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The French Army in the Franco-Prussian War

Louis Napoleon excused himself by alleging he was deceived into believing that France was completely prepared ; but when the test was applied the whole military organization broke down, the resources so blindly culculated on proved miserably defective, and a terrible collapse ensued. On the 6th of July 1870 Marshal le Boeuf presented a statement to Louis Napoleon, which represented the disposable force of France as amounting to 588,000 men, with all material complete, and he was assured that only fifteen days would be required for "mobilization." On the 15th of July war was declared. The Grand Army had no existence, except on paper. At the end of three weeks" (from July 6th) the eight corps-d'Armee sent to the frontier only furnished about 220,000 men.

Not only was one-half the numerical strength of the French army, that had been so confidently calculated on, not forthcoming, but even the 220,000 hastily collected, and hurriedly sent to the frontier, were totally defective in organization, imperfect in discipline, and in scarcely any one particular-save in the matter of personal bravery-did they possess the requirements necessary to enter on a momentous struggle with a highly disciplined enemy. In the first place, the men were but very imperfectly armed. Half the regiments were not provided with the improved Chassepot rifle. The old musket had to do duty instead. Then the regiments had been hastily filled up from peace to war-strength by men taken from the reserve ; but so astounding had been the incapacity that managed the war department, that these men had actually never been trained to handle the Chassepot.

Even more reprehensible, if possible, was the course pursued with respect to the mitrailleuse, a weapon from which the most murderous results were anticipated. This destructive machine was entirely a French invention. The secret of its design and manufacture had been guarded with an everwatchful jealousy. The world had heard a great deal about its value, but knew nothing ; and, as in such cases, its destructive effects, though terrible, were greatly exaggerated. Now, it so happened that theae novel and powerful weapons, which, if properly worked in the first instance, might have saved France, had their warlike utility, their high destructive power, almost entirely neutralized by the most scandalous and criminal mismanagement. They were absolutely sent into the field with no one qualified to work them.

Immediately on the declaration of war, Prussia put 640,000 men in motion, and at the beginning of August, with the North German forces, had a total of 944,000 men in the field, with 1680 guns and 193,000 horses. This immense host was further increased by the forces of the South German States, which joined Prussia immediately after the battle of Woerth; so that the total force by the middle of August at the disposal of Prussia amounted to 1,124,000 men.

When war was declared - July 15 - the combined Prussian and North German army, on the peace footing, only amounted to 360,000 men; yet in four weeks time, so rapidly were the forces mobilized, the offensive had been assumed along the whole French frontier; two crushing defeats had been sustained- by Froisard at Wisembourg, and HacMahon at Woerth ; Strasbourg was invested; the scattered remnants of the French army of the Rhine took refuge under the fortifications of Metz; there were 1,124,000 Germans in France.