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J-6 (Jian-6 Fighter aircraft 6) - Production

The J-6 fighter was built in a large series, and became the main training fighter Chinese military aviation. The J-6 fighter was an aircraft successfully produced under license and then put into mass production by the Chinese aviation industry. Through the life cycle of the aircraft (prototype production, mass production, delivery and operation) the aviation industry completely mastered manufacturing techniques and gained managerial experience, thus improving work in both these fields.

The Nanchang Aircraft Factory was the second factory to be assigned the task of licence production of the MiG-19P and the MiG-19PM. Thus it was planned to convert the propeller aircraft factory into a jet aircraft factory. In September after receiving the drawings and technical documents supplied by the Shenyang Aircraft Factory, the Nanchang Aircraft Factory immediately set up a Prototype Production Committee and 7 professional groups. Relevant workshops also set up prototype production groups to assist in organizing the program. All the staff and workers of the factory worked very hard and created conditions needed for the production of jet fighters. At last, with the cooperation of relevant organizations, the MiG-19P was successfully produced in Nanchang. This prototype aircraft piloted by Wang Youhuai flew for the first time on September 28, 1959. On November 28, it was certificated by the State Certification Committee. A total of 7 aircraft were produced.

Under the ideological guidance of the "Left", serious problems appeared in the trial production of MiG-19P. The first was to ignore the information provided by the Soviet Union and change the design and process regulations without knowing the technology. As a rule, imitation products should first digest design and process data, find out the characteristics, and master the technology. But at that time, they were dispelled as superstitions. Not only was there no special team to conduct research and digestion, but many technical design materials were not translated. For example, until 1960, more than one-third of the technical data for the RD-9B engine used in the MiG-19P imitated by the 410 factory had not been translated, and a large amount of the original technical data had not been updated for a long time.

The process data and process regulations that have a decisive impact on imitation quality were also not given due attention. Before the arrival of the MiG-19P technical data in July 1958, the 112 factory began to compile its own process specifications; after the technical data arrived at the factory, it did not organize proofreading and review. At one time, it was even stipulated that craftsmen were not allowed to view Soviet technical documents, thinking that they had to "hold back" and compile a complete set of technological processes themselves. Therefore, the self-compiled process data was very rough and full of errors.

However, some process procedures were oversimplified. Under the guidance of the slogan of "standardization of process equipment and typical process flow", the process flow is arbitrarily modified. For example, the heat treatment and holding time of the magnesium alloy parts of MiG-19P aircraft, the original process regulations stipulated 13-14 hours, when the process regulations were compiled by themselves, they were changed to 11-13 hours without testing, and they were changed to 8 during actual operation ~9 hours.

Coupled with the lax process discipline, it caused serious problems. For example, the 410 factory disassembled an RD-9B engine and found that many indispensable procedures were missed, and there were more than 15,000 defects that did not meet the technical requirements. Secondly, there are too few selections of process equipment and poor manufacturing quality. In order to pursue the progress of trial production, under the slogan "The less the selection of process equipment, the better", blindly reduced the process equipment necessary for trial production. For example, the 410 factory only figured out that 35,000 sets of tooling and tools are needed to produce the RD-9B engine for two years, but only more than 5,000 sets were selected for trial production.

At the same time, the manufacturing quality of process equipment was also very inferior. Even the standard samples necessary for the assembly of the MiG-19P aircraft have a large number of inconsistencies. As a result, process equipment and products cannot be coordinated and exchanged for a long time, and the future problems are very serious. Due to poor product quality, major accidents occurred many times during the flight. For example, in December 1959, the MiG-19P aircraft caused a fire accident in the air due to a leak in the fuel tank duct.

Licence production of the MiG-19M, a front-line interceptor carrying missiles, began in March 1959 based on the drawings and technical documents supplied by the Soviet Union. Five MiG-19PM were assembled with the Soviet kits. Thereafter the Nanchang Aircraft Factory built 19 aircraft on their own. The Nanchang Aircraft Factory mastered the production techniques of jet aircraft through the license production of these two versions of the MiG-19. They also laid the foundation for the development of their own jet fighter.

The Soviet Union had not cooperated at this time. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union should deliver all 415 special and accessory technical documents of the MiG-19 aircraft to my country in the first half of 1959 and the end of 1959. However, as of June 30, 1960, the technology of the MiG-19 There are still 45 items missing, accounting for 10.8%. Caused immense difficulties for imitation work. Some of the materials that have been delivered were not complete sets, and confusion and errors were also serious. The anti-wave rubber materials used on the MiG-19P aircraft hood should have been delivered together with the complete set of documents, but the Soviet side had been delayed. Yes, it forced China to organize relevant units to trial-produce dozens of formulas for nearly a year, but the failures directly affected the quality of aircraft manufacturing.

At this time, the trial production had not yet concluded, and it was hurriedly decided to mass produce. The "First Five-Year Plan" imitation experience had shown that the trial production of an aircraft for the first time did not mean that the trial production was successful. After that, a large number of tests and flight tests were required to confirm that the performance and quality of the aircraft meet the design indicators. And from the successful trial production to stable mass production, there must be a transition stage, that is, the process is finalized. The trial production of MiG-19P completely violated these laws. In the trial-production stage, it is shoddy and shoddy, forced to assemble, and make it through. On January 9, 1959, an accident occurred in which the cockpit cover of the imitation MiG-19P flew off due to poor assembly quality during an aerial shooting test.

From April 1959 to April 1960, the 410 factory, which was responsible for the production of MiG-19 engines, experienced RD-9B engine centrifugal valve gear damage, broken turbine blades, worn rear bearing seats, and corrosion of the middle casing. 20 major quality accidents. Among the 610 parts of an engine sampled, only 82 were qualified products, accounting for 8.8%; 102 were out-of-poor products, accounting for 11.1%, 497 had to be repaired, accounting for 48.7%; 280 were scrapped, accounting for 31 %. None of the engines of this type produced in three years were qualified. In 1959, 40 units were reluctantly delivered to the troops, which cut their lifespan by half, and still could not guarantee safety.

In the process of trial production and batch production, the factory has seen an upsurge of "gross output value" regardless of quality. Within 40 days, 21.7% of the total output value of the year was completed, and it was put into batch production without the identification and finalization. Production of the MiG-19P (Dongfeng 103) ceased in July 1960, and a total of 65 were produced, plus a prototype from the Soviet Union, a total of 66. By the end of 1960, due to major quality problems of the aircraft, only two were delivered to the Air Force in 1959, and they could only be used for aviation school training, and none could be used for combat. As the aircraft could not be used after production, it had to be overhauled. By 1964, all renovation work was completed. From 1962 to 1964, 66 aircraft were delivered to the Air Force.

Aircraft production differed from general machinery production in forging, casting, welding, machining, metal sheet forming and assembling. Moreover, the interchangeability and assembly techniques in aircraft production are unusually complicated. Through the license production of the J-5 and J-6 a transition from the pure imitation of Soviet manufacturing techniques to the ability to apply and develop these techniques at will was achieved. After learning the three methods of assembly, i.e. lofting and template, master tooling and reference holes, the Chinese developed their own qualified master tooling and all production tooling. New equipment such as the jig assembly machine and optical instruments were widely used and a complete set of technical methods for solving interchangeability problems was established. Significant progress in other manufacturing techniques such as welding, casting and heat treatment had also been made. In a word, manufacturing techniques in the aviation industry had been improved comprehensively.

Management in aircraft industry had its own peculiarity as well. Beginning with license production of the J-5 the Shenyang Aircraft Factory studied Soviet experience in management and set up its own series of production management systems. For example:

• Aircraft manufacturing activities were organized in accordance with work sharing by workshops, manufacturing schedules, master tooling manufacturing schedules, assembly diagrams, assembly cycles and part kits in order to ensure the timely supply of parts and components to the aircraft production.
• All the parts and sub-assemblies were divided into different groups according to their manufacturing schedules and their assembly orders. The parts and sub-assemblies in the same group were manufactured at the same time. If a group of parts and sub-assemblies took a longer period of time to manufacture or they were to be used on the assembly line first, they were manufactured first and vice versa. In this way no parts would be manufactured too early and kept on the shelf or manufactured too late thus delaying the assembly.
• In order to ensure the quality strict quality control was carried out from the incoming raw materials, through finished parts, assemblies, tests and even to flight test.

Due to the aforementioned systems the production of the J-6 was stable and the quality good enough for mass production, so the industry progressed from the old fashioned production techniques to modern large scale production. Many were built when Chinese factories had yet to hear about "standardized quality control", and according to some, variances among the planes can range up to some planes being six inches longer than the others. Without the right tolerances of parts, these makes parts interchangeability among the J-6s alone, and from the parts bin, difficult and lucky shots. It made even cannibalization difficult.

On October 23, 1971, the Ministry of Three Machines reported the "Report on the Quality of the Current Backlog of Aircraft in the Factory". According to the report, there are a total of 946 J-6 aircraft backlogged in the factory, of which 664 aircraft can be tested and delivered to troops without problems and although problems have been eliminated, accounting for 71% of the total. A total of 282 aircraft had quality problems and needed to be delivered after troubleshooting, accounting for 29% of the total.

The J-6 fighter experienced serious quality problems, which are related to national defense security and combat readiness, and foreign aid. The impact was huge. The superiors demanded that the inspection system be restored immediately, and the J-6 fighters that were to be delivered to Pakistan and other countries should be immediately tested for flight tests. Fang also carried out a test flight and replaced it as soon as a quality problem was found. Such an investigation revealed that 7 out of the 40 J-6s aided by foreign countries could not be delivered, which seriously affected the national reputation. The factory required spending 2 years to improve product quality. Grasp J-6, promote others, grasp the aviation industry, and promote the defense industry. It required sending personnel to form a technical team to Pakistan, Albania and other countries to inspect the foreign aid F-6 and provide comprehensive protection to avoid accidents. After two years of rectification, Shen Fei's product quality has finally improved significantly.

At of the end of 1973, all the remaining aircraft were repaired, except for 3 scrapped. A total of 609 high-quality F-6 and 201 F-6 improved aircraft were shipped. It met the needs of the troops, improved the economic situation of the factory, and reversed the situation of living on loans.

In November 1973, the Air Force proposed a new development plan for weapons and equipment, one of which was: to meet the needs of night operations, it is recommended to resume the production of the F-6A. At that time, the MiG-17PF (J-5 A) was outdated, and it was inevitable to produce the J-6 A without other options. In 1974, the Guizhou Aircraft Factory re-imitation of the J-6A in accordance with the requirements of the Air Force in order to undertake night combat missions. On December 21, 1975, the new J-6 A succeeded in its first flight. In 1977, the design of the machine was finalized, and a small amount of it was put into production.