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French Military - Mobilization

The nature of French military organization gave no connection between regiments of the Line and of the Guard Mobile. The latter had, therefore, in it the dangerous elements without the excellent qualities of the Landwehr. What the Mobile Guard actually did was to free the active Army for the field by garrisoning fortresses. They were worse than useless for every field service, and proclaimed their opinion on that point loudly enough when asked to defend the camp at Chalons.

In time of war France would be deficient in her number of trained men who could be put in the field; but sosaething even worse remained behind. The organization for calling up the Reserves was terribly deficient. A well known pamphlet, attributed to the Emperor Napoleon the Third, states that he himself was aware that France would be out-numbered, for she could only put 300,000 men in line before the enemy at the commencement of the campaign, while Germany could bring up 550,000. To make up for this numerical inferiority, the author of the pamphlet said that it was necessary by a rapid movement to cross the Rhine, separate South from North Germany, and by the brilliancy of a first success, draw Austria and Italy into alliance with France. The only chance of success for this plan was to be quicker than the Germans in taking the initiative.

But now appeared the advantage of the German District Corps organization, and the disadvantage of the scattered system of France. No example can be better than the one given in the pamphlet. Strasbourg was one of the places named for a great concentration of troops; 100,000 men were to assemble there. Now the town of Strasbourg and the districts surrounding it contained many men belonging to some of the regiments concentrated in the neighborhood. Surely common sense will show that these men ought to have been able to join their regiments at once :- ought to have been, but were not. Some of the defect where lay their uniforms, arms, and accoutrements, were actually in the south of France, and even in Algeria. Instead of the railways being entirely available for a concentrated movement of troops from all quarters, they were partly taken up with the conveyance of men away from the seat of war, in order to bring them back equipped a few days afterwards.

The same great mistake, with its attendant consequences, was discovered in the organization of the supply departments. There was much talk about treason, and the breaking down of the Intendance ; the truth was that the French people had, previously to the war, been traitors to themselves by their carelessness in not insisting upon a proper organization, with the events of 1866 before their eyes.

Too little initiative was allowed to the Generals commanding the Departments, and to the Chief Officers of the Intendance. For the smallest matter, he says, a ministerial order was necessary ; not even arms could be supplied to the soldiers without an order from Paris. What, then, must have been the pressure and overwork in the War Office ? what the distrust and discontent among regimental Officers and men ? What at last the despair when, still incomplete and not yet fully organized, the armies of France were caught in the very act of formation ?