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SECTION II: BOS NARRATIVES

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Organized by BOS, these narratives amplify the bullet listings in Section I. As appropriate and/or available, they provide techniques, procedures and doctrinal references to support the needed training emphasis. The narratives are labeled IAW the Blueprint of the Battlefield system for standardized reference and long-term trend development.

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS

5.1 Collect Information

* Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R & S) plans lack focus and detail. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Poor priority intelligence requirement (PIR) development.
2. PIR are not tied to named areas of interest (NAI).
3. No start and stop times for NAI coverage.
4. Specific information requirements (SIR) are too general.
5. R & S assets are overtasked with NAIs.

Techniques:

1. Have S2s review R & S principles, techniques and procedures in FM 34-2-1 to help overcome R & S planning difficulties.
2. S2s should learn to incorporate situation and event templates into the development of the R & S plan. (FM 34-2-1, Chapter 2).
3. The S3 should approve the R & S plan to ensure it supports the scheme of maneuver.
4. Include other BOS elements into the R & S plan. (FM 34-2-1, Chapter 4).

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is inadequate. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Insufficient analysis of the battlefield environment: (see FM 34-130, Chapter 2):

• Terrain and weather analysis is too general for brigade and battalion planning and in the development of threat courses of action.

• Units too often fail to consider specific terrain and weather effects on enemy and friendly courses of action.

• Too often S2s use higher echelon IPB information and products without conducting further refinement to the level of detail required for brigade and battalion operations.

2. Incomplete enemy course of action (COA) development:

• S2s normally develop only one enemy COA.
• Too often enemy COA development situation or event templates are either missing or incomplete.
• Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities are not developed.
• High value targets (HVT) are not identified.

RESULT: When the enemy conducts a COA different than expected, the unit is taken by surprise and cannot effectively react to the unexpected situation.

Technique: Use OPFOR doctrinal references, such as TRADOC Pam 350-16 and the BCTP World Class OPFOR NKPA Handbook to assist S2s in developing likely enemy COAs. Also refer to FM 34-130, Chapter 2 for the doctrinal principles and effective techniques to use in developing enemy COAs.

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TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative