• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

PLAN Unit Training

China had a tradition in military development: "It is better to let trained personnel wait for new weapon development than to let weapons that have finished development wait for personnel training". By 2020 this practice appeared to have been abandoned, as the pace of shipbuilding seemed to have outstripped the pace of producetion of seamen.

Naval construction is difficult to overtake in a corner and cannot be accomplished overnight, and it is difficult to truly move toward the ocean without experiencing enough wind and waves. The modern navy is a high-tech intensive service. The overall quality requirements of all officers and soldiers exceed those of the air force and the army. The new entry of 5-8 large ships and 10 medium-sized ships a year is a new addition of nearly 3,500 personnel. The number of other ships is not enough, the combat readiness and training are also affected. The surrounding situation is still grim and the hardware has been supplemented. How to make a large number of new equipment quickly form combat effectiveness, whether personnel training can keep up, how to carry out formation tactical operation training, and how to accumulate combat experience in a large fleet.

No matter how advanced warships are, they are all manned. In order for new combat ships to display the powerful combat capabilities of advanced weapons and electronic equipment, the first prerequisite is to train enough and good enough ship operators. The Chinese Navy has been weak for a long time in the past, and the training of talents relied on naval academies. A Dalian Naval Academy has trained more than 80% of Chinese captains. In addition to the professional and technical officers who graduated from academies, the growth of soldiers and non-commissioned officers depends to a large extent on the "passage" of the personal experience of the veterans in addition to the training syllabus. In the era of developing the navy in small steps and fast running before 2010, this old system can also provide the navy with sufficient military command and engineering and technical personnel step by step. However, after the navy has entered the fast lane in the past ten years, the training period is long and the elimination rate is long. The shortcomings of high and inadequate utilization of human resources began to appear, and the stamina was insufficient.

The training of officers in China's military places emphasis on professional subdivision. Flying, naval vessels, submarines, and marines are all trained separately by different academies, and they rarely overlap with each other. The future naval warfare will be a highly integrated war of all dimensions and professions, and naval officers will not be competent with the knowledge and skills of their professions alone. The Chinese Navy has already noticed this problem.

Compared with the U.S. Navy, which has been in the ocean for a century, the Chinese Navy has not yet achieved global deployment and continuous operations, and its training methods are quite different from all U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups and amphibious alert groups around aircraft carriers/amphibious assault ships. . However, the basic concepts of tactical training are the same, that is, follow the order of individual soldiers, battle positions, departments, entire ships, and formations to train level by level and evaluate each level. In the end, all personnel are trained and qualified, and the formation forms a complete combat effectiveness.

Training Guidance

The PLA Navy provides training guidance to its forces in several ways, including conferences, training documents, and training guidance concepts. The PLAN convenes a Party Congress every five years and usually convenes two plenary sessions each year, which provide guidance for all PLAN activities. After each plenary session, the PLAN then holds a conference to review all of its training for the previous period and to provide guidance for the next period. The PLAN's training conference occasionally coincides with an All-Army Training Conference.

Following the PLAN Training Conference, participants return to their units and hold fleetand unit-level training meetings to discuss the implementation of the training guidance. Besides the training guidance concepts, the PLAN also provides long-term training guidance to its units through the following documents:

• The Gangyao
• The Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE)
• Various types of regulations

The OMTE

The PLAN published a completely revised Outline of Military Training and Evaluation in January 2002. The OMTE consists of multiple volumes, with each volume identified as the OMTE for a specific topic. According to PLAN writings, the OMTE consists of the standardized documents used by each branch and type of vessel unit to organize and conduct military training. The OMTE is divided according to branch, vessel type, specialized function, and specialized technology. Its content includes the guiding thought, training subjects, content, timing, and objectives of training. The OMTE is nowissued in binder format, rather than as a bound volume, so that individual sections can be replaced as necessary.

The OMTE stipulates the procedures for implementing training, the drafting of plans, the topics and programs, the training organization, and the examination and assessment of training. Some examples of individual OMTE volumes are as follows:

• Units Equipped with Each Class of Naval Submarine and Surface Vessel
• Units Equipped with Each Type of Naval Aviation Aircraft, AAA, and SAM
• Naval Coastal Defense Coastal Artillery and Coastal Missile Units
• Marine Corps
• Logistics Units
• Chemical Defense Units

Regulations

Since the revised OMTE was issued, the PLAN has published numerous revised and new regulations that provide guidance for units on how to implement the OMTE. For example, in December 2002, the PLAN commander and political commissar formally issued the new PLAN Military Training Regulations. The new regulations completely updated the previous ones, which were issued in 1991. New regulations, such as joint training, were added, while others, such as the standards for quantifying training types and training time, were removed.

Unit Training Objectives

The PLAN's training objectives for all units today consist of the following key components:

• Training under real-war situations
• Employing mobile operations and support
• Operating in unfamiliar areas and under unknown conditions
• Transitioning from day into night
• Training in poor weather conditions
• Conducting multiple training subjects simultaneously
• Employing increasingly larger formations
• Using data links and radio silence
• Operating in an electromagnetic jamming and countermeasures environment.

Real-War Situations

To increase PLAN units' ability to operate under real-war conditions, the PLAN is increasingly using scenarios for its training events that focus on reacting to an "enemy" attack that has just occurred or is imminent against land- and sea-based assets. The training consists of raising readiness conditions, implementing defensive measures, moving munitions from storage facilities to aircraft and vessels, scrambling aircraft and vessels, quickly moving forces out of harm's way, repairing damage after an attack, dealing with injured personnel, and supplying forces at home and deployed locations.

The PLAN is also restructuring its forces based on the assumption it will experience considerable personnel losses during a conflict. Specifically, officers and enlisted personnel must now have more than one specialty, so they can fill in for someone if that person is killed or injured. Although the PLAN, like the rest of the PLA, relies heavily on centralized control for all of its training and operations, it is slowly trying to provide its pilots and vessel COs with some command autonomy to implement the war plan if communications are disrupted or the situation changes rapidly.

Mobile Operations and Support

Over the past two decades, a consistent PLAN objective has been to move from a force focused on "coastal defense" to one focused on "offshore defense." This force transformation requires the ability to conduct mobile operations in both offensive and defensive campaigns further from its home bases for longer periods of time. To fulfill this objective, the PLAN has acquired new weapon systems, but even more important have been the PLAN's efforts to restructure its vessel and aircraft logistics and maintenance support systems. As the PLAN restructures its operational vessel forces, such as creating combined destroyer and frigate zhidui, to be able to better conduct more complex task force operations, it is also restructuring its on-shore and at-sea support forces. For example, in 2004, the PLAN created its first combat support vessel zhidui in each fleet to be able to provide better at-sea support for the more demanding mobile operations the PLAN aspires to execute.

The PLAN is also implementing what it calls "socialized support" of its on-shore logistics support by contracting with local vendors for food supplies that can be delivered within hours after ordering them via the internet. Poor pre-departure preventive maintenance and vessel maintenance problems at sea, however, have affected the PLAN's ability to conduct certain types of mobile operations. As a result, vessels often must return to base shortly after departing because of insufficient technical training for crewmembers or the lack of spare parts aboard the vessel. This remains a major concern for the PLAN.

Concerning aircraft mobility, until the late 1990s, Naval Aviation aircraft rarely deployed to another base equipped with a different type of aircraft because of the fixed maintenance and logistics support structure in existence. This situation has now changed. Over the past few years, Naval Aviation has created small mobile logistics and maintenance teams that can accompany deploying aircraft to units equipped with a different type of aircraft.

These units can be deployed mostly by rail or road, but some are now using transport aircraft that accompany the combat aircraft deployment. Other small teams are being trained to support other types of visiting aircraft for short periods of time. As a result, Naval Aviation aircraft are now conducting more deployments from their home base for longer periods of time for both offensive and defensive purposes, including avoiding imminent "enemy" attacks.These deployments are taking place both within and among the three fleets. Naval Aviation airfields are also increasingly supporting PLAAF aircraft and Army Aviation helicopters during their deployments through the coastal provinces.

Unfamiliar Areas and Unknown Conditions

As the PLAN implements its "offshore defense" strategic guidelines, it is now conducting training further from "its own front door." Vessels and aircraft are now training in what the PLAN calls "unfamiliar" sea areas, airspace, and air- fields. To be better prepared for operating in these areas, the PLAN has undertaken a concerted effort to map the ocean's floor in the Bohai Gulf, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.

As part of its mobility training, Naval Aviation aircraft now routinely deploy to "unfamiliar" airfields for short periods of time. One of the PLAN's limitations has been the reliance on scripted training events. Under the old OMTE, the "Red Force" and "Blue Force" commanders in a training event or exercise exchanged information about their movements and intentions before deploying to sea or conducting air engagements. The PLA calls this training under "known conditions." Under the new OMTE, only a general area of operations is provided and neither side is prebriefed about the other's activities.

The PLA calls this training under "unknown conditions." The premise is that the "enemy" is not going to pre-brief the PLAN on its intentions or operations before or during a conflict. Furthermore, PLAN vessels are beginning to conduct more training in narrow and shallow seas, and in areas with islands, shoals, and reefs.

Transitioning from Day into Night during All Types of Weather

Historically, due to various weapon system limitations, the PLAN did not often train during non-daylight hours or during poor weather conditions. Vessels often trained during the day and anchored at night. While the PLAN divides the training day into three 8-hour periods, most training events occured in only one of those periods. The situation is now changing as the PLAN acquires more weapon systems that can operate in all types of weather conditions and the realization that future conflicts may very well be conducted mostly at night. Under the new OMTE, PLAN aircraft and vessels now routinely conduct training that transitions from one period into the next. Training that covers all three periods is called "rolling-type" training.

The Shift to Multiple Training Subjects

In each of the PLAN's branches, the annual training cycle progresses from individuals, to small units, to larger units, and from basic subjects to techniques to tactics and combat methods. These tactics and combat methods are then incorporated into larger air formations and vessel task forces as campaign-level training subjects, such as antisubmarine warfare. Typically, PLAN units previously conducted only one training subject per sortie in a building block approach. Under the new OMTE, however, vessels and aircraft now conduct more than one training subject per sortie. For example, vessels now conduct both offensive and defensive training subjects at the same time, to include dealing with injured crewmembers and shipboard damage. This change now allows the vessel crewmembersand pilots to conduct longer but fewer sorties to accomplish the same training requirements. Among other factors, the rising cost of fuel is driving this reform.