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DF 103 / MiG-19P / J-6A (all-weather gun)

The J-6A (code name: J-6A , English: SAC J-6A , former code name: Dongfeng-103 ) all-weather fighter, is the first supersonic aircraft made in China. The aircraft is a Soviet MiG-19P fighter jet copied from China. It flew for the first time in July 1954 and mass production began in 1955. The J-6A was developed by Shenyang Aircraft Factory and Nanchang Aircraft Factory in 1958 and was modeled after the MiG-19. In November 1964, the Ministry of Aviation Industry unified the naming of domestically-produced aircraft, and Dongfeng 103 was renamed the J-6A.

Due to quality problems, it was transferred to Guizhou Aircraft Factory for re-development in 1974, and it first flew in December 1975. MiG -19 or lower wing fighter F-6 may be linked to four K-5, using chase missile attack, a transmitter typically two, to ensure hit. In May 1975, the first flight of the J-6A aircraft was successful. After a test flight of technology and fire control performance, it reached and obtained the design finalization in early 1977.

Dongfeng 103 was a parallel project with Dongfeng 102. It was an all-weather fighter that Shen Fei imitated from MiG-19P. Dongfeng 103 installed a RP-1 ranging radar on the upper lip of the intake rear, with a maximum search distance of 2 kilometers. The aircraft made its maiden flight on December 17, 1958, but like the Dongfeng 102, the Dongfeng 103 also encountered quality problems and did not have enter production. After China adopted the new naming system in 1964, Dongfeng 103 was renamed the J-6A. In 1974, the Guizhou Aircraft Factory began to imitate the J-6A and B to meet the needs of the Chinese Air Force's night fighter. On December 21, 1975, the new J-6 A succeeded in its first flight. In 1977, the design was finalized and equipped with small batches.

In 1957, China signed a technology import contract with the Soviet Union. The Second Aircraft Department decided that Shenyang Aircraft Manufacturing Plant and Shenyang Aero Engine Plant would designate imitation of MiG-19P fighters. According to the 1957 agreement, the Soviet Union successively sent the MiG-19P drawings to the Shenyang Aircraft Manufacturing Plant and Liyang Engine Plant in the first half of 1958. In August of that year, the preliminary preparations for imitation were basically completed, and the imitation work was officially started. The imitation MiG-19P is called Dongfeng 103 in China, which was one of a series of "Dongfeng" models proposed by the domestic aviation industry at that time.

To July 1958, the Soviet side drawing in attendance, SAC began to spread out across the MiG-19P trial imitation work. A problem occurred during this period. When the Soviet side delivered the structural drawings of the fighter aircraft to the Chinese side, due to some reasons, it was unable to deliver the process specifications at the same time. However, the Chinese side believes that the process regulations were dispensable, and the Soviet side did not provide them and can be written by themselves, so they did not ask the Soviet side for help.

Chinese people are familiar with this year of 1958, and the country is filled with fanatical emotions of the Great Leap Forward. Dongfeng 103 began to imitate under this situation. Without sensible guidance, no down-to-earth research on technical data, and under the slogan of "catching up with the British super beauty" (the "quick trial production" policy proposed by the Fourth Bureau), the results can be imagined. In the trial production process, the two factories in Shenyang all adopted the process data compiled by themselves and the process equipment manufactured by themselves. From the perspective of focusing on future development and not being controlled by others, this choice is understandable.

Later, experts from the Soviet side strongly suggested that the Chinese side should supplement the introduction of technical procedures and equipment, but the Chinese side refused, thinking that "it is not necessary." As a result, after the imitation started, the "Great Leap Forward" movement was set off across the country. Under the slogan of "Quick Trial Production" put forward by the Second Ministry of Machinery and the Fourth Bureau, Shen Fei was no exception. The personnel change the design and process specifications at will, and they do not study the Soviet data seriously, and blindly map quickly. Regarding the process specifications that the Soviet side failed to provide, the Chinese technicians closed their doors to engage in "innovation", and they just wrote process specifications that were full of errors. In addition, the Sino-Soviet relations had drastically cooled down at that time. The Soviet experts gave domestic instructions that they had no enthusiasm for issues that China did not ask for advice.

After a vigorous "quick trial", Dongfeng 103 on 17 December 1958 conducted a successful maiden flight, on 26 April 1959 from country evaluation committee formally identified acceptance. In this regard, the production of Dongfeng 103 was fully rolled out, and at the same time hastily decided to stop production of the F-5 fighter. The results were ridiculous. In the frenetic atmosphere of the "Great Leap Forward", the production of Dongfeng 103 also blindly "do it fast", regardless of quality. To 1960 the second half of the Shenyang Aircraft Factory Total fed 578 rack parts DF 103 and the modification DF 102 , only the assembly to 111 aircraft, yield is less than 20%. However, all the 111 fighters assembled had major quality problems, and none of them qualified and was rejected by the troops.

In September 1958, before the first flight of the aircraft, the Air Force requested Shen Fei to deliver 40 Dongfeng-103 fighter jets by April 1959, and later demanded 75 aircraft in August 1959. But at that time, the Shenfei Plant was short of 520 tons of steel, 100 tons of lead, 130 tons of zinc, and 90 tons of antimony. In this case, the Shenfei Plant adopted the method of doing the parts with materials first and doing more, and not doing the parts without materials, which seriously undermined the law of planned, complete and balanced production. In such production, some parts are enough for 400 airplanes and still in production, causing serious waste; while some parts are not manufactured at all, causing the airplane to lack parts and cannot be delivered. Such chaotic management has turned the aircraft factory into a "chicken farm."

The final result was that in 1961, the Dongfeng-103 fighter was required to stop production and was never delivered to the army. Shen Fei became a "chicken farm" for a time, with hundreds of fighter planes in stock, and the waste was amazing. At the same time, the People's Air Force, which is still at war with the Kuomintang Air Force from time to time, had long waited for new fighters to come, and paid a bloody price in actual combat.

On 27 January 1961 the Defense Committee, and the Central Military Commission instructed Vice Premier He Long, the Central Committee officially decided to stop the DF-103 and its modifications Dongfeng 102 production. So far, New China's first attempt to imitate the MiG- 19 fighter Dongfeng 103 ended in a disastrous defeat.

The result of blindly seeking quickness is serious quality problems. According to "Contemporary Chinese Air Force" records, Dongfeng 103 has not been officially put into production. According to other data, the machine was actually put into production before the national acceptance, and production was stopped until January 1961. If both statements are correct, it means that at least the management of the aircraft in finalizing and putting into production was quite chaotic, and we did not establish or establish a corresponding management system that did not strictly follow.

In November 1964, the Ministry of Aviation Industry unified the naming of domestically-made aircraft, and Dongfeng 103 was renamed the J-6A. Due to the poor quality, the F-6A produced early did not play any role. No public information mentions the whereabouts of the planes. However, during the night interception operations of the Air Force from 1958 to 1966, the J-6A was never seen. At that time, the main force was still the MiG-17PF and the Tu-2/ Tu-4 interception type equipped with interception radar. From then on until the end of the 1970s, the night sky on the mainland was defended by the old MiG-17PF (J-5A).

In November 1973, the Air Force proposed a new development plan for weapons and equipment, one of which was: to meet the needs of night operations, it is recommended to resume the production of the F-6A. At that time, the MiG-17PF (J-5 A) was outdated, and it was inevitable to produce the J-6 A without other options. In 1974, the Guizhou Aircraft Factory re-imitation of the J-6A in accordance with the requirements of the Air Force in order to undertake night combat missions. On December 21, 1975, the new J-6A succeeded in its first flight. In 1977, the design of the machine was finalized, and a small amount of it was put into production.

The early J-6 A was a complete clone of the MiG-19P. The main features are: the nose is extended to install a split PR-1 radar; the camera gun is on the right of the air inlet; the airspeed tube is on the right wing tip; the fixed weapon is 2 23mm cannons. The most prominent point of the improvement of the new F-6 A modeled in Guizhou is: the airborne mine-2 radar has been improved so that it can be used to control the firing of the Pili-2 air-to-air missile in addition to shooting with aircraft guns. The types of airborne weapons of the F-6A have been expanded and its combat capabilities have been enhanced. Because of this improvement, two pylons have been added under the new J-6 armored wing for mounting the Pili-2 missile. This is also the reason why some articles believe that the J-6 A can mount the Pili-1 missiles, but due to the different control systems, neither the early nor the later J-6 A can use the P-1 missiles. In addition, the new J-6A also adopted a total of 7 improvements such as the Type I rocket ejection rescue system, the dual-engine starting system, and the application of disc brakes to the main landing gear.

In terms of performance, because the RP-1 "Emerald 1" radar (later version changed to RP-5) equipped with MiG-19P is quite bulky, the air combat performance is significantly lower than that of daytime MiG-19S - equipped with the same type. The radar’s MiG-17PF is still 252? heavier than the MiG-17F even after the H-37 (37?) cannon is removed. In order to reduce the weight of the MiG-19P, 2 HP-2 3 cannons were installed instead of the original 3 HP-30 cannons. Even so, its performance is still severely affected. Later, the Air Force requested mass production of the MiG-19 day type, and the main reason was this.

In terms of technical level, there is no difference between MiG-19P and MiG-19S. The main difference between the two aircraft is the RP-1/5 interception radar. But the problem is that the Chinese Air Force was already equipped with MiG-17PF at that time, and the aircraft equipped with radar was RP-1. For the Chinese Air Force, the MiG-19P equipped with RP-1 is actually nothing new. Of course, after the late MiG-19P is retrofitted with the RP-5, the radar can search and track with different frequencies. At present, there is no further information to determine whether we want to imitate the early type or the late type, but from the Soviet Union's attitude towards China, I think the early type is more likely.

In fact, the MiG-19PM equipped with the Soviet Union's first air-to-air missile (K-5M) had greater technical value. Air-to-air missiles, an advanced air combat weapon, were first invented by the Luftwaffe, but they have not been used in actual combat. China had reason and need to thoroughly analyze and understand this revolutionary air combat weapon and its carrier. In terms of the more urgent night interception operations at the time, the difficulty of using air gun interceptors was obviously much greater than that of using missile interceptors.

Looking at the choices at the time, the MiG-19P is not the best imitation model from any angle. To fight for air supremacy, China would consider the MiG-19S; to conduct intercept operations, China could consider the MiG-19PM. However, it does not rule out the possibility that the Soviet Union had overcharged the MiG-19PM with missile system, thus compelling China to choose the MiG-19P. On the other hand, judging from the response of the Air Force in 1958 (it requires more fighters instead of interceptors), there may be two situations: the delegation did not coordinate well with the Air Force when selecting specific imitation models; air defense in May 1957 After the merger, the Chinese Air Force was mainly positioned for air defense operations, but did not take into account the changes in future operational requirements (that is, operations in Fujian in 1958).

In terms of technical level, there is no difference between MiG-19P and MiG-19S. The main difference between the two aircraft is the RP-1/5 interception radar. But the problem is that the Chinese Air Force was already equipped with MiG-17PF at that time, and the aircraft equipped with radar was RP-1. For the Chinese Air Force, the MiG-19P equipped with RP-1 is actually nothing new. Of course, after the late MiG-19P is retrofitted with the RP-5, the radar can search and track with different frequencies.

The choice of MiG-19P is logical: because the machine is exactly between MiG-19S and MiG-19PM - to imitate the MiG-19S, China only need to modify the MiG-19P front machine. To imitate the MiG-19PM, China only needed to increase the missile suspension point, and imitate the K-5M and the RP-2U radar matched with the K-5M. Without considering intellectual property issues, this strategy seems reasonable. But the problem is that China overestimated its technical level, so that China took a lot of detours later.