, and that the same course had been adopted with the rifled 4-pounders in 1859.The few "mitrailleuses" which were in use during the fighting of 1870 were usually used as field cannons rather than as infantry weapons which, if they had been used correctly by the French, could have brought direct fire superiority to bear at close range.

Above all things, the German victory at Sedan was a German artillery victory over French artillery. September 1st found the French surrounded and all avenues of escape cut off. They were crowded together in a narrow area, while five hundred Prussian artillery pieces fired at point blank range. The French paid no attention to the Napoleonic principle of massing artillery pieces for concentrated fire power and, as a result, were completely silenced by the German guns. Not only did the French use their artillery by independent batteries, but they even failed to have any conceivable plan or pattern in which these batteries were to be used. With this victory of the German artillery, came the collapse of the French resistance.