People's Liberation Army
The active components of the PLA are the country's standing army, which mainly undertakes the task of defensive military operations and helps maintain social order, if necessary, in accordance with the law. Its basic organizational structures can be categorized into the general headquarters/departments, the services and arms and the military area commands.
The PLA's general headquarters/departments system is composed of the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department and the General Armaments Department, which are placed under the leadership of the CMC. The CMC, through these four general headquarters/ departments, directs all the military area commands and the services and arms. The routine work of the Ministry of National Defense is handled respectively by these four general headquarters/departments.
Operational control of the PLA runs from the Central Military Commissions to the PLA's general departments: General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department. Below the department level run parallel chains of command for operational, political, and logistical matters, each with its own separate communications facilities. Military policy originates in the party Political Bureau or the party Central Military Commission, became an operational order at the General Staff Department level, flowed through the military regions, and arrived at a main-force unit. Orders to regional forces also passed through the military district (provincial) level.
The Central Military Commission (CMC) has planned to gradually terminate all paid services in the military in three years, according to a CMC circular issued in March 2016. According to the document, military units will no longer be allowed to launch new programs or sign new contracts of paid services, and expired contracts may not be extended.
The CMC also rolled out principles and measures on the termination of military paid services, aiming to tackle problems that may emerge as a result of the move to phase out paid services. The circular stressed that terminating all paid services was "an important political task" in building the armed forces, and urged units at all levels to fully implement the decision. In late 2015, China initiated a new round of military reforms. Paid services were flagged to be removed, to reduce corruption in the army.
The People's Liberation Army's insignia consists of a round device with a design of five stars and the Chinese characters "ba-yi" (August 1, the anniversary of the 1927 Nanchang Uprising), surrounded by wheat ears and cog wheels. (Use of the insignia is governed by the 1984 Military Service Law.) The history of the PLA is officially traced to the Nanchang Uprising, when the army started fighting the Kuomintang (KMT) government. To commemorate the uprising, August lst is celebrated as PLA Day.
The PLA wss composed of three services -- the Army, Navy and Air Force -- and an independent arm, the Second Artillery Force.
The military area commands (theaters of war) of the PLA are military organizations set up according to the State's administrative divisions, geographical locations, strategic and operational orientations, and operational tasks. Prior to 2016 the PLA has seven military area commands, namely, Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. Thse were reduced to five in 2016.
The PLA has the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), the National Defense University (NDU), and the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT). The AMS is the PLA's highest-level research institute and center of military sciences. The NDU is mainly responsible for the education and training of senior commanding and staff officers and researchers. The NUDT is mainly responsible for the education and training of senior scientists and engineers, and specialized commanding officers.
The PLA's reserve force is a force with its present organizational structure with the reserve personnel as the base and active personnel as the backbone. The reserve force, which is incorporated into the PLA's order of battle, receives military training in peacetime according to relevant regulations, and helps maintain social order, if necessary, in accordance with the law. In wartime, it may be called into active service in pursuance of a State mobilization order.
Military reorganisation in April 2024 came amid what has been described as the biggest purge in Chinese military history, with key leaders being fired or disappearing from view. Much of the upheaval has taken place within the armed forces elite Rocket Force, which oversees Beijing’s tactical and nuclear missiles and was supposed to be among the military’s most capable units. “The Rocket Force purges of last year showed that the Chinese armed forces are not as ready for prime time as we have previously imagined,” Yang Zi, a PhD student at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told Al Jazeera.Prominent figures have disappeared as well. The defence minister, Li Shuangfu, who previously served as a deputy commander of the SSF and was considered a Xi loyalist, went missing last year. Beijing confirmed that Li had been removed in October, nearly two months after he disappeared from view.
The fact that high-ranking officers and officials seemingly close to Xi have not been spared in the purge underlines the shifting landscape of loyalty and power in Chinese elite politics, according to Shaoyu Yuan, a scholar of Chinese studies at Rutgers University in the US. “Individuals removed might have initially risen under Xi’s patronage but their dismissal signals a recalibration of loyalty and trust as his strategic vision and his perception of potential threats evolve,” Yuan told Al Jazeera.
In Yang’s view, the purges and the recent military reorganisation suggest that Xi has little faith in the commanders who have risen through the ranks in recent times, or in the previous reforms, even though he played a key role in their promotions and the structural changes. While that might raise questions about Xi’s choices, Yuan said the Chinese president’s reactions to his lack of faith demonstrate his ruthless adaptability as well as his willingness to recalibrate his approach to maintain control and pursue his vision.
“His determination to eliminate any structures or individuals that do not align with his current strategic objectives regardless of their past contributions may reinforce his image as a decisive leader who prioritises the present needs of the state over past allegiances,” he said. Yuan adds that in the power dynamics around the president, loyalty must be continually earned.
“This approach can create a cycle where trust is perpetually conditional, driving the need for constant reaffirmation of loyalty,” he said. At a recent military conference, Xi stressed that military officials, especially those at senior levels, had to have the courage to put aside their prestige and acknowledge their shortcomings. “They must deeply self-reflect … make earnest rectifications, resolve problems at the root of their thinking,” he said.
RSIS’s Yang expects that there will be a greater emphasis on political work within the armed forces, building on last year’s focus on Xi Jinping Thought, the president’s political, economic and social philosophy, throughout the Communist Party. Such political work could take time away from crucial military training, according to Yang, or encourage talented officers to keep their heads down to avoid the risk of being targeted in any future purges.
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