TACO: Trump Always Chickens Out
TACO, an acronym standing for "Trump Always Chickens Out," emerged in May 2025 as a Wall Street shorthand describing a recurring pattern in President Donald Trump's approach to trade policy and, by extension, foreign affairs generally. Financial Times journalist Robert Armstrong introduced the term in a May 2, 2025, opinion piece that analyzed how markets were adapting to what he characterized as a predictable cycle wherein the Trump administration announces aggressive tariffs that send markets plummeting, only to subsequently delay or reduce those measures after economic and political pressure materializes, allowing markets to rebound. Armstrong wrote that markets were recognizing "the United States administration does not have a very high tolerance for market and economic pressure, and will be quick to back off when tariffs cause pain," a phenomenon he dubbed "the Taco theory: Trump Always Chickens Out."1 The term gained rapid traction among traders, investors, and political analysts as a framework for understanding not merely trade policy but a broader pattern of presidential behavior characterized by dramatic threats followed by strategic retreats.
The concept builds on an earlier Wall Street coinage, the "Trump put," which during Trump's first term described his apparent tendency to modify policies when financial markets reacted negatively, suggesting that investors could effectively rely on market pressure to constrain presidential actions that might harm asset values. The TACO formulation represents a more pointed and provocative articulation of this same insight, transforming what had been neutral financial jargon into explicitly pejorative political commentary. The acronym's adoption reflects growing recognition among market participants and policy observers that Trump's negotiating style, while producing considerable volatility and uncertainty, follows sufficiently consistent patterns to enable strategic positioning. Traders who recognized this pattern early in 2025 reportedly profited by purchasing stocks after tariff announcements drove prices down, then selling after subsequent policy reversals produced rebounds, a strategy some financial professionals explicitly labeled the "TACO trade."2
Liberation Day and the Tariff Cycle
The pattern that crystallized the TACO concept centered on Trump's April 2, 2025, announcement of what he termed "Liberation Day" tariffs, which represented perhaps the most dramatic example of this cycle. In a White House Rose Garden ceremony, Trump signed Executive Order 14257, declaring a national emergency over the United States trade deficit and invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to authorize sweeping tariffs on foreign imports. The order imposed a ten percent baseline tariff on imports from nearly all countries beginning April 5, with country-specific tariff rates scheduled to commence April 9. Trump characterized these measures as "reciprocal," asserting they mirrored trade barriers faced by American exports, and declared April 2 as "one of the most important days in American history" and "our declaration of economic independence."3 The actual tariff structure proved considerably more complex and arbitrary than the reciprocal framing suggested, with rates apparently based substantially on bilateral trade deficits rather than matching foreign tariffs, resurrecting a decades-old proposal from former Representative Richard Gephardt that President Ronald Reagan had vetoed in 1987.4
Markets responded with immediate and severe turbulence. Following the Liberation Day announcement, the United States total stock market index plunged by approximately 12.4 percent over the subsequent week, marking the largest decline since the COVID-19 pandemic disruption in 2020. The S&P 500 fell more than 15 percent from its earlier 2025 highs, erasing trillions of dollars in market capitalization as investors grappled with uncertainties about supply chain disruptions, rising input costs, and potential retaliatory measures from trading partners. Major retailers warned that the tariffs would force immediate price increases and product shortages. Congressional Republicans, while publicly supporting the president, privately expressed alarm about the economic and political consequences.5 China responded by announcing matching retaliatory tariffs, initiating a tit-for-tat escalation that ultimately saw American tariffs on Chinese goods reach 145 percent while Chinese tariffs on United States imports climbed to 125 percent, creating the highest trade barriers between the world's two largest economies in modern history.6
The pattern that gave rise to the TACO meme materialized with striking speed. On April 9, just seven days after the Liberation Day announcement and mere hours before the higher country-specific tariff rates were scheduled to take effect, Trump signed an executive order pausing those increases for 90 days while maintaining the baseline ten percent tariff. White House Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing Peter Navarro promised "90 deals in 90 days," suggesting the administration planned to negotiate bilateral agreements during this period that would render the threatened tariffs unnecessary. Markets responded euphorically, with the S&P 500 rallying approximately 9.5 percent in a single trading session, one of the largest single-day gains in market history, as investors interpreted the reversal as confirmation that market pressure could effectively constrain presidential action. Trading volumes surged as institutional and retail investors rushed to capitalize on what many now explicitly termed the TACO dynamic.7
The 90-day pause would be extended repeatedly over subsequent months as bilateral negotiations proceeded more slowly than the administration had projected. By late July, the United States had announced trade frameworks with only eight partners: the United Kingdom, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and a temporary truce with China. The substance of many of these agreements appeared limited, often maintaining significant tariff levels while providing modest adjustments to create political cover for both sides. Navarro's promise of "90 deals in 90 days" fell dramatically short of realization, with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick subsequently lowering expectations to perhaps ten to twelve significant agreements by Labor Day. Trump announced on July 8 that he would delay implementation of higher tariffs yet again, pushing the deadline from July 9 to August 1, then subsequently offered additional extensions for several countries. By early August, the president was providing Mexico a further 90-day negotiating period, demonstrating the pattern's continuation well beyond the initial Liberation Day cycle.8
Variations on the Theme: Additional Trade Retreats
The Liberation Day sequence, while particularly dramatic, represented merely the most prominent example of a pattern that repeated across multiple policy domains throughout Trump's second term. On May 26, Trump announced that he would impose 50 percent tariffs on European goods, only to delay their implementation to July 9 just three days later on Memorial Day, ostensibly to provide more time for negotiations while the baseline ten percent tariff continued. Markets, which had fallen sharply on the Friday announcement, rallied 2.1 percent when trading resumed after the holiday, with traders expressing increasing confidence that Trump would ultimately retreat from his most aggressive positions when faced with economic pressure. The Financial Times' Katie Martin identified this episode as exemplifying what she termed "the Taco factor," wherein Trump reverses decisions in response to negative market reactions.9
Similar dynamics played out regarding other trading partners. In February 2025, Trump announced 25 percent tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico, citing concerns about fentanyl trafficking and illegal immigration, only to pause them within days as the economic and diplomatic backlash intensified. The tariffs were subsequently reinstated in early March before being modified again, creating a whiplash effect that left businesses uncertain about planning and supply chains. Trump repeatedly threatened automobile tariffs, announcing a 25 percent levy on imported vehicles and automotive parts, then modifying the implementation, exempting certain categories, and adjusting timelines in response to lobbying from both domestic manufacturers who needed imported components and foreign automakers with United States production facilities. Each cycle followed a recognizable pattern: dramatic announcement, market turbulence, lobbying and pressure, strategic retreat or modification, and market recovery.10
The administration also backed away from eliminating the de minimis exception for small-value shipments from China on multiple occasions. Trump initially revoked China's eligibility for duty-free treatment of packages valued up to $800 in a February 1, 2025, executive order, characterizing the practice as enabling Chinese exporters to avoid tariffs and conceal illicit goods. However, he paused the revocation shortly thereafter, citing the absence of "adequate systems" to process the anticipated volume of low-value shipments. The change was finally implemented beginning May 2, but only after considerable delays and with graduated increases to the fees charged, suggesting continued accommodation to logistical and political realities. Even after implementation, the administration exempted various electronic products including computers, smartphones, semiconductors, and related components from reciprocal tariffs, arguably undermining the policy's stated objectives while responding to industry pressure.11
Trump's threats regarding Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell illustrated the pattern extending beyond trade policy. In late April 2025, Trump publicly called for Powell's termination, declaring that the Fed chair was not cutting interest rates sufficiently to support economic growth and suggesting that presidential authority extended to removing Fed leadership. Markets reacted with alarm to the threat against Federal Reserve independence, and Treasury yields spiked as investors contemplated potential politicization of monetary policy. Within days, however, Trump distanced himself from the proposal, with administration officials clarifying that the president understood he lacked legal authority to remove Powell and was merely expressing frustration. Markets stabilized as the perceived threat to Fed independence receded, once again validating the TACO thesis that Trump's most dramatic threats would not materialize when faced with substantial pushback.12
Presidential Reaction and Political Dynamics
Trump first learned of the TACO meme when CNBC correspondent Megan Cassella questioned him about it during a May 28, 2025, swearing-in ceremony for the acting attorney general. The president's reaction revealed considerable sensitivity to the characterization. "Oh, I chicken out? You call that chickening out?" Trump responded, visibly agitated, before calling it a "nasty question." He defended his approach by characterizing it as negotiation rather than retreat: "It's called negotiation. They wouldn't be over here today negotiating if I didn't put a 50 percent tariff" on Europe. Trump added, "The sad thing is, now, when I make a deal with them, it's something much more reasonable, they'll say, 'Oh, he was chicken, he was chicken.' That's so unbelievable. I usually have the opposite problem. They say, 'You're too tough, Mr. President.'"13 The defensive tone suggested the moniker had struck a nerve, challenging Trump's carefully cultivated image as an uncompromising dealmaker and tough negotiator.
The president's sensitivity to the TACO label appears rooted in its direct challenge to core elements of his political brand and self-conception. Trump has consistently presented himself as uniquely willing to confront adversaries, break with established practice, and follow through on threats that previous presidents made but never executed. The suggestion that he "chickens out" contradicts this narrative, implying instead that his threats constitute bluster rather than genuine commitment and that his policy positions represent opening gambits subject to negotiation rather than fixed principles. For a president whose political appeal rests substantially on projecting strength and unpredictability, the TACO framing poses a particular challenge by suggesting that his approach has become sufficiently predictable that sophisticated observers can profit by betting against his stated intentions.14
Political analysts and Trump supporters offered various defenses of the pattern identified by the TACO meme. Some characterized the cycle of threats followed by negotiations as reflecting sophisticated strategy rather than weakness, arguing that Trump deliberately stakes out maximalist positions to create negotiating room and extract concessions that would be unavailable through conventional diplomacy. From this perspective, the initial tariff threats serve as leverage to bring reluctant partners to the negotiating table, and the subsequent modifications represent successful deal-making rather than capitulation. Commerce Secretary Lutnick explicitly articulated this view when defending the administration's approach, suggesting that the goal was never to implement the highest threatened tariff rates but rather to use them as bargaining chips.15
Critics contend, however, that the pattern imposes significant costs even if it occasionally produces negotiating advantages. The market volatility generated by Trump's announcements and reversals creates uncertainty that inhibits business investment and long-term planning. Supply chains that depend on predictable trade rules struggle when tariff rates fluctuate on political whims, forcing companies to maintain larger inventories, diversify sourcing at greater expense, or simply accept heightened risk. The whipsaw effect on markets, while creating opportunities for sophisticated traders, imposes costs on retail investors, pension funds, and retirement accounts that cannot as easily time entries and exits. Foreign governments increasingly discount American threats when they have observed repeated examples of Trump backing down under pressure, potentially reducing United States leverage in future negotiations. Legal challenges to Trump's use of emergency powers to impose tariffs gained traction in federal courts, with judges questioning whether trade deficits genuinely constitute national emergencies justifying unilateral executive action, and these challenges were strengthened by evidence that the administration modified policies based on political and economic considerations rather than security imperatives.16
The Foreign Policy Dimension: TACO Beyond Trade
While the TACO meme originated in response to Trump's trade policy reversals, analysts quickly recognized that similar patterns characterized his approach to foreign policy more broadly. Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times wrote that "Trump always chickens out on foreign policy too," noting research by Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations documenting that Trump had threatened the use of force against foreign adversaries on 22 occasions as of early 2025 across his two terms, but actually employed force on only two occasions. This pattern suggested that Trump's bellicose rhetoric—while creating international tension and complicating American diplomacy—rarely translated into actual military action, particularly when facing adversaries capable of imposing costs on the United States.17 Shapiro characterized this as "a pattern of bullying" wherein Trump "used threats to intimidate his adversaries and mostly only employed force against his weaker victims," providing insight into his decision-making calculus and suggesting that foreign leaders were increasingly recognizing that standing firm against Trump's threats often proved more effective than immediate accommodation.18
Trump's first-term handling of North Korea exemplifies the foreign policy manifestation of the TACO pattern. In August 2017, following North Korean missile tests, Trump threatened that further provocations would be met with "fire and fury like the world has never seen," language that raised the specter of nuclear confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. According to reporting by the New York Times, Trump even proposed using nuclear weapons against North Korea and blaming the attack on another country, though he was dissuaded by Chief of Staff John Kelly. In subsequent months, Trump continued his inflammatory rhetoric, calling North Korean leader Kim Jong Un "Little Rocket Man" and declaring that military solutions were "locked and loaded." Yet rather than escalating toward military confrontation, Trump ultimately pursued direct diplomacy, becoming the first sitting United States president to meet with a North Korean leader through three summit meetings in 2018 and 2019.19 While Trump initially declared "There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea" following the Singapore summit, the meetings failed to produce meaningful progress toward denuclearization, and by 2020 North Korea's nuclear arsenal had reportedly increased to levels far larger than prior to the diplomatic engagement. Trump's approach thus followed the TACO pattern: dramatic threats, apparent retreat into negotiations, and ultimate failure to achieve stated objectives despite the presidential bluster.20
Afghanistan policy during Trump's first term displayed similar characteristics. In July 2019, Trump declared that if he wanted to win the war in Afghanistan, "I could win it in a week. I just don't want to kill ten million people," casually threatening genocide against the Afghan population while asserting he could "wipe Afghanistan off the face of the Earth." These extraordinary threats received limited international condemnation, perhaps because foreign leaders had learned to discount Trump's most extreme rhetoric. Rather than following through with intensified military operations, Trump instead pursued negotiations with the Taliban that culminated in a February 2020 agreement committing the United States to full withdrawal without securing meaningful concessions from the insurgents. The agreement, widely criticized as a "surrender" by Trump's own former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, sanctioned the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters and established conditions that contributed to the rapid collapse of Afghan government forces when the withdrawal ultimately occurred in 2021 under the Biden administration.21 Trump's approach thus combined apocalyptic threats with actual policy choices that effectively ceded ground to adversaries, embodying the contradiction that the TACO meme captures.
Similar patterns appeared in Trump's handling of Iran, where he withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear agreement in 2018, reimposed sanctions, and repeatedly threatened military action, including after Iran shot down an American drone in 2019. Trump initially authorized retaliatory strikes but called them off at the last minute, explaining that the potential casualty count made the response disproportionate. While the administration maintained economic pressure through sanctions and orchestrated the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, Trump consistently chose economic coercion and limited strikes over the sustained military campaign his rhetoric suggested. In his second term, Trump has suggested renewed interest in negotiating with Iran regarding its nuclear program, despite having torn up the previous agreement and declaring it the "worst deal ever," exemplifying the cycle of threats, partial action, and eventual repositioning that characterizes the TACO pattern.22
Market Adaptation and Investor Strategies
As the TACO pattern became widely recognized throughout 2025, market participants adapted their strategies to exploit what they increasingly viewed as predictable presidential behavior. The basic TACO trade involved purchasing stocks or other risk assets after Trump announced aggressive tariffs or other disruptive policies, anticipating that the initial negative market reaction would prove temporary as the administration ultimately backtracked or modified its position. Sophisticated investors refined this approach by analyzing the specific characteristics of different policy announcements to assess the probability of reversal. Threats directed at major trading partners whose retaliation could significantly harm the American economy appeared more likely to be modified than those targeting smaller economies with limited retaliatory capacity. Measures that produced immediate and visible economic pain, such as disruptions to supply chains affecting American manufacturers or retailers, generated faster reversals than those with more diffuse or delayed effects.23
Vital Knowledge analyst Adam Crisafulli noted in a May 28, 2025, research note that "the narrative is growing increasingly bullish as investors become more comfortable with the severity of the tariff threat (the 'TACO' mindset is being embraced by more people) while companies demonstrate an ability to absorb the import tax hike relatively well." This growing comfort with the pattern reduced market volatility over time as the initial shock of Trump's announcements diminished and investors increasingly positioned themselves to benefit from anticipated reversals. Options traders reportedly employed strategies designed to profit from volatility spikes following policy announcements, while hedge funds and other sophisticated investors maintained playbooks for different scenarios based on Trump's past behavior patterns.24 The proliferation of such strategies suggested that markets had effectively discounted Trump's most extreme threats, pricing in expected reversals and treating presidential announcements as tactical gambits rather than fixed policy positions.
However, multiple investment strategists cautioned against excessive reliance on the TACO pattern, warning that market complacency could prove dangerous if Trump eventually followed through on threats to demonstrate credibility or respond to political pressures. Nomura's head of global macro research, Rob Subbaraman, argued that "it may be dangerous to believe that a Trump put is set in stone" because the administration's negotiating power weakens as markets and foreign governments increasingly believe in the pattern, making it a less viable strategy over time. Billy Leung, investment strategist at Global X, similarly noted that "the market's reaction to tariffs has evolved. It's not just a fade-the-headline play anymore. The Trump put has weakened." These analysts suggested that Trump might eventually recognize the need to follow through on threats to restore credibility, potentially catching investors off-guard if they had positioned themselves too aggressively based on expectations of reversal.25
The TACO dynamic also raised questions about the credibility of American policy more broadly. UBP's head of equity research in Asia, Kieran Calder, argued that Trump's approach was "denting traders' confidence in United States policy and United States assets," pointing to episodes in April 2025 when significant capital outflows from American markets occurred as investors questioned the stability and predictability of the policy environment. The dollar weakened and Treasury yields spiked during these periods as international investors reassessed the risk premium they demanded for holding American assets. While these movements proved temporary as Trump reversed course, they illustrated the costs of a negotiating style that generated persistent uncertainty. Foreign investors who had traditionally viewed United States markets as safe havens began diversifying into other developed-market equities and bonds, potentially raising long-term borrowing costs for the American government and corporations.26
International Responses and Strategic Implications
Foreign governments' recognition of the TACO pattern appears to have influenced their strategic calculations regarding how to respond to Trump's threats. As The Hill reported in June 2025, citing Shapiro's analysis, "many leaders still seem intimidated by Trump, but increasingly they are catching on to his pattern of bullying. In places as diverse as Canada, Iran, China and the European Union, we are seeing increasing signs that leaders now recognize that Trump is afraid of anything resembling a fair fight. And so they are increasingly willing to stand up to him." This evolution in foreign leaders' approaches created what some analysts characterized as a credibility paradox: Trump's unpredictable communication style and willingness to threaten dramatic action may have initially enhanced American deterrence by creating uncertainty about how the United States might respond to provocations, but the consistent pattern of backing down under pressure increasingly encouraged adversaries to test American resolve.27
The European Union's response to Trump's tariff threats illustrated this evolution. Initially, European leaders expressed alarm at the proposed levies and scrambled to offer concessions that might forestall implementation. However, as the TACO pattern became clear, European negotiators appeared more willing to call Trump's bluff, dragging out negotiations and offering minimal substantive changes while waiting for the president to extend deadlines or reduce demands. The eventual agreement reached in July 2025, which lowered the tariff rate on European goods to 15 percent from the threatened 50 percent while maintaining many existing trade structures, arguably represented a European victory achieved by recognizing that steadfast resistance would ultimately produce better outcomes than hasty accommodation. Critics of this approach characterized it as appeasement and questioned whether Europe was effectively surrendering its economic interests to avoid Trump's wrath, though others argued that the EU had successfully navigated a difficult situation by avoiding a full-scale trade war while preserving most of its market access.28
Chinese negotiators similarly appeared to adapt their strategy based on observation of Trump's behavior patterns. After the initial escalation in April 2025 that saw tariffs reach 145 percent on Chinese goods, China announced it would "ignore future tariff increases," suggesting Beijing had concluded that matching every American escalation was unnecessary if Trump would ultimately retreat under pressure. The subsequent agreement in May to reduce tariffs to 30 percent on American goods and ten percent on Chinese goods (for a 90-day assessment period) represented a significant de-escalation that China appeared to secure by maintaining its position rather than offering major concessions. While negotiations for a comprehensive agreement continued, Chinese officials appeared less concerned about immediate compliance with American demands, apparently calculating that Trump's domestic political pressures and market concerns would force accommodation even without significant Chinese movement.29
The TACO pattern has also influenced alliance relationships, with traditional American partners questioning whether they can rely on presidential commitments when Trump has demonstrated repeated willingness to reverse course. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney declared in April 2025 that the deep relationship between the United States and Canada on economic, security, and military issues was effectively over, a remarkable statement from the leader of America's closest ally reflecting frustration with the volatility of Trump's approach. French President Emmanuel Macron planned a symbolic visit to Greenland in June 2025 as a show of European solidarity after Trump's expressions of interest in acquiring the Danish territory, signaling that European leaders would not simply acquiesce to American demands regardless of the pressure applied. These actions suggested that allies were concluding they needed to demonstrate resolve rather than immediate compliance when faced with Trump's threats, even at the risk of short-term friction in bilateral relationships.30
Assessment and Implications
The TACO phenomenon represents more than a clever financial markets meme; it captures a fundamental characteristic of Trump's decision-making process that has profound implications for domestic policy, international relations, and economic stability. At its core, the pattern reflects Trump's apparent sensitivity to immediate feedback—particularly negative market reactions and visible economic pain—combined with limited tolerance for sustained conflict when adversaries prove willing to resist initial pressure. This creates a strategic vulnerability that sophisticated actors have learned to exploit by maintaining positions rather than immediately accommodating American demands, calculating correctly that Trump will typically retreat when faced with substantial costs or prolonged stalemate. The pattern also reflects the dominance of short-term political considerations over longer-term strategic planning in Trump's approach, with decisions often driven by news cycles, market movements, and immediate political pressures rather than sustained analysis of national interests.31
However, the implications of the TACO pattern remain deeply uncertain and contested. Supporters argue that Trump's approach, while unconventional and volatile, has produced genuine negotiating successes by creating uncertainty and forcing partners to engage seriously rather than maintaining comfortable status quo arrangements. They point to instances where threatened tariffs appeared to accelerate negotiations or produce concessions that might not have materialized through conventional diplomacy. Critics counter that the costs of this approach—market volatility, damaged relationships with allies, reduced American credibility, legal challenges to executive authority, and the opportunity costs of businesses and governments spending resources to manage uncertainty rather than productive activities—far exceed any tactical gains achieved. They argue that the pattern has taught foreign leaders that Trump's threats need not be taken seriously and that standing firm typically produces better outcomes than accommodation, ultimately undermining rather than enhancing American leverage.32
The widespread recognition of the TACO pattern by mid-2025 creates a potential inflection point. Trump may recognize that his negotiating strategy has lost effectiveness as counterparties have learned to discount his threats, potentially leading him to follow through on measures to restore credibility and demonstrate that he does not always "chicken out." Such an approach could produce more sustained trade wars, actual military conflicts, or economic disruptions that markets are not currently pricing in, catching investors and policymakers off-guard if they have become too confident in the pattern's reliability. Alternatively, Trump might adapt his approach by reducing the gap between initial threats and final positions, announcing more realistic demands that he intends to implement rather than using extreme positions as negotiating tactics. A third possibility is that the pattern continues largely unchanged, with Trump repeatedly going through the cycle of dramatic announcements and subsequent retreats while insisting that each represents successful negotiation, and with markets, foreign governments, and domestic constituencies continuing to adapt their expectations accordingly.33
The TACO phenomenon also raises broader questions about presidential power, institutional constraints, and the role of market discipline in constraining executive action. The pattern suggests that financial markets and economic feedback loops may impose more effective constraints on presidential behavior than formal institutional checks such as congressional oversight or judicial review, at least regarding economic policy domains where market reactions materialize quickly and visibly. This market-based discipline, while potentially beneficial in preventing the most disruptive policy choices, also raises concerns about democratic accountability, as it effectively grants disproportionate influence to financial markets and sophisticated investors who can trade on policy expectations while ordinary citizens and small businesses bear the costs of uncertainty without comparable ability to profit from volatility. The constitutional and political implications of a presidency constrained more by market reactions than by elected representatives or legal norms remain underexplored but potentially significant for understanding contemporary executive power.34
Looking forward beyond 2025, the durability and implications of the TACO pattern will depend substantially on factors including the political sustainability of Trump's approach among his electoral base, the willingness of foreign governments to continue testing American resolve, the possibility of exogenous shocks that force sustained commitments rather than tactical retreats, and the broader evolution of American political economy and governance. If Trump's supporters remain committed to his leadership despite repeated policy reversals, the political costs of "chickening out" may remain manageable, allowing the pattern to continue indefinitely. However, if critics can effectively use the TACO framing to undermine Trump's image as a strong negotiator, the political dynamics might shift, potentially forcing different approaches. Similarly, if a major crisis requires sustained presidential commitment rather than tactical maneuvering, the limits of the TACO approach may become apparent in ways that reshape both Trump's behavior and broader assessments of his leadership. What remains clear is that the TACO meme has captured something fundamental about the current American presidency—a pattern of dramatic announcements, market-driven reversals, and the gap between presidential rhetoric and actual policy implementation that appears likely to persist as a defining characteristic of Trump's second term regardless of whether the acronym itself endures in popular discourse.35
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