Venezuela - Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC)
A Major Theater War (MTW) is a large-scale conventional conflict against a peer or near-peer adversary, typically involving multiple service branches, sustained operations, and significant force deployments, such as Iraq in 1991, with extensive mobilization, multiple theater-wide operations, potential for hundreds of thousands of troops. A Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) is a smaller-scale conflict against a regional power with more limited objectives and forces. Examples include interventions in Kosovo or Libya in 2011, typically involving fewer forces, shorter duration, and more constrained geographic scope. The classic Cold War-era formulation was the "two-MTW standard"—the U.S. military should be capable of fighting two major theater wars simultaneously (say, Korea and the Middle East). Post-Cold War planning shifted to "one-MTW-plus" scenarios (one major war while handling a lesser contingency elsewhere).
Judging by the experience of the first years of Trump's presidency, he won't resort to a full-scale military invasion—like the campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan—as it would be too risky and expensive. A much more likely scenario is limited, targeted strikes against military infrastructure and decision-making centers, as has already happened in the confrontation with the Houthis or Iran.
"Inside the White House, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is actively lobbying for an invasion of Venezuela. Other figures are more skeptical, plagued by doubts about whether this plan will work," Alexey Chernyaev, a political scientist and American studies specialist, told Komsomolskaya Pravda. "Rubio is most likely promising Trump that the Maduro regime will quickly collapse as a result of strikes on Venezuela— he's calculating that after American strikes on Venezuelan territory, or in conjunction with them, Maduro's domestic opponents will rise up and ensure the government's overthrow."
Venezuela presents a complex strategic challenge characterized by political instability, humanitarian crisis, significant natural resources, external power involvement, and regional security implications. Any potential military operation would require careful consideration of multiple strategic factors including international law, regional stability, coalition building, and post-conflict governance.
Each Ohio-class SSGN carries 154 Tomahawks, meaning a single submarine could deliver a devastating strike package with far more firepower than needed for high-value leadership and infrastructure targets. The converted SSGNs—Ohio, Michigan, Florida, and Georgia—are purpose-built for precisely this mission profile. They can position covertly offshore, launch simultaneous strikes across multiple aim points with compressed time-on-target, maintain an initial deniability window during the first hours of ambiguity about strike origin, and scale from dozens to over 150 targets in a single salvo.
This would be a discrete strike operation well below even a Lesser Regional Contingency threshold. The closest analogs would be Syria 2017 when the U.S. launched 59 Tomahawks from destroyers, the opening strikes of Libya 2011 with 112 Tomahawks, or the targeted Soleimani strike in 2020. These operations share the characteristic of delivering significant firepower without ground forces or sustained campaigns.
The strategic considerations are significant. Striking Maduro leadership sites carries high risk of civilian casualties and international outcry, while drug infrastructure targets are easier to justify and offer cleaner targeting. Regional reactions would likely see Colombia supportive while Brazil and Mexico express concern about precedent-setting unilateral action. The legal framework would probably invoke drug trafficking statutes and national security justifications rather than an Authorization for Use of Military Force.
The "deadline bluff then early action" pattern fits documented Trump operational preferences, similar to moving the embassy to Jerusalem ahead of the waiver deadline or striking Soleimani during supposed de-escalation messaging. This would be a limited strike operation rather than an LRC—no ground forces, no occupation, no sustained campaign. The closest historical analog remains Operation El Dorado Canyon against Libya in 1986. The key variable is whether the operation stops at missiles or triggers broader intervention.
II. Strategic Context and Situation Assessment
A. Geopolitical Environment
Venezuela occupies a strategically significant position in South America, bordered by Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana, with extensive Caribbean coastline. The nation possesses the world's largest proven crude oil reserves, estimated at approximately 300 billion barrels, making it a significant energy producer despite recent production declines due to economic mismanagement and lack of investment.
The current political situation is characterized by authoritarian governance under the Maduro regime, which has overseen economic collapse, hyperinflation exceeding 1,000,000 percent in recent years, and a humanitarian crisis that has driven over seven million Venezuelans to emigrate, primarily to Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and other regional nations. This massive displacement has created significant regional instability and burden on neighboring countries.
B. International Stakeholders and Alignments
The Venezuelan situation involves multiple international actors with competing interests:
Russia: Maintains significant military and economic ties with Venezuela, has provided military equipment and advisors, and uses Venezuela as a platform for projecting influence in the Western Hemisphere. Russian interests are primarily geopolitical, seeking to challenge U.S. influence in its traditional sphere of influence.
China: Has substantial economic investments in Venezuelan oil sector, holding billions in debt owed by the Venezuelan government. China seeks to protect its investments and maintain access to energy resources while avoiding direct military involvement.
Cuba: Provides significant advisory support to the Maduro regime, with estimates of 20,000-25,000 Cuban personnel in Venezuela providing intelligence, security, and healthcare services. Cuba depends on Venezuelan oil subsidies for economic survival.
Colombia: Faces the greatest direct impact from Venezuelan instability, hosting over two million Venezuelan refugees, dealing with border security challenges, and concerned about spillover effects including narco-trafficking and irregular armed groups operating in border regions.
Brazil: As South America's largest nation, Brazil has significant interests in regional stability but has traditionally been cautious about military intervention. Brazil hosts approximately 260,000 Venezuelan refugees in northern border states.
C. Regional Security Framework
The Organization of American States (OAS) has been deeply divided on Venezuela, with some members recognizing opposition leadership while others maintain relations with the Maduro government. The Lima Group, established in 2017, comprises 14 nations seeking democratic restoration in Venezuela but explicitly rejecting military intervention.
The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has been largely ineffective, with several member states withdrawing. The newer PROSUR forum excludes Venezuela but faces challenges in coordinating regional response.
III. Strategic Objectives Assessment
A. Potential Justifications for Military Action
Various scenarios could theoretically provide justification for military operations, each with distinct legal and strategic implications:
B. Strategic End States
Clear definition of the desired end state is essential for strategic planning. Potential end states could include:
- Regime Transition: Replacement of current government with democratic leadership through free and fair elections, requiring extensive post-conflict political reconstruction
- Security Stabilization: Elimination of specific security threats without broader political transformation, potentially including counter-narcotics focus or border security operations
- Humanitarian Protection: Establishment of protected areas or humanitarian corridors, potentially requiring long-term international presence
- Limited Punitive Action: Targeted operations against specific capabilities or leadership without occupation or long-term presence
The selected end state significantly impacts force requirements, coalition support, international legitimacy, duration of operations, and costs.
IV. Strategic Challenges and Risk Assessment
A. International Legal Framework
Humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization remains legally controversial despite precedents in Kosovo, Libya, and other cases. Regional authorization through OAS would face challenges given divisions among member states. Unilateral action by the United States would generate significant international criticism and potentially isolate the U.S. diplomatically.
The International Criminal Court could potentially assert jurisdiction over alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela, but ICC action does not authorize military intervention by other states. Venezuela is a party to the Rome Statute, complicating legal justifications.
B. Coalition Building Requirements
Successful operations would benefit significantly from multinational coalition, particularly including regional partners. Key considerations include:
- Colombian Participation: Critical due to geographic proximity, shared border, and direct stake in Venezuelan stability. Colombia has sophisticated military capabilities and experience with irregular warfare. However, Colombia would face domestic political challenges and risks of retaliation.
- Brazilian Support: Brazil's participation would provide regional legitimacy and substantial military capabilities. However, Brazil has historically opposed military intervention in regional affairs and faces domestic political constraints.
- Caribbean Nations: Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and other Caribbean nations face direct impacts from Venezuelan instability and could provide geographic access and political support.
- European Allies: European nations could provide political legitimacy, intelligence support, and potentially specialized capabilities, though direct military participation would be unlikely.
- OAS Authorization: While non-binding, OAS support would provide significant regional legitimacy, though achieving consensus would be extremely challenging.
C. Military-Strategic Challenges
Venezuela presents multiple complex military challenges that would impact operations:
Geographic Complexity: Venezuela encompasses 916,445 square kilometers with varied terrain including Andean mountains, Amazon rainforest, extensive plains (llanos), and Caribbean coastline. This geographic diversity complicates military operations and requires diverse capabilities.
Population Distribution: Approximately 28 million people concentrated in northern coastal regions, particularly the Caracas metropolitan area (population ~5 million). Urban operations in densely populated areas would be highly challenging and risk significant civilian casualties.
Infrastructure Degradation: Years of economic mismanagement have resulted in severely degraded infrastructure including electrical grid failures, fuel shortages, and deteriorating transportation networks. This complicates logistics but also creates humanitarian challenges requiring immediate address.
Armed Forces Assessment: The Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB) nominally comprise approximately 123,000 active personnel plus 220,000 reserves and militia. However, readiness, morale, and equipment serviceability are questionable. Key considerations include:
| Service Branch | Personnel | Key Capabilities | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Army | ~63,000 | Mechanized brigades, light infantry | Limited readiness; equipment largely Russian origin; maintenance challenges |
| Navy | ~18,000 | Submarines, frigates, patrol craft | Minimal operational capability; most vessels non-operational |
| Air Force | ~12,000 | Su-30MK2 fighters, transport aircraft | Limited operational aircraft; parts shortages; pilot training deficiencies |
| National Guard | ~30,000 | Internal security, border control | Most politically reliable; focus on internal control |
| Militia (FANB) | ~220,000 | Irregular forces, local security | Variable training and equipment; politically mobilized |
D. External Power Involvement
Cuban Intelligence Network: Cuban personnel provide significant intelligence and security advisory support. They have deep knowledge of Venezuelan security apparatus and could facilitate resistance or provide advance warning of operations.
Chinese Economic Leverage: While China has avoided military involvement, it could provide economic support, humanitarian assistance to the regime, or diplomatic pressure against intervention. Chinese investments in infrastructure and oil sector create long-term interests.
E. Irregular Warfare Considerations
Multiple irregular armed groups operate in Venezuelan territory, including:
- Colombian ELN: National Liberation Army uses Venezuelan territory as safe haven, estimated 2,000-2,500 fighters
- FARC Dissidents: Former FARC members who rejected peace agreement, operating along Colombian border
- Colectivos: Pro-government armed groups, estimated 40,000+ members, crucial for regime control
- Criminal Organizations: Sophisticated narco-trafficking networks with combat capability
These groups could complicate operations, resist intervention, or opportunistically expand operations in power vacuum. Post-conflict security would require addressing these groups.
V. Strategic Communication and Information Operations
A. Narrative Framework
Strategic communication would be critical to building and maintaining international support. Key narrative elements would need to emphasize:
- Humanitarian justification and protection of civilian population
- Support for democratic restoration and Venezuelan people's will
- Regional stability and addressing transnational threats
- Multilateral nature of operations and regional support
- Limited objectives and exit strategy
B. Information Environment Challenges
The Venezuelan regime would likely employ comprehensive information operations including:
- Portrayal of intervention as imperialist aggression
- Mobilization of domestic resistance through nationalist messaging
- International propaganda through Russian and Chinese media channels
- Exploitation of civilian casualties and collateral damage
- Regional messaging emphasizing threats to Latin American sovereignty
Counter-messaging would require sophisticated multilingual information operations across traditional and social media, coordination with regional partners, and rapid response to emerging narratives.
VI. Post-Conflict Stabilization Requirements
A. Governance Transition
Post-conflict governance presents perhaps the greatest strategic challenge. Key considerations include:
Security Sector Reform: Venezuelan security forces would require comprehensive reform including vetting of personnel, retraining, democratic oversight mechanisms, and establishing civilian control. This process typically requires 5-10 years and substantial international support.
Economic Reconstruction: Venezuela faces catastrophic economic conditions requiring immediate humanitarian relief, restoration of basic services, and long-term economic reconstruction. Oil sector recovery is critical but would require massive investment and potentially 3-5 years to restore production capacity.
Justice and Reconciliation: Addressing human rights violations, corruption, and criminal activity while avoiding destabilizing purges would require carefully balanced transitional justice mechanisms, potentially including truth commissions and selective prosecutions.
B. Humanitarian Response Requirements
Immediate humanitarian needs would be substantial:
- Food distribution to address malnutrition affecting approximately 35% of population
- Medical supplies and healthcare infrastructure reconstruction
- Restoration of water and sanitation systems
- Electrical grid stabilization and repair
- Fuel distribution for transportation and electrical generation
- Coordination of international humanitarian organizations
Humanitarian operations would need to begin immediately upon commencement of military operations to prevent additional civilian suffering and build legitimacy for intervention.
C. Regional Refugee Repatriation
Over seven million Venezuelans have fled the country, creating the world's second-largest refugee crisis after Syria. Post-conflict planning would need to address:
- Voluntary repatriation programs in coordination with host nations
- Reintegration support including housing, employment, and social services
- Land and property rights resolution
- Coordination with UNHCR and regional governments
- Addressing xenophobia and social tensions in communities receiving returnees
VII. Economic and Resource Considerations
A. Financial Requirements
Military operations would entail substantial costs. Rough estimates based on comparable operations:
| Cost Category | Estimated Range (USD) | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Military Operations | $15-40 billion | 3-6 months |
| Stabilization Operations | $8-15 billion annually | 3-5 years |
| Humanitarian Assistance | $5-8 billion | First 12 months |
| Economic Reconstruction | $50-100 billion | 5-10 years |
| Security Sector Reform | $3-6 billion | 5-8 years |
These costs would ideally be distributed among coalition partners, international financial institutions, and eventually Venezuelan oil revenues, though burden-sharing would be politically contentious.
B. Oil Sector Considerations
Venezuela's oil resources represent both strategic opportunity and challenge:
- Revenue Potential: Restored production could generate $30-50 billion annually, providing resources for reconstruction
- Investment Requirements: Sector requires $50-100 billion investment to restore production capacity
- Timeline: Return to significant production levels would require 3-5 years minimum
- Political Sensitivities: Control and benefit-sharing of oil resources would be highly contentious politically
- Environmental Concerns: Legacy environmental damage requires remediation
VIII. Strategic Alternatives to Military Action
A. Enhanced Sanctions
Continued or enhanced economic pressure targeting regime leadership, economic sectors, and external supporters. Effectiveness has been limited to date, with humanitarian concerns about impact on civilian population.
B. Negotiated Transition
International mediation efforts to facilitate negotiated power transition. Multiple attempts have failed due to regime intransigence, but renewed efforts with enhanced pressure and incentives could potentially succeed.
C. Support for Internal Opposition
Non-military support for democratic opposition, civil society, and potential defection of security forces. Faces challenges of regime repression and opposition divisions.
D. Regional Containment
Focus on managing spillover effects in neighboring countries while containing Venezuelan instability. Accepts continued crisis but limits regional impact.
E. Selective Targeted Operations
Limited strikes against specific capabilities (e.g., narco-trafficking infrastructure) without broader intervention. Lower risk but limited strategic impact.
IX. Strategic Assessment and Recommendations
A. Prerequisites for Successful Operations
If military action were to be pursued, the following would be essential prerequisites:
- Clear Legal Justification: Establish compelling legal basis under international law, ideally with UN Security Council authorization or broad regional support
- Multinational Coalition: Build coalition including key regional partners, particularly Colombia and Brazil, with clear burden-sharing arrangements
- Defined Political Objectives: Establish clear, achievable political end state with realistic assessment of requirements
- Post-Conflict Planning: Comprehensive plans for governance transition, economic reconstruction, security sector reform, and humanitarian response
- Long-Term Commitment: Realistic assessment and commitment to 5-10 year presence and support
- Resource Allocation: Sufficient financial resources and burden-sharing arrangements for all phases of operations
- Domestic Support: Sustained domestic political support in participating nations for duration of operations
B. Risk Factors
Even with optimal planning, significant risks would remain:
- Civilian casualties in urban operations damaging legitimacy
- Prolonged irregular warfare and insurgency
- Regional destabilization and spillover effects
- Russian or Cuban escalatory responses
- Failure to establish legitimate governance
- Economic reconstruction costs exceeding projections
- Loss of domestic or international support during extended operations
C. Strategic Conclusions
The Venezuelan situation presents a classic strategic dilemma: significant humanitarian and security concerns that could justify action, but extremely high costs and risks of military intervention. The lack of clear legal justification, challenges in building regional coalition, complexity of post-conflict stabilization, and risks of irregular warfare suggest that military action should remain a last resort after exhausting diplomatic and non-military options.
However, contingency planning remains prudent given the possibility of sudden regime collapse, escalation of humanitarian catastrophe, or direct threats to neighboring nations. Such planning should emphasize:
- Maintaining readiness for rapid response to humanitarian emergencies
- Developing coalition frameworks with regional partners
- Preparing detailed post-conflict stabilization plans
- Building international support for potential action
- Exploring all non-military alternatives
The strategic complexity of Venezuela requires sophisticated analysis, careful planning, and realistic assessment of both the costs of action and the costs of inaction. Any decision regarding military operations must balance humanitarian imperatives, regional stability concerns, international legal constraints, and long-term strategic interests.
