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Venezuela - Major Theater War (MTW)

As of late 2025 there were no indications that the Trump Administration contemplated military operations against Venezuela of the scale or duration of Vietnam or Iraq. A Major Theater War (MTW) is a large-scale conventional conflict against a peer or near-peer adversary, typically involving multiple service branches, sustained operations, and significant force deployments, such as Iraq in 1991, with extensive mobilization, multiple theater-wide operations, potential for hundreds of thousands of troops. A Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) is a smaller-scale conflict against a regional power with more limited objectives and forces. Examples include interventions in Kosovo or Libya in 2011, typically involving fewer forces, shorter duration, and more constrained geographic scope. The classic Cold War-era formulation was the "two-MTW standard"—the U.S. military should be capable of fighting two major theater wars simultaneously (say, Korea and the Middle East). Post-Cold War planning shifted to "one-MTW-plus" scenarios (one major war while handling a lesser contingency elsewhere).

Trump sent conflicting signals about whether the US is considering strikes on drug-related targets in Venezuela. "Next will be land," he said on 23 October 2025, commenting on strikes on ships involved in drug trafficking. And on October 31, when asked if media reports were accurate that he was considering strikes on Venezuela, the US president replied, "No."

While the premise that a large-scale U.S. land operation into Venezuela would likely require staging from a neighboring country is logistically sound, it was considered highly unlikely that such an invasion would occur due to a lack of political will, insufficient troop deployment, and complex logistical challenges.

Colombia has historically been a strong U.S. ally and a key strategic partner in the region, with established frameworks for military cooperation. Staging a large-scale land operation from Colombia is logistically plausible due to shared land borders and potential access to existing infrastructure, but it would require explicit approval from the Colombian government, which has its own complex internal political dynamics and concerns about regional stability.

Guyana has a territorial dispute with Venezuela and has engaged in defense cooperation with the U.S., but it shares a challenging, largely jungle border with Venezuela. While useful for certain operations or as a potential location for a future "power-projection" base, launching a large-scale land invasion of a country the size of Venezuela through this terrain would present immense logistical and geographical challenges compared to Colombia.

Military analysts and officials indicated that a full-scale ground invasion aimed at regime change is not the likely scenario. The current force levels in the region (around 10,000 troops, primarily Marines and sailors on ships) are considered insufficient for a full invasion of a country the size of Venezuela, which would likely require over 100,000 troops. The U.S. focus was on using air and naval power for limited, high-impact strikes and destabilizing the Maduro regime rather than a protracted ground war.

I. Operational Environment Assessment

A. Geographic Analysis

Venezuela's operational environment presents multiple complex challenges across diverse geographic regions, each requiring distinct operational approaches and specialized capabilities.

1. Northern Coastal Region

The northern coastal zone stretches approximately 2,800 kilometers along the Caribbean Sea and contains the majority of Venezuela's population and critical infrastructure. This region includes major urban centers, principal ports, and the capital Caracas.

2. Andean Region

Mountainous terrain along Colombian border reaching elevations over 5,000 meters. This region contains critical border crossings, population centers like Mérida and San Cristóbal, and irregular armed group sanctuaries.

Terrain Challenges: Limited road networks, high altitude operations, seasonal weather affecting air operations, difficult logistics, and terrain favoring defensive operations and irregular warfare.

3. Llanos (Central Plains)

Vast savanna covering approximately 300,000 square kilometers in central Venezuela. Relatively flat terrain with seasonal flooding, limited infrastructure, and sparse population.

Operational Characteristics: Suitable for mechanized operations during dry season, poor trafficability during rainy season (May-November), limited cover and concealment, few population centers, suitable for establishing forward operating bases.

4. Orinoco River Basin

Major river system providing strategic transportation corridor, location of heavy oil deposits, and access to interior regions. River navigable for 1,200 kilometers.

5. Amazon Region (Amazonas State)

Dense rainforest covering approximately 180,000 square kilometers in southern Venezuela. Extremely limited infrastructure, indigenous populations, and challenging operational environment.

Limited Strategic Value: While geographically large, this region has minimal strategic infrastructure and would likely be lower priority for operations. Primary concerns would be monitoring for irregular force movements and humanitarian access to isolated populations.

6. Guayana Region

Eastern region containing mineral resources, hydroelectric infrastructure (Guri Dam), and Ciudad Guayana industrial center. Border with Guyana includes disputed Essequibo territory.

B. Infrastructure and Lines of Communication

Infrastructure Type	Current Status	Operational Impact	Priority
Road Network	Deteriorated; major highways passable but secondary roads poor condition	Limited trafficability; heavy equipment transport challenging	Critical
Bridges	Many in poor repair; weight restrictions likely	Limits movement options; potential demolition targets	High
Airports	Major airports operational; 15+ capable of handling military aircraft	Airfield seizure critical for operations	Critical
Seaports	Major ports operational despite degradation	Essential for logistics; rapid seizure required	Critical
Rail	Minimal functional rail system	Cannot support operations; not factor in planning	Low
Electrical Grid	Unreliable; frequent blackouts	Complicates operations but also Venezuelan defense; civil affairs priority	High
Communications	Mobile networks functional but degraded	Cannot rely on commercial infrastructure	Medium
Water/Sanitation	Severely degraded in most areas	Humanitarian priority; water sourcing required	High

C. Weather and Environmental Factors

Venezuela experiences tropical climate with two distinct seasons significantly impacting military operations:

Dry Season (December-April): Optimal period for large-scale ground operations, better trafficability in llanos region, reduced cloud cover improving air operations, lower river levels affecting water crossings.

Rainy Season (May-November): Heavy rainfall particularly in Amazon and llanos regions, flooding significantly reduces trafficability, increased cloud cover affecting air operations and ISR, higher disease risk (dengue, malaria, vector-borne diseases), mudslides in mountainous regions.

Operational Recommendation: If operations can be timed, initiate during early dry season (December-January) to allow maximum time before rainy season impacts operations.

II. Opposing Forces Analysis

A. Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB) Order of Battle

Despite nominal strength, the Venezuelan military faces significant readiness, maintenance, and morale challenges. However, they should not be underestimated, particularly for urban defense and irregular warfare.

Army (Ejército Bolivariano)

Formation	Strength	Equipment	Assessment
6x Armored Brigades	~3,000 each	T-72M1, AMX-30; ~150 operational MBTs	Limited operational readiness; parts shortages
12x Infantry Brigades	~2,500 each	Mix of motorized and light infantry	Variable readiness; better motivated than mechanized
1x Artillery Brigade	~2,000	Towed and self-propelled; limited ammunition	Obsolescent systems; ammunition constraints
1x Air Defense Brigade	~1,500	SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 systems; MANPADS	Limited operational systems; training deficiencies
Special Forces	~2,000	Small arms, light vehicles	Most capable units; focus on counter-insurgency

Naval Forces (Armada Bolivariana)

Platform Type	Quantity	Operational Status	Capability
Submarines	2x Type 209	0-1 operational	Limited threat; maintenance challenges
Frigates	6x Lupo/Mariscal Sucre class	1-2 operational	Anti-ship missiles; limited readiness
Patrol Vessels	~20 various types	~8 operational	Coastal patrol; limited combat value
Amphibious	4x landing ships	1-2 operational	Limited capacity
Marines	~8,000 personnel	Moderate readiness	Coastal defense; base security

Naval Assessment: Venezuelan Navy represents minimal conventional threat. Most vessels are non-operational due to maintenance issues. Primary threats are coastal mines, small boat operations, and shore-based anti-ship missiles. Marines are moderately capable infantry force focused on defense of naval bases and coastal installations.

Air Force (Aviación Militar Bolivariana)

Aircraft Type	Inventory	Operational	Capability Assessment
Su-30MK2 Flanker	23	8-12	Most capable fighters; parts shortages; limited pilot proficiency
F-16A/B Fighting Falcon	21	0-3	Embargoed; cannibalized for parts; essentially non-operational
CF-5 Freedom Fighter	9	2-4	Obsolete; limited capability
K-8 Karakorum	18	10-14	Trainer/light attack; limited combat value
Su-25 Frogfoot	8	3-5	Ground attack; limited operational
Transport Aircraft	Various ~40	~20	Mix of C-130, C-295, Mi-17 helicopters
Attack Helicopters	10x Mi-35	4-6	Limited capability; maintenance issues

National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana)

The National Guard comprises approximately 30,000 personnel organized in eight regional commands. This is the most politically reliable element of the armed forces, focused on internal security, and likely to offer strongest resistance.

Capabilities: Light infantry with armored vehicles (V-100, V-150), riot control equipment, and extensive experience with urban operations. Well-positioned in major cities with detailed knowledge of terrain. Would likely form core of urban defense and could transition to irregular warfare if conventional defense fails.

Militia (Milicia Bolivariana)

Nominally 220,000 members organized in territorial units. Variable training and equipment ranging from unarmed to assault rifles. Political reliability high but military effectiveness questionable. Could provide localized resistance, intelligence to regime forces, or transition to irregular warfare.

B. State Actors

C. Irregular Forces and Non-State Actors

Group	Strength	Capability	Likely Posture
Colectivos (Pro-regime)	~40,000	Small arms; urban warfare experience	Active resistance; urban operations; intelligence
ELN (Colombian)	~2,500	Guerrilla warfare; improvised explosives	Likely neutral initially; opportunistic
FARC Dissidents	~1,500	Experienced fighters; border operations	Likely neutral; potential spoilers
Criminal Organizations	Unknown thousands	Weapons trafficking; combat experience	Opportunistic; exploit power vacuum
Megabandas (Caracas)	~5,000	Heavy weapons; control territory	Variable; may resist or remain neutral

D. External Supporting Forces

Russian Personnel: Estimated 200-500 military advisors and technicians providing maintenance support, training, intelligence cooperation, and potentially air defense operations. Russian ex-Wagner Group or similar private military contractors may be present in unspecified numbers.

Cuban Personnel: Estimated 20,000-25,000 including intelligence officers, military advisors, security personnel, and healthcare workers. Cuban intelligence deeply embedded in Venezuelan security apparatus. Could provide crucial intelligence to regime or facilitate resistance.

Iranian Personnel: Limited presence, estimated <100, focused on drone technology transfer and potential asymmetric capabilities development.

III. Force Requirements Analysis

A. Mission Analysis and Force Planning Factors

Force requirements depend heavily on defined mission scope. Analysis considers full-spectrum operation including initial combat, stabilization, and transition phases.

B. Phased Force Requirements

Phase	Duration	U.S. Forces	Coalition Forces	Primary Tasks
I: Preparation	30-60 days	15,000-25,000	5,000-10,000	Force flow; staging; intelligence preparation
II: Initial Operations	14-30 days	85,000-120,000	20,000-40,000	Air superiority; ground operations; regime collapse
III: Stabilization	90-180 days	120,000-180,000	40,000-80,000	Security operations; disarmament; humanitarian
IV: Transition	1-2 years	80,000-120,000	30,000-60,000	Security sector reform; institution building
V: Sustainment	2-5 years	30,000-50,000	20,000-40,000	Advisory role; counterterrorism; deterrence

Force numbers represent estimated ranges based on mission scope and level of resistance. Lighter resistance could allow lower end of ranges; significant irregular warfare would require upper end or beyond.

C. Detailed Combat Force Requirements

Ground Forces

Unit Type	Quantity	Rationale	Key Tasks
Heavy Brigade Combat Teams	2-3	Armor/mechanized operations in llanos; rapid decisive operations	Defeat armored forces; rapid maneuver; breakout operations
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams	4-6	Urban operations; security operations; population centers	Urban combat; stability operations; key site security
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams	2-3	Mobility in varied terrain; rapid response	Security operations; quick reaction force; route security
Airborne Brigade	1-2	Airfield seizure; rapid deployment; vertical envelopment	Seize airfields; rapid insertion; show of force
Air Assault Brigade	1-2	Mountain operations; rapid reaction; difficult terrain	Andean region; quick reaction; key terrain seizure
Special Operations	3,000-5,000	Direct action; unconventional warfare; advisory	Leadership targeting; sensitive site exploitation; train partners
Marine Expeditionary Units	2-3 MEUs	Amphibious operations; coastal operations	Secure ports; amphibious assault; maritime security
Military Police Brigades	3-4	Detention operations; stability; law enforcement	Detainee operations; traffic control; civil support
Civil Affairs Groups	2-3	Civil-military operations; governance support	Infrastructure assessment; governance; liaison
Psychological Operations	2-3 battalions	Information operations; influence	Strategic communication; tactical PSYOP; leaflets

Aviation Forces

Capability	Platform/Unit	Quantity	Primary Role
Air Superiority	F-22 Raptor	24-36	Counter-air; SEAD escort; air dominance
Multirole Fighters	F-35A/C Lightning II	48-72	Strike; CAS; ISR; SEAD
Multirole Fighters	F-15E Strike Eagle	36-48	Deep strike; interdiction; CAS
Multirole Fighters	F-16C/D Fighting Falcon	72-96	CAS; strike; air defense; CAP
Close Air Support	A-10C Thunderbolt II	24-36	CAS; forward air control; anti-armor
Electronic Warfare	EA-18G Growler	12-18	SEAD/DEAD; electronic attack; jamming
ISR/Command	E-3 AWACS	4-6	Air battle management; surveillance
ISR/Command	E-8 JSTARS	2-4	Ground surveillance; targeting; battle management
Aerial Refueling	KC-135/KC-46	24-36	Aerial refueling; force projection
Strategic Airlift	C-17 Globemaster III	40-60	Heavy lift; equipment transport; airdrop
Tactical Airlift	C-130J Super Hercules	36-48	Tactical transport; airdrop; medevac
Attack Helicopters	AH-64E Apache	72-108	Anti-armor; CAS; reconnaissance; security
Utility Helicopters	UH-60M Black Hawk	120-180	Air assault; medevac; utility; command
Heavy Lift	CH-47F Chinook	48-72	Heavy lift; artillery movement; resupply
UAV/ISR	MQ-9 Reaper	18-24	Persistent ISR; strike; targeting
UAV/ISR	RQ-4 Global Hawk	4-6	High-altitude ISR; strategic reconnaissance

Naval Forces

Capability	Platform	Quantity	Primary Role
Carrier Strike Group	CVN + escorts	1-2	Power projection; sea control; strike operations
Amphibious Ready Group	LHD/LHA + escorts	2-3	Amphibious operations; MEU deployment; air operations
Guided Missile Cruisers	CG-47 Ticonderoga	3-4	Air defense; strike; command and control
Guided Missile Destroyers	DDG-51 Arleigh Burke	8-12	Air defense; strike; anti-submarine
Attack Submarines	SSN Los Angeles/Virginia	3-5	Anti-submarine; strike; ISR; special operations
Littoral Combat Ships	LCS	4-6	Coastal operations; mine warfare; patrol
Maritime Patrol	P-8 Poseidon	6-9	Anti-submarine; maritime surveillance; ISR
Mine Countermeasures	MCM ships/helicopters	4-6	Mine clearance; port security; safe passage
Logistics Ships	Various support vessels	8-12	Underway replenishment; fuel; ammunition

D. Coalition Force Contributions

Coalition operations would significantly enhance legitimacy and share burden. Anticipated partner contributions:

Brazil (Desirable but Unlikely): If Brazil participates, could contribute 10,000-20,000 troops, primarily for southern border security and humanitarian operations. Brazilian participation would significantly enhance regional legitimacy but faces substantial political constraints.

Other Regional Partners: Caribbean nations (Trinidad, Guyana) could provide limited forces, primarily for logistics and stability operations. Panama, Chile, Argentina, Peru might contribute specialized capabilities or small contingents.

European Allies: UK, France, Spain could provide specialized capabilities including intelligence, air refueling, maritime patrol, and potentially small ground contingents. NATO support would enhance political legitimacy.

IV. Concept of Operations

A. Operational Phasing

B. Lines of Operations

Operations would proceed along multiple synchronized lines connecting strategic objectives to tactical tasks:

1. Combat Operations: Defeat Venezuelan military; neutralize threats; establish security
2. Civil Security: Public safety; police functions; criminal justice
3. Governance: Interim administration; political transition; institution building
4. Economic Stabilization: Humanitarian relief; infrastructure; employment; trade
5. Security Sector Reform: Military/police training; vetting; democratic oversight
6. Information Operations: Strategic communication; counter-propaganda; influence
7. Regional Engagement: Border security; refugee management; coalition coordination

V. Logistics and Sustainment

A. Operational Logistics Concept

B. Strategic Lift Requirements

Phase	Short Tons/Day	Personnel Flow	Primary Mode	Key Challenges
Deployment (Phase 0-I)	8,000-12,000	5,000-8,000/day	Air/Sea combination	Port capacity; airfield capacity; throughput
Combat Operations (Phase I)	15,000-20,000	2,000-4,000/day	Air primary	Fuel; ammunition; combat loss replacement
Stabilization (Phase II)	18,000-25,000	1,000-2,000/day	Sea primary	Fuel; construction materials; humanitarian supplies
Transition (Phase III-IV)	10,000-15,000	Declining	Sea primary	Sustained operations; reconstruction materials

C. Fuel Requirements

Fuel represents largest single logistics challenge, with daily requirements estimated at:

• Combat Operations: 4-6 million gallons per day (ground vehicles, aircraft, ships, generators)
• Stabilization Operations: 3-5 million gallons per day
• Transition Phase: 2-3 million gallons per day

D. Ammunition Requirements

Based on historical consumption rates in similar operations:

Phase	Daily Consumption	Days of Supply Required	Total Requirement
Initial Combat (High Intensity)	800-1,200 short tons	30 days	24,000-36,000 ST
Stabilization (Medium Intensity)	300-500 short tons	90 days	27,000-45,000 ST
Transition (Low Intensity)	100-200 short tons	180 days	18,000-36,000 ST

E. Critical Logistics Nodes

Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs):

• Simón Bolívar International Airport (Caracas/Maiquetía) - Primary APOD; must be seized early
• La Chinita International Airport (Maracaibo) - Secondary APOD; western operations
• Arturo Michelena International Airport (Valencia) - Supporting APOD; central operations
• Externally: Palanquero Air Base (Colombia DENIED) - Staging base; secure rear area

Seaports of Debarkation (SPODs):

• Puerto Cabello - Primary SPOD; largest port facility; central location
• La Guaira - Secondary SPOD; closest to Caracas; capital support
• Port of Maracaibo - Tertiary SPOD; western operations; oil infrastructure
• Eastern ports (Puerto La Cruz, Cumaná) - Supporting ports; eastern operations

F. Host Nation Support

Colombian Support: DENIED Critical for operations; provides staging areas, logistics support, fuel, maintenance facilities, medical support, and secure rear area. Colombian infrastructure and commercial logistics networks essential for sustaining operations.

Caribbean Bases: Curaçao, Aruba, Trinidad and Tobago could provide logistics support, fuel storage, and maritime patrol bases with host nation agreement.

G. Medical Support

Comprehensive medical support required across operational area:

Echelon	Capability	Location	Capacity
Role 1	Battalion aid stations; immediate care	With maneuver units	Stabilization only
Role 2	Forward surgical teams; emergency surgery	Brigade support areas	20-40 beds each
Role 3	Combat support hospitals; advanced surgery	Major logistics bases	248-bed hospital x3-4
Role 4	Definitive care; specialized treatment	CONUS or Germany	Aeromedical evacuation

Estimated Casualty Rates: Based on force-on-force ratio and historical experience, estimate 2-5% combat casualties during initial operations (1,700-6,000 casualties), plus disease/non-battle injuries requiring robust medical infrastructure.

H. Logistics Challenges and Mitigations

VI. Command, Control, and Communications

A. Command Structure

Component Commands:

Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC): Commanding general of deployed Army Corps or Marine division; responsible for all ground operations including Army, Marine, special operations ground forces

Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC): Air Force or Navy flag officer; responsible for all air operations including Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army aviation; controls airspace management and air tasking order

Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC): Navy flag officer; responsible for naval operations including surface, subsurface, amphibious, and maritime patrol operations

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF): Special operations flag officer; responsible for all special operations including direct action, unconventional warfare, and specialized missions

B. Communications Architecture

Robust, redundant communications essential for distributed operations across large geographic area:

• Satellite Communications: Primary means; requires substantial commercial and military SATCOM capacity; multiple geostationary and LEO systems
• Troposcatter: Line-of-sight over-the-horizon systems for key nodes
• Tactical Radio Networks: VHF/UHF tactical nets; encrypted communications
• Fiber Optic: Leverage existing infrastructure where secure; deploy tactical fiber for key facilities
• High Frequency Radio: Backup communications; useful in remote areas

C. Command Posts

Command Post	Personnel	Location Concept	Primary Function
JTF Main CP	800-1,200	Colombia (initial DENIED); Venezuela (post-lodgment)	Planning; coordination; strategic direction
JTF Forward CP	200-400	Venezuela; mobile	Current operations; situational awareness
JFLCC Main CP	500-800	Venezuela; semi-mobile	Ground operations; maneuver control
JFACC Combined Air Operations Center	600-900	Colombia DENIED or CONUS reach-back	Air tasking; airspace management
Division/MEF CPs	300-500 each	Area of operations	Tactical operations

D. Intelligence Architecture

Comprehensive intelligence support from strategic to tactical levels:

Strategic Intelligence: National agencies (NSA, NGA, CIA, DIA) provide strategic intelligence on regime leadership, military dispositions, NBC programs, external support, and strategic targets

Operational Intelligence: JTF J2 coordinates operational intelligence including target development, battle damage assessment, enemy intent, and intelligence preparation of battlefield

Tactical Intelligence: Division/Brigade S2 sections provide tactical intelligence using UAVs, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and all-source fusion

Special Requirements:

• Counter-intelligence for Cuban intelligence penetration
• Human intelligence from opposition groups, refugees, defectors
• Cyber intelligence on regime command and control
• Geospatial intelligence for targeting and planning
• Technical intelligence on Russian/Cuban systems

VII. Critical Operational Challenges

A. Urban Operations

Urban Operations Considerations:

• Extensive civilian casualties risk; requires precision engagement and restraint
• Complex terrain favors defenders; limits armor and mechanized advantages
• Intelligence-driven operations essential; substantial ISR requirements
• Special operations for leadership targeting; minimize collateral damage
• Extensive use of non-lethal measures; psychological operations; negotiation
• Humanitarian corridors for civilian evacuation
• Massive requirements for medical support, rubble clearing, utilities restoration

B. Oil Infrastructure Protection

Venezuela's oil infrastructure represents both strategic asset and vulnerability. Protection essential to enable post-conflict economic recovery.

Critical Oil Infrastructure:

• Maracaibo Basin fields (western Venezuela) - 60% of conventional production
• Orinoco Oil Belt (central) - Heavy oil deposits; requires specialized processing
• Refineries at Amuay-Cardón, Puerto La Cruz, El Palito - Processing capacity
• Export terminals and loading facilities
• Pipeline networks connecting fields to refineries and ports

C. Irregular Warfare Transition Risk

Primary operational risk is transition from conventional to protracted irregular warfare if Venezuelan forces or colectivos choose guerrilla strategy rather than conventional defense.

Indicators of Irregular Warfare Transition:

• Cache emplacement of weapons and supplies in civilian areas
• Dispersal of forces rather than concentration for conventional defense
• Leadership relocation to secure remote areas
• Increased propaganda preparing population for resistance
• Increased coordination with Colombian ELN/FARC dissidents

Counter-Insurgency Preparation: Even during conventional operations, maintain counter-insurgency focus including population security, intelligence development, limited force footprint in population centers, information operations, and building relationships with local populations.

D. Chemical/Biological Concerns

While Venezuela is not believed to maintain offensive chemical or biological weapons programs, industrial chemicals and medical pathogens could be weaponized. Additionally, riot control agents are known to be in inventory.

NBC Protection Requirements:

• All forces equipped with protective masks and suits
• Detection capabilities at all echelons
• Decontamination capabilities deployed forward
• Medical countermeasures including nerve agent antidotes
• Special operations prepared for NBC site exploitation and security
• Intelligence focus on potential NBC capabilities and locations

E. Humanitarian Crisis Management

Military operations will exacerbate existing humanitarian crisis requiring immediate, large-scale humanitarian response integrated with military operations.

Humanitarian Need	Scope	Military Role	Civilian Agency Lead
Food Distribution	10-15 million people at risk of food insecurity	Logistics; security for distribution	WFP; NGOs
Medical Care	Healthcare system collapse; medication shortages	Military medical units; security for clinics	WHO; PAHO; MSF
Water/Sanitation	60% lack reliable clean water access	Engineer units; purification; distribution	UNICEF; ICRC
Electrical Power	Grid degraded; frequent blackouts	Generators; repair support; fuel	World Bank; IDB
Shelter	Displaced persons; damaged infrastructure	Tents; materials; construction support	UNHCR; IOM

Civil-Military Coordination: Establish humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) to synchronize military and civilian humanitarian efforts. Military provides security, logistics, and specialized capabilities while civilian agencies lead humanitarian operations.

VIII. Assessment and Recommendations

A. Operational Feasibility

B. Critical Success Factors

1. Speed and Overwhelming Force: Rapid operations to collapse Venezuelan military before transition to irregular warfare
2. Intelligence Preparation: Comprehensive intelligence on regime leadership, military dispositions, and irregularforces
3. Civilian Protection: Minimize civilian casualties to maintain legitimacy and support
4. Oil Infrastructure Security: Protect economic foundation for reconstruction
5. Coalition Cohesion: Maintain multinational support throughout operation
6. Logistics Sustainment: Overcome geographic challenges with robust logistics
7. Information Operations: Win information warfare against regime propaganda
8. Transition Planning: Immediate post-conflict stabilization to prevent security vacuum

C. Risk Assessment

High Risk Factors:

• Urban warfare in Caracas causing massive civilian casualties
• Transition to protracted irregular warfare
• Regional instability and spillover effects
• Russian or Cuban escalatory responses
• Failure to establish legitimate post-conflict governance
• Humanitarian catastrophe overwhelming response capacity

Medium Risk Factors:

• Logistics challenges due to infrastructure degradation
• Venezuelan military more effective than assessed
• Difficulty securing dispersed oil infrastructure
• Coalition fracture during operations
• Domestic political opposition to extended operations

D. Operational Recommendations

If decision made to proceed with military operations, recommend:

1. Maximize Intelligence Preparation: Extensive intelligence preparation focusing on regime leadership locations, military dispositions, key infrastructure, and irregular forces
2. Comprehensive Information Operations: Begin information operations well in advance to encourage Venezuelan military defections and prepare population
3. Secure Coalition Support: Ensure robust coalition particularly Colombian participation DENIED before commencing operations
4. Rapid Decisive Operations: Execute operations with overwhelming force in compressed timeline to prevent irregular warfare transition
5. Integrated Civil-Military Planning: Fully integrate humanitarian response and post-conflict planning from outset
6. Flexible Force Structure: Build force structure capable of transitioning from conventional to counterinsurgency operations
7. Protect Critical Infrastructure: Prioritize oil infrastructure security to enable reconstruction
8. Regional Engagement: Coordinate closely with all neighbors for border security and humanitarian response
9. Sustained Commitment: Recognize and resource for long-term commitment of 5-10 years
10. Contingency Planning: Prepare contingency plans for worst-case scenarios including chemical weapons use, mass refugee movements, regional conflict expansion

E. Alternatives to Full-Scale Operations

Before committing to full-scale military operations, strongly recommend thorough evaluation of more limited military options:

• Targeted Strikes: Precision strikes against specific capabilities (narcotics infrastructure, regime leadership targets) without occupation
• No-Fly Zone: Establish air exclusion zone to protect populations or support opposition without ground forces
• Humanitarian Intervention: Limited operations to secure humanitarian corridors or protect specific populations
• Support to Opposition: Provide military equipment, training, intelligence to Venezuelan opposition forces
• Enhanced Sanctions: Continue economic pressure while avoiding military risks

F. Final Assessment