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TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

* Breaching operations are poorly planned and are not rehearsed. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Breach operations are not organized properly because they do not include a support force, a breach force, and an assault force.

2. The principles of suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR) are not applied.

3. Breaching operations are not rehearsed prior to the attack; what rehearsals are conducted are not done as a combined arms team.

Techniques: Refer to FM 90-13-1 for the techniques of combined arms breaching operations.

6.2 Provide Countermobility

* Countermobility planning does not support the brigade scheme of maneuver. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade engineers do not understand obstacle control measures and fail to convey these control measures to task force engineers:

• Task force engineers plan obstacles outside brigade directed belts.
• Obstacle belts are not prioritized and weighted with appropriate engineer assets.
• Obstacle overlays and graphics are inaccurate and misleading.

2. Planning at the task force level is conducted without considering the brigade countermobility plan:

• Obstacle groups are not sited to take advantage of terrain.
• Obstacle groups do not fulfill the belt's obstacle effect.

Techniques: Refer to FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration as the doctrinal reference for obstacle planning.

* Obstacle execution is inadequate. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Obstacles are not integrated with fires (direct, indirect, CAS). See FM 90-7.

2. Obstacle execution at the task force level does not support the task force scheme of maneuver.

3. Brigade engineers do not develop brigade or task force directed engagement areas with obstacles when appropriate.

4. Executed obstacles do not create the planned effect; they do not support the commander's intent.

5. Obstacles are not executed aggressively.

6. Frequently engineer units sit idle without missions.

7. Too often there is poor battle tracking of engineer work and assets; obstacle tracking and obstacle data dissemination is poor.

8. Situational obstacles are not executed in a timely manner to support the scheme of maneuver:

• Employment and capabilities of FASCAM assets are not understood at brigade and battalion levels.
• FASCAM employment not tied to decision support template (DST).

6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles

* Situational obstacle planning is inadequate. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Units that do plan situational obstacles often fail to synchronize the plan with the other battlefield operating systems.
2. Units lack understanding of the capabilities and employment considerations of scatterable systems.
3. Units fail to consider all available systems during planning.
4. Situational obstacles are not event driven in the decision support template.

Technique: Staff engineer must fully understand planning considerations for situational obstacles. Refer to FM 90-7, Chapter 7 for situational planning doctrine; refer toFM 70-32, Chapter 6 for scatterable systems capabilities and employment doctrine.

6.2.2.2 Prepare/Emplace Constructed Obstacles

* Digging assets are poorly managed. :

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade engineers allocate digging assets without considering an effective means of control:

• Dozer sections are assigned to support units without adequate command and control.
• There is not an execution plan based on time or missions.
• Lack of proper allocation and control degrades overall survivability efforts.

2. Engineer company commanders do not manage their assigned assets closely:

• Equipment tends to remain in one place upon completion of their assigned work.
• Reporting to higher is erratic and incomplete.

Technique: The use of a survivability execution matrix at all levels will assist in the planning and execution of obstacles. Refer to FM 90-7.

6.3 Enhance Survivability

* Force is not adequately protected. :

PROBLEMS:

Offensive operations --

1. As the brigade attacks or moves to contact, the advance element does not provide security for the main body, nor provide adequate reports on the disposition of enemy forces or obstacles.

2. Generally the force designated is not robust enough or have the right focus to perform the mission adequately. (Refer to FM 71-123, Chapter 3)

3. OPSEC and deception operations are not executed.

PROBLEMS:

Defensive operations --

1. The security force is generally a task force with the mission of guard or screen; the task force is expected to withdraw from the security zone to a subsequent position in depth.

2. This movement is seldom accomplished. RESULT: Removal of this considerable amount of defensive depth severely impacts on the subsequent mission execution. (Refer to FM 71-123, Chapter 4).

TA.3 Air Defense BOS Narrative

TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narrative