UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status

* Tactical operations centers (TOC) are not managing information. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Mismanagement of information results in poor situational awareness and commanders not having the facts they need to make critical decisions.

2. Non-standard TOC layouts do not support the smooth flow of information to answer CCIR.

3. Commanders seldom identify the information they need and the format they need it in to make decisions.

  • Information on windboards in CPs is inadequate and incomplete.
  • CCIR not being posted in TOCs.

4. Units do not establish a TOC capable of satisfying the commander's information requirements, adequately battle track, nor facilitate staff responsibilities:

  • Staffs are not using tools to help commanders make decisions, ie., event analysis template; decision support template (DST).
  • Huddles are not routinely conducted to quickly update the staffs in the CPs as situations change.

5. Map boards are not placed so commanders and staff can see a complete snapshot of the battlefield.

Techniques: Refer to FM 101-5, Chapter 6 for TOC operations doctrine; CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center for techniques and procedures.

1. The operations, intelligence, and fire support map boards usually contain the essential elements of information, and they should be side-by-side to portray a complete picture.

2. Other map boards, engineer, air defense, and NBC must be nearby so that information is also readily available.

3. Information charts must be relevant as well as frequently updated to be of use.

4. Use the battle staff NCO as a combat multiplier in controlling the flow of information:

  • Can ensure reports and messages are properly distributed.
  • Can update status on maps and charts.
  • Can monitor critical TOC events and actions.

4.1.1 Communicate Information

* Information is disseminated without analysis. :

PROBLEMS:

1. S2s track and develop the enemy situation based solely on spot reports and often do not use situation and event templates:

  • S2 are more reactive than predictive.

2. S2s often disseminate higher echelon intelligence products; i.e., INTSUM/INTREP, without tailoring them down to their level of operation:

  • Information is passed without an evaluation of impact or meaning to the unit.
  • Too much reliance is placed on higher headquarters analysis.

Techniques:

1. Use situation and event templates to help focus the conduct of the operation.
2. S2s should review FM 34-3 and FM 34-130 for refinement of the analyticaltechniques and procedures.

* Brigades do not promptly pass early warning to all units. :

PROBLEMS:

1. During an enemy air attack, air defenders in brigade TOCs often do not pass early warning promptly to all subordinate units.
2. Lapses in early warning transmission have been as long as thirty minutes or more.
3. Some air defense liaisons only notify specific units of impending attack, even though the red air intended target is unknown.

Procedure: Brigades need to establish a firm SOP stating that all friendly units will be passed every early warning alert immediately upon receipt. Refer to FM 44-64, Chapters 1-3.

* Logistics reporting is weak. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Commonly, at all echelons within the brigade, TOC personnel do not record and submit timely CSS status reports; charts are not updated, and often reflect old information. (Refer to FM 71-123, Chapter 8).

2. Command posts are not portraying current combat power status. EXAMPLE: often between CPs within the brigade there is a wide variance in reported combat power mission capable, in maintenance, and destroyed. This variance negatively impacts the commander's capability to make sound, rapid decisions.

3. Maneuver brigades often do not know the status of supplies in their own trains. RESULT: units frequently generate unnecessary emergency resupply requests.

4. Support battalions lose track of the status of supplies on hand or the location of supplies on the ground.

* Command and control communication nets (FM) are not being properly used. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Units are not using the command net (FM) to command tactical operations:

  • Units rely too heavily on MSE and wire communication during operations.

  • Commanders are reluctant to talk on command nets (FM). RESULT: this reluctance negates the commander's ability to maintain situational awareness and to achieve agility in the battle.

2. Communication nets and equipment are not properly established with TOCs:

  • Non-standard TOC and communication layouts are being used.
  • Communication equipment is not remoted close to situational maps to facilitate posting and reference.

3. Nets are not being monitored adequately; i.e., command, O& fire support, etc.

4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status

* Operations & Intelligence net is not operated effectively.:

PROBLEMS:

1. Sporadic use of the O & I net limits the flow of information within the brigade.
2. Brigade S3s generally do not ensure all units receive information.
3. Battalions do not consistently monitor the O & I net.
4. Battalions often use MSE for the brigade O & I net, not FM.

Technique: Practice, at Home Station, using the O & I net as a valuable resource in providing a common view of the battlefield among all battalions within the brigade.

* Battle tracking is incomplete at the brigade and battalion level. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Fire support elements and DS artillery do not track friendly nor enemy forcesduring battles:

  • Maneuver staffs do not pass information within the BOS elements to update unit locations.
  • FISTs do not provide timely information on their positions to task force FSOs.
  • Task forces do not provide information to brigades on FLOTs.
  • Field artillery battalions do not pass status of artillery or radar to combined arms headquarters.

2. Procedures are not in place to pass fire support coordinating measures in a timely manner nor procedures to verify that all units have proper information.

Techniques:

1. Battle tracking assists in the responsive clearance of fires and the decision process on fire support assets movement, ensuring they stay within range. DOCTRINE: Refer to FM 6-20-40 and FM 6-20-50.

2. Fire support officers must aggressively seek information on friendly forces and then update higher headquarters.

* Air defense assets are not adequately tracked during the battle. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Air defense cells frequently fail to properly track the status of their Stinger teams.

2. Team locations, supported unit locations, air defense coverage overlays, engagement and logistics reports often contain dated information or are not tracked at all.

Procedure: Air defense liaisons need to establish a standardized method to track the air defense battle for their brigades. DOCTRINE: Refer to FM 44-64, Chapter 2, Section IV.

* FSB and Bde command posts are not accurately tracking the fight. :

PROBLEMS:

1. CSS elements in command posts at both the FSB and the brigade are not posting locations of friendly and enemy forces on current operations maps accurately and in sufficient resolution to portray the FLOT or FEBA.

2. Terrain management:

  • The brigade S3 does not address the issues of terrain management and movement control for units in the brigade rear area. ( Refer to FM 71-100, Chapter 1).

3. Fire support:

  • Even when brigades do allocate indirect fire systems to the support battalion, there are no plans for fire support coordination measures.

Technique: Brigade S3s must synchronize rear area operations with the scheme of maneuver. (Refer to FM 71-123).

* Battle tracking is inadequate. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigades and battalions rarely track adjacent units and often do not post the graphics of the next higher headquarters.

2. Tracking of subordinate units is incomplete.

3. Tracking of the enemy situation is incomplete; all sources that can provide information about the enemy are not used, ie. fire support, air defense, engineers, etc.

Techniques:

1. Use all available sources to enhance battle tracking, such as eavesdropping on command and O & I nets.

2. Directly communicate with any source outside the TOC that might have pertinent information.

3. Track subordinate units 2 levels down, and lower as required.

4. Develop a system for battle tracking. Accurate, disciplined battle tracking enables the commander to make timely decisions and effectively synchronize battlefield activities. DOCTRINE: FM 101-5, Chapter 6.

4.2 Assess Situation

* Air defense LNOs do not plan for contingencies or future operations. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Stinger teams suffer losses during the battle, resulting in gaps in air defense coverage.
2. Frequently a brigade will conduct an attack, than transition to the defense with no air defense plan.

Techniques:

1. During the conduct of current operations, the air defense cell should be constantly conducting contingency and future operations planning.

2. Plans should exist to realign air defense teams to maintain protection of supported units.

3. Air defense liaisons should constantly consider contingency actions and plan for future operations when not engaged with the battle.

4. DOCTRINE: FM 44-64, Chapter 7.

4.2.1 Review Current Situation

* Reconnaissance & surveillance execution is not monitored. :

PROBLEMS:

1. R & S efforts often fail because units do not monitor the actions of collectors to ensure that R & S is executed as planned:

  • R & S assets are allowed to report on their own schedule.
  • Named Areas of Interest (NAI) coverage is not verified.
  • When R & S assets are attrited, no action is taken to replace them.

2. There is confusion between security and reconnaissance missions:

  • Security tasks and missions are not clearly identified.
  • naccurate descriptions of tasks and missions cloud the purpose and requirements of an operation.
  • R & S assets are often assigned security tasks which are mislabeled as reconnaissance. Refer to FM 34-2 and FM 101-5-1 for doctrinal definitions of reconnaissance and security.

4.3 Determine Actions

* Units do not plan to achieve mass. :

PROBLEMS:

Offensive operations --

1. Units do not develop courses of action with narrow sectors for the main effort, or sufficiently weight the main effort.
2. Units seldom plan on having two task forces attack the same objective to overwhelm the enemy.
3. Attacks are generally made uncoordinated and piecemeal. DOCTRINE: Refer to FM 71-123, Chapter 3.

PROBLEMS:

Defensive operations --

1. The defensive concept of operations is seldom developed to the point where a recognizable plan for the defense is obvious.

2. Task forces are positioned within the brigade defensive framework, but are not assigned missions that cause them to function as team conducting a brigade plan.

3. Defeat mechanisms and the use of a reserve are not adequately planned.

Techniques:

1. Mass is achieved by synchronizing all elements of combat power where they will have a decisive effect on the enemy force.

2. The plan must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive plan and time. DOCTRINE: Refer to FM 100-5, Chapter 2.

*Units do not consider tempo. : Tempo is the combination of mass and speed which promotes surprise, keeps the enemy off balance, denies the enemy freedom of action, and contributes to the security of the attacking force.

PROBLEMS:

Offensive operations --

1. Units do not plan to operate at a tempo which is unexpected by the enemy.
2. Task forces seldom are rapidly committed, and massed to defeat the enemy piecemeal.
3. Task forces generally use a frontal attack resulting in a battle of attrition; other forms of maneuver are not considered.

Technique: Offensive plans should cause the weight of fires and maneuver forces to fall on selected enemy positions to create a coordinated destruction of the enemy. DOCTRINE: Refer to FM 71-123, Chapter 3.

PROBLEMS:

Defensive operations --

There is little planning to disrupt or desynchronize the enemy plan enough to prevent achievement of their aim.

Techniques:

1. The defense should deny enemy reconnaissance a clear picture of force disposition.

2. Force the enemy to maneuver where he does not want to maneuver, and then destroy the enemy with a defeat mechanism that is planned and clearly articulated.

3. The defense must affect the enemy tempo, and disrupt the enemy's ability to coherently attack the friendly defense.

4. DOCTRINE: FM 71-123, Chapter 4.

* Plans do not have sufficient flexibility. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Task forces are generally placed into positions that are not mutually supporting.
2. Task forces primarily act independently of other brigade units in the defense.
3. The brigade does not adequately plan for commitment of the reserve or a defeat mechanism.
4. The brigade does not plan for creating an assailable flank by fires or obstacles and then attacking that flank.

Techniques:

1. The defense must be tied together in a relatively seamless operation.

2. The defense must be planned and executed as a brigade effort, not individual battalion task forces.

3. When the reserve is committed, it becomes the main effort, and must receive the appropriate assets to accomplish the mission.

4. Commit the reserve to maintain the integrity of the defense or to seize the initiative from the enemy.

5. Defensive operations should reflect flexible planning and agile execution:

  • The attacker initially decides when and where combat will take place.
  • The agile defender can counter or evade the attacker blow, and then effectively strike back.

6. DOCTRINE: FM 71-123, Chapter 4; FM 100-5, Chapter 9.

* Brigade staffs do not involve CSS personnel in the decision making process. :

PROBLEMS:

1. S1, S4 and FSB personnel hesitate in expressing CSS restrictions during course of action analysis and wargaming sessions:

2. Comparison of the CSR to the RSR is frequently either not accomplished or it is done by the S4 or support operations officer, with no input from the S3 or the FSO; too often brigade S3s ignore their responsibility to determine the RSR for planned operations. DOCTRINE: FM 63-3, Chapter 5.

3. Movement planning is extremely weak:

4. Deputy brigade commander and/or XO, S1, S4 and FSB personnel do not fully understand their role in the decision making process. DOCTRINE: FM 71-3, Chapter 3.

* There is a lack of command involvement with the CSS process. :

PROBLEM: In separate brigade, the deputy brigade commander (DBC) and the brigade executive officers in divisional brigades tend to situate themselves in the brigade TOC and uniformly the DBCs and the XOs focus forward.

Techniques:

1. Brigade commanders should make greater use of the DBCs and XOs in CSS and rear operations planning and execution.

2. Deputy commanders normally operate within specific areas as defined by the commander, including:

  • Operation of the BSA.
  • Logistics support for the operation.
  • Coordination and execution of rear operations.
  • Main and rear CP interface.

3. The XO ensures continuous CSS for the brigade:

  • The XO is responsible for conduct of rear operations due to the duties of coordinating the staffs of both the main and rear CPs.

4. DOCTRINE: for staff roles and functions, see FM 71-3, Chapter 3.

* Commanders and staffs are not knowledgeable about the deliberate decision making process. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Commanders and staffs do not demonstrate the ability to apply the process to develop a doctrinally correct order. DOCTRINE: FM 101-5, Chapter 4.

2. Units do not develop different and complete courses of action (COA):

3. Units do not understand nor conduct proper analysis and comparison of COAs:

4. Enlisted staff personnel are not fully participating in the deliberate decision making process:

4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance

* Commanders' guidance and intent statements are doctrinally incomplete. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Most commanders only consider four or five (enemy COAs, restated mission, intent, concept of operation, priorities) of the nine elements they should consider for developing their guidance. RESULT: staffs being unfocused during the critical COA development stage.

2. Commanders do not articulate their intent through the end state:

  • This gives staffs the impression they are not required to plan for subsequent "on order" missions.
  • End states are not addressed in relation to friendly forces, the enemy and terrain.

3. Commanders do not use tactical terms to precisely convey the concept of the operation:

  • Standard doctrinal terms are not used nor fully understood. EXAMPLE: must know the specific forms of maneuver or pattern of defense to define the battlefield framework.
  • Command and support relationships are not adequately understood in task organization.
  • Units do not tailor task organization to METT-T, and rely mostly on habitual relationships.

DOCTRINE: Refer to FM 101-5, Chapter 4 for commander's guidance; see Chapter 4 and Appendix H for commander's intent and end state. Refer to FM 101-5-1 for operational terms and graphics.

4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

* Terms of the battle are set by the enemy. :

PROBLEMS:

Offensive operations --

1. Brigades no not mass forces nor fires to achieve overwhelming superiority over the enemy.

2. The main effort is generally not sufficiently weighted to achieve mass.

3. Units believe that an objective can only be attacked by one task force, not multiple task forces. DOCTRINE: see FM 71-123, Chapter 3).

PROBLEMS:

Defensive operations --

1. Fires and obstacle planning do not force the enemy into a position to be destroyed.

2. Fires and obstacles are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

3. Multiple task forces rarely engage a force simultaneously; forces tend to operate independently within the defensive framework.

4. Units can seldom describe what the defense is meant to do (purpose), and how to achieve the purpose (method).

5. Defeat mechanisms are seldom identified, and the concept is not understood. DOCTRINE: see FM 71-123, Chapter 4 about defeat mechanisms, ie. the means by which the enemy will lose the battle, and the synchronization of combat power required.

* Brigades are exercising poor troop leading procedures. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Time is mismanaged during the decision making process:

2. Staffs spend too much time on mission analysis.

3. S3s do not spend enough time developing sound, distinguishable courses of action.

4. Staffs are allowed to become unfocused during COA wargaming sessions.

5. Warning orders from brigades are late and incomplete. RESULT: unproductive time for battalions when they should be parallel planning. DOCTRINE: FM 101-5, Appendix H.

6. Units tend to provide "cartoons" or crude COA sketches, rather than overlays.

Techniques:

1. XOs must develop realistic timelines and then ruthlessly enforce timelines.
2. Provide at least an 80% solution on task organization to battalions so they have an idea what resources are available.
3. Develop and provide complete, accurate and correct operations overlays to subordinates.
4. Address the battlefield framework completely and type of maneuver or the pattern of defense required by the mission.

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

* Rear operations plans are incomplete and fail to account for areas outside the BSA. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade S2s often fail to integrate the brigade rear area into the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R& plan.

2. Support battalions often do an R& plan for the BSA, but it does not include the entire brigade rear area.

3. Responsibility for rear area operations are not clearly depicted or understood:

  • Too often brigade S3s assume the FSB commander is the rear area commander, with all of the inherent responsibilities and resources.

  • Rear areas are often not adequately resourced for appropriate threat levels.

Techniques:

1. The brigade commander is responsible for brigade rear area. DOCTRINE: FM 71-3, Chapter 6; FM 63-10.

2. The brigade staff is responsible for all necessary coordination as directed by the deputy brigade commander or executive officer.

3. The brigade S3 ensures all units in and around the BSA have taken adequate security measures.

4. The FSB commander is responsible for the BSA, and he may be assigned additional rear area responsibilities.

5. Designation of a Tactical Combat Force (TCF):

  • A combat unit with appropriate CS and CSS assets that is assigned the mission of defeating level III threats. DOCTRINE: see FM 101-5-1 for definition.

  • Task organized by the G3 (division or corps).

  • TCF may contain it own organic artillery or aviation support.

* Command and control is negatively impacted by inaccurate and incomplete operation orders and graphic overlays. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Operation orders are not synchronized; inconsistencies exist between brigade and battalion orders. RESULT: commanders do not have a common view of the battle, and they have less ability to control the operation. DOCTRINE: FM 101-5, Appendix H.

2. Units do not crosswalk orders with higher and subordinate unit orders to synchronize operations.

3. Task organizations are incomplete and inaccurate; command/support relationships are inaccurate.

4. Units fight independent operations rather than synchronized brigade battles.

5. Operational graphics and overlays are incomplete and inaccurate: DOCTRINE: FM 101-5-1.

  • Marginal data is almost never complete.
  • Graphical symbols are not standard and are incomplete.
  • Boundaries are not labeled nor unit identification properly marked.
  • Non-doctrinal symbols are used without a legend.
  • Control measures, such as phase lines and fire support coordination lines, are not properly marked.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Air IPB and A2C2 plan without other BOS input. : The A2C2 task is usually delegated to the air defender, who lacks knowledge in airspace management planning. RESULT: a useful product is rarely produced. DOCTRINE: FM 44-64, Appendix 1; FM 44-82, Chapter 5.

Techniques:

1. The development of the air IPB should be a joint effort with the S2, the ALO, the Army aviation officer, threat capabililties and probable course of action.

2. The development of the A2C2 plan requires input from every staff element concerned with airspace coordination. DOCTRINE: FM 100-103, Chapter 2.

* CSS planning and resupply operations are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigades do not understand the process of ordering and receiving corps resupply:

2. Supply synchronization:

3. Improvements needed in the selection, delivery timing and planning for material handling equipment (MHE) support for engineer barrier materials.


TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narrative



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list