Chapter 2

Prepare, Mobilize, and Deploy

From today forward the main effort of the US Army must be to prepare for war with Iraq.

General Eric Shinseki
Chief of Staff of the Army,
9 October 2002 ¹

During the 12 years following DESERT STORM, the deliberate preparation for operations against Iraq focused primarily on defensive preparations in the event of a second Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and operation of the northern and southern no-fly zones. The US-led coalition maintained a presence in the region to serve as a deterrent, a "trip wire," and to confirm the continuing US commitment to the Kuwaiti people. The Army maintained near-continuous presence by rotating small, battalion-size forces to Kuwait to conduct combined training with Kuwaiti and other Gulf Cooperation Council armed forces.

Folded into the CENTCOM exercise INTRINSIC ACTION, these rotations served several purposes. First, INTRINSIC ACTION demonstrated resolve and a continuing commitment to the defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from another attack. Second, the deployed task forces exercised the Army's brigade set of equipment pre-positioned in Camp DOHA, Kuwait. Although deploying units rarely used the entire set, rotational use and maintenance of the equipment ensured it would be fully mission-capable when called upon. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 3rd Infantry Division drew and used this equipment to fight its way up the Euphrates valley and into Baghdad. Similarly, constant practice in receiving new units into Kuwait, marrying personnel with pre-positioned vehicles and equipment, staging those units, and then moving them out to desert training areas developed the expertise, standing operating procedures, and organizations necessary to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of large formations into the theater.² Third, these exercises built proficiency in desert warfighting. Ten years of rotations by units from each of the armored and mechanized divisions of the Army into Kuwait, combined with more than 100 rotations to the NTC in the Mojave Desert, built expertise across the Army in desert combat. Finally, INTRINSIC ACTION, in conjunction with the ongoing Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH, helped to educate America's soldiers and leaders in the culture, politics, and social aspects of the Arab world.

Building on a dozen years of engagement, much of the success in OIF stems from the planning, preparation, mobilization, and deployment that took place from the fall of 2001 until major combat operations began on 19 March 2003. During that period of intense activity, soldiers and organizations around the Army built on the foundation laid down during the 12 years since DESERT STORM. When President Bush named Iraq as part of the "axis of evil," it rekindled speculation about war with Iraq. Slowly, yet steadily, America moved ever closer to its second war of the millennium. Although coalition forces remained engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan, CENTCOM shifted focus toward a possible offensive campaign to remove Saddam's regime. Although often accused of preparing to refight the last war, soldiers attempt to prepare for the next war. And because all campaigns are joint and interagency, the Army prepared in conjunction with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps under the command of CENTCOM. Planning included the key agencies of the nation's security team: the State Department, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the National Security Council, and other national agencies. Even without orders or assigned missions, alert leaders started to think through the immense challenges of a campaign in the deserts and river valleys of Iraq.

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Figure 9. Ground scheme of maneuver in Iraq

As OIF changed from possible to probable, the Army and the rest of the nation's armed forces undertook a number of important tasks designed to prepare for war. From the Army's perspective, these included preparing the theater infrastructure, determining the ground forces command and control architecture, planning the campaign, training the staffs and soldiers, fielding new equipment, providing theaterwide support, mobilizing the US Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) forces, deploying forces into the theater, and moving to the border. Equally important, preparing the theater had joint implications for the Army and the other services meeting their obligations to each other and preparing for their roles in increasingly likely operations in Iraq. Although On Point focuses on the Army's effort, the Army did not act alone, but in concert with the other services and in response to CENTCOM. Joint Forces Command, Transportation Command, European Command (EUCOM), and other joint organizations played central roles in training, preparing, and working with other nations' military and civilian authorities to set conditions for the possibility of a campaign in Iraq. This effort continued through execution of combat operations during operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in CENTCOM's area of responsibility. CENTCOM and its subordinate commands found themselves stretched to assure they accomplished all of their missions.

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Prepare - Building the Theater Infrastructure

For most of the 12 years following DESERT STORM, CENTCOM assumed that both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could be used to mount a campaign against Iraq. More accurately, CENTCOM assumed a defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from Iraqi attack. In conjunction with the INTRINSIC ACTION exercises, the Army improved the logistics, training, military support, and command and control infrastructure in Kuwait with this in mind. CENTCOM always made improvements for the next rotation but did so with an eye to a possible rematch with the Iraqi dictator. Training improvements included building the Udairi Range complex, located about an hour's drive from Camp DOHA and set in a wide-open expanse of desert. The Army steadily improved and upgraded the firing range and training resources, and experienced training support personnel created a first-class training facility. All of the services operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility also sought to improve communications and command and control infrastructure so they could meet wartime requirements. The services also sought to improve facilities to better sustain combat operations. Third Army worked to develop the capability to receive and sustain units in Kuwait and elsewhere in the theater. As a general principle, Third Army focused on joint requirements for support in theater rather than on US Army operations. Prior to the war, for example, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the Third Army and CFLCC commander, asserted, " There will never be a Third Army fight. We will always be in a combined [and] joint contest."³

By the end of the 1990s, planning in CENTCOM included branches to defensive plans that assumed counteroffensive operations. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the concept of operations in Kuwait shifted from a presumption of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to mounting offensive operations from Kuwait. Major General Henry "Hank" Stratman, the deputy commanding general for support of Third Army and CFLCC observed that from 9/11 on, the assumption in Third Army concerning war with Iraq was not whether, but when. According to Stratman, whatever doubts anyone in Third Army might have had evaporated when the president gave his "get ready" remarks. Of the general officers assigned to Third Army when it became CFLCC, Stratman had the longest tenure, having arrived in the summer of 2001. Stratman brought considerable experience to his task. He commanded a battalion in DESERT STORM and served on the Task Force Eagle staff in Bosnia during the operations by the Implementation Force (IFOR).⁴

Among the key planning assumptions that Stratman and his staff made, perhaps the most important was that they would not be able to stage in Saudi Arabia. Thus, Third Army had to augment existing Kuwaiti facilities or build what was required. Stratman and his engineers, logisticians, and training support staff developed a set of preparation tasks required to support opening and operating a theater within Kuwait. That meant building or improving everything from "bed-down" sites to training facilities to theater support facilities. Theater support facilities ran the gamut from aerial and sea ports of debarkation to bases for mobilizing theater support command (TSC) units. Stratman remembered well what the euphemism "austere theater" really meant in the northern Saudi desert in 1990 and in Bosnia in 1995. Accordingly, he sought to improve on what he believed would always be a difficult proposition - joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration - in short, receiving the inbound units and preparing them for combat. Where possible, Stratman and his commander, Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, took advantage of the growth in forward presence of Army troops from a task force to a brigade combat team. That growth enabled them to build Camps VIRGINIA, PENNSYLVANIA, and NEW YORK, all named for states that suffered attacks on 9/11. Equally important, the growing crisis enabled them to draw and prepare two brigade sets of equipment from the Army pre-positioned stocks to increase combat power on the ground.⁵ Other Army organizations also began to lean forward and to build capability on the back of the incremental deployment into the theater.

RSOI Infrastructure Improvements

To support developing and justifying requirements, Stratman brought in Major General Bill Mortensen, commander, 21st Support Command. Together, the two generals and key staff officers made some assumptions about throughput, bed-down, and storage requirements. Virtually all of these requirements support joint logistics. Accordingly, Mortensen and Stratman worked with Major General Dennis Jackson, the CENTCOM J4. Jackson consolidated the various requirements of the functional components and supported validating those requirements for approval by the joint staff and the Department of Defense. The bill was $550 million for preparation that included developing an airfield that could accommodate 250 rotary-wing aircraft, fuel pipelines, improvements at Kuwait Naval Base, housing and warehousing at Arifjan for 15,000 soldiers and various classes of supply to accommodate the TSC. CENTCOM validated virtually all of the preparatory tasks and the Army funded them so that, in the summer of 2002, they could begin in earnest. Although work did begin in the late summer of 2002, the pace quickened following Lieutenant General McKiernan's assumption of command on 7 September 2002. In October, after completing his mission analysis, McKiernan briefed the Army chief of staff on his requirements, already vetted at CENTCOM and approved by the Department of Defense. As a consequence, General Shinseki made Third Army's preparation tasks the number one priority in the Army. General Shinseki's decision was important since Army dollars paid the bills.⁶

In execution, General Stratman found he had to approach the task as though he were a project manager. His team included elements of the Third Army staff and the early-entry command post of the 377th TSC. The US ambassador, the government of Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti armed forces also played essential roles. Stratman believes their enthusiastic and unwavering support, and that of the Kuwait National Oil Company, made a gargantuan task feasible at the least possible cost. To illustrate this point, Third Army made more than 130 requests for support from Kuwait, and not one request was turned down. More important, the Kuwaitis took the initiative to help solve fundamental problems. For example, one key task involved laying a pipeline to move fuel to northern Kuwait. The Kuwait National Oil Company did the work, asking only that Third Army buy the pumps. At the time of this writing, Kuwait continues to provide the fuel at no cost. In Stratman's view, the support from both the American diplomatic team in country and from the Kuwaitis could not have been better. ⁷

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Figure 10. Key coalition camps and location

Figure 11. Sea port of debarkation bed-down facilities, Kuwait Naval Base, Kuwait

At the receiving end of operations, the Army is the lead service responsible for operating common-user seaports, which is executed under Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) as the single port manager. The single port manager concept grew out of lessons learned during operations in support of DESERT STORM. Although the Army is the lead service, port operations are a joint operation. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Colonel

Figure 12. Troop housing complex, Arifjan, Kuwait

Figure 13. Supply storage facility, Arifjan, Kuwait

Victoria Leignadier and her troops from the 598th Transportation Terminal Group led operations for the services as the single port manager and ran port operations in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait to support OIF and troops in Afghanistan. The group also operated in Djibouti to support operations in the Horn of Africa. The 598th, in Leignadier's words, provided the "single face of port operations to the warfighter [and] to the port authority."⁸ In the three Kuwaiti ports, Leignadier's soldiers collaborated with their counterparts in the Military Sea Lift Command and with a USMC Port Operations Group. The Navy also supplied a coastal warfare unit that provided "waterside" security. Finally, a Coast Guard port security unit patrolled the harbor waters.⁹

Figure 14. Kuwait pipeline and fuel infrastructure

Figure 15. Sea port of debarkation facilities, As Shuaybah, Kuwait

The 143rd Transportation Command, USAR, assumed responsibility subordinated to the 377th TSC (USAR) to work in the port in support of the 598th. The 7th Transportation Group operated the ports for the 143rd. The 7th Group, a unique and valuable resource for the joint team, is normally composed of four battalions - the 6th Transportation Battalion (the only "truck" battalion in the group), and the 10th, 11th, and 24th Transportation Battalions (Terminal). The 24th assumed control of all Army watercraft in the theater. Additionally, the 106th Transportation Battalion (a line haul truck battalion) joined the group in theater.¹⁰

Figure 16. Kuwait Naval Base supporting US Army vessels

The 7th Group operated both in EUCOM and in CENTCOM. The 10th Transportation Battalion originally deployed to Iskendrun, Turkey, but ultimately redeployed to Kuwait. In Kuwait, the 7th Group supported terminal operations in three ports: Shuwaikh for containers, As Shuaybah, the principal port, and Kuwait Naval Base (KNB) for unloading I MEF, ammunition, and JLOTS. The 7th Group tasked the 24th Transportation Battalion with controlling watercraft to support port operations and JLOTS. The 24th had operated periodically at KNB since 1998 and had maintained at least one Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) at KNB since 2000. Accordingly, they were on reasonably familiar turf. The 24th began to ramp up its efforts in the spring of 2002 when 7th Group received an alert to transfer selected watercraft to the theater.¹¹

In August 2002, the 24th Transportation Battalion soldiers loaded five Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels belonging to the 824th Transportation Company (USAR) onto the semi- submersible vessel Tern. They also loaded one large and one small tug assigned to the 10th Battalion and five of their own Landing Craft Mechanized-8 Mike boats. These vessels and associated crews joined the LSV forward. Finally the 24th's 331st Transportation Company (Causeway), the Army's only modular causeway system company, also deployed forward to support offloading equipment over the shore.¹²

To this mix, the Army added the theater support vessel (TSV) Spearhead. As noted, the Army acquired the TSV as an offshoot of the Army transformation effort and as a possible solution to Army requirements for lift within a theater. The Spearhead and its naval counterpart, the High-Speed Vessel (HSV) X1, Joint Venture, which was commanded by a naval officer and manned by a joint Army-Navy crew, provided first-rate high-speed lift for use in theater to make runs within the gulf and, as required, to the Red Sea and back.¹³

During OIF, Army watercraft, the TSV, and Army causeways all contributed to the theater efforts in important, if generally unheralded ways. Army watercraft sailed nearly 57,000 miles supporting ship handling, cargo hauling, passenger ferrying, and combat operations, including seizing the gulf oil platforms. The Spearhead sailed 30,000 of those miles, moving what amounted to 1,000 C-130 sorties of cargo. Army units supported 12 separate JLOTS

Figure 17. Tern delivers Army watercraft

Figure 18. The 331st Transportation Company (Causeway) in operation in Kuwait

operations and enabled the Marines to close at a single port, thus facilitating their consolidation and movement forward. Although the Army provided support, the Marines have world-class capability of their own and discharged the bulk of their equipment without assistance from 7th Group units. Finally, an Army tugboat helped clear the channel for the first humanitarian assistance supplies to be delivered by the UK cargo vessel Sir Galahad.¹⁴

Figure 19. Joint Venture and Spearhead at Kuwait Naval Base

Figure 20. Sea port of debarkation operations, Kuwait

MTMC terminal units, marines, navy cargo units, and a battalion of 7th Transportation Group offloaded 199 vessels at the sea ports of debarkation (SPODs), handling 880,000 short tons of goods and materiel. The 11th Battalion's assigned Army stevedores offloaded 51 of these vessels. As a general rule, if it came through Kuwait, someone in MTMC or 7th Group handled it or moved it.¹⁵

None of these US armed forces operations could have been achieved without the support and collaboration of the Kuwait Port Authority. Leignadier, as General Stratman had earlier, found the Kuwaiti authorities to be first-class partners. Similarly, her counterparts in the European ports she operated in strove to help when and where they could. Recognizing the threat to the ports posed by Iraqi missiles, Leignadier was also determined to protect contract stevedores from the threat of chemical weapons. Accordingly, the 598th soldiers equipped the contract stevedore teams with masks and protective garments in the event of a chemical strike. More important, they trained their stevedores on donning the chemical equipment so that when missile alarms sounded, the stevedores donned their gear and remained at the port, prepared to return to work the moment the "all clear" sounded.¹⁶ The record of the 598th, the troops of all services, and their Kuwait and third country nationals involved in the ports during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM speaks for itself.

Aerial Port Operations

On one side of Kuwait International Airport, life seemed to go on as usual. The exception was the occasional coalition trooper in desert camouflage sipping a cup of Starbucks coffee while sitting next to a Kuwaiti in long flowing gowns reminiscent of Arab herdsmen. But despite this odd and somewhat disorienting picture, the civil side of the airport was calm in contrast to the frenetic pace and apparent chaos on the far side, where the coalition's military airlift and charter airliners were disgorging people and gear at high speed.

Soldiers arriving in Kuwait by air did not pass through the civilian terminal, but rather entered the country through Camp WOLF. The Army built Camp WOLF right outside the airport as a reception, staging, and onward movement facility for soldiers and equipment arriving by air. A sprawling facility, it served as a holding area for troops awaiting transport to marry up with their equipment and their units. It also served as a trans-load point where equipment and supplies were transferred from aircraft pallets to trucks ready to move the equipment forward 24 hours a day. The Army's 3rd Theater Army Movement Control Center provided movement control for all of the services. More than 200,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen came through the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) between 1 January 2003 and the end of major combat operations. Movement troops processed and handed off 85,218 tons of air cargo for transportation. Obviously, the arrival airfield was a joint and combined operation, with all services and coalition forces, including the Kuwaitis, working together. All of the airmen, whether US or otherwise, and soldiers and civilians who operated the arrival airfield did a difficult job superbly.¹⁷

Figure 21. Aerial port of debarkation operations, Kuwait International Airport

Pre-positioned Equipment

The Best I Have Ever Seen We drew tanks in UDAIRI. They were excellent; best I have ever seen! If we had used our tanks from Fort Benning, we would have lost the war.

Staff Sergeant Michael Brouillard Alpha Troop, 3-7 Cavalry

In Europe during the Cold War, the Army had, at one point, two forward-deployed corps available to fight on short notice and supported by an enormous stockpile of gear in the Pre-positioned Equipment Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS). The plan was that, in the event of war, CONUS units would deploy their soldiers to Europe, marry them up with the POMCUS and head for the front lines. POMCUS greatly reduced the deployment problem since equipment did not have to be moved from CONUS. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army reduced its footprint in Europe and has sought to pre-position equipment where it might be needed. Today, some equipment remains in Europe and is therefore closer to possible theaters than CONUS. Other equipment is pre-positioned at sea, following studies mandated by the Congress. The Army study, called the Army Strategic Mobility Program, focused on the deployment triad of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned equipment. Among other things this study led to moving some equipment from Europe to other sites, including the Gulf region and its Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) APS-3 (afloat) and APS-5. Each set contained the bulk of gear required to equip a heavy brigade composed of two mechanized infantry battalions, two armor battalions, and supporting units. ¹⁸

Figure 22. Army pre-positioned stocks, Arifjan, Kuwait

CONUS Facility Improvements

In addition to TRANSCOM, EUCOM, and Third Army efforts, the Army had to ensure that its units could use their installations as power-projection platforms. This meant investing in the infrastructure to move rapidly from home stations to sea or air ports. The Army identified and assigned priorities to the sites from which it would deploy or support deployments. Based on this analysis, the Army made improvements to railhead capacity and deployment facilities to ensure it could deliver units to ports of embarkation from which TRANSCOM would take them to the theater of operation. To that end, over the past 12 years, the Army invested $800 million to improve capability at 15 posts, 14 airfields, 17 seaports, and 11 ammunition plants to improve deployment posture. In short, the Army modernized its platforms and altered the focus of its thinking from forward basing to force projection.¹⁹

European Command

EUCOM also contributed to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in a number of ways. In the fall of 2002, CENTCOM conceived the "Northern Option," which intended to produce concentric ground attacks on Iraq from all points of the compass. In the Northern Option, the coalition would introduce forces from Turkey. Because Turkey is in EUCOM's area of responsibility, EUCOM assumed responsibility for supporting CENTCOM's effort. Both commands already collaborated effectively to support operations in Afghanistan.

EUCOM assigned the mission of establishing a Joint Rear Area Coordinator to US Army Europe. Ultimately, US Army Europe (USAREUR) and V Corps assigned the mission to Major General John Batiste's 1st Infantry Division (Big Red One). In the end the Joint Rear Area Command mission evolved into a service component requirement. Specifically, the Big Red One provided command and control as Army Forces-Turkey. The division provided the core of this headquarters, two battalion task forces. USAREUR further augmented the 1st ID with units from the 21st TSC, 66th Military Intelligence Group, 18th Engineer Brigade, 7th Signal Brigade, 38th Personnel Support Battalion, and 313th Rear Area Operations Command. Ultimately, some 2,200 troops deployed to Turkey starting in January 2003 to prepare to receive, stage, and support units (primarily the 4th Infantry Division) that CENTCOM planned to employ from Turkey. The troops, in coordination with Turkish authorities, developed a 700- kilometer route, including three convoy support centers, four rest stops, 32 checkpoints, and six traffic control points, in addition to the work done to prepare staging areas near the ports. In the end, this capability was not required and the troops assigned to support the effort began redeployment to Europe in April 2003.²⁰

However, EUCOM provided other important support, some of which stemmed from EUCOM engagement in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and a EUCOM program called "In the Spirit of Partnership for Peace." Both programs originally existed as a means of engaging former members of the Warsaw Pact as it began to collapse following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Over time these programs produced benefits as nations sought to join NATO. Basing rights, overflight, and other means of cooperation are in part benefits of more than a decade of NATO and EUCOM efforts in the newly democratic states of central Europe. Access to infrastructure and support in building communications links that CENTCOM needed could be found in countries eager to help as part of the continued effort to join NATO or to demonstrate support based on relations generated, at least in part, as a result of military-to-military engagement through Partnership for Peace or EUCOM's "Spirit" program. Lieutenant General Dan Petrosky, who served as chief of staff at EUCOM from 2000- 2002, summed it up this way, "What (engagement efforts) did [is] set the stage for our war on terrorism and how we could support it." ²¹ Refueling rights in central Europe were among the benefits Petrosky believed stemmed from these efforts.²² E

UCOM supported CENTCOM in other ways, including contracting support along the main air and sea deployment routes, developing communications infrastructure along the air and sea routes for example. Despite political differences of opinion, EUCOM had help from allies in the region in providing security in the Mediterranean. EUCOM's service components supported the operation from sites as diverse as Ramstein Air Base and Rhein Ordnance Barracks in Germany to bases in Spain and in the Azores.²³

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Prepare - Building the Command and Control Relationships

In any campaign, the design of the command and control architecture is extremely important. For large-scale ground combat operations, such design is critical. In DESERT STORM, the CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, elected to command the ground operations himself, without a land component commander to integrate ground operations. In contrast, for IRAQI FREEDOM, General Tommy Franks decided to establish a Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) to command and control the operations of all Army, Marine, and coalition ground forces. Although General Anthony Zinni, who preceded General Franks at CENTCOM, had declared Third Army the joint land component command, Third Army had never been assigned the people required to enable it to function in that role.²⁴ On 20 November 2001, Franks designated Third US Army, based at Fort McPherson, Georgia, as the CFLCC.²⁵ Franks' order provided Third Army the basis to organize and man the headquarters as a joint forces land component command. During the previous winter and spring, Third Army had served as the CFLCC for OEF in Afghanistan and throughout the region. Much of the Third Army Headquarters (HQ) deployed to its forward command post at Camp DOHA, Kuwait, but by late spring 2002 had redeployed to Fort McPherson.

Filling the CFLCC's Empty Chairs

Commanded by General George Patton during WW II, Third Army has a proud history and tradition and had focused on the CENTCOM area since the late 1980s. But it was manned in peacetime at about half strength. As the potential for war grew in the fall of 2002, the Army began filling the Third Army HQ to full strength. Lieutenant General David McKiernan assumed command in September 2002. McKiernan, commissioned in 1972, had commanded a tank battalion, an armored brigade, and 1st Cavalry Division. He served with VII Corps in DESERT STORM, where he ran the corps tactical command post. As G2/G3 Intelligence and Operations in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, McKiernan learned NATO and coalition staff procedures. Finally, he served as the deputy chief of staff for operations (G3) for the Army prior to arriving at Third Army. McKiernan's experience and understanding of both coalition and joint warfare ideally suited him to the task of commanding CFLCC.

Shortly after McKiernan assumed command, he decided he needed to ramp up the experience level of his primary staff. Accordingly, he asked for a number of officers by name. With General Shinseki's support, McKiernan handpicked several generals and placed them in the key staff positions in Third Army, including Major General James "Spider" Marks as the CFLCC intelligence officer (C2), Major General James "JD" Thurman as the CFLCC operations officer (C3), and Major General Claude V. "Chris" Christiansen as the CFLCC logistics officer (C4). Colonel Kevin Benson, recently assigned to CFLCC as the C5 plans officer, remained at his post. Major General Lowell C. Detamore joined as the C6 communications officer. Before McKiernan took command, Shinseki provided a second deputy commanding general to the CFLCC. Major General William "Fuzzy" Webster joined the headquarters as deputy commanding general for operations (DCG-O). Major General Henry "Hank" Stratman, who arrived earlier, served as the deputy commanding general for support (DCG-S). Colonels normally headed the Third Army staff sections, but for OIF McKiernan and Shinseki wanted the most experienced team possible.

Joint and coalition members also joined the team. Major General Robert "Rusty" Blackman, USMC, arrived from CENTCOM to serve as the CFLCC chief of staff in October 2002. Blackman, who commanded the 2nd Marine Division and served as the president of the Marine Corps University, brought a wealth of experience to the team and amply demonstrated his skills as a leader. One Army colonel observed of Blackman, "I would follow him anywhere."²⁶ Major General Daniel Leaf, USAF, joined the CFLCC to direct the Air Component Coordination Element in February 2003, coming from the Air Staff. Leaf, a command pilot with more than 3,600 flying hours, had multiple combat experiences, including Operations NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq. He was intimately familiar with US Army operations, having been an honor graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff Officer Course and a graduate of the Army's pre-command course. Leaf and his team represented the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and supported integrating air and space operations with ground operations. Finally, Brigadier, later Major General, Albert Whitley, British Army, rounded out the CFLCC corps of generals. Whitley replaced Brigadier Adrian Bradshaw as senior adviser to CFLCC for British land forces. McKiernan, who had served with Whitley in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, asked Whitley to lead a planning team that focused on operations in the northern part of Iraq.

Moving the Third Army staff toward a genuine joint and coalition headquarters could not be achieved by assigning a handful of generals. When Major General Blackman joined CFLCC in October 2002, he found "four or five" marines on the staff against a joint manning document calling for 90 or so marines. Blackman weighed in with his service to assign marines to CFLCC. In January 2002, Lieutenant General McKiernan also sought to have marines assigned. Although the Marine Corps could not immediately produce 90 marines in the grades required, it did assign more than 70 marines to serve with CFLCC.²⁷ Transitioning any service headquarters into a truly joint headquarters takes both time and effort to assure the result functions usefully. McKiernan and Blackman turned their attention to that task as well.

Staff Organization

Lieutenant General McKiernan also reorganized his staff. McKiernan wanted to move away from the traditional structure of administrative, intelligence, operations, and logistics and toward the operational functions that CFLCC would perform. In Blackman's view this meant transitioning from a "Napoleonic staff system" to a functional staff system. These functions included operational maneuver, effects, intelligence, protection, and sustainment. This organization required developing staff organizations, coordination boards and cells within the headquarters, new processes, and new digital architectures. For example, Blackman developed an Effects Synchronization Board that, among other things, attempted to examine whether CFLCC efforts achieved their intended outcomes.²⁸ Major General Marks, the C2, led the reorganization of the intelligence staff to meet the requirements of operational intelligence. At the same time, he built a new operational-level intelligence architecture that linked tactical and strategic intelligence functions while providing interoperability with all the various agencies and capabilities of the intelligence community. In plain English, Marks developed the organization to leverage joint intelligence and to provide intelligence support both to V Corps and to I MEF, which used different tools to move intelligence than did the Army. McKiernan's vision in developing a 21st-century functional staff organization contributed significantly to the successful battle command of complex simultaneous joint operations by CFLCC during the IRAQI FREEDOM campaign.²⁹

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Prepare - Planning the Campaign

CENTCOM did not plan the campaign in Iraq in isolation. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa all required resources and supervision. To develop a campaign based fundamentally on a concentric attack against the regime, CENTCOM needed to work with EUCOM, whose regional area responsibility included northern Iraq and much of the Middle East as well as friendly nations in the region. CENTCOM also needed support and services from TRANSCOM and United States Space Command (SPACECOM). CENTCOM's task required more than a little finesse.

Figure 23. CFLCC to V Corps training and preparation schedule - linkages
between plan evolution and deliberate training events

As the winter of 2001 gave way to the spring of 2002, planners at CENTCOM and the supporting functional component headquarters including CFLCC, continued the dynamic process of planning contingencies in the region, now focusing on operations ranging from the isolation of the regime to the toppling of Saddam. Colonel Mike Fitzgerald and Colonel Kevin Benson led the plans cells at CENTCOM and CFLCC, respectively. Colonel Fitzgerald, an artilleryman, had been at CENTCOM headquarters since before 9/11. As chief of the CENTCOM Long-Range Planning Element, he had been the chief architect of the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM campaign in Afghanistan. A proven planner, Fitzgerald had a keen understanding of the strategic context in which the campaign would unfold. Benson, a cavalryman who had just finished a fellowship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, served as chief of plans at CFLCC. Benson had served at Third Army before and knew the CENTCOM region, Kuwait, and Iraq very well.³⁰

Ripple Effects With the release of a draft prepare to deploy order (PTDO) in April 2002, there was an immediate ripple effect throughout the Army.31 In addition to giving V Corps responsibility for lead planning instead of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the divisions considered how to refocus their training and maintenance posture to be ready for the possible deployment. The 101st Airborne Division, for example, was in the middle of planning an expected relief in place of its brigade in Afghanistan, along with a possible relief of the 10th Mountain Division's headquarters. However, as a unit specified on the draft PTDO, then-commanding general Major General Cody directed his staff to develop and resource 30-, 60-, and 90-day training and maintenance plans, as well as refocus from other contingency planning operations. The division staff had to balance the new requirements with what was already on its plate.

Major William Abb Chief of Plans, 101st Airborne Division

Together, and in cooperation with planners of the other service components and special operations forces (SOF), Fitzgerald, Benson, and their two planning staffs laid out the broad outline of what would eventually become the campaign known as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. However, the planning was not a top-down effort. In the information-age era that enables distributed, parallel planning, V Corps,I MEF, and subordinate divisions were near-equal architects for the final plan. V Corps and I MEF developed base plans and fed them up the chain. These plans, VIGILANT GUARDIAN and CONPLAN WOOD, were designed to thwart any Iraqi offensive action toward Kuwait or the Shiite population of southern Iraq. The planning process, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Danna, then chief of plans for V Corps, and his lead OIF planner, Major Kevin Marcus, paralleled both the I MEF and Third Army from the beginning. Among the key considerations later affecting the execution was how many units would deploy before combat operations began and how many axes of advance ground forces would use.

Planning Considerations

The planners considered several major factors to determine how many forces would deploy before the offensive began. Part of the consideration was the tension between the historic American penchant for large-scale, deliberate deployments of overwhelming force and the more efficient approach of "just-in-time" operations. Logistic requirements for large Army and Marine Corps formations and relatively limited strategic lift argued for a deliberate deployment, while strategic surprise argued for a no-notice deployment. From that tension flowed three options: a deployment scheme similar to DESERT STORM; an almost no-notice deployment in which the war would start with very few forces on the ground in Kuwait; and a hybrid that combined elements of both approaches.

The planners, in fact, developed a course of action for each of these three approaches. The DESERT STORM-like "generated start" plan required a lengthy deployment but carried a heavy price in both time and resources. By the fall of 2002, US diplomatic efforts in the United Nations demonstrated to the world that an American-led campaign to remove Saddam from power was becoming not just possible, but probable. Diplomacy in this case forfeited strategic surprise but allowed a gradual buildup of combat forces in the Persian Gulf region that exerted pressure on the Iraqi regime and its military forces. While the possibility of strategic surprise evaporated, opportunities for operational and tactical surprise remained.

Although no one in the command thought the regime would immediately collapse under the pressure of simultaneous attacks along multiple lines of operation, CENTCOM did attempt to create the conditions that might produce a sudden collapse. Planners thought it possible that the combination of effects from Tomahawk missiles, air attacks, ground attacks, and robust information operations would either render the regime irrelevant or cause it to collapse very early in the fight - in effect, like a balloon pops when poked. There were three iterations of planning based on differing sets of conditions. Each included the idea of simultaneous attack from the air and on the ground, with the number of units available as the key variable. Planners labeled the first option "generated start," which assumed a buildup of forces until all the forces required had arrived in theater. Since no one could be sure whether or when they would be told to go to war, planners developed a "running start" option, which assumed launching combat operations with minimum forces and continuing to deploy forces and employ them as they arrived. The final option stemmed from wargaming the running start. The hybrid plan reflected an assessment that the minimum force required reached a higher number of troops than envisioned in the running start option. In the end the plan reflected a compromise solution between the hybrid and running start options that provided more forces than planned in the running start, but fewer than estimated as required for the hybrid plan. Although most of those officers developing the plan would have preferred the simultaneous attacks afforded by the "hybrid" plan, they perceived the possibility of achieving operational surprise by way of the "running start." Further, operational surprise could offset the risks inherent in sequencing forces into the fight.³²

The number of forces required to conduct the operation was the single most important variable around which all of the variants revolved. The end was never in question - remove the regime; but the specific method, or way, required to achieve this strategic goal was the subject of contentious debate. Without agreement on the way - simultaneous or sequential - there rarely was agreement on the amount of force or means required. Yet, correctly balancing mass, surprise, and sustained operations kept the two (way and means) entirely interrelated. The amount of available force affected the proposed course of action, which invited reevaluations of force requirements. This friction is not uncommon and can be found in virtually every modern US campaign. In the end, CENTCOM and CFLCC successfully concluded major combat operations with the forces allocated.³³

General Scheme of Maneuver Both General Tommy Franks at CENTCOM and Lieutenant General Dave McKiernan at CFLCC wanted to avoid making the main effort along the direct approach between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This approach is not only the obvious and most heavily defended approach; historically, armies using this direction of attack had been defeated. Also, the planners had concerns about Saddam's ability to flood the valleys, limiting coalition mobility. Yet to close on Baghdad from all directions required CENTCOM to commit forces into the Tigris-Euphrates valley to mount an attack along the Tigris to approach Baghdad from the east. Coming up the Euphrates also posed problems. Forces advancing along the southern approach would have to fight through or bypass the heavily populated urban areas along the Iraqi rivers. And finally, entering Iraq only from Kuwait would limit the coalition's ability to generate and sustain combat power through Kuwait's relatively limited ports and airfields. So, planners examined the southwest axis from Jordan and the northern axis from Turkey. Both axes were operationally difficult, but executable. That said, both axes were also subject to the restrictions imposed by the governments of Jordan and Turkey. These countries supported the effort against Saddam Hussein, but both restricted the use of their land and airspace for ground operations into Iraq.³⁵

As planning continued through the summer of 2002, the campaign's basic outline took shape. CENTCOM's main effort would be a ground attack out of Kuwait to defeat Iraqi forces, isolate the regime in Baghdad and, if necessary, the Ba'ath Party home city of Tikrit, remove the regime from control of the country, and transition to security operations after major combat operations were complete. The main effort ground attack would be supported by significant air and special forces operations. To some extent the air component had already achieved a key goal for any campaign. Operations NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH effectively precluded any Iraqi effort to challenge the coalition in the air or even to use helicopters. Again, as in DESERT STORM and in Afghanistan, the coalition owned the airspace. Air support to ground forces and the air campaign in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are a model of responsiveness and precision, from strikes to air mobility operations. Obviously, the air component had other tasks besides supporting the ground component. The air component developed and ultimately executed an air campaign in support of CENTCOM objectives. Eventually some 1,800 coalition aircraft supported operations in OIF, ranging from B-2 bombers flying from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, to aircraft operating from US Navy aircraft carriers.

The coalition maritime component provided support to the air component and operated to assure the safe transit of vessels en route to the theater. The US Navy fielded five carrier task forces, two amphibious task forces, and a dozen submarines. Britain's Royal Navy provided the next largest contingent based on a task group formed on the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. Australia deployed two frigates and other supporting vessels. Naval units from other coalition countries supported operations by executing security operations at maritime choke points on the sea lanes into the theater.

Building on lessons inferred from Kosovo and confirmed in Afghanistan, SOF would mount two major supporting operations. In the north, SOF and conventional and Iraqi Kurdish forces would attempt to fix Iraqi army formations along the Green Line separating the Kurds from the rest of Iraq, attack south to isolate Tikrit, and maintain stability in the Kurdish region. SOF and the CFACC would conduct the other supporting operation in the western region of Iraq to deny the Iraqi forces the ability to engage Jordan, Turkey, or Israel with ballistic missiles. This would be a far more robust and visible "Scud hunt" than the one conducted during DESERT STORM. SOF also would insert "deep" to provide reconnaissance and execute direct action missions as required.

Baghdad - Planning for an Urban Fight

As planning matured, the challenge of urban combat loomed as a major issue. Not only was Saddam's regime centered in Baghdad, a city of approximately 5 million people, there were approximately 40 other cities that held significance for both the Iraqis and the coalition

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Figure 24. V Corps objectives

in any potential campaign. These cities differ from Western cities in that the buildings are generally less than five stories tall, but like cities everywhere, they "sprawl."

Urban operations are traditionally difficult, deadly, and destructive. House-to-house fighting usually leads to large numbers of friendly, enemy, and civilian casualties, and battles conducted in cities usually result in the destruction of large numbers of buildings and infrastructure. Unwilling to repeat the horrors of Stalingrad, Berlin, Aachen, Hue, and Grozny, the Army began a serious planning effort for combat operations in Baghdad and other critical cities of Iraq. In the years immediately preceding OIF, the Army and Marine Corps had focused on tactical operations in urban environments, but neither had devoted as much effort thinking about large-unit operations in cities. The Russian experience in Grozny sparked a more deliberate consideration of this problem. There, the Russian army experienced relentless attacks from guerilla forces positioned with vertical depth in urban infrastructure that made penetrating the city difficult and deadly. The Russians solved their problem by reducing Grozny to ruins. US planners strove to avoid anything resembling a Grozny-type operation in Baghdad.

Systems-Based Planning

In Atlanta, Colonel Benson led his operational planning team through a multiservice/ multiagency planning effort focused on urban operations. In a parallel effort, Major E.J. Degen, who became the chief of plans at V Corps in July 2002, directed his planning staff to begin examining the cities in the potential V Corps area of operations, focusing on Baghdad.35 Major Degen assigned Major Lou Rago, newly arrived from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, the mission to lead the detailed planning effort for urban operations in Iraq. Over the next six months, Rago would combine Armywide intelligence, engineering, and planning support with assistance from government and civilian agencies to refine the analysis, planning, and target selection.

Major Rago approached the problem of urban operations from a systems-based analysis of the city and of how Saddam exercised control over the population. Under Rago's direction, a team of soldiers, airmen, and marines attacked the problem of urban operations. Rago's team also included a group of officers from the SAMS. The corps planning team included a robust contingent from I MEF led by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Mahaney and Major Phil Chandler. The Marine planning team also included representatives from the MEF's air wing. Together the planners developed a methodology to identify key nodes in the regime's system of control.³⁶ The regime used the security forces, secret police, Special Republican Guard (SRG), the media, cultural and religious icons, and even the water, sewage, and power systems to control the population. The regime lavished wealth and quality of life incentives on those

Figure 25. Saddam's systems of control over Baghdad and Iraq

neighborhoods that supported them, while denying the same to those they feared or hated. In cooperation with the Army, Department of Defense, and national intelligence agencies, the planners worked to identify the most lucrative targets. Destroying or seizing the most critical nodes would theoretically chip away at the regime's control.

The corps planners and their hired help from SAMS drew inspiration from several sources. First, all had read and considered the implications of arguments advanced by Dr. Roger Spiller in Sharp Corners. Commissioned by the chief of staff of the Army in 1999 to develop a study on urban operations and possible implications for the Army, Spiller published the results of his efforts - Sharp Corners, in 2001. In succinct clear language, Spiller did a survey of sieges and assaults on cities from Sargon the Great at Baghdad to the Russians at Grozny. He offered several conceptual solutions that influenced the planners. Spiller argued that cities could be spared if the right targets could be attacked with precision. Colonel James Greer, the director of SAMS, provided the second key influence. Greer published a "white paper" on urban operations drawing on Dr. Russ Glenn's notions on the environment of cities, including physical, cultural, and economic variables. Based on the work of Dr. Tom Czerwinski at the National Defense University, Greer came to see the city as a self-adapting system. Greer argued that cities operated as a system of systems, and as such, they had relationships among the systems that produced vulnerabilities. In advancing this case, he borrowed from Dr. Joe Strange, teacher and military theorist at the Marine Corps University, ideas on the relationships between nodes or points of critical vulnerabilities related to centers of gravity. Since the regime's primary control mechanisms lay in Baghdad, some or all of these could be construed as critical vulnerabilities, which, if exploited, could weaken the regime or even cause its collapse.³⁷

By attacking the real and symbolic levers of control with precision, Major Rago's team hoped to avoid a house-to-house fight for the city. Historically, that type of fight carried an overwhelming human, political, and financial cost that would be unacceptable in a campaign of liberation. Aside from the inevitable American casualties, images of Berlin, Hue, and Grozny - wanton physical destruction, rampant human misery, and post-fighting devastation - haunted everyone associated with the planning. The relatively surgical application of force held the promise of avoiding that politically, militarily, socially, and morally unacceptable outcome. Admittedly theoretical and wholly untested, this approach informed the corps' target selection and mission planning. Eventually, V Corps briefed Lieutenant General McKiernan and General Franks on the systems approach to urban warfare. Both generals endorsed the approach and then designated V Corps to lead the effort to plan and execute operations in Baghdad.³⁸

In preparing for IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army and the Marine Corps remained conscious of the Army's experiences in Mogadishu and those of the Russians in Grozny. Black Hawk Down and Grozny cast a long shadow. Determined to repeat neither experience, the Army, the Marine Corps, and JFCOM accelerated the publishing of essential doctrine for urban operations in the summer of 2002. The Infantry Center at Fort Benning produced the Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain tactical doctrine manual (FM 3-06.11). The Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth published FM 3-06, Urban Operations, and the Marine Corps, under the auspices of JFCOM, produced Joint Publication 3-06, Urban Operations. A number of papers and pamphlets published by everyone from the Rand Corporation to the Marine Corps Combat Developments Command added to this body of newly published doctrine.

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Figure 26. Map of Baghdad with V Corps' urban operations overlay

Obviously the planners did not operate in a vacuum or some monkish retreat cut off from others, or more important, from their commanders. They collaborated with their commanders and with each other not only because it made sense, but also because they belonged to a community. Most of the planners were graduates of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies or the Air Force or Marine equivalent. Founded in 1983, SAMS graduated its first class in 1984. Later, both the Air Force and Marine Corps established similar programs. Educated in the theory and practice of planning, graduates of these advanced military studies courses are assigned to important assignments specifically as planners. Often these are iterative assignments. Major Degen for example, served as a division planner prior to joining V Corps as the corps chief of plans; similarly, Colonel Benson served as a planner at XVIII Airborne Corps and at Third Army in an earlier tour as well. As an experienced marine planner, Colonel Chris Gunther, the I MEF planner, moved easily in this circle along with his two lead planners, who were graduates of the Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Warfare School.

The planners knew each other and networked because it makes difficult work less difficult. They also enjoyed their work, so many engaged in theoretical and practical debates on the art and science of war on Internet lists that they managed expressly for that purpose. Their community included some of their superiors at CFLCC as well, including Generals Fuzzy Webster and Spider Marks. Marine Brigadier General Chris Cowdrey, who joined CFLCC as deputy C3, did a fellowship at SAMS that included one year of study and a second year on the faculty, so he was both a graduate of and teacher in the Army's course. All of this facilitated parallel planning and reduced friction; as the planners came to know each other, they also passed on information, which they called "FLAGINT" or intelligence generated by their "flag or general officers."³⁹

The top tier of generals in the land component participated actively in the planning process. They worked closely with each other and with their own planners. McKiernan made a point of assuring that he remained closely tied to Lieutenant General Wallace at V Corps and to Lieutenant General Conway at I MEF. More important, McKiernan understood the operational tasks CFLCC needed to accomplish and kept his staff on track. He coached his planners "not to plan the V Corps fight, not to plan the I MEF fight, but to shape (them)."⁴⁰ McKiernan wanted his subordinate commanders to have "freedom of action within their zone," so he focused at the operational-strategic level and worked with his planners and his subordinates in a de facto, "adaptive planning process" that accounted for the dynamic variables in the theater.⁴¹ At V Corps, Wallace engaged frequently and at length with his planners in a comfortable relationship, encouraging debate and issuing guidance as required.⁴²

McKiernan had clear ideas on a number of important operational issues. For example, he did not like the notion of sequencing I MEF and V Corps into the fight. An early iteration of the plan called for I MEF to lead the attack with a relatively small force composed of units from 1st Marine Division and a BCT from 3rd ID. Ultimately a CENTCOM wargame confirmed McKiernan's view and the plan changed. McKiernan also wanted one commander in charge at Baghdad. Initially, he determined that Lieutenant General Wallace would command the forces assaulting Baghdad. In the end, however, he divided the responsibility for Baghdad between V Corps and I MEF. Finally, in response to guidance from General Tommy Franks, McKiernan began considering how to open a northern front if 4th ID could not enter through Turkey.⁴³

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Prepare - Training the Staffs and Soldiers

With the chain of command and general scheme of maneuver emerging, the next step in preparation included training the troops and headquarters. Preparing to operate at a scale and scope not seen since DESERT STORM with units not used to working together, a series of exercises served to advance the planning and develop procedures, teamwork, and familiarity across the divisions, corps, CFLCC, and CENTCOM. CENTCOM began to host a Component Commanders Conference monthly to build the team. The CFLCC commander ensured his major subordinate commanders also attended these events. These events not only enabled CENTCOM to convey guidance and information, they helped build the command team. Lieutenant General Wallace at V Corps began to build his team by hosting a seminar on command and control in August of 2002. The senior mentors of the seminar were General (retired) Fred Franks and his VII Corps operations officer, Brigadier General (retired) Stan Cherrie, both of DESERT STORM fame. The seminar included the commanders from all the subordinate divisions and separate brigades that were matched against any possible war plans for Iraq.

Figure 27. V Corps command and control seminar, 26-28 August 2002

Training Exercises In September 2002, V Corps and selected subordinate command posts deployed to Poland and conducted Exercise VICTORY STRIKE. This exercise enabled the V Corps staff to practice planning, preparing, and executing corps operations with a focus on the deep fires and maneuver that would be critical to the coming campaign. VICTORY STRIKE enabled the corps to train with airmen in a "live" training environment. Conducting the exercise proved difficult since the V Corps staff was simultaneously planning for the actual IRAQI FREEDOM campaign. V Corps also used this exercise to test its deployment systems, as it deployed a large portion of the corps to Poland and back again. VICTORY STRIKE led the way for a series of exercises through the fall and winter that resulted in completed and rehearsed plans.

CFLCC conducted the next critical exercise, LUCKY WARRIOR, in Kuwait. It was McKiernan's first opportunity to plan and conduct operations with his new staff and new general officers and to exercise the new organizations. LUCKY WARRIOR also provided the first opportunity for CFLCC's major subordinate elements - V Corps, I MEF, and coalition forces - to practice operations under the CFLCC HQ. Much of the exercise focused on team building and establishing standing operating procedures (SOPs) that would enable the CFLCC to integrate the operations of forces with differing capabilities, doctrine, languages, communication capabilities, and historical modes of operation. The exercise also provided an opportunity to practice a variation of the still-evolving plan, thus contributing to commanders' and staffs' understanding of the challenges and complexity of the environment, terrain, and enemy they would soon confront.

Figure 28. V Corps VICTORY STRIKE summary

CENTCOM conducted the next major exercise, its annual INTERNAL LOOK, which had a long history for the command. A dozen years earlier, shortly before Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, General Schwarzkopf led CENTCOM through an INTERNAL LOOK exercise. The 1990 iteration contributed significantly to CENTCOM's rapid and effective response to Saddam's invasion on 2 August 1990. But that INTERNAL LOOK occurred without foreknowledge of the impending war. In contrast, CENTCOM executed the 2002 INTERNAL LOOK in an atmosphere of growing likelihood of war with Iraq. Accordingly, INTERNAL LOOK 2002 focused on joint and coalition operations specifically for the OIF campaign.

As the services turned to the final preparations for the anticipated campaign, INTERNAL LOOK provided the venue for the functional components of the command to examine their plans. Air Force, Marine, and Navy air units combined to form the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC), while Special Operations Command for CENTCOM (SOCCENT) formally established two Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF): JSOTF-North and JSOTF-West. McKiernan also won an important point with General Franks on the minimum US force required to execute the running start option. CFLCC would have at least I MEF with part of its air wing, 1st Marine Division with two regimental combat teams, and V Corps with all of 3rd ID, an attack helicopter regiment, and part of the corps artillery.⁴⁴ This decision laid the cornerstone for the final version of the war plan for Iraq to evolve. McKiernan decided he would attack into Iraq with V Corps and I MEF simultaneously.

Lieutenant General McKiernan identified the regime's ability to control and direct the country as the principal target. Since most of the regime's control mechanism resided in Baghdad, he believed Baghdad to be the center of gravity. In consonance with General Franks at CENTCOM, McKiernan envisioned a simultaneous and synchronized ground attack from multiple directions aimed at isolating the regime within Baghdad and ultimately at striking sites in the city. He directed V Corps to attack along the west bank of the Euphrates River as the main effort and the I MEF to make the supporting effort up the Tigris-Euphrates river valley. Because CENTCOM joint special operations task forces in the north and west mounted offensive operations, Saddam had to cope with concentric attacks. McKiernan further specified the method he desired as simultaneous, multidirectional, continuous effects using combined arms maneuver, operational fires, and information operations, synchronized within the context of the CENTCOM plan. The plan dictated that the two corps control liberated portions of Iraq as they progressed toward Baghdad to minimize the damage to infrastructure, ensure security of lines of communication, assist with the exploitation of sensitive sites, and to control the populace. In short both corps would, in McKiernan's words conduct a rolling transition to stability operations and support operations as they advanced on Baghdad.⁴⁵

V Corps conducted the last significant series of exercises at the Grafenwoehr, Germany, training area in late January and early February 2003. The first of these was called VICTORY SCRIMMAGE. Like LUCKY WARRIOR, VICTORY SCRIMMAGE's primary purpose was team building as it provided Lieutenant General Wallace and his staff the first opportunity to work with the units they would employ in the coming campaign. All of the subordinate divisions and separate brigades were represented for this exercise. Supported by the Army's BCTP, the corps and its units fought a campaign similar to the one that would shortly unfold. The exercise allowed the corps to plan and execute combat operations using a corps battle simulation in computers against the Army's World-Class Opposing Force (an element within BCTP trained to portray various types of enemy forces - in this case the Iraqi armed forces). VICTORY SCRIMMAGE accomplished Wallace's training objectives of building a cohesive team, refining SOPs and rehearsing various aspects of the plan.

Parallel to VICTORY SCRIMMAGE in nearby Vilseck, Germany, the V Corps Support Command conducted a weeklong rehearsal of the entire range of logistics efforts required by the vast distances, large formations, and major combat operations of the coming campaign. The logistics rehearsal identified a number of challenges that logisticians were able to adapt to during deployment and before the beginning of hostilities. V Corps also sponsored an urban-focused exercise named GOTHAM VICTORY immediately following VICTORY SCRIMMAGE.⁴⁶ Colonel J.D. Johnson, commander of 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, tested the corps' newly developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for urban warfare in an interactive simulation against a "thinking" enemy. The results of this simulations-driven exercise seemed to validate the corps' new concepts for urban warfare and generated tools useful to the commanders who would eventually fight in As Samawah, An Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. The results of GOTHAM VICTORY were so pertinent to impending operations that Lieutenant General Wallace brought Johnson to Kuwait to brief the urban operations lessons to all key leaders in the corps just prior to the war.

Collective training by units from the smallest sections all the way up to CFLCC continued right up until the attack. Numerous command post exercises were conducted to verify communications and validate plans. V Corps actually conducted a corpswide exercise just days

Figure 29. VICTORY SCRIMMAGE, V Corps training exercise summary

prior to the actual attack to rehearse movement plans to attack positions and the initial breach plan of the Iraqi border. The corps also validated the initial deep fires plan and logistic support structure during this last exercise. Time was seen as a valuable but perishable resource, therefore it was managed meticulously to ensure units were given ample time to prepare for the fight ahead.

BCTP Training Support

By late summer 2002, CENTCOM and its major subordinate commands were actively planning urban operations for what became OIF. To General Shinseki, the possibility of combat in Iraq required him to get the US Army up to speed on current urban operations doctrine and materiel requirements. Urban operations had not been an area where the Army had focused its energies since the end of the Cold War, but leaders anticipated Iraqi operations would include significant city fighting. Shinseki took several steps, including directing General John Abrams, the TRADOC commander, to form teams to train units on the anticipated troop list for OIF and to determine any materiel requirements for combat in the complex and urban terrain of Iraq.⁴⁷

TRADOC responded by organizing a fifth, temporary, operations group in the BCTP - Operations Group F (OPS F). TRADOC tasked OPS F to conduct seminars in urban operations focused on JP3-06 and FM 3-06 for division and higher echelons. Simultaneously, Operations Group C (OPS C) developed and executed seminars in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) at brigade level and below.⁴⁸ Additionally, TRADOC planned to support mission rehearsals for V Corps and Third Army and ultimately to deploy BCTP soldiers to augment the V Corps and Third Army staffs. JFCOM also moved to support required training by augmenting OPS F for the V Corps seminar as well as supporting all OPS F seminars with "targeteers" from the JFCOM J7 targeting school at Dam Neck, Virginia. Two British officers (a brigadier and a lieutenant colonel)

Figure 30. V Corps urban operations seminar, 4-6 November 2002

also supported development of the seminars, as did Dr. Russell Glenn, an expert in urban operations from the Rand Corporation. Two senior mentors, retired Generals Ed Burba and Jim Lindsay, and retired USMC Lieutenant General Paul "PK" van Riper, who served as a "Red" or enemy subject-matter expert, supported the team in developing and executing the seminars.⁴⁹

OPS F's deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Al Watts, came from OPS C and served with OPS F long enough to lay the groundwork for the seminars and to set conditions to execute brigade training with OPS C. OPS F finished with a seminar for 1st Cavalry Division that ended on 17 December 2002. In just over three months, OPS F formed, developed its training products, coordinated training with the planned troop-listed units, and conducted seminars for CFLCC, V Corps, I MEF, and associated divisions in CONUS, Europe, and Kuwait. It is impossible to say with certainty what OPS F achieved for the training units. Major General Blackman, the CFLCC chief of staff, may have said it best when he observed that the "seminar was helpful, but not critical."⁵⁰ Clearly units appreciated the opportunity to consider the problem and discuss solutions useful since the demand for OPS F events exceeded the supply. Two units - 1st Marine Division and 10th Mountain Division - ran their own training seminars and invited members of OPS F to participate after its dissolution. OPS F also set the stage for brigade level training by OPS C.

OPS C received the mission to prepare training seminars for brigades while in Korea training the forward-deployed maneuver brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division. Preparation for OPS C's work with the brigades included lessons garnered by a small team that visited Israel in November 2002. OPS C built on the work begun by OPS F and eventually conducted tactical-level military operations in urban terrain seminars for every maneuver brigade on the planned troop list. OPS C supported training for units in the United States, Europe, and Kuwait, completing its work in February. BCTP managed this unplanned addition to its training load without canceling other events, including both routine training and special events planned to accommodate anticipated operations. Unit and Soldier Training

As the soldiers flowed into the theater, they quickly completed the reception and staging process and moved out to the various camps and facilities in the Kuwaiti desert. However, rather than relaxing in the not-yet-too-hot sun, most of the troops embarked on an aggressive individual and collective training program to further hone their combat skills. Although it was far away from their families and the comforts of home, the Kuwaiti desert offered vast training space. Moreover, with the Army gearing up for combat, the usually scarce training resources - ammunition, time, and fuel - were abundant.

Lieutenant Colonel John Charlton assumed command of 1-15 Infantry Battalion in July 2002. His battalion, part of the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, had already completed a six-month rotation in Kuwait, returning to Fort Benning, Georgia, in October 2002. They redeployed to Kuwait in January, and their efforts are representative of the typical training regimen for units in 3rd ID:

TF 1-15 IN arrived in Kuwait on 9 January 2003 and immediately moved to Camp NEW JERSEY, located deep in the Kuwaiti desert. After the soldiers got their feet under them in the crowded camp, they moved out to a bare spot in the desert, designated Assembly Area MAINE, about 20 km from the border with Iraq. The soldiers spent three austere months in hard training with daily force-on-force exercises, live fires, urban combat training, and operating in a chemically contaminated environment. The task force took advantage of the extensive live-fire ranges at the Udairi Range complex as well as the numerous mock-up villages and trench complexes. Additionally, the soldiers learned how to use the bevy of new equipment that the Army accelerated through the procurement process to bring to the field. While the soldiers and junior leaders trained relentlessly, the staff and senior leaders continued to plan and prepare for the task force's expected missions. As they moved closer to D-day, security relaxed and the soldiers were "read on" to their specific missions. The platoons and companies then went through as many rehearsals as time would allow. The six weeks of training went far to build the critical esprit de corps that the soldiers would rely on in the pending combat.⁵¹

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Prepare - Equipping the Forces

In the fall of 2002, the Army senior leadership was convinced that war with Iraq would come early in 2003. General Shinseki used the opportunity provided by the annual 4-Star Army Commanders' Conference to assemble key corps, division, and separate regiment commanders. Shinseki used the conference to determine requirements and assign priorities. The conference also provided Lieutenant General McKiernan the opportunity to describe to his potential subordinates his vision for the campaign that lay ahead. Due to extremely tight security measures during the initial planning, many of these commanders learned for the first time that their units were among those anticipated for use in the mission. The conference also gave these commanders the opportunity to coordinate directly with the senior Army staff to articulate their

Figure 31. TF 1-30 IN practicing bunker clearing training, Kuwait

requirements. Finally, TRADOC presented the Army's plan for battle command interoperability, urban operations training, and a host of other actions to prepare for the campaign ahead.⁵² One of the key outcomes of this conference was the decision to create from within the Army staff an Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB). The ASPB formed on 14 September 2001 to help manage the Army's rapid transition to a wartime focus, as well as to sustain the Army's support to homeland defense and the global war on terrorism (GWOT). To support equipping the field Army for the upcoming fight, the ASPB managed priorities, tracked over 485 discrete tasks, and obligated over $3 billion to field urgently needed capabilities and technologies to units deploying or otherwise engaged in the GWOT. The Army staff's work to prepare units and infrastructure proved critical to the future success. The ASPB managed the Army's effort to abridge the ponderous acquisition cycle and bring selected equipment and systems to the field in time for the campaign.⁵³

Fielding New Systems Accelerating fielding required a delicate balancing act between getting the best capabilities into the hands of soldiers against the risks of incomplete training and integration into the receiving unit's SOPs. Under the direction of the Army G3, Lieutenant General Richard Cody, the Army changed the priorities for the fielding of numerous systems to ensure those units designated to participate in OIF got the best equipment available. All avenues were explored by Army staffers to ensure that these new systems and equipment got to the units in time for their employment in war. The new systems achieved varying levels of success in striking this balance. Systems such as the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) and AN/MLQ-40V Voice Collection System (PROPHET) earned rave reviews and worked very well. Others, such as the AN/ PRC-150 Harris high-frequency radio or the Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence

Figure 32. Soldiers posing with a D9 armored bulldozer

Management System did not meet operational expectations because they reached units too late for the recipients to learn how to use them effectively.⁵⁴ The D9 armored bulldozer was one of the more visible successes. It represented a concerted effort to bring enhanced capabilities to the Army in anticipation of a specific combat operation - urban warfare. TRADOC moved rapidly to develop the mission needs statement for the D9 armored bulldozer. The D9 is enormous - nearly 20 feet tall with an add-on armor kit that protects the driver's compartment against small-arms fire and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Inspired by the utility that the Israelis found in the D9, the Army began to think seriously about acquiring it in the summer of 2002. By October 2002, TRADOC was convinced and actively expedited acquisition. Ultimately, the Army acquired 12 of the behemoth dozers, fielding eight in V Corps and providing four to I MEF.⁵⁵ Troops who used the D9 swore by them.

Fielding Information-Age Battle Command and Control

The Army that fought OIF was an information-age army, one determined to leverage the power of information to gain effectiveness. Accordingly, the Army, as an institution and individual units, had invested in, experimented with, and employed a wide array of digital C2 systems since DESERT STORM. These separate initiatives coalesced into the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). ABCS consists of 11 subsystems that enabled digital command, control, and coordination of various battlefield functions ranging from maneuver and fires to intelligence and digital terrain support.

Acquiring such systems is expensive, so the Army had not completed fielding them to the entire force. To bridge the gap, some units bought alternatives to meet their needs. For example, USAREUR units spent the last half of the 1990s in peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans with a significant requirement for digital battle command. But because it was not high on the Army's priority list, USAREUR bought commercial systems as surrogates for the ABCS equipment it had not yet been issued. Additionally, as in home computers, hardware and software upgrades continually outpaced the Army's purchasing ability. For example, as the lead digital division, only the 4th Infantry Division had the latest equipment and software. Because other units had various versions and surrogates, the Army had to move aggressively to bridge the gaps.

To further complicate matters, the Army needed to be interoperable with the other services and coalition partners. Joint battle command at the CENTCOM level would be conducted using the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). As a completely new organization, the CFLCC had to create a C2 architecture where one had never existed. After significant discussion and analysis, CFLCC chose to combine joint systems with the ABCS and commercial systems the Army had been using, most notably Command and Control for Personal Computers (C2PC).

In anticipation of the looming challenge of achieving interoperability with the other services and coalition partners, the TRADOC commander, General John Abrams, brought together three organizations in August 2002. These included the TRADOC Program Integration Office for ABCS (TPIO-ABCS), directed by Colonel John Bartley; the Army's Battle Command Battle Lab (ABC-BL), directed by Colonel Jim Connelly; and a team of representatives from various Army program managers responsible for the development, acquisition, and fielding of the ABCS equipment. Bartley's organization synchronized requirements for the 11 ABCS components and their integration into Army units. Connelly's battle lab developed future battle command systems through experimentation and in coordination with commercial ventures. The program managers did the actual work of acquisition and fielding. Bartley, Connelly, and the various program representatives met at Fort Leavenworth and set about finding a solution for the interoperability challenge.⁵⁶

First, the group identified what hardware and software the other services, coalition partners, and Army units currently used. Then, they looked at courses of action to redistribute systems or field new systems to ensure interoperability. Time was of the essence since there were only a few months to field systems that normally take years to distribute. Whatever they selected, or rather recommended for selection, had to be issued, and then training teams had to train the receiving units. Once they had some answers, Colonels Bartley and Connelly traveled to the Pentagon and briefed the proposed solution to the Army's deputy chief of staff for operations, Lieutenant General Dick Cody, who set the Army in motion to acquire and distribute the needed hardware and software.⁵⁷

The Army solution also provided for joint and coalition interoperability. The Army and Marine Corps already shared the same field artillery battle command system, but IRAQI FREEDOM required interoperability in other key tactical systems. Accordingly, the Army provided the deploying Marine Corps units with BFT and the Air and Missile Defense Warning System (AMDWS) - which provided an integrated picture of enemy aircraft and missiles as well as friendly aircraft. The Army also provided systems to participating British forces. The Kuwaiti Patriot missile force was already interoperable with US Patriots, using the AMDWS linkage already in place.

Figure 33. V Corps assault command post with command vehicles

Tactical Communications and Battle Command on the Move (BCOTM)

Yet for these systems to work, they must be able to talk to each other, whether the units using them are halted or on the move. Communications in combat are notoriously difficult but absolutely necessary to enable commanders not merely to control their units, but to exercise command over them - tell them what must be done and provide them the means to do it. Not surprisingly, armies historically put significant energy into developing systems to support command and control (C2). However, the Army of 2002 remained tied to line-of-sight terrestrial equipment - 30-50 km range FM radios or Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). Although the Army and the Department of Defense had been investing in satellite communications for some time, ground forces generally had lower priority than space, air, naval, or strategic forces. The scope and depth of the pending operation would clearly exceed this capability. As a result, following the October 2002 Army Commanders' Conference, the Army moved rapidly to purchase and field special-built BCOTM vehicles and satellite phones, radios, and bandwidth to ensure adequate communication capabilities.

The V Corps' 22nd Signal Brigade, commanded by Colonel Jeff Smith, took on the task of providing the communications for the hundreds of commanders, command posts, and units that would be spread across an area larger than California. Smith, an experienced "signaleer," also enjoyed the benefit of an innovative staff that reflected his own drive for new solutions to tough problems. Together, they planned a series of "bands of communications" that would open as V Corps marched up-country. Command posts moving through the bands and in proximity to signal nodes would be able to use the wideband and multichannel communications Smith's signal troops would make available. In addition, the Army rapidly invested in tactical satellite radios for voice communications by commanders and their staffs. These TACSATs, as they are called, enabled commanders from corps to brigade to communicate across the vast distances over which they would operate.⁵⁸

Blue Force Tracking and the Common Operational Picture

The BFT system is a revolutionary component to the ABCS and the Army's effort to fight as an information-age army. BFT is the software and hardware that enable the Army's Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system to operate via satellite communications rather than ground-based radios. BFT-equipped vehicles carry transponders that transmit the vehicle's location and receive the locations of similarly equipped vehicles, which are then displayed on a small screen in the vehicle. BFT includes limited text messages and, more important, populates the common operational picture shared at all echelons. The common operational picture shows blue icons depicting BFT-equipped units and their location on a digital map. In short, the common operational picture is a map with friendly units displayed in real time. Red icons, representing enemy units, can be added to the system as well, but they are not automatically updated. The BFT-generated common operational picture enables units to "see" friendly units and to "see" the enemy if enemy information is available. BFT also produced an unintended, but happy, surprise; it helped reduce fratricide in this nonlinear fight since objects that could be seen but not identified, could, with high reliability, be discriminated by looking at the screen. In short, a tank equipped with BFT that can be seen at a distance, but not recognized, can be identified as friendly by its icon on any BFT monitor.

BFT provided the common operational picture, augmented communications, and allowed the Army's combat units to fight digitally enabled in OIF. BFT also permitted commanders to generate graphics rapidly that all of their units could see. This helped them to articulate concepts rapidly and clearly. Notwithstanding all of the capability inherent in BFT, there are things BFT did not enable units to do. BFT is a tool, but it does not provide the means to receive detailed images or other products that require large bandwidth. BFT displays relied on a library of preloaded images and maps as a background for the icons. While better than anything the units had before, the images were typically months old. BFT did not support disseminating current intelligence products to tactical units. It is important to recall that not all combat vehicles, or platoons for that matter, were equipped with BFT. Equally important, not all logistics units fielded the logistics equivalent of BFT. While taking a large and effective step toward becoming a fully digital force, the Army had not reached that goal.

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Prepare - Additional Considerations

In addition to these specific infrastructure, organizational, planning, and equipping preparations, the Army leadership focused on several other areas in preparation for the campaign. These included providing much of the intratheater logistics support to the entire joint force, as required by law and interservice agreement; building the theater missile defenses; preparing the complex military intelligence architecture; preparing to process the expected enemy prisoners of war; preparing to respond to any oil field disasters, whether accidental or as the result of sabotage; and supporting the integration of Iraqi exiles who would participate in the upcoming campaign.

Theaterwide Support

The Army provided combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) to the other components in the theater in accordance with legal requirements or because it was the right thing to do. More than 6,200 soldiers supported special operations, and another 33,220 soldiers executed critical missions throughout Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and elsewhere, in a wide variety of units and organizations. Some of these include the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, the 244th Theater Aviation Brigade, the 204th Air Traffic Service Group, the 416th Engineer Command, the 52nd Ordnance Group, the 377th TSC, the 335th Theater Signal Command, the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, the 3rd Medical Command, and the 75th Field Artillery's Sensitive Site Exploitation and WMD Discovery teams.⁵⁹

These soldiers distributed bulk fuel, water, and ammunition and managed mortuary affairs, enemy prisoner of war operations, theater communications, transportation, air and sea port operations, and combat support hospitals. Many soldiers wore "purple" uniforms, working solely in a joint environment, while others remained "Army Green" but nonetheless supported all of the services and theater personnel. For example, in support of I MEF, the 377th TSC transported more than 4,266 containers from 16 January to 19 April, 9,572 short tons of cargo and just under 10 million gallons of bulk fuel from 20 March to 19 April 2003. During the same period, soldiers provided similar support to the Air Force, including handling more than 18 million gallons of fuel.⁶⁰

Support to I MEF

By design, Marine Corps forces are not organized or equipped for sustained land combat, and certainly not for a campaign ashore lasting months in an offensive hundreds of miles into the interior of a country with a poor infrastructure and virtually no coastline. Accordingly, the Army provided significant reinforcement from both active duty and reserve units to round out or - in the case of rocket artillery, Patriots, civil affairs, and psychological operations - provide the I MEF capabilities they required for a sustained campaign.

So as Army forces flowed into the theater, Marines assigned to and supporting I MEF also arrived and prepared. The I MEF, commanding 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV), 1 Air Wing, the 1st Armoured Division (UK), and other supporting units, made the supporting attack on the right flank of CFLCC's advance to Baghdad. At the time the Marines executed their initial operation to secure the southern oil fields in Iraq on 20 March 2003, the Army had attached more than 2,700 soldiers to I MEF to provide the capabilities not resident in Marine forces, including: a Patriot missile brigade and five Patriot batteries; an engineer group with two engineer battalions and three bridge companies; a military police (MP) battalion; a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense battalion; an air medical evacuation company; a signal battalion; a civil affairs brigade; a psychological operations (PSYOP) battalion; a corps support group with seven transportation companies; and numerous smaller units.⁶¹ These units contributed to the success of the I MEF in OIF.

Theater Missile Defense Employment

The Army also supported theater air and missile defense (TAMD) as part of a joint theater air and missile defense effort. TAMD had to be provided not only over Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and coalition forces, but also over the nations of Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), based in Fort Bliss, Texas, provided the Army component of joint theater air and missile defense.

The 32nd fulfilled several roles. First, it provided the Army Forces (ARFOR) and the CFLCC an organization for theater air and missile defense planning, integration, coordination, and execution. Second, the 32nd deployed liaison officers to the other components to facilitate integration of the Army air defense systems in the theater. In this capacity, the commander of the 32nd served as the Army's theater army air and missile defense coordinator, commanding all Army echelon above corps air defense units, and served as the air component commander's deputy for air defense. Simply stated, the 32nd represented one-stop shopping for access to and execution of Army TAMD. Equally important in fulfilling these roles, the 32nd relieved an air defense brigade commander from wearing all of these hats and commanding a brigade as well.

The Army air defense artillery worked hard to correct technical deficiencies perceived in theater missile defense based largely on Operation DESERT STORM. First praised as the "bullet that could hit a bullet," the Patriot soon came under fire after DESERT STORM. Upon analysis of the results, Patriot had not performed as well in DESERT STORM as the Army first believed. Army air defenders and their colleagues in the other services worked to develop systems that would solve the problems identified during DESERT STORM. Some of the solutions proved to be technical, while others were organizational or doctrinal. Technical solutions included better ways to detect launches and more effective communications to facilitate destroying missiles on the ground or in flight. Organizational changes included weaving together ground, air, naval, and space-based capabilities to provide a seamless capability. The air defense artillery and its joint colleagues capitalized on 12 years' worth of experience in the region, developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to defend against the missile and WMD threats.

In the end, two general threads led to a far better missile defense in OIF. One was technological, including the development of the Patriot Advanced Capabilities Version 3 (PAC 3) air defense missile. When combined with various software and hardware that enabled better linkage with the US Navy's AEGIS Combat System, the theater early warning and command and control improved dramatically. The second thread was the creation of a deliberate theater air/missile defense plan and assigning the 32nd as the force protection headquarters.

The services worked together to improve technical solutions to the problem of air and missile defense as well. The Army, for its part, chose to develop and implement incremental improvements to the Patriot system. Patriot Advanced Capabilities Version 2 (PAC 2) improvements included software upgrades and hardware changes that enabled better acquisition and tracking. After PAC 2, the Army took an even more deliberate approach, developing and testing "configurations" designed to assure an affordable and highly reliable PAC 3 that would account for changing threats and solving system deficiencies discovered in testing or in use. After more than a decade, the result is that air defenders can say with certainty they destroyed nine out of nine missiles engaged. Moreover, the improved missile and command and control structure enabled a truly joint and coalition effort featuring effective early warning from the Aegis Destroyer USS Higgins and the integrated Kuwait Patriot batteries. Problems persist, including two fratricides, but the performance of the joint and coalition team remains extraordinary given the inherent difficulty of the problem.

Brigadier General Howard Bromberg, commanding the 32nd, wore four hats and led the organizational solutions to the problem. In addition to commanding the 32nd, he served as the deputy area air defense commander (DAADC) for JFACC, the theater army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMCOORD), and the CFLCC chief of operational protection. He devoted much of his time to maneuvering the Patriot brigades, battalions, and batteries to generate a "strategic set" that protected the nations of the coalition while enabling a "tactical set" that protected the military forces as they attacked into Iraq. To meet these requirements, the Army deployed the majority of its Patriot systems to the Iraqi theater.

Military Intelligence (MI) Preparation

The Army Military Intelligence Corps reaches from the tactical to the strategic level - literally from mud to space. In the mud, the MI Corps' focal point is a young intelligence analyst working in a battalion S2 section. However, that soldier integrates information drawn from the entire intelligence community through "reach" operations. In reach operations, an intelligence soldier must draw on the intelligence and information available from the entire intelligence community. The organizational and communications architecture to enable this is complex and requires deliberate planning and execution to be effective. Although the Army had started work to build this capability during DESERT STORM, these efforts came to fruition just in time for OIF.

Army intelligence maintained a steady, if small, presence in-theater throughout the previous dozen years in support of the INTERNAL LOOK and INTRINSIC ACTION exercises. However, by the summer of 2002, the intelligence units supporting Army Central Command (ARCENT) and V Corps started enlarging their presence in the theater. From the national intelligence agencies to the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), to the intelligence professionals within the V Corps, Europe, and the United States, the entire intelligence community focused on the Iraqi conventional military threat. What followed was a steady growth in capabilities and manning until, by January 2003, the Army component of the joint intelligence system was ready to go to war.

National, Joint, and Army Intelligence

The US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the Army's "echelon above corps" intelligence organization. Historically considered a "strategic intelligence" organization with little direct connection to tactical combat operations, INSCOM, commanded by Major General Keith Alexander, transformed itself into the organization responsible for bringing the national intelligence capabilities to bear on the tactical commander's problems. INSCOM also coordinated linguist support for all military forces in theater, eventually hiring more than 3,500 linguists.⁶²

INSCOM "plugs" into the national intelligence organizations through its subordinate brigades. Among its many subordinate units, the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade works with the National Security Agency (NSA); the 902nd Military Intelligence Group works with the nation's counterintelligence organizations; the NGIC is the nation's expert knowledge center for ground combat; and the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade directly supports USAREUR it its operations. In a symbiotic relationship, these INSCOM units support the host organizations in their national missions, while they act as a network for the Army to meet its particular needs. All of these capabilities complement and reinforce the tactical intelligence units organic in the Army's divisions and corps.

Under Alexander's direction, INSCOM moved to integrate and synchronize its vast capabilities to meet the CFLCC and V Corps requirements. The 18 months from 11 September 2001 to 19 March 2003 mark the "operationalization" of INSCOM to support the soldiers in the field.⁶³ Alexander instituted often twice-daily video teleconferences with the subordinate commanders and eventually included representatives of the CFLCC and V Corps. His main purpose, aside from improving synergy and integration, was to "find out where the data sits [in the national intelligence community] and getting it to V Corps."⁶⁴

Through the various subordinate commands, INSCOM leveraged the information and capabilities of the nation's various intelligence agencies. For example, through the hard work of Army military intelligence experts such as Chief Warrant Officer 5 Walter Price, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Cochran, and Lieutenant Colonel Ian French, the NSA was a full partner supporting the soldiers in the field. They served as the points of contact to whom intelligence soldiers "reached back."⁶⁵

Moreover, under the close direction of the operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel David Grogan, the NGIC shifted from its historic mission of long-term analysis to developing a highly focused knowledge center concentrated on tracking the Iraqi Republican Guard, conducting detailed hydrology studies in support of the CFLCC, and analyzing urban areas, including Baghdad. NGIC created products that anticipated specific requests from the field and adjusted its hours to assume the theater's battle rhythm. To ensure a responsive relationship, it dispatched liaison officers, including Captain Ruey Newsom to CFLCC and Major Mike Bowling to V Corps. Specialized collaboration software allowed analysts in Kuwait to work with NGIC's analysts in real time. Regular secure video teleconferences augmented the communications and cooperation between NGIC and the theater.⁶⁶

US Army Europe

Within Europe, INSCOM's 66th Military Intelligence Group, commanded by Colonel Gus Greene, Sr., added its capabilities to support the forces deploying from - and through - Europe to Southwest Asia. In addition to the ongoing requirement to support Army operations in the Balkans, the 66th surged to help meet the deploying forces' requirements. As the European theater intelligence support unit, the 66th cooperated with America's European allies to provide force protection and counterterrorism intelligence support to the units moving through Europe.⁶⁷

First and foremost, the 66th, and specifically 2nd MI Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Smith, had to plan and provide counterintelligence support to V Corps ` deployment from Germany along ground lines of communication at convoy support centers, and at sea and air ports of debarkation in Germany, Belgium, and Italy. The 66th's counterintelligence troops focused on counterintelligence and force protection requirements. Moreover, the 66th simultaneously supported out-load requirements in the European Central Region while supporting deployable counterintelligence, all-source, and specialized communications capabilities to Joint Task Force Cobra in Israel, Joint Task Force Free Iraqi Forces in Hungary, Army Forces-Turkey, JSOTF-North, the 10th Special Forces Group, and 173rd Airborne Brigade. The group's military intelligence detachments, located throughout USAREUR, had "pre-established direct coordination and liaison procedures with their supporting area support groups and base support battalion leadership, with the USAREUR leadership, and with their local host nation contacts," contributing to the successful force protection and counterintelligence mission.⁶⁸

In support of the original plan for the 4th Infantry Division to launch from Turkey into northern Iraq, the 66th prepared to provide the necessary intelligence support for northern Iraq. The 66th's Analysis and Control Element (ACE) conducted detailed intelligence studies to meet the expected 4th ID requirements while still maintaining its support to ongoing European missions. Although the 4th ID ultimately entered the theater through Kuwait under CENTCOM's control, the 66th and EUCOM intelligence posture continued to support the JSOTF-North and 173rd operations along the "Green Line," the semi-permanent de facto border between the Kurdish Autonomous Zone in northeastern Iraq and the areas under the Ba'athist regime's control.⁶⁹

Additionally, at the joint level, EUCOM brought its intelligence capabilities to bear. The Joint Analysis Center (JAC), under the direction of Colonel Sharon Mack and coordinated by Major Matthew Glunz, established a 24-hour watch capability to provide intelligence and targeting support to forces in and around Iraq.⁷⁰ Further, to ensure the steady flow of requirements and intelligence, the JAC provided liaison officers to the various units operating in the region. These liaison officers were selected based on their experience, education, and ability to provide the most value-added to supported units.⁷¹

V Corps

V Corps' 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, commanded by Colonel Gary Parrish, aggressively laid the groundwork to provide intelligence to Lieutenant General Wallace and the soldiers of the corps. Normally a three-battalion unit, the 205th grew to seven battalions, including several reserve intelligence units from Utah and California. As the brigade worked to deploy its organic battalions, it integrated these additional units.⁷²

In the late summer, the brigade started cycling its long-range surveillance teams into the theater to train and acclimate soldiers to the environment. Normally trained in the western and central European woodlands and fields, the soldiers found that the desert environment posed an entirely different set of challenges. Trained to infiltrate deep into hostile territory and maintain 24-hour coverage of a targeted area without being detected, the soldiers had to adjust to the temperature, terrain, soil, and cultural differences between Europe and Iraq. Five months of cycling units through the theater went far to improve their readiness. ⁷³

Similarly, the tactical human intelligence collection teams and linguists started rotating into the theater in late fall 2002. Organized into highly flexible four-soldier teams, these intelligence collectors developed the familiarity necessary to support the force protection requirements for the corps. Moreover, they honed language skills and conducted mission-specific training to prepare for the possibility of a campaign in Iraq.⁷⁴

Additionally, the brigade deployed its specialized, advanced imagery systems into the theater. Under the direction of Major Laura Potter, the brigade's imagery systems were integrated into the theater architecture. Under her leadership, the Army's exploitation of theater and national imagery collection proved so exceptional that they were given responsibility for all in-theater imagery production. Collocated with a fighter wing, Potter's team provided targeting folders to pilots before they launched on close air support (CAS) missions.⁷⁵ Armed with this intelligence, the pilots consistently reported that they were far more effective than their less-fortunate brethren.⁷⁶

Military Police and Enemy Prisoner of War Planning

Figure 34. 18th MP Brigade headquarters, Baghdad

One of the coalition's fundamental assumptions was that the Iraqi military would not resist. Indeed, most strategic intelligence assessments predicted large-scale surrenders and capitulations on the order of those experienced during DESERT STORM.⁷⁷ This assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed into the theater and played a significant role in the development of the CFLCC's campaign plan. Given the anticipated numbers of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), CFLCC required a robust military police capability. Moreover, as the combat forces moved north, Lieutenant Generals McKiernan and Wallace appreciated the need for military police to help stabilize the liberated territories. Clearly, military police would be critical in the campaign, both in Phase III and IV.

CFLCC EPW Capture Rate Estimate Iraqi Unit Operational Ready Rates Regular Army Infantry Units = 65% Ready Rate Regular Army Mechanized Units= 75% Ready Rate Regular Army Armor Units= 80% Ready Rate Republican Guard Units= 90% Ready Rate Special Republican Guard Units= 90% Ready Rate Projected Capture Rates 50% of Regular Army Units 20% of Republican Guard Units 10% of Special Republican Guard Units Estimates of EPWs by Iraqi Defensive Strategy Iraqi Units in Positional Defense In Depth 49,000 to 57,000 Iraqi Units in Urban-Centric Defense 31,000 to 35,000 Early Regime Collapse 16,000 to 18,200

> CFLCC EPW Methodology Briefing, CFLCC G2 plans

The 18th MP Brigade, stationed in Mannheim, Germany, began planning for OIF in December 2001.⁷⁸ Identifying the specific MP units to deploy and fight proved difficult since the FORSCOM list of available units fluctuated daily based on worldwide MP obligations. The war on terrorism, in particular, absorbed many MP units from both the Active and Reserve Components. Their missions ranged from airport security to force protection at the Pentagon and military installations all over the world to detainee operations in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Originally, the 18th MP Brigade planned to have two battalion headquarters and 8-10 MP companies available when combat operations commenced.⁷⁹ This formation, in addition to the division MP companies, would enable the 18th MP Brigade to execute all of its specified and implied tasks, including EPW operations, high-value asset (HVA) security, area security operations, and main supply route (MSR) regulation and enforcement. To bring combat units into the theater more quickly, CFLCC assumed risk and moved the MP units toward the tail end of the force flow. As additional MP units arrived, they immediately moved north and joined the fight.

As planning progressed and execution neared, it became obvious that there would be significantly fewer MP units in-theater when the war started than originally planned based on the new force packaging decisions. These decisions had the greatest effect on the division provost marshals, who were responsible for coordinating MP support to the divisions with only half of the required police forces. As the provost marshal for the corps' lead division, Lieutenant Colonel John Huey, the 3rd ID provost marshal, developed the EPW handling plan for the offensive. His main concern was that he would not be able to relieve maneuver commanders of EPWs in a timely manner. After analyzing the mission, he concluded that the three general support platoons (each with 21 soldiers) of the division's 3rd MP Company would have to limit their operations to one specified task: EPW operations. He also realized he could not afford to operate in accordance with current doctrine, which calls for holding EPWs for 12-24 hours until the corps MPs moved them to a corps holding area.⁸⁰

To manage the problem, Huey formed Task Force EPW. In addition to the division's MP company, the task force received the 546th Area Support Hospital, the 274th Medical Detachment (Field Surgical Team), a tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team, a mobile interrogation team, a criminal investigation division (CID) division support element, and an adviser from the Staff Judge Advocate.⁸¹ With the 3rd MP Company, the task force had the resources necessary to receive, process, and safeguard prisoners. This proved to be a highly successful, responsive task force that relieved maneuver commanders of the burden of prisoners across the full breadth of the battlefield.

Preparing for the Worst: Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO)

Based on Saddam's performance during DESERT STORM, planners at all echelons from the Department of Defense down to V Corps and the I MEF assumed that the Iraqis would set fire to their oil fields. Destroying the oil production infrastructure would produce both an ecological and economic disaster of huge proportions for the region and the Iraqi people. In anticipation, the Department of Defense assigned the Army responsibility for developing a plan and the means to put out the fires and rebuild the oil infrastructure, even as CENTCOM considered plans to attack rapidly to seize the oil fields if the Iraqis moved to set them ablaze.⁸²

The Army assigned the task to the Corps of Engineers, Southwest Division, in Dallas, Texas, commanded by Brigadier General Robert Crear. Crear assembled a joint team of military and civilian personnel, including contractors from Kellogg, Brown, and Root, which had already demonstrated expertise in fighting difficult oil field fires during DESERT STORM. Task Force RIO's missions included: extinguishing any fires; safely shutting down oil facilities to prevent accidents prior to full restart of the Iraqi oil industry (because the Iraq oil reserves are under pressure, an uncontrolled shutdown can be as disastrous as setting fires); conducting environmentally sound reduction of spills; repairing and restoring facilities; and assisting the Iraqis in restarting their oil industry after the war.⁸³

In February and March, Task Force RIO mobilized and deployed both military and contract personnel focused on the worst-case scenario of hundreds of fires. In the first two weeks of March, four sets of firefighting equipment arrived. In the end, RIO did not have to confront hundreds of fires. The Iraqis damaged nine wells, setting seven afire. Two gushed oil onto the ground. By the middle of April, Task Force RIO had put out all of the oil field fires in the southern fields. In late April, RIO got access to the northern fields, where damage proved insignificant.

The lack of damage stemmed from several factors. First, coalition forces responded rapidly at the first hint of Iraqi sabotage, reaching the southern fields by 23 March. Second, Iraqi oil workers took matters in hand, safely shutting down facilities before departing. For example, at the refinery in Basra, Iraqi oil workers executed safe shutdown and welded doors shut to prevent looting. Finally, coalition engineers executed safe shutdown of several wells and facilities.⁸⁴ The combination of combat operations, courageous decisions by Iraqi oil workers, and Task Force RIO helped preserve the southern oil fields for the future, democratic Iraq.

Free Iraqi Forces

The Army program to recruit, train, deploy, and employ Iraqi citizens as Free Iraqi Forces (FIF) had operational and tactical implications. This effort actually began with the Iraqi Liberation Act, passed in 1998, which provided for assistance to Iraqi democratic opposition forces.⁸⁵

In June 2002, the Army received the mission to train up to 5,000 FIF for employment during a future campaign to liberate Iraq. The Army assigned the mission to TRADOC, due to its expertise with training initial-entry soldiers for the US Army - that is, changing civilians into soldiers. During the fall of 2002, a TRADOC task force created a program of instruction and prepared to train the incoming FIF recruits. The planners selected Taszar, Hungary, as the site for FIF training. By January 2003, the trainers, primarily USAR civil affairs soldiers, were mobilized and ready.⁸⁶

The task force arrived in Taszar on 25 January and began preparing to train the Iraqis. The first class of 55 Iraqi citizens started their 10-day course on 17 February. While training was ongoing, planners coordinated with CFLCC and Army units in Kuwait to determine where the FIF could best be employed. By 4 March, the initial class of FIF arrived in Kuwait. Meanwhile, a second class of 23 FIF started training back in Hungary.⁸⁷

Upon arrival in Kuwait, FIF were assigned to V Corps, I MEF, and the 352 Civil Affairs Command. During the war, the FIF trained various coalition units on the culture, politics, and environment of Iraq. They conducted negotiations with local civilians and served as interpreters for the same purpose. FIF assisted in searches and performed initial evaluation of captured documents, at times enabling rapid exploitation of information that led to capture of senior Ba'ath Party members. Following major combat operations, the FIF were released, and the task force redeployed to the US. While the total number of FIF was small, their strategic, operational, and tactical impact was significant.⁸⁸

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Mobilizing the Reserves

Throughout the winter of 2002 and the spring of 2003, ARNG and USAR units mobilized for OIF. Many of these units were CSS or logistics units, providing the bulk of the soldiers who operated ports, hauled fuel, repaired equipment, and sustained the theater in general. As well, some CS units, including military police battalions, engineer bridge companies, civil affairs detachments, and psychological operations units, mobilized and met vital requirements. For these critical assets, rapid mobilization and deployment was the goal, but not one that the Army always achieved. Generally, the Army met its reserve mobilization timelines.

But whether the planned timelines were adequate depended partly on how quickly the unit was required. In OIF, the timelines and requirements did not always match up. For example, the 299th Engineer Company, a multirole bridge company, received its mobilization order in September 2002. Activated on 1 November 2002, the 299th left Fort Belvoir, Virginia, three days later for Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. By prewar planning, the engineers should have conducted their mobilization training at Fort Eustis, Virginia, but because there was a bridge available for training in Missouri, the company headed west. Soon, four more bridge companies mobilized and joined the 299th at Fort Leonard Wood. Eventually, the bridge companies were validated as trained and ready for deployment to Kuwait and Iraq. The 299th Engineer Company experience was repeated all across the United States as ARNG and USAR units mobilized.

The 19th Army Special Forces Group was another key Reserve Component unit mobilized due to the heavy SOF requirements after 9/11. The 19th SF Group deployed much of its force to Kuwait in 2002 for Operation DESERT SPRING, along with elements of Special Operations Command and Control Element - Kuwait (SOCCE-Kuwait) and the 3rd ID. During OIF, the 19th SF would operate under the command of JSOTF-West in support of both V Corps and I MEF in the first large-scale use of Reserve Component special forces since the group was formed. The 19th SF's missions included reconnaissance and direct action in support of the Marine Corps' TF Tarawa battles in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah.⁸⁹

Individual Reserve mobilization was another critical effort. The Army was authorized to mobilize over 34,000 Reservist soldiers to fill vacant positions. Contacting, recalling, training, and deploying individual Reservists proved to be a management and leadership challenge. After mobilization, each Reserve soldier cycled through one of the Army's CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) to receive training and equipment. The CRCs also served government and contract civilians deploying into the theater. The CRCs themselves were run by USAR formations, often mobilized with short notice and still in need of training to perform their mission.

Week after week, hundreds of soldiers and civilians passed through the CRCs at Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Bliss, Texas, en route to IRAQI FREEDOM. Operating a CRC was a trying mission, made more difficult since such centers only existed in wartime or during crisis operations. Soldiers and civilians processing through CRCs were often frustrated by their experience. Standing in lines for shots or to draw equipment has never been anything other than frustrating. Staying in old World War II-style billets only added to the soldiers' frustration. At times, after an almost immediate response to their mobilization, the mobilized solders stayed at the CRC for weeks with little to do as they awaited orders assigning them to a specific unit and position. As trying as the CRC system was, in the end it worked effectively.

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Deployment to Theater

As summer gave way to the fall of 2002, the center of gravity of Army preparations for IRAQI FREEDOM shifted from CONUS to the theater. In addition to the BCT from 3rd Infantry Division already in Kuwait for Operation DESERT SPRING, a second BCT from 3rd ID deployed from Fort Stewart to Kuwait. Deploying a second BCT increased pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with UN WMD inspections and to pre-position for potential combat operations. An attack helicopter squadron, 2-6 CAV, deployed from Germany into Kuwait to support the troops in the field. Additional logistics units also deployed. The two major Army headquarters, Third Army and V Corps, deployed their respective forward command posts to Kuwait from Atlanta and Heidelberg, Germany, respectively and joined the 3rd Infantry Division, I MEF-Forward, and the CENTCOM Forward Command Post, already in theater. The V Corps' Rear Command Post and the headquarters of the 377th TSC deployed as well. These two staffs would be critical for coordinating deployments and logistic support during the campaign. With the arrival of these command posts, the essential theater land operations infrastructure was complete.

Deployment Planning

With the coming of the new year, activity shifted into high gear and focused on three critical components of the operation: deploying forces to the Iraqi theater of operations, mobilizing ARNG and USAR units and individuals, and developing the theater logistics infrastructure necessary for the campaign. Deploying V Corps' combat units began in earnest as political rhetoric heated up and war inched ever closer. The shifting strategic landscape of coalition and supporting partners, as well as the lack of a specific date and troop list for the operation, complicated deployment, mobilization, and logistics. The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provided the framework and structure for handling these three components of the campaign. As planners developed courses of action, they built a Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL), using the JOPES automated systems, of which units would deploy and in what priority sequence. Once approved, a TPFDL flows forces into the theater automatically until turned off by the command. While very structured, this system forces detailed planning. It ensures, for example, that logistics and support units are available as combat units arrive in the theater. However, because of the complexity of synchronizing units, limited transportation assets, and time, a TPFDL is frustratingly difficult to modify in response to changing requirements.

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Reilly of Third Army and Major Kevin Marcus of V Corps, planners did tremendous work building the TPFDL. They worked hard to maintain the proper mix of combat, CS, and CSS units to fulfill the war plan requirements. Although this system worked very well for deliberate planning, it lacked the flexibility and responsiveness required by senior leaders. Accordingly, after six time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) conferences at TRANSCOM headquarters, CENTCOM resorted to a different approach.

The new approach required planners to group units into force packages that could deploy in the order required as the campaign unfolded. This system allowed CENTCOM to hold units for deployment at a later date. However, it required that every force package be approved by CENTCOM. As a result, force packaging as executed in OIF reduced the ability to plan the integration of units since the commanders depended on approval from higher headquarters to flow the force. Additionally, deviating from the detailed TPFDL had unintended consequences as logistic units fell farther back in the force flow. This affected not only Army units, but also those from sister services that depended on Army supporters.⁹⁰ For example, the Army provided much of the long-haul ground transportation used by the Marine Corps. However, because Army planners were directed to move those units into later force packages, I MEF compensated by contracting civilian trucks in Kuwait until the Army units were allowed to deploy in country.

From a national strategic perspective, there was another impact of using force packaging to deploy the force. The ability to adjust the deployment sequence rapidly did not match the requirement to schedule the finite strategic lift assets - the airlift and sealift fleets - well in advance. The careful, detailed management of the lift assets could not readily adjust to meet the relatively rapid adjustments to the deployment timelines. As the campaign progressed, the force flow never caught up with the operational requirements; the approach ultimately failed to provide either the flexibility or responsiveness anticipated.

Deployment Execution: Planes, Trains, Ships, and Automobiles

The difficulties in planning a deployment are equally evident at the unit execution level. To give a sense of perspective of the magnitude of the challenge, imagine that one day, without warning, the manager of the Wal-Mart in Clarksville, Tennessee, adjacent to the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, was told to move everything in the store - merchandise, displays, equipment, computers, and all employees - to Kuwait within three weeks, and to be ready to open the store within days of arriving. That is a miniature example of the problem - miniature because the 101st is bigger than 100 Wal-Marts.

While this sounds, and is, chaotic, confusing, and often inefficient, it is not the result of indifference or poor planning. The deployment system is large, complex, and sensitive to mistakes and serendipity. A unit showing up at the airfield out of sequence or late causes a ripple effect that can take days to overcome. Weather delays, vessel breakdowns at sea, and a host of other problems are common and have similar effects on the unit's arrival in the theater. Many things can go wrong, and even when they go very well, cargo and passengers usually arrive at facilities not designed to receive an army on the move. Even the cardinal rule of not separating soldiers from their gear can be difficult to follow. Units, personnel, and equipment are often cross-loaded in different aircraft or ships to maximize loading efficiency, but causing those units to arrive at different locations and times and separated from their equipment. Moreover, since deployment occurs in several stages as units move from their home station to the theater, these events can occur at multiple points in the deployment sequence.

Units are not necessarily located adjacent to either aerial or seaports, so a move is required to get from "fort to port" then from "port to port," and finally RSOI in the theater. This stage, or "port to foxhole," is perhaps the most fragile part of the entire deployment process. RSOI starts with receiving arriving unit passengers who, in most cases, arrive by air and must be met and transported to a place where they may be reunited with their equipment. Ultimately it includes uploading ammunition and other supplies, test-firing weapons and, as time permits, training and rehearsing for missions.

"Fort to Port" - Deployment

Packing up an entire unit and its soldiers is akin to packing the family into the car for the summer vacation - with the associated frenetic pace, urgency, and chaos. Tactical units all have deployment SOPs with slews of checklists to assist and order the process. But reality and checklists do not always match. Seemingly endless changes in the transportation timelines and availability, combined with changes to the tactical plan, ripple throughout the units. In addition to validating load plans, finalizing deployment rosters, and physically preparing the equipment to load onto rail cars or aircraft, the units must also prepare the families for the ordeal to follow. Deploying is even more intense for USAR and ARNG units that have not had the time, resources, or experience to prepare accordingly.

That said, the Army's 12-year investment in deployment infrastructure paid dividends for OIF. From improved railhead facilities at individual posts to the improvements at the ports, the units were able to move their equipment to the ports far more efficiently than for DESERT STORM. As well, the investment in training unit movement officers and sergeants in the technical aspects of rail and aircraft loading down to the company level helped to smooth the process even more. Finally, modernized deployment and unit movement software tools improved the management process significantly. With the Army's steady rate of deployments over the previous dozen years, virtually every unit had a cadre of soldiers who were experienced with the art and science of getting "down range."

"Port to Foxhole" - RSOI

Units normally arrive in a theater of operations by a combination of surface and air delivery methods. By experience, approximately 95 percent of personnel arrive by air. Conversely, 95 percent of materiel arrives by sea. The soldiers, arriving at an airfield with just their personal bags, must then meet up with their unit equipment and vehicles in designated staging areas near arriving seaports (ports of debarkation). Through this synchronization of airlift and sealift arrivals, soldiers prepare their equipment for movement forward to the battlefield. Essentially, this means arriving unit personnel must be met and transported, hopefully with their baggage, either to the port of debarkation to pick up their unit equipment or to the forward assembly area where their equipment will later arrive.

Even this is not as straightforward as it sounds. Anyone waiting for a bag on a turnstile at an airport has discovered and indeed is told by convenient announcements that many bags look alike. Well, in the Army, they all look exactly alike. Passengers on a deploying military aircraft, say 300 or so, typically disembark from about 25 hours in transit. The unwritten rule is that units usually arrive in pitch dark and no one is there to meet them. The exhausted soldiers, who are entirely disoriented now, rummage through bags to find their own. This little vignette, or ones like it, repeated hundreds of times during the buildup and execution of OIF.

Given all that can go wrong, the performance of the US deployment system in OIF was superbly efficient, rapid, and generally effective as a consequence of thoughtful analysis of previous deployments and important investments in infrastructure and equipment since Operation DESERT STORM. TRANSCOM and its major subordinate commands, including the Army Materiel Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the MTMC, are responsible for deployment transportation, literally from point of origin to final destination. Their tasks are enormous, require intensive management, and depend on Active and Reserve Component service members and a great many civilians. The Army depends on TRANSCOM and its subordinate commands to move everything from tanks to troops to paper clips to support operations around the globe.⁹¹

Soldiers on the Move

So, the divisions and supporting units destined to fight the Iraqi army began to flow into the theater. The first four divisions on the move, and the only ones to participate in Phase III combat operations, included the 3rd Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 82nd Airborne Division, and the 4th Infantry Division. They were all in different stages of deployment when combat operations began.

3rd Infantry Division

The 3rd Infantry Division was the first into Kuwait. The 2nd BCT was already in Kuwait, having deployed for Operation DESERT SPRING in the fall of 2002. In December 2002, the remainder of the 3rd ID began to deploy from Fort Stewart, Georgia, to Kuwait. The soldiers of the division flowed into the theater by air and linked up with the pre-positioned heavy brigade equipment sets of APS-3 and APS-5. The soldiers and leaders of 3rd ID found the APS vehicles and equipment to be in excellent shape (many said better than their own), but some equipment did not exactly match the model and version the soldiers had back at Fort Stewart. That was, however, a minor difficulty and one quickly overcome by soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

The division drew the APS equipment and deployed out to camps in the desert of Kuwait. Brigades began training in earnest, using the Udairi Range complex and the vast expanse of desert to practice offensive operations. Training right up until they attacked into Iraq, during the next four months the division would fire, drive, and fly the equivalent of two years of training ammunition and fuel, roughly six times what they would have experienced in peacetime. This precious training opportunity, afforded only to 3rd ID because of the unique buildup in this campaign, contributed significantly to the division's success.

101st Airborne Division

The second major unit to deploy into Kuwait was the 101st Airborne Division. Alerted for deployment in January 2003, the division began deploying on 6 February 2003. Based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the division deployed its equipment by rail, truck, and air to the port of Jacksonville, Florida, including self-deployment of over 250 helicopters. After loading, the division's equipment made the 9,000 mile voyage to Kuwait. As the ships approached Kuwait, more than 20,000 soldiers from the reinforced division flew to Kuwait International Airport and began to link up with their equipment at Camp WOLF. For many of the soldiers, particularly from the division's 3rd Brigade, deploying to Kuwait followed closely on the heels of their deployment in Afghanistan from January to August 2002 and their subsequent JRTC

Figure 35. Udairi Airfield, Kuwait

training rotation in November. Indeed, some of the division's CH-47 Chinook pilots were at Fort Campbell for only 22 days before departing again.⁹²

The division's rapid deployment is a testament to the hard work and planning by both the division staff and the Fort Campbell garrison soldiers and civilians. During the fall as the V Corps and CFLCC plan evolved, the 101st executed a series of deployment and load-plan validation exercises to prepare for the anticipated movement. Colonel Kim Summers, the Fort Campbell Garrison commander, brought all of the fort's capabilities to bear in pushing the division "out the door." The division off-loaded its first ship in Kuwait less than 30 days after its receipt of the deployment orders.⁹³

The last planeload of "Screaming Eagle" soldiers arrived on 10 March. Despite a remarkable effort, the division closed in theater less than 10 days before hostilities commenced. The division conducted RSOI in significantly less time than planned, including moving to the desert, acclimatizing soldiers, pilots, and equipment to desert operations, drawing ammunition and test-firing all weapons, and performing the thousand other tasks required to prepare a division for war in a distant land. Still, because the formal order to deploy had come so late, when the CFLCC offensive commenced, the last elements of the 101st were still completing their preparations for war.

4th Infantry Division

In the northern portion of the theater, the deployment was not going as well. In January, CENTCOM and EUCOM began setting the stage for a northern front. During planning and coordination, operating from Turkey into northern Iraq was considered integral to the campaign's success. EUCOM had been in close consultation with the Turkish armed forces and civilian leadership throughout the fall. In early January, EUCOM designated the 1st Infantry Division, based in Germany, to serve as the Joint Rear Area Command (JRAC) in Turkey. The

Figure 36. CH-47 helicopters and assorted rolling stock

JRAC would perform coordination, logistics support, and force protection to enable the 4th ID to deploy to Turkey, position in assembly areas close to Iraq and, on order, attack south toward Tikrit. The 1st ID moved elements to Turkey and began coordination and preparations for the 4th ID's arrival. At the same time, elements from the Army's 10th Special Forces Group, under command of Colonel Charlie Cleveland, formed the core of JSOTF-North and began coordination and staging for future operations from Turkey. Meanwhile, the 4th ID loaded its equipment on ships bound for the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey. Soon, more than 40 ships carrying tanks, aircraft, and supplies were flowing into the "eastern Med."

While the JRAC continued its preparations and 4th ID ships arrived outside the ports, the Turkish government refused to allow offensive operations from its soil. As the United States and Turkey tried diplomatic means to resolve the impasse, preparations for operations into Iraq from Turkey slowed and then halted. While negotiations continued, the ships carrying the equipment of 4th ID awaited permission to enter port and discharge their cargo. When hostilities commenced, it became clear that the 4th ID was not going to be able to operate from Turkey. Eventually, General Franks ordered the ships to move through the Suez Canal to Kuwait, and the 4th ID joined V Corps in the attack from the south. Meanwhile, JSOTF-North was forced to deploy by air into northern Iraq without transiting Turkish airspace, leading to dangerous infiltrations by air as SOF C-130 aircraft negotiated the dense Iraqi air defense umbrella. The Turkish government finally granted limited use of their airspace and ground for logistics only. This would help sustain the campaign in the north over time, but the initial damage was done.

Without the 4th ID in the north, the Third Army resorted to a backup plan. The 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy, as part of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), had been part of the planning for the northern front since mid-December. Although the 173rd was intended to serve under the 4th ID, the plans quickly changed to employ the brigade as a

Figure 37. 4th Infantry's route was to take it through the Mediterranean Sea
and Turkey to attack into Iraq from the north.

conventional force under command of JSOTF-North. The 173rd fielded two infantry battalions provided with a few high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), an artillery battery, and other support elements. Because the 173rd had no armored or mechanized forces, USAREUR contributed its medium ready company (MRC) of infantry in M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and its heavy ready company (HRC) of M1 Abrams tanks and M2 BIFVs. With those two companies placed under command of 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor, the 173rd became a light-heavy BCT.⁹⁴

JSOTF-North identified Bashur Airfield in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq as the best place to bring the 173rd BCT into the theater. After reconnaissance by SOF and Kurdish Peshmerga Freedom Fighters, the "Pathfinders" of the 173rd moved into Bashur, followed shortly by the first brigade-size airborne assault since Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989. Once the airborne troops secured the airfield, C-17s brought in the heavy equipment, tanks, and Bradleys of Task Force 1-63rd AR. After building combat power and preparing for combat, the 173rd BCT participated in the final ground operations that sealed the fate of Iraqi Regular Army forces in northern Iraq. Operations in the north could not, however, attain the effect hoped for with the 4th ID's heavy forces. Nonetheless the brigade did contribute to JSOTF-North operations.

82nd Airborne Division

The 82nd Airborne Division initially endured an "on again/off again" experience with IRAQI FREEDOM. While the division's airborne assault capability offered tremendous operational flexibility, the "All Americans" already had a BCT and part of the division headquarters deployed in Afghanistan for OEF. Still, CENTCOM and CFLCC planners needed to be able to place a large force anywhere in Iraq rapidly, either to take advantage of opportunities such as a sudden collapse of the regime or to meet unforeseen challenges as the campaign unfolded. So, in early January the rest of the division was alerted for deployment to Kuwait.

The division's advance party arrived by air and established the All-American Base Camp adjacent to Camp WOLF and the Kuwait International Airport, from where they would depart on any airborne operation. Because the Kuwaitis had no facilities for rigging the 82d Division's heavy equipment for airborne drop, the division's engineers created the same capability in the desert that they had back at their home - Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Breaking ground on 16 February, the engineers completed a world-class heavy drop rig site on 7 March - capable of rigging every piece of the division's equipment. As the 82nd's heavy equipment arrived by sea, they quickly positioned it at the All-American Base Camp and prepared for operations. Meanwhile, the division's ground and air troops conducted desert operations training at Udairi Range and at the Faylaka Island training site. By 17 March, the 82nd was ready for war in Iraq.⁹⁵

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Prelude to War: "Final Planning and Preparation"

As mid-March approached, the Army began to position for war. The 3rd ID, as the lead element of V Corps, moved out of its base camps and into assembly areas along the Kuwait/ Iraq border. This was in part to be closer to their jump-off point, but also to make room for follow-on units arriving in the theater. Even the desert can fill up when over 200,000 soldiers, marines, and their vehicles and equipment deploy into a relatively small country. According to the V Corps situation report on the evening of 19 March 2003, the corps had the following combat systems ready to attack:

Unit	M1 Abrams	M2/3 Bradley	Paladin How.	Towed How.	MLRS	AH-64A/D	OH58D	UH-60	CH-47
3rd ID	247	264	54		18	18	16	15
101st				60		72	24	126	34
2/82nd							12
11 AHR						61
12 AVN								37	28
Total	247	264	54	60	18	151	52	178	62

As the 3rd ID left camp, the 101st BCTs moved in to replace them. Likewise, artillery units moved to positions from which Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and MLRS batteries would fire the opening salvos of the war. The huge fuel tank farms that had been built began to fill up and everywhere command posts and signal nodes sprouted antennas as the Army set up the communications architecture that would enable the campaign. Throughout Kuwait, there was last-minute training, resupply of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies, and soldiers engaged in their own mental and physical preparation for war. By 18 March, Third Army, V Corps, and their subordinate units were prepared to open the campaign.

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Notes

1. Taken from personal notes of Colonel James K. Greer, director, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Colonel Greer attended the Army Commanders' Conference and was one of the principal briefers.
2. The RSOI process is critical to the rapid deployment and then employment of large units in a theater. See also JP 4-01.8 and FM 100-17-3 for joint and Army doctrine on RSOI.
3. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, commander, Third Army ARCENT/CFLCC, interview by Major John Aarsen, 17 November 2002.
4. Major General Henry Stratman, deputy commanding general for support (DCG-S), CFLCC interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 19 May 2003.
5. Stratman. See also Stratman input to On Point assigned tracking number 031027. Colonel Kevin Benson, who served as the Third Army plans officer for then Lieutenant General Franks, believes the turning point for planning operations under the assumption that Saudi Arabia would not be available came in 1997. Benson accompanied Franks on his first trip to the theater as commanding general, Third Army. Franks told Benson as the two of them "stood on a dune looking into Iraq," that in the rewrite of the war plan, Benson should assume starting from Kuwait. See also Colonel Kevin Benson, C5, CFLCC interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 20 November 2003.
6. Stratman.
7. Stratman.
8. Colonel Victoria Leignadier, commander, 598th Transportation Group (Terminal), interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 24 November 2003.
9. Ibid.
10. Lieutenant Colonel David Kolleda, "Chapter Prep Mob Deploy, Section 2. SWA Theater Prep and JLOTS" 15 July 2003 OIFSG. Developed from after-action reviews and interviews collected in April and May 2003. Lieutenant Colonel Kolleda joined the OIF-SG in theater, where he served with the 377th TSC.
11. Kolleda. Much of this information could also be found on 7th Transportation Group unit web pages in summer 2003.
12. Kolleda, "Port Operations and JLOTS.," 15 July 2003.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. See also Leignadier. USMC MPS vessels, in the end, did not employ Army JLOTS or their own on- board lighters. The Marines did use their excellent hovercraft.
15. Major General Ann Dunwoody, commanding general, MTMC. In the operational summary Lieutenant Colonel Kolleda prepared, he argued that Army watercraft played important roles in enabling rapid unloading and supporting JLOTS. Neither Major General Dunwoody nor her staff agreed with this assessment. Colonel Leignadier, whose Transportation Terminal Group provided port management believed that they could have done the job without the watercraft, but having them reduced the burden. Some of the data cited here came from 7th Transportation Group web pages. See also Major General Bobby Dail email to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Kolleda, 3 July 2003.
16. Leignadier.
17. Kolleda.
18. Ibid. (section titled APR Master Plan) APS-1 includes equipment stored in the US. APS-2 includes three brigade sets, one in Germany, one in the Netherlands, and one in Italy. APS-3 includes a brigade set afloat in Diego Garcia and one in Saipan. APS-4 is a brigade set in Korea. APS-5 includes a brigade set in Kuwait and one in Qatar.
19. Kolleda.
20. V Corps Rear (Provision), "AAR Draft," December 2002.
21. Lieutenant General Dan Petrosky, US Army, Retired, interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 20 November 2003.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Technically, with the Marine Corps providing ground forces, the CFLCC is actually a CJFLCC - Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command. However, this work adopts the theater's common naming convention.
25. "CJFC FRAG ORDER, 02-015."
26. This remark made to Gregory Fontenot on 13 November 2003 by an Army colonel who served on the CFLCC staff.
27. Major General Robert Blackman, chief of staff, CFLCC, interview by Brigadier General Robert Cone, 17 and 31 March 2003.
28. Ibid.
29. Major General J.D. Thurman, C3, CFLCC, interview by Colonel James K. Greer, 25 April 2003. See also Major General J. D. Thurman, C3, CFLCC, interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 21 May 2003. Specifically, Thurman recalled they had to train the staff to conduct a battle update assessment.
30. Benson.
31. Major Kevin Marcus,G3 planner, V Corps, email to Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, 8 September 2003.
32. Benson.
33. Ibid.
34. An operational planning team (OPT) formed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, spring 2002, in support of the Army Staff and CENTCOM for the purpose of examining the logistic considerations for deployment and sustainment of Army forces through the three axes of advance (Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey). Briefing prepared by SAMS Deployment OPT, undated, held in Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
35. Major E.J. Degen was later promoted to lieutenant colonel by Lieutenant General Wallace in Baghdad on 26 April, 2003.
36. In October and November 2002, SAMS deployed a team of six students to Heidelberg, Germany, to assist V Corps in planning the Baghdad operation. These students planned side by side with the V Corps staff in an example of the successful marriage of education and actual operations. On Marine participation, see email Rago to Degen, 5 January 2003. According to Rago, the marines brought a "platoon" of planners to every planning session to assure the MEF understood the plan and could collaborate effectively.
37. See Dr. Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2001). Colonel Greer's white paper essentially formed the core of the concept that V Corps built in preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Dr. Russell Glenn is a Rand analyst who has published a number of studies on urban operations. A frequent speaker at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Glenn enjoys wide respect in the Army and in the USMC. A retired Army officer, graduate of School of Advanced Military Studies and a past faculty member, Glenn's major publications on urban operations include several Rand studies, the most important of which is Heavy Matter: Urban Operations Density of Challenges (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2001). See also Tom Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Non-Linearity in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998). Dr. Joe Strange's ideas on critical vulnerabilities are detailed in Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting No. 4, 1997.
38. Major E.J. Degen from notes taken at the CENTCOM Component Commanders' Conference held at Camp DOHA, Kuwait, September 2002.
39. Much of this paragraph is planners' "tribal wisdom" but facts cited stem either from list of graduates of School of Advanced Military Studies or from Benson.
40. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, commanding general, CFLCC interview by Major John Aarsen, 30 November 2002.
41. Ibid.
42. Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Degen to Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired, 12 November 2003.
43. Ibid. See also Lieutenant General David McKiernan, commanding general, CFLCC, interview by Major John Aarsen, 19 December 2002. See also Benson.
44. V Corps G3 Plans notes. Major John Aarsen, 19 December 2002.
45. "CFLCC OPLAN COBRA II Base Plan," Camp DOHA, Kuwait, 13 January 2003.
46. Exercise timelines referenced from V Corps/CJTF-7 Standard Operations Brief, or MOAB (Mother of All Briefings), 12 July 2003.
47. General Shinseki came to this conclusion while at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during a visit to the Pre- Command Course. Shinseki received a briefing on "The Way Ahead for Urban Operations" from Lieutenant General James Riley, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center, and his staff. The CSA determined to publish FM 3-06, Urban Operations, immediately and to distribute it to the field with priority to troop listed units. Second, he directed that TRADOC field a mobile training team to educate the field in the new urban operations doctrine, including both joint and Army doctrine.
48. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), formed in the late 1980s by General Carl E. Vuono, CSA, originally focused on providing flagship training for divisions and corps. In the beginning BCTP included two operations groups (A and B), each commanded by a colonel. Subsequently, BCTP formed Operations Group C to support the training of Army National Guard brigades as part of the Army's effort to improve training in the Guard. Finally, as Atlantic Command transitioned to become JFCOM, BCTP formed Operations Group D to support joint training until the Joint Warfare Center could form. In the end, Operations Group D supported Army service component training. Starting with ODS and since, BCTP has supported mission rehearsal exercises and augmented Army staffs in the field during DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
49. Memorandum for BCTP commander, "OPS Group FAfter-Action Review," 20 December 2002. Three other senior mentors supported execution, including Generals Crouch, Franks, and Hendrix, all of whom had commanded at the four-star level. Crouch commanded US Army Europe and served in Bosnia in a NATO command. Franks, who commanded VII Corps in DESERT STORM, commanded the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Hendrix, who led V Corps in support of operations in Kosovo, later commanded US Army Forces Command.
50. Blackman.
51. Lieutenant Colonel John Charlton, commander, TF 1-15 IN, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Durante, US Army, Retired, 22 August 2003.
52. Personal notes of Colonel James K. Greer.
53. Department of the Army (DAMO-SS) Information Paper, "Army Strategic Planning Board Functions and Organizations," 28 August 2003.
54. United States Army Intelligence Center "Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Consolidated Lessons Learned (DRAFT)," 22 August 2003, 34.
55. Army engineers did the analysis of the D9's use in Israel and developed the requirement for the Army, processing it through all of the required acquisition steps.
56. Taken from personal notes of Colonel James K. Greer, director of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Colonel Greer participated in Colonels Bartley and Connelly's efforts and was one of the principal briefers in the decision brief to Lieutenant General Cody.
57. Ibid.
58. "V Corps Command and Control Briefing," presented to Army staff team by Colonel Jeff Smith, commander, 22nd Signal Brigade, 19 June 2003.
59. "US Army Contributions to the Iraqi Theater of Operations," Department of the Army briefing to the secretary of defense, 4 June 2003.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Colonel Clyde Harthcock, chief of staff, INSCOM, interview by Major Daniel Corey and Major David Tohn, 19 June 2003.
63. Major General Keith Alexander, commander, INSCOM, interview by Major Daniel Corey and Major David Tohn, 19 June 2003.
64. Ibid.
65. Harthcock.
66. Major Daniel Corey, OIF-SG, "OIF-SG Operational Summary: Intelligence," 15 July 2003.
67. Lieutenant Colonel John McPherson, deputy commander, 66th Military Intelligence Group, interview by Major David Tohn, 14 June 2003.
68. 66th Military Intelligence Group, "History Of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM," 25 May 2003.
69. McPherson.
70. Major Matthew Glunz, operations officer, JAC, interview by Major David Tohn, 16 June 2003.
71. Major Robert Mooney, senior Russian analyst, JAC, interview by Major David Tohn, 16 June 2003.
72. Colonel Gary L. Parrish, commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, interview by Major Daniel Corey and Major David Tohn, 30 May 2003.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Major Laura A. Potter, Operations Officer (S3), 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion, interview by Major Daniel Corey and Major David Tohn, 29 May 2003.
76. Major Michael Millen, A-10 pilot, 190th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, USAF, to Major David Tohn, 4 September 2003.
77. Major Anthony Cavallaro, S3, 800th MP Brigade, interview by Captain Michael Matthews, 1 June 2003.
78. Lieutenant Colonel Erik Nikolai, MP planner, V Corps, interview by Captain Michael Matthews, 9 May 2003.
79. Colonel Teddy Spain, commander, 18th MP Brigade, interview by Captain Michael Matthews, 10 May 2003.
80. Lieutenant Colonel John Huey, provost marshal, 3rd ID, interview by Captain Michael Matthews, 13 May 2003.
81. 3rd MP Battalion memorandum for record, "Subject: MP Chronology, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM," 16 March 2003.
82. Lieutenant Colonel James Knowlton, OIF-SG, "OIF-SG Operational Summary: Task Force RIO." Developed from Engineer News Record, TF RIO History and CFLCC SITREP. OIF-SG and TF RIO happened to be assigned adjacent office space so that the study group had some first-hand opportunity to observe TF RIO's planning and execution efforts.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., TF RIO's efforts continue as of the development of this study. RIO confronted serious challenges due to looting and long-term neglect of facilities, from pipelines to well heads. Prior to the war, the Iraqi oil industry employed a security force of as many as 12,000. As these security forces departed, looters moved in. Lack of adequate security required coalition troops to secure key facilities. Stretched thin already, security remained a problem as late as June 2003.
85. "Mission Overview, Free Iraqi Forces," produced by Task Force Warrior, Colonel James D. Doyle, 26 April 2003.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Members of SOCCE-Kuwait and 19th SF Group, interviews by Colonel James K. Greer, 20 April 2003. Of note, several ODAs from 19th SF were being debriefed from missions in support of TF Tarawa in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah, and the interviewer had the opportunity to take unclassified notes.
90. CFLCC planning staff, Camp DOHA, Kuwait, interview by Colonel James K. Greer, 25 April 2003.
91. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1992), 318, provides an excellent overview on the previous desert war's deployment issues and is essential to understanding the complexities and scale of strategic deployments.
92. Major William Abb, chief of plans, 101st Airborne Division to Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, 4 September 2003. Major Abb visited the OIF Study Group after having reviewed first draft material. This passage reflects corrections to the draft that he offered.
93. Ibid.
94. Colonel Blair Ross, public affairs officer, US Army Europe, "A Transformed Force in Legacy Clothing" (Unpublished).
95. Colonel Carl Horst, chief of staff, 82nd Airborne Division, interview by Colonel James K. Greer, 3 May 2003.

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