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BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM
PERCEPTIONS II, FY 95

Brigade Command & Battle Staff Training

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5.1 Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R & S) plans lack focus and detail. (II-1)

5.3 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is inadequate. (II-1,2)

1.1.1 Movement and positioning of field artillery assets are not realistic. (II-2)

1.3 Force does not gain positional advantage. (II-2,3)

2.1 Fire mission processing is not timely. (II-3)

3.3 Air defense task organization not based on the threat nor organized to achieve the commander's priorities. (II-3,4)

3.3 Commanders do not doctrinally integrate air defense in their plans. (II-4)

6.1.1 Breaching operations are poorly planned and are not rehearsed. (II-4)

6.2 Countermobility planning does not support the brigade scheme of maneuver. (II-5)

6.2 Obstacle execution is inadequate. (II-5)

6.2.1 Situational obstacle planning is inadequate. (II-5,6)

6.2.2.2 Digging assets are poorly managed. (II-6)

6.3 Force is not adequately protected. (II-6)

7.6 Logistical planning is inadequate. (II-7)

4.1 Tactical operations centers (TOC) are not managing information. (II-7,8)

4.1.1 Information is disseminated without analysis. (II-8)

4.1.1 Brigades do not promptly pass early warning to all units. (II-8)

4.1.1 Logistics reporting is weak. (II-9)

4.1.1 Command and control communication nets (FM) are not being properly used. (II-9)

4.1.3 Operations & Intelligence net is not operated effectively. (II-9)

4.1.3 Battle tracking is incomplete at the brigade and battalion level. (II-10)

4.1.3 Air defense assets are not adequately tracked during the battle. (II-10)

4.1.3 FSB and Bde command posts are not accurately tracking the fight. (II-10)

4.1.3 Battle tracking is inadequate. (II-11)

4.2 Air defense LNOs do not plan for contingencies or future operations. (II-11)

4.2.1 Reconnaissance & surveillance execution is not monitored. (II-11,12)

4.3 Units do not plan to achieve mass. (II-12)

4.3 Units do not consider tempo. (II-12,13)

4.3 Plans do not have sufficient flexibility. (II-13)

4.3 Brigade staffs do not involve CSS personnel in the decision making process. (II-14)

4.3 There is a lack of command involvement in the CSS process. (II-14)

4.3 Commanders and staffs are not knowledgeable about the deliberate decision making process. (II-15)

4.3.1 Commanders' guidance and intent statements are doctrinally incomplete. (II-15,16)

4.4 Terms of the battle are set by the enemy. (II-16)

4.4 Brigades are exercising poor troop leading procedures. (II-16,17)

4.4.1 Rear operations plans are incomplete and fail to account for areas outside the BSA. (II-17)

4.4.1 Command and control is negatively impacted by inaccurate and incomplete operation orders and graphic overlays. (II-17,18)

4.4.5 Air IPB and A2C2 plan without other BOS input. (II-18)

4.4.5 CSS planning and resupply operations are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. (II-18)

Introduction

TA.5 Intelligence BOS Narrative