French 2nd Empire Army - Recruitment and Training
The French after 1814, in almost complete reversal to the Prussian acceptance of universal conscription, returned to the belief in a small professional army. Much of this was the result of the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy to the throne of France by the enemies of Napoleon I, Not only did the monarchy have a distaste for Napoleonic military tradition, but it also had no use for a large standing army which might arouse the hostility of the various nations which were providing the French monarchy with the support necessary for it to remain in power, in any case it was felt that a professional army could be relied upon for future support much more dependably than could a large array with a peasant base.
This belief, which evolved from the conditions of 1814, was to continue as the dominant French military thought until 1870. The period from 1814, when the Bourbons abolished universal conscription, until the revolution of 1848, saw little desire for a large standing array. Only after 1848 was there any extensive feeling which realized the necessity for a conscripted array based upon the common man. This view was suppressed by Napoleon III who, during the early part of his reign, relied completely on a well-trained professional army.
The system of obtaining recruits, organizing and preparing them for war under the law of 1832 (Marshal Soult's) was based upon that of Gouvion St. Cyr in 1818. Nominally the recruitment was by voluntary enlistment, practically by conscription. The annual contingent was voted by the Legislature and might vary considerably. The conscript was taken at twenty years of age, served seven years nominally with the colours, but usually in part with his regiment and the rest on furlough in the Reserve, which was further increased by the conscripts drawn each year, but not required to fill up the active army, and, therefore, allowed to remain at home on furlough. The latter class were liable to be called out oceasionally for drill, but the call was seldom given.
A law of 1831, and a later one in 1851, provided for a mobile national guard, to be drawn from the sedentary national guard to defend the soil of France in case of invasion. It requires little thought to prove that reserves consisting chiefly of young men seldom or never drilled, would be of little use, and the Mobile Guard of still less. The laws were unpractical, and remained dead letters to all intents and purposes, as far as the reserves and National Mobile Guard were concerned. The Army consisted of men, counting about five or six years' service, and of men bribed by extra pay and bounties to re-engage. Seeing that this was no condition of preparation for war, Napoleon the Third began his measures of reorganization by ordering that such men of the contingent as escaped service in the Army, should not go scot frce, but pass a few weeks of each year in "depots of instruction."
For a long time the annual contingent for all services including navy and gendarmes, had been fixed at 100,000 men of whom 79,000 only were really disposable for the Army. By the law of 1832 these would be divided into two portions, one to supply the wants of the Army, which would theoretically require 43,000 recruits, the other portion would go home and have only a slight amount of drill in the depots. But a new element was introduced into the question by the law of 1855, encouraging re-engagements with extra pay. Many men remained, so that there was not room for the usual number of youths to join. Furthermore, the bad principle of escape by payment of a sum of money, was working so disastrously, that at last, only 59,000 were called each year, of whom 36,000 went home on furlough, 23,000 remaining with tho colours. That is to say, that only 23,000 men annually were learning to be soldiers in France.
Nor was this all, for the outgoing soldiers were freed on the 31st December, while forms of one sort or another so delayed the incoming of the recruits, that the drill season was over before they joined, and they were, for their first year, useless for war purposes. All these causes combined to reduce the effective of the Army, and that so thoroughly, that in the Crimean and Italian wars, it was found necessary to call up annual contingents of 140,000 men, thereby pressing hardly on the population of the country, and unfairly on those who happened to be of a certain age, while failing to afford soldiers immediately ready for service.
The year 1859 was a memorable one in the military history of Europe. France, after drawing 140,000 men for three successive years during the Crimean war, had nominally an effective force of 639,000 soldiers. Practically all that the Emperor was able to dispose of amounted to 300,000 when the necessary garrisons were subtracted from the total force. At the battle of Solferino only 107,000 Frenchmen could be put in line against Austria, and the result of the battle was much too uncertain for a while to justify Napoleon III in continuing the war, even with Italy for an ally.
Something was clearly wrong here. But something was also wrong further north, for it was now that Prussia discovered how cumbrous was the weight of her huge Landwehr force, and how difficnlt to move. These faults in system were acknowledged in both countries. In Prussia the King risked everything to set his army in perfect order, even against the will of the people. But the Emperor of the French lived on the goodwill of the Marshals, and the suffrages of the country classes, always hardest hit by conscription. So the talk came to nothing, and Prussia was allowed gradually to work herself into the position of the first military power in Europe. It is well known that in 1866 the army of Frauce was unfit to take the field, being unprovided with stores for a campaign. Her self-love was wounded, and henceforth the work of re-organization began in earnest.
Marshal Kiel was responsible for the law of 1868, which was based on the principle that it is better to have an active peace army of short service men with good reserves than of long service men with no soldiers behind them. Only his influence could have carried it against the opposition it encountered in the Chamber. The shameful action of the State in taking money from a conscript instead of service was abolished, though he might still find a substitute if he were willing to give vicarious service. Bounties for re-engaged men were also abolished, as it had been decided by general concurrence of opinion that soldiers do not become more valuable for war, but less so after ten years' service, and those retained in the ranks fill up places and prevent young men coming in to learn their duties as soldiers.
But since good and clever Non-commissioned Officers are always worth retaining, the Prussian plan was adopted of promising civil employment to such as should complete a re-engagement of five years. The term of service for all soldiers was fixed at nine years, only five of which were to be with the colors, the remainder with the reserve. Besides these the reserve took all the men out of 100,000 conscripts who were not required for the active army. But the main feature of the law was the institution of a mobile national guard, consisting of all the men fit for service each year who escaped, by any means whatever, conscription for the regular army, and who were now obliged to give five years' service in the Mobile Guard. They were intended to supply the place of the German Land wehr and Ersatz reserve together; their Officers were chosen by the Emperor chiefly from among the retired Officers of the Regular Army.
By making the law retrospective as far as 1864, the men who had escaped conscription in that year now owed two years' service to the State in the Mobile Guard, those of 1865 owed three years, and so on. Thus at once 550,000 men were added to the defensive forces of France, but their fifteen days' drill annually would at the best, after several years, turn out very poor soldiers compared with the Prussian Landwehr men.
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