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Chapter 4

CA Methodology: Decide

Lingering doubts about the crucial role of Civil Affairs were settled in the North African Campaign. On November 30, 1942, General Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall, "The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters."

United States Army in World War II Special Studies,
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors,
Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army,




4-1.   During the first step of the CA methodology-assess-the CA soldier gains a thorough understanding of the background and current conditions of an area, identifies the needs or requirements (supported commander, organization, or populace) to be addressed by CA activities or CMO, and formulates a restated mission statement for CA or task-organized forces. During this step-decide-the CA soldier determines who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA and other assets and activities to address the needs and requirements identified in the first step. The ultimate goal of decide is to ensure all participating organizations, both military and civilian, are focused and synchronized toward a desired outcome or COE. This chapter will focus on the activities that occur during the decide phase.

4-2.   This step is characterized by the processes that develop and analyze COAs and create plans or orders. It includes initiation of the interagency process through the establishment of the CMOC. With consideration for the nonmilitary factors of CASCOPE, CA soldiers, together with the supported staff and participating civilian agencies, determine the tasks and task organizations required to manage the civil component challenges of the operation. They do this not only for the phases of develop and detect, and deliver, but also for the transition phase and, if applicable, redeployment, as well.

4-3.   During these processes, CA/CMO planners assign responsibilities and procedures (civil-military objectives) for the identified tasks and task-organized elements along civil lines of operation. For the develop and detect phase, these tasks are normally related to creating or observing those conditions or events (civil decisive points) that would either mitigate or trigger a specific response (civil decisive point outcomes). For the deliver phase, these tasks include the general and specialized tasks that support the CA activities of PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration. For the evaluate phase, these tasks include identifying MOEs and how the various MOEs will be measured. For the transition phase, those tasks required to be completed before, during, and after a relief-in-place or transition of authority are included.

4-4.   CA/CMO planners also war-game possible variations of the operation and formulate contingency plans that address potential branches and sequels to the operation. At the end of this step, they will have produced the commander's intent for CMO, defined CA priorities of effort, defined MOEs, and produced the CA annex, OPLAN, CONPLAN, or OPORD.



Identification of supporting RC units early in the planning process would prevent unnecessary coordination problems and assist in timely, efficient support once the units link up in-country. Had the CA unit commander been involved in the mission analysis process in conjunction with the supported Division G5, designing the CA task force could have been accomplished more smoothly. The CA unit commander could have accompanied the G5 on a leader reconnaissance and thus have been better able to prepare his soldiers for deployment to the target country. Greater Active-Reserve coordination early in the planning stages could alleviate these problems in the future.

CALL Report on Haiti Initial Impressions,
October 1996



4-5.   The concept of CA employment is addressed in JP 3-57 and FM 41-10. Figure 4-1, demonstrates how Active Army and RC CA forces work together to assist a supported commander. CA employment can apply to routine operations, to operations requiring rapid deployment, or to long-term operations requiring systematic rotations of CA units, teams, and individuals.

Figure 4-1. Concept of CA Employment

Figure 4-1. Concept of CA Employment


4-6.   Upon validation of a mission requirement for CA forces, USACAPOC assigns a mission to subordinate CA units using SO operational planning procedures. If the mission requires the participation of more than one subordinate unit, a single CA unit is tasked as the mission planning agent (MPA) while others are assigned supporting roles. These units may further delegate mission requirements to subordinate CA units or teams.

4-7.   Whether tasked as the MPA or to provide mission support, subordinate CA units and teams follow similar problem-solving procedures. Upon receipt of a mission tasking from a higher CA HQ, the commanders and staffs of the subordinate CA units (CACOMs, CA brigades, and CA battalions) analyze the mission using MDMP. Commanders and leaders of subordinate CA companies and teams analyze the mission using TLP. Each tasked unit or team reports the results of its mission planning to the tasking HQ using SO operational planning procedures. All units and teams involved in mission planning continue to use SO operational planning procedures until deployed.

4-8.   Once deployed in support of an operation, CA/CMO planners participate in the planning processes of the supported unit. At geographic combatant command and JTF levels, that process is JOPES. At Army commands from corps to battalion, that process is MDMP. At the CA company and team levels, CA leaders continue to use TLP to solve problems and make plans.

4-9.   Figure 4-2, illustrates how each of the planning processes are used by CA forces during a typical operation. NOTE: Some processes occur simultaneously.

Figure 4-2. The Planning Processes in a Typical Operation

Figure 4-2. The Planning Processes in a Typical Operation

Figure 4-2. The Planning Processes in a Typical Operation (Continued)

Figure 4-2. The Planning Processes in a Typical Operation (Continued)




4-10.   The history of U.S. military operations contains many examples of U.S. military planners focusing narrowly on the military aspects of the operation and ignoring the nonmilitary organizations in their AO. Failure to incorporate or even consider the operations of these organizations into military plans has often led to frustration, wasted resources, and mission-stopping incidents.

4-11.   DODD 2000.13 provides the authorization for CA forces to conduct interagency planning and coordination. It states, "The activities conducted by CA forces shall include, but are not limited to...coordinating military operations with other agencies of the U.S. Government, international organizations, agencies and military components of foreign governments, nongovernmental and non-profit organizations, and the private sector."

4-12.   Chapter 2 describes the interagency process at the national level through the NSC and its subordinate committees. DOD representation in this process is through the CJCS; Vice Chairman, JCS; joint staff representatives; and combatant command representatives. The combatant commander translates policies and decisions from this process into combatant command campaign plans and peacetime TEPs.

4-13.   To differentiate the interagency process at the national level from interagency activities conducted in conjunction with CA/CMO planning, the remainder of this publication will refer to interagency activities at the combatant command HQ and below as coordinating with nonmilitary organizations.

4-14.   There are many challenges to sharing information between military and nonmilitary organizations. In addition to the obvious challenges posed by language barriers, terminology differences, personal backgrounds, and personalities, some challenges are more complicated. Planners and operators must understand-

  • The difference between sharing information with USG agencies versus other organizations.
  • Early classification of a plan often prohibits integration of the international organization and NGO community in the planning process. CA/CMO planners need to evaluate how they can best integrate civilian planners into the process without compromising operations security (OPSEC).
  • International organization and NGO representatives who participate in information sharing might be considered as participating in intelligence activities by third parties.
  • The way information is packaged for military organizations may not be practical or useful to nonmilitary organizations, and vice versa.
  • Military organizations often do not know that some of the information they have may be of great interest or value to a nonmilitary organization, and vice versa.

The challenges to coordination with nonmilitary organizations, from geographic combatant command HQ to the battalion, are minimized at the CMOC.



A CMOC is the JFC's nerve center for CMO and coordination with other non-DOD agencies. CMOC members are primarily civil affairs personnel augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (i.e., Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel ... A CMOC is flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to humanitarian assistance or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. It may be the primary coordinating agency for all international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), USG agencies during war or peace operations where DOD has complete control of the theater. A CMOC may be organized to help integrate US military forces into both multinational forces and military-civil partnership efforts. It may comprise or be augmented by either or both military and civilian personnel representatives of any organization the commander, joint task force considers necessary to effectively coordinate CMO.

Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia,
16 July 1997


4-15.   FM 41-10 describes the capabilities, activities, organization, and setup of the CMOC. The purpose of this section is to build on that description and to set the minimum requirements for establishing and operating a CMOC. The following paragraphs describe techniques and procedures for structure, communications systems, location options, security, and reachback requirements of the CMOC.

4-16.   The purpose of the CMOC is to analyze, monitor, plan, coordinate, synchronize, and influence the civil component of the commander's battlespace across the range of full-spectrum operations. In the context of a related activity, the CMOC contributes to IO. Before military operations, it serves as the conduit for integrating nonmilitary organizations into the collaborative planning process.

4-17.   During offensive and defensive combat operations, the CMOC serves as the commander's filter to control the many nonmilitary "distractors" to C2 of military operations. The CMOC also captures a record of infrastructure needs in the immediate wake of combat operations to facilitate emergency relief to the populace, as well as long-term reconstruction requirements.

4-18.   During stability operations and support operations, the CMOC serves as the primary center for synchronizing military operations with the operations of nonmilitary organizations. During transition from military to civilian control, the CMOC serves as a source of operational continuity and a facilitator to the transition process.


The whole idea of facilitating, of creating an environment where people can interact, is crucial. That environment was the CMOC or the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC), the Swedish-funded communication center that became a core around which we could develop a humanitarian space. People came to us because we had something to offer, and there was a good bit of interaction. Facilitating communications means transparency, ensuring that there is free interaction and that misunderstandings are not allowed to develop.

United States Institute of Peace Special Report,
Managing Communications: Lessons From Interventions in Africa,
March 1997



Additionally, the CMOC is-

  • Based on a clearly defined core structure comprising command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)-enhancing assets.
  • An analysis center for the civil component of the battlespace.
  • A collaborative planning cell for CMO.
  • A meeting place for interagency coordination, mediation, and consensus building.
  • A link to the nonmilitary partners and participants of an operation, both locally and through reachback capability to intertheater and extratheater locations.
  • An organization with the ability to synchronize and influence military and nonmilitary activities within authority granted by the supported commander (subject to limitations established in the supported unit OPORD).
  • Employed with a task and purpose.
  • A clearinghouse for requests for military support from nonmilitary organizations.
  • A key node for achieving information superiority and a clearinghouse for CMO information.
  • An archives-and-research facility.

The CMOC is not-

  • A passive participant in the commander's civil engagement plan.
  • A maneuver element.
  • An operations center that competes with the operations center of the supported unit.
  • An organization with tasking authority over unassigned resources.
  • An intelligence collection element or intelligence fusion cell.
  • The IO cell.

4-19.   In both domestic and foreign operations, there are examples of organizations that perform functions inherent to the CMOC. These examples are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Domestic Operations

4-20.   The incident command system (ICS) is the model tool for command, control, and coordination of an incident response. The ICS provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident and protecting life, property, and the environment. The ICS was developed in the 1970s in response to a series of major wildfires in southern California. At that time, municipal, county, state, and federal fire authorities collaborated to form the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE). FIRESCOPE identified several recurring problems involving multiagency responses, such as-

  • Nonstandard terminology among responding agencies.
  • Lack of capability to expand and contract as required by the situation.
  • Nonstandard and nonintegrated communications.
  • Lack of consolidated action plans.
  • Lack of designated facilities.

4-21.   Federal law requires the use of the ICS for response to hazardous material (HAZMAT) incidents. Many states have adopted the ICS as their standard for emergency management at the incident site and in their emergency operations centers (EOCs). The ICS is also part of the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), which consists of 16 teams across the United States that respond to a wide range of emergencies, including fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tidal waves, riots, HAZMAT release, and other natural or man-made incidents.

Foreign Operations

4-22.   Like FIRESCOPE, the HA community, as a result of experience gained working with military organizations during humanitarian crises in the 1990s, has recognized the utility of a centralized coordination center to promote unity of effort in complex humanitarian emergencies. For example-

  • During the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1994, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) created the OSOCC in Kigali, Rwanda, to coordinate the international response. It evolved into the focal point for UN-led operations in Rwanda and Zaire. Personnel from CMOC Kigali (which consisted of two CA officers and one OFDA/disaster assistance response team [DART] representative) attended all OSOCC meetings and supported the OSOCC by preparing contingency plans to support anticipated refugee movements.
  • During operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (1995-present), allied militaries created robust CA capabilities and operated CIMIC centers.
  • The Kosovo Humanitarian Community Information Center was established in Pristina in 1999 by the UNHCR, OCHA, USAID, and various NGOs.
  • Other organizations, such as the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), as well as the NGO Consortium or the NGO Forum, have become commonplace fixtures in relief operations around the world.
  • During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, British and American CJCMOTF assets and elements of the 96th CA Bn (A) renamed their CMOCs Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Centers, or CHLCs (pronounced "chicklicks") to describe its role and function and facilitate operations with participating NGOs.

4-23.   In all military operations across the spectrum of operations, both foreign and domestic, the CMOC remains the commander's vital center of activity for CMO. No matter what it may be called during the operation, when the CMOC encounters an existing civilian organization, it may augment the organization's efforts as described later in this section.

A CMOC can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the collective national or international mission. In establishing the CMOC, the JFC should build it from a nucleus of organic assets and CA, logistic, legal, and communications elements.

Chapter IV: Interagency Coordination,
JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,
8 February 2001


4-24.   To tailor an organization, a basic structure or model must exist. The basic structure of the CMOC is shown in Figure 4-3. This basic structure applies equally to CMOCs established at strategic, operational, or tactical levels of operation.

4-25.   The establishing entity organizes the CMOC into five main functions: directorate, plans section, operations section, logistics section, and administration section. Small CMOC organizations may need to consolidate two or more of these functions under a single entity (operations and plans section or administration and logistics section). Larger CMOC organizations may subdivide the functions into additional organizational units to facilitate operations and minimize span of control problems. In multinational operations, the CMOC may be modified to accommodate coalition assets.

Figure 4-3. Basic CMOC Structure

Figure 4-3. Basic CMOC Structure


4-26.   Although CA soldiers may form the nucleus of the CMOC, filling positions within and throughout the CMOC, not every position must be filled by a CA soldier. The CMOC can be manned by any combination of U.S. military personnel, foreign soldiers, USG agency civilians, foreign government agency or UN civilians, or NGO representatives. The most habitual augmentation comes from the engineer, legal, public affairs, logistics, medical, chaplain and public affairs sections. The security considerations for such an organization are discussed later in this section.

4-27.   The directorate has responsibility for overall management of the CMOC (and any mobile or satellite CMOCs) and provides direction and oversight of CMOC activities. The senior CA officer usually assumes the function of CMOC director, but this is not a requirement. Depending on METT-TC, the director might be a senior officer of the Army or other service component, a senior civilian, or a foreign military officer or civilian. Regardless of nationality or affiliation, the director must be fully qualified to manage the activities of the CMOC.

4-28.   As the needs arise, the director may delegate authority for performing certain activities to others. For instance, he may designate-

  • An information branch to handle media inquiries, to coordinate the release of information to the media with the PAO at the supported unit HQ, and to synchronize CMOC information with the supported unit's IO cell.
  • A security branch to manage the various aspects of security-physical, information, operations, personnel, communications, and computer-inherent to CMOC operations.
  • Liaison officers or representatives to be on-scene CMOC contacts for both military and civilian agencies and organizations in the AO, as required by the operation.

4-29.   The director will also receive liaison officers or representatives from military and civilian agencies and organizations participating in the operation. These include representatives from-

  • U.S. military units.
  • Allied or coalition military units.
  • USG and contracted agencies.
  • Foreign nation government and contracted agencies.
  • Local government agencies.
  • NGOs.
  • Local business and industry.
  • Multinational corporations.

4-30.   The plans section performs the following functions:

  • Links to USG agencies for guidance on U.S. policy changes, long-range stability and support programs, and transition plans.
  • Collects and evaluates CMO-related information about the AO from sources that include, but are not limited to-
    • Reports from subordinate CMOCs and CA teams.
    • Preliminary, hasty, and detailed assessments.
    • Nonmilitary organization representatives.
    • Nonmilitary organization publications and web sites.
  • Participates in the development of long-range plans (greater than 96 hours out) that engage civil centers of gravity in the AO.
  • Participates in the development of CMO policy and guidance in coordination with functional specialists.
  • Develops public information campaigns.
  • Maintains the unit's archives and lessons learned.
  • Eliminates redundancies in activities performed by military organizations and nonmilitary organizations.
  • Develops calendars of significant upcoming CA/CMO events.

4-31.   The operations section performs the following functions:

  • Plans operations out to 96 hours.
  • Manages the daily activities of the CMOC.
  • Prepares and staffs CMO-related FRAG orders.
  • Conducts daily meetings.
  • Maintains communications with all participants in CMO.
  • Prepares and submits reports, as appropriate, including, but not limited to-
    • Security situation reports.
    • Upcoming significant event reports.
    • Daily significant event rollups.
  • Maintains the status of all operations conducted or supported by CA soldiers and all CMO conducted by non-CA units, teams, and individuals on situation maps, in a CMO database, and in ABCS.
  • Collects, evaluates, tracks, and disseminates CMO-related information about, and requests from, nonmilitary organizations, including, but not limited to-
    • Reports from subordinate CMOCs and CA teams.
    • Names, programs, and capabilities of all NGOs.
    • Status of ongoing projects.
    • Requests for assistance and information.

4-32.   The logistics section performs the following functions:

  • Maintains a database of all POCs and HN resources that can be used for military or humanitarian purposes (facilities, transportation assets, goods, and services).
  • Coordinates and tracks logistics activities in support of CMO.
  • Maintains adequate levels of supplies for use in CMOC operations (for example, office supplies, fuel, batteries, and light bulbs).
  • Manages operator-level maintenance on vehicles, communications, and generator equipment.
  • Maintains current status of routes used in CMO.
  • Produces records and reports, as required.

4-33.   The administration section performs the following functions:

  • Focuses on internal CMOC activities and personnel issues:
    • Maintains access roster and identification system for the CMOC.
    • Responsible for the conduct of CMOC meetings, minutes, and scheduling.
    • Maintains the duty roster.
    • Processes required reports.
  • Tracks costs incurred by military forces and other agencies participating in CMO activities.
  • Provides for reimbursement accounting, as necessary.
  • Creates recognition documents and certificates.
  • Produces and archives records and reports.

4-34.   The nature of CMOC operations presents communications requirements that are more extensive than the average TOC. Figure 4-4, depicts the military tactical communications environment in which the CMOC must operate.

Figure 4-4. Military Tactical Communications Environment

Figure 4-4. Military Tactical Communications Environment


4-35.   The CMOC must be able to enter secure tactical digital networks, as well as nonsecure civilian networks via the Internet. The CMOC must be able to communicate over secure and nonsecure military radio and telephone systems, as well as nonsecure NGO radios and nonsecure commercial telephone systems for voice and data transmission. If the local telephone infrastructure is inoperable, the CMOC may require cellular or satellite communications capability. The CMOC must be able to monitor other open sources of information, such as commercial television and radio. Additionally, the CMOC must have redundant systems to enable it to operate in split operations.

4-36.   The following paragraphs provide a list of the capabilities and examples of systems CMOCs should have to fully perform routine CMOC operations. Systems should be upgraded coincidentally with the fielding of follow-on Army command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) architecture systems (Figure 4-5) to supported unit HQ according to CA planning associations.

Figure 4-5. Army C4I Architecture

Figure 4-5. Army C4I Architecture


4-37.   Secure digital capability with the supported military units is necessary to provide input into the common tactical picture (CTP) and common relevant operational picture (CROP) through the ABCS:

  • Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A) (strategic, theater, and EAC). Provides force tracking, HN and CA support, theater air defense, targeting, PSYOP, C2, logistics, and medical and personnel status. Deployed from theater (EAC) elements down to the corps JTF and joint contingency force.
  • Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) (corps to battalion) consisting of-
    • Maneuver Control System (MCS). Provides corps- through battalion-level commanders and staffs the ability to collect, coordinate, and act on near-real-time battlefield information and to graphically visualize the battlefield.
    • All-Source Analysis System-Remote Work Station (ASAS-RWS). Provides battle commanders with analyzed intelligence and unanalyzed combat information.
    • Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Provides command, control, and communications (C3) for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps cannon, rockets, missiles, mortars, close air support, and naval surface weapon systems. AFATDS will provide fire support coordination measures, weapon and counter-battery radar range fans, and target data. Target data will include active, inactive planned, on-call and suspect targets, and support identification of protected targets, no-fire areas, and restricted-fire areas.
    • Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). Battlefield decision support and situation awareness for planning and controlling the logistics support of combat operations. CSSCS provides materiel and personnel status of units. It identifies logistical capability to resupply units for subsequent combat operations.
    • Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). Provides situational awareness through a seamless battle command capability to leaders at brigade and below. Provides horizontal and vertical integration of the information generating and processing capabilities of individual weapons, sensors, and platforms.
    • Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). An integrated C3 system that provides near-real-time data communications, position and location, navigation, identification, and reporting information.

4-38.   Another system is the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), the Army XXI communications network that will replace the Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC) and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) (from theater to battalion CP/TOC) and provide command and control on the move (C2OTM) to the warfighter. WIN-T is based on commercial products and technology; provides wired and wireless communications to support voice, data, and video information exchange requirements; provides seamless connectivity among ABCS and weapons platforms within the battlespace; supports multiple security levels; and integrates terrestrial, airborne, and satellite-based transport systems.

4-39.   Secure and nonsecure radio and telephone capabilities with military organizations consist of the following:

  • Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). The primary combat net radio (CNR) for the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and combat Air Force designed primarily for voice C2.
  • AN/PSC-3 Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) Radio Set. A battery operated, highly portable, manpack TACSAT terminal that provides the range extension required to conduct effective operations. Single-channel TACSAT is specifically suited for the conduct of critical contingency operations. The set uses an AS-3567/PSC-3 medium-gain antenna for at-halt satellite communications. In the secure voice mode, the AN/PSC-3 uses the advanced narrowband digital voice terminal (ANDVT) or a communications security (COMSEC) interface device such as the VINSON KY-57.
  • Antenna Group OE-254/GRC or a similar antenna system.
  • DRS MDA-31 Digital Voice Terminal With Data Adapter (DVT/DA). A communications terminal for an individual soldier with access to MSE or TRI-TAC networks. The DVT/DA is an MSE data adapter (MDA) and digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT) built into a single, lightweight, ruggedized unit suitable for field operation. For voice communications, the DRS DVT/DA operates like any DNVT. For data communications, the DVT/DA contains a multifunction RS-232 data port capable of interoperating with most standard data devices, such as personal computers (PCs), FAX machines, and message terminals.
  • Telephone Set TA-312/PT.

4-40.   Secure and nonsecure radio and telephone capabilities with nonmilitary organizations consist of the following:

  • AN/PRC-148 Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) or commercial equivalent. A very capable handheld radio, used by SOF, which can operate in the frequency band mostly used in civilian applications.
  • FAX machines.
  • Local commercial telephones.
  • Cellular or satellite telephones.

4-41.   Nodes that can access unrestricted, unclassified Internet lines as well as restricted systems include the following:

  • World Wide Web (WWW). Access to web sites of participating organizations and agencies for research and contact information.
  • Electronic Mail (E-mail). Ability to request information from and pass information to participating organizations and agencies. Systems must support all media formats: text, audio, video, and graphics. Systems should include the ability to integrate commercially available secure systems that may be adopted by key organizations.
  • Refugee Management Tracking System (RMATS). Hardware and software that provide the user (for example, UNHCR) the capability to automatically and interactively collect, store, analyze, prepare, and disseminate individual refugee registration reports; identification products based on digital processes, such as digital imagery, digital fingerprinting, digital voice printing, retinal scanning, or other digitally-based identification system; biographical data reports; and statistical reports.
  • Open-Source Information System (OSIS) (software). An unclassified confederation of systems serving the intelligence community with open-source intelligence.
  • Civil Affairs Database (software).
  • Geographic Information System (GIS). Compatible database and mapping must be compatible with standard GIS protocols to ensure a seamless exchange of information between collaborating organizations.
  • Plug-ins for interagency and multinational augmentation.
  • Modeling tools to facilitate decision making in complex contingency situations involving limited resources and time-critical operations.

4-42.   CMOCs should have the ability to plug into the local indigenous government architecture and, as required, the UN and ad hoc organizations, such as interim administrations. CMOCs must also have input into the EMPRS, which provides updated, real-time information to deploying forces. Additionally, CMOCs should have access to the global information grid (GIG). GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.


4-43.   While the CMOC has a set structure, it retains the capability to expand, conduct split and mobile operations, and contract to meet the demands of the operation. It must be able to accommodate the various agencies that join or depart an operation during its different phases. The following paragraphs describe techniques for establishing the CMOC. Maintaining and expanding the CMOC are covered in Chapters 5 and 6. Contracting the CMOC is covered in Chapter 8.

4-44.   A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC, and more than one CMOC may be established in an AO. The supported commander establishes the CMOC early in an operation-routinely as early as the initial planning phase-for two primary reasons:

  • To account for the nonmilitary threats, distractions, and interference that can adversely affect the military mission.
  • To foster successful interagency coordination inherent in all operations.
JTF Support Hope (1994) deployed from USEUCOM to Entebbe, Uganda, with an ad hoc team of logistics and foreign area officers to run the JTF's CMOC at Entebbe-the focal point of logistics operations. Elements of the JTF were spread out across five geographic areas in Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Kenya to establish water purification and distribution systems, airfield services, and logistics management support. Not trained in CA, CMO, or techniques for analyzing the civil considerations of a situation, JTF planners and the soldiers of CMOC Entebbe failed to identify the civil center of gravity of the relief operation. Consequently, the JTF experienced an initial lack of understanding the magnitude of the humanitarian situation and an inability to effectively interact with NGOs working in the same sector or geographical area. CA soldiers from the 353d CACOM, delayed by poorly programmed TPFDD priorities, arrived 10 days into the operation to establish CMOCs at Goma, Zaire, and Kigali, Rwanda-the focal points of the humanitarian crisis.

G-5, JTF Support Hope,


4-45.   A CMOC should be given a specific task and purpose, such as in a TASKORD. A METT-TC analysis of this task and purpose will determine the exact structure, equipment, manning, location, and operational requirements to accomplish the CMOC's mission.

4-46.   As discussed in Chapter 2, CA teams and CA planning teams at all command levels are tasked with establishing CMOCs to support CMO at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operation. The diagrams in Figures 4-6 through 4-10, depict the minimum organizational and equipment requirements necessary to establish CMOCs at each command level. NOTE: Equipment listing in each figure is not final.

Figure 4-6. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a Brigade CMOC

Figure 4-6. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a Brigade CMOC

Figure 4-7. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a Division, COSCOM, and ASG CMOC

Figure 4-7. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a Division, COSCOM, and ASG CMOC

Figure 4-8. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a Corps, JTF, or TSC CMOC

Figure 4-8. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a Corps, JTF, or TSC CMOC

Figure 4-9. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a CMOC at EAC by a CAPT-B

Figure 4-9. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a CMOC at EAC by a CAPT-B

Figure 4-10. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a CMOC at EAC by a CAP3T

Figure 4-10. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a CMOC at EAC by a CAP3T


4-47.   Those teams establishing a CMOC for rapid decisive operations may be required to deploy without certain items of equipment, such as vehicles, trailers, generators, or tents, to conserve limited transportation space. These teams must be prepared to palletize mission-essential items of equipment, based on METT-TC (laptops, radios, video cameras, and other team equipment), and coordinate the rest of their equipment for follow-on transportation by air, rail, or surface ship. The team must plan and coordinate to rent or requisition transportation and billeting in the AO while its own vehicles and tents are in transit.

4-48.   At every level, the CMOC must be flexible enough to expand and contract as requirements change; for example, incorporating members of military and nonmilitary organizations to meet short- or long-term projects. It must also be appropriately located, staffed, and equipped to perform the vital functions of research, planning, recording, coordinating, monitoring, and influencing CMO in a secure, and sometimes less-than-secure, austere environment.

4-49.   The CMOC must be prepared to conduct echelon- and split-based operations. Doing so means operating within the security perimeter of the supported military HQ, as well as outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ, and on the road (mobile)-often simultaneously. The parent CA unit must be manned, organized, and equipped with redundancy to do this in support of all units with which it has a planning association.

4-50.   When operating in support of an operational or tactical unit, the CMOC, at a minimum, must establish its relationship with the CMO staff officer (G-5/S-5), operations officer (G-3/S-3), and IO cell. The CMOC's normal relationship with the-

  • CMO staff officer is similar to that of a direct support field artillery unit with the fire support coordinator. The staff officer monitors the daily operations of the supported unit and advises the supported commander on CMO and the employment of CA assets. The CMOC provides the CMO staff officer with current status of CMO and CA activities and assists in planning and posturing CMO and CA activities to support future operations of the supported commander.
  • Operations officer is that of a satellite office specializing in a specific aspect of the overall military operation. The CMOC keeps the G-3/S-3 advised of how CMO and CA activities are providing the desired effects in support of the military operation. The CMOC routes requests for assistance through the G-3/S-3 for approval and ultimate tasking.
  • IO officer is that of a related activity specializing in CMO. As the commander's nerve center for civil-military engagement, the CMOC ensures that the IO cell is aware of the CMO situation and is in a position to best synchronize IO.

4-51.   One important consideration when establishing a CMOC is whether local, national, or international coordination mechanisms for civil-military interface already exist. If the UN, HN, or some other organization or agency already operates a facility to coordinate CMO in the AO (for example, a city or county EOC during DSO), it may be best to establish a liaison or augmentation cell within that facility. Such a COA legitimizes the efforts of the lead organization and facilitates the disengagement of U.S. forces during transition and redeployment from the operation.

In Operation STRONG SUPPORT (post-Hurricane Mitch relief operations in Central America in 1999), a regional- or national-level "CMOC" was avoided. This was in deference to stated HN concerns about sovereignty and aversion to the CMOC concept as putting a foreign military in charge of what should be a national coordinating function. The concept for conducting civil-military interface was to work through HN emergency management centers and HN authorities as much as possible. However, mini-CMOCs (called mini-HOCs in that operation) were established at the local level to deconflict relief operations where JTFs were operating.

Notes of a U.S. CA Officer on Operations
During Operation STRONG SUPPORT,


4-52.   Another important item to consider early while establishing a CMOC is the creation of continuity books. A continuity book facilitates continuity of operations during periods of potential disruption; for example, routine or emergency personnel turnover, extending and contracting the CMOC, and transition operations. Although there is no particular format for a continuity book, there are some techniques to make the book useful, as follows:

  • Arrange the book chronologically with daily, weekly, and monthly calendars that show essential tasks.
  • Provide enough detail (who, what, where, why, when, and how) to each task to eliminate guesswork by the replacement.
  • Include a journal to record actions taken and POCs for major ongoing projects.
  • Take photographs of projects, POCs, meeting facilities, and other items pertinent to conducting CMO, and include them where appropriate in the continuity book.

4-53.   The location of the CMOC depends on METT-TC. The basic options for locating a CMOC are-

  • Within the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.
  • Outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.
  • On the road (mobile).
  • Combination of two or all three (echelon- and split-based operations).

4-54.   Each option has merit based on the situation and mission requirements. During the course of operations, the CMOC must be flexible and ready to move from one option to another based on changes in the security situation and mission requirements.

4-55.   Figure 4-11, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC inside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC here should be considered when-

  • Planning and coordinating CMO at the strategic (geographic combatant command) level.
  • The security environment at the operational (JTF, corps) level permits nonmilitary individuals to enter freely or with limited inconvenience.
  • The primary mission of the military force is CMO, such as during HA or disaster relief operations.
  • Resources are limited and must be shared with other military units.

Figure 4-11. Possible Arrangement for a CMOC Inside the Security Perimeter of the Supported Headquarters

Figure 4-11. Possible Arrangement for a CMOC Inside the Security Perimeter of the Supported Headquarters


4-56.   Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, this facility will receive much traffic. The CMOC and its associated parking area should be in a location that offers convenient access to visitors and that will not interfere with the internal operations of the supported HQ. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. If possible, the facility should include space for supported organizations to conduct business.

4-57.   Figure 4-12, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC outside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC here should be considered when-

  • The security environment at the supported military HQ restricts access to nonmilitary individuals, and access procedures offer major inconvenience to those individuals.
  • Planning and coordinating CMO at the tactical (corps and below) level.
  • The primary customers are the NGOs, international organizations, government officials, and the local populace.
  • The CMOC is tasked to form the nucleus of a HOC or HACC.

Figure 4-12. Possible Arrangement for a CMOC Outside the Security Perimeter of the Supported Headquarters

Figure 4-12. Possible Arrangement for a CMOC Outside the Security Perimeter of the Supported Headquarters


4-58.   This CMOC location option normally results in split-based operations. Split-based operations occur when a CMOC must operate a less-secure facility outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ while retaining a secure facility inside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ. Split-based operations often occur when the nature of the military operation absolutely prohibits or severely limits civilian access to the supported military HQ site.

4-59.   The less-secure, external CMOC may be active 24 hours daily or during set business hours. If the external CMOC is active for 24-hour operations, it must be equipped to operate as an extension of the internal CMOC. (This arrangement requires some redundancy in communications and ADP equipment.) If the CMOC is active only during set business hours, the internal CMOC may be required to answer the phone when the external CMOC is not operational.

4-60.   Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, this facility will receive much traffic by those participants, as well as visibility from local officials and the media. The CMOC should be in a location that offers convenient access to those partners and participants. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. The interagency work and meeting areas should also be cleared of classified and unclassified but sensitive materials.


There are instances when nonmilitary organizations cannot participate in the activities of the CMOCs mentioned above. Such instances may occur during fluid combat operations, in nonpermissive environments, or because of political or cultural considerations. A mobile CMOC (Figure 4-13) may be required to interface with those organizations.

Figure 4-13. A Mobile CMOC

Figure 4-13. A Mobile CMOC


4-62.   A mobile CMOC might be a CAT-A operating on foot (dismounted) or from a team HMMWV under the control of a CAT-B. These CMOCs generally conduct hasty assessments and pass assessment results to the higher-level CMOC for incorporation into posthostilities plans. A mobile CMOC may also be a task-organized team of CA specialists that travels on a set schedule ("circuit-rider" arrangement) to visit civilian organizations or agencies throughout a specified region. When detached from the main CMOC to perform such activities, the CMOC is conducting echelon-based operations.


4-63.   The CMOC cannot fully depend on its supported unit HQ to provide the facilities it requires to operate efficiently and effectively. A CMOC should be self-deployable and operational using organic vehicles and equipment. The organic vehicles and equipment must be compatible with those of the unit with which the parent CA unit has a planning association, to include containers express (CONEXes) or trailers, generators, tents, and so on.

4-64.   CA units should consider placing their CMOCs in two large CONEXes or trailers-one containing the secure equipment that will remain within the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ, and one containing the nonsecure equipment for split operations outside the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ. In addition, the units should employ several HMMWVs with trailers to transport CMOC soldiers and their personal equipment, as well as to perform as mobile CMOCs.

4-65.   Depending on the environment, situation, and available existing structures, a CMOC can be established in civilian trailers or vehicles, a suite in an office building, a municipal EOC, or a separate building, such as a storefront or "CIMIC house."

4-66.   Whether operating from organic facilities or civilian structures, the CMOC must contain sufficient space for work areas, meeting areas, parking areas, living quarters, break areas, and so on. It must provide a healthy and safe environment for the CMOC personnel (for example, proper ventilation, fire protection, weather protection, and sanitation).

4-67.   Wherever and whenever the CMOC is established, it is important to identify and publicize its location to the CMOC "customers" in terms understandable to them. For example, providing a street address, building name, facility markings, commonly known landmark, or strip map is better than providing a universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid location to people who do not use military maps.


4-68.   Because of the nature of activities that occur at the CMOC, there are many physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity of operations issues to consider. Before initiating operations, the CMOC security officer conducts a site and situation threat and vulnerability assessment to determine CMOC security requirements. He considers and advises the CMOC director on security and force protection issues, such as-

  • Defensibility (for example, fighting positions, "safe rooms," multiple exits, or shelter).
  • Communications with a quick reaction force (QRF).
  • 24-hour access control systems and procedures (restricted areas, restricted hours, parking areas, barriers, and security in depth).
  • Business hour access control systems and procedures (passes, metal detectors, or escorts).
  • Security of vehicles and equipment during meetings.
  • Guidance for security and force protection of visitors and civilian members of the team.
  • Coordination with local law enforcement for-
    • Patrols.
    • Full-time on-site security presence (gate security).
    • Periodic threat updates.
  • Background checks of full-time staff members, especially local hires.
  • Alternate power supply or uninterrupted power supply for computers and communications equipment.
  • Emergency destruction procedures for classified materials and equipment.

4-69.   The security manager may extend this assessment to areas and locations supported or frequented by the CMOC, such as HN and NGO facilities. The section on force protection in Chapter 5 includes specific techniques.




4-70.   Chapter 2 illustrated the fact that CA/CMO planners perform at various levels of command and must be familiar with at least two different planning processes. At the joint level, planners must be familiar with JOPES. At all Army levels down to battalion, planners must be familiar with the MDMP.

4-71.   Three additional processes are critical in planning and conducting CA missions. These processes are discussed below.

4-72.   SO operational planning, outlined in JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, provides guidance for operational-level joint and Service HQ conducting and supporting joint special operations. CA units, teams, and individuals use message formats to communicate CA mission taskings, CONOPS, concept approval, MSRs, and operation summaries (OPSUMs) between the various levels of CA HQ. Use of SO operational planning ensures all aspects of the mission are properly analyzed and fully supported.

4-73.   EMPRS is a communications-based system that provides commanders the capability to receive operations and intelligence updates in-flight, conduct collaborative planning with HQ and forward elements, and disseminate and rehearse mission changes among the combat forces en route to the objective area. CA teams may be in the position of providing information from the objective area or supporting the forces deploying on contingency operations.

4-74.   The TLP support problem solving at the tactical level. TLP are used at company level and below.

4-75.   Appendix E covers the five planning processes in the most logical order of employment by CA soldiers: JOPES, SO operational planning, EMPRS, MDMP, and TLP. The techniques and procedures described in the appendix apply equally to CA units, teams, and individuals. They also apply across the four types of military action-offense, defense, stability operations, and support operations-in joint, multinational, and interagency environments.




4-76.   The commander's intent for CMO is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to achieve the desired CMO end state. The statement normally consists of four to five sentences focusing on the purpose, key tasks, and CMO end state:

  • Purpose is not the mission statement purpose. It is a broader purpose that looks beyond the immediate mission in the context of the overall operation.
  • Key tasks refer to those tasks that must be performed to achieve the stated purpose of the operation. They are not tied to any specific COA, but are fundamental to the success of the force. They provide the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original CONOPS no longer applies.
  • End state of CMO refers to effects that must be achieved or conditions that must be met to achieve the stated purpose of the operation. Ultimately, the end state consists of successful transition of CMO to an indigenous civilian solution that is durable and sustainable.



4-77.   The focus of CA operations has its foundation in U.S. national policies and objectives. The interagency process at the NSC and its subordinate committees refines the CA mission focus for specific operations. CA mission focus is further articulated through the efforts of the CA planning team at the combatant command HQ and transmitted through the CA representatives of each subsequent commander. At the lower levels of command, changing priorities or changing conditions often muddle the CA mission focus, which tends to result in the phenomenon known as mission creep (discussed in Chapter 3).

4-78.   As operations progress, CA/CMO planners often reach a point at which there are conflicting requirements for CA assets or there are more requirements for CA assets than the number or type of CA assets available. At this point, in consultation with the supported commander, CA/CMO planners must designate the CA priority of effort (POE). Designating a CA POE enables CA/CMO planners to recommend COAs that support national policies and objectives more effectively and efficiently at the operational and tactical levels. The CA POE focuses CA activities and dictates task organization and allocation of resources. For most CA operations, there are three priorities:

  • Facilitate maneuver operations.
  • Provide HA.
  • Promote legitimacy (of the U.S. or the HN).

For other operations, such as MOOTW, CA activities may be prioritized as-

  • Life-saving.
  • Life-sustaining.
  • Life-enhancing.

Within prioritized operations, preference should be given to projects that offer a combination of low cost, short duration, and high impact.

4-79.   It is important for CA/CMO planners to consider the capabilities and usefulness of particular CA assets. Facilitating maneuver operations primarily requires the support of CA generalists on planning and tactical teams. Providing HA requires a combination of CA generalists and CA specialists on planning teams, tactical teams, and specialty teams. Promoting legitimacy of the U.S. or the HN primarily requires the expertise found on CA specialty teams.

4-80.   CA POEs will often differ from one operation to another. For example, beginning in 1993, the POE for CA support to JTF Bravo was to promote the legitimacy of the United States and various HNs. The POE for CA supporting JTF 180, the forced entry option of Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY (in 1994), was to facilitate maneuver operations. The POE for CA in Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Zaire and Uganda, also in 1994, was to provide HA to the massive numbers of DCs from Rwanda.

4-81.   CA POEs may also shift during different phases of the same operation. For example, the initial CA priority in Haiti during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY was to facilitate maneuver operations during the entry phase. (This goal was to be accomplished primarily by members of the 96th CA Battalion [A] and the 450th CA Battalion [A] supporting the planned forced entry of JTF 180. It was accomplished by other members of the 96th CA Battalion [A], the 450th CA Battalion [A], and 360th CA Brigade [A] during the permissive entry of JTF 190.) Once the forces were successfully lodged, the priority shifted to providing HA. (This goal was accomplished initially by the members of the 96th CA Battalion [A], the 450th CA Battalion [A], and 360th CA Brigade [A] until the effort transitioned to follow-on CA forces from the 352d CACOM.) When the immediate humanitarian needs were met, the CA focus shifted to promoting the legitimacy of the HN Aristide government.

4-82.   Examining DC planning may further illustrate POE shifts. The CA planning team develops and implements a plan for dealing with expected refugee flow. A clearly stated CA POE would assist the team in selecting a mission-appropriate COA, as follows:

  • If the CA POE were to facilitate friendly maneuver operations, the team might recommend a "stay put policy" and develop civilian collection points which were well clear of maneuver axes and main supply routes.
  • If the CA POE were to provide HA, the team might recommend employing U.S. military or other immediately available transportation to move HA supplies or international organization and NGO support to the affected group.
  • If the CA POE were to promote HN legitimacy, the team might recommend waiting for HN authorities and vehicles to address refugee flow issues, even if maneuver forces might be hindered by the additional traffic.



    4-83.   MOEs refer to observable, usually quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOEs to determine how well or how poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to his mission statement. He also uses MOEs to identify effective strategies and tactics and to determine points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.

    4-84.   MOEs are a product of mission analysis. They differ for every mission and for different phases of a mission. As the commander and his staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they define what constitutes successful completion of each task. The commander and his staff decide how the MOE will be identified, reported, and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE is achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOEs are not achieved according to the original plan. MOEs are not necessarily fixed, however. They are often adjusted as the situation changes and higher-level guidance develops.

    4-85.   CA/CMO planners begin the process of determining CMO MOEs when they develop the civil-military lines of operation. These lines of operation normally follow the six CA activities: FNS, PRC, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration. Along each line of operation, the planners identify civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, and desired outcomes of the civil decisive points. They then determine CMO MOEs to evaluate the effectiveness of those outcomes. Figure 4-14 depicts an example of MOEs.

    Figure 4-14. Sample Measures of Effectiveness

    Figure 4-14. Sample Measures of Effectiveness


    4-86.   In HA missions, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees has established five basic categories of data, which are used as MOEs:

    • Mortality rate (crude and those under five years of age).
    • Morbidity or disease rate.
    • Nutritional status measured by height-weight standards and mid-upper arm circumference.
    • Public health activities as measured by immunizations, hospital attendance, and feeding center attendance.
    • Vital sectors, as measured by sanitation facilities, food distribution, and shelter availability. Standards have been prepared for each of these categories, which serve as a baseline for assessing the current situation in a given emergency and to gauge improvements.

    4-87.   MOEs to assess the success of the CA/CMO missions should be designed with the same considerations in mind as for any other types of missions. CA/CMO planners should ensure that MOEs are-

    • Appropriate. MOEs should correlate to the audience objectives. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOEs should be general and few in number; if the objective is to assist on-scene commanders, then MOEs should be more specific and detailed.
    • Mission-related. MOEs must correlate to the mission. If the mission is relief, MOEs should help the commander evaluate improvements in living standards, mortality rates, and other related areas. If the mission expands, so should MOEs. Planners should tailor MOEs to address strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
    • Measurable. Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than qualitative or subjective MOEs, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. When using qualitative or subjective MOEs, clear measurement criteria should be established and disseminated to prevent mismeasurement or misinterpretation.
    • Numerically reasonable. MOEs should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the relief environment. Planners should avoid establishing excessive MOEs; they become unmanageable or collection efforts outweigh the value.
    • Sensitive. MOEs should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions. Extraneous factors should not greatly affect established MOEs.
    • Useful. MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.

    4-88.   In multinational or multiagency operations, CA/CMO planners should coordinate MOEs with those of participating nations and agencies. In some cases, they may also collaborate on how the MOEs will be measured and reported. For example, emergency indicators commonly used by the NGO community can be used as a baseline for developing MOEs. The chart in Table 4-1, is extracted from UNHCR's Handbook for Emergencies, Second Edition.

    Table 4-1. Key Emergency Indicators

    Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) Normal rate among a settled population 0.3 to 0.5/10,000/day.
    Emergency program under control <1/10,000/day.
    Emergency program in serious trouble >1/10,000/day.
    Emergency out of control >2/10,000/day.
    Major catastrophe >5/10,000/day.
    Mortality Rate Among Children Under 5 Years Old (U5MR) Normal rate among a settled population 1.0/10,000/day.
    Emergency program under control <2/10,000/day.
    Emergency program in serious trouble >2/10,000/day.
    Emergency out of control >4/10,000/day.
    Clean Water Minimum survival allocation 7 liters/person/day.
    Minimum maintenance allocation 15-20 liters/person/day.
    Food Minimum food requirement for a population totally dependent on food aid 2,100 kcal/person/day.
    Nutrition Emergency level

    >15% of the population under five years old below 80% weight for height.


    >10% of the population under five years old below 80% weight for height together with aggravating factors; for example, epidemic of measles, crude mortality rate > 1/10,000/day.

    Measles Any reported cases. 10% or more not immunized in the 6 months-to-5 years age group.
    Respiratory Infections Any pattern of severe cases.
    Diarrhea Any pattern of severe cases.
    Appropriate Shelter Protection from wind, rain, freezing temperatures, and direct sunlight are minimum requirements.
    Minimum shelter area 3.5 sq. m/person.
    Minimum total site area 30.0 sq. m/person.
    Sanitation Lack of organized disposal of excreta and waste. Less than 1 latrine cubicle per 100 persons.

    4-89.   Using this chart, planners can create measurable MOEs, such as-

    • Mortality rates in the affected population drop below one per 1,000 per day.
    • The amount of clean water available to each disaster victim exceeds 7 liters per person per day.
    • The amount of food actually consumed by the affected populace exceeds 2,100 kilocalories (kcal) per person per day.
    • The shelter area available to the inhabitants of DC camps does not fall below 3.5 square meters per person.
    • Incidence of disease in the area drops below 5 percent of the affected population.

    4-90.   Other useful sources of potential MOEs are-

    • The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response created by the Sphere Project with input from over 650 individuals from 228 organizations, including NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, academic institutions, the UN, and government agencies. It is available at
    • The USAID Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response, available at
    • The collective brainstormed ideas of specialists in the 16 functional specialties; for example-
      • Judicial systems staffed and operating at precrisis levels. (International Law.)
      • Sustainable, legitimate governmental processes are in place according to the provisions of (named) agreement. (Public Administration.)
      • Enrollment of students in primary and secondary schools exceeds 98 percent of school-age population. (Public Education.)
      • The ratio of general practice medical doctors to the local populace exceeds one per 1,000 individuals. (Public Health.)
      • The number of incidents of capital crimes falls below five per week. (Public Safety.)
      • At least 80 percent of public services and private enterprise have access to adequate communications services. (Public Communications.)
      • The capacities of indigenous transportation systems allow for the mobility of people and goods at a level that reduces reliance on military assets to zero. (Transportation.)
      • The indigenous workforce of the (named facility) demonstrates the ability to correct system failures within 24 hours. (Public Works and Utilities.)
      • Indigenous capabilities in (named areas) provide at least 75 percent of the resources required to support the essential needs of the populace. (Civilian Supply.)
      • Unemployment in (named area) is reduced to 4 to 8 percent or better. (Economic Development.)
      • NGO-supported system of food production, processing, storage, and distribution in the (named area) reaches a level that no longer requires the augmentation of U.S. military resources. (Food and Agriculture.)
      • At least 90 percent of the populace has access to accurate and timely civil information through various (indigenous and foreign) media platforms. (Civil Information.)
      • 80 percent of significant cultural property and facilities are restored to prehostilities conditions NLT (date). (Cultural Relations.)
      • HN authorities and local law enforcement are organized, rehearsed, and ready to assume control of DC assembly areas in (named area) NLT (date) according to negotiated plans and agreements. (Dislocated Civilians.)
      • The emergency services agencies of (named areas) demonstrate the ability to effectively plan, resource, and conduct a tabletop exercise designed to train first responders and emergency management personnel in the execution of selected portions of the (named area) Emergency Management Plan. (Emergency Services.)
      • The major industries in (named area) adopt regulations and guidelines designed to reduce identified environmental degradation in the area. (Environmental Management.)

    4-91.   In addition to deciding what the MOEs are, CA/CMO planners must decide certain aspects about each one, such as-

    • Who will observe the MOE? (For example, task a specific individual or team.)
    • When will the MOE be observed? (Is the MOE event-driven or time-driven? How often will the MOE be tested?)
    • How will the MOE be observed? (What method will be used to detect indicators? Direct observation or all-source analysis?)
    • Where will the observations be made? (For example, ground level, the CMOC, an all-source analysis center, or some other location.)
    • Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOE?
    • What actions will be taken when the MOE is satisfactorily achieved? By whom?

    4-92.   The tasks derived from the questions listed above must be put into the CA annex of the OPORD. Additionally, CA/CMO planners should consider depicting MOEs in a flowchart, an activity network diagram (AND), or both, to facilitate tracking MOEs during the evaluate phase.




    4-93.   Army Regulation (AR) 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, prescribes DA policy for proper wear and appearance of Army utility, field, training, or combat uniforms and insignia and civilian clothing, as worn by officers and enlisted personnel of the Active Army and RC. In operations short of international armed conflict, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, has the authority to approve exceptions to the regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this authority in writing to an individual within the proponent agency who holds the grade of colonel or above.

    4-94.   CA soldiers operate worldwide across the range of military operations. The uniform worn and personal items of equipment carried by CA soldiers are influenced by environmental, operational, and practical factors:

    • Environmental factors include terrain, weather, and climate in the AO. The operational environment can also be characterized as permissive, semipermissive, and nonpermissive. The degree of permissiveness may vary within the theater or AO.
    • Operational factors range from full-scale combat operations to low-density security cooperation missions. Operational tasks vary from staff integration to hands-on deliberate assessments to project coordination and management.
    • Practical factors include force protection issues, civil-military relationship management, and credibility management. These factors do not always support one another and are often mutually exclusive.

    4-95.   Uniform and equipment variations range from seasonal uniform with full combat gear to local civilian clothing without a personal weapon. Sometimes the class A, B, or formal military uniforms may be appropriate while, at other times, civilian business attire may be required. Actual uniform and equipment requirements are normally directed by the mission-tasking agent. When authorized to vary from normal standards, CA soldiers use the factors of METT-TC to determine uniform and equipment requirements appropriate to the mission. Table 4-2, provides a sample of typical considerations when evaluating uniform and equipment combinations.

    Table 4-2. Uniform and Equipment Combinations




    Battle dress uniform (BDU) complete with combat equipment, to include Kevlar, load-bearing vest, individual weapons, and basic load.
    • Professional military appearance.
    • High level of combat readiness.
    • High level of force protection.
    • Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide.
    • Aids in dealing with supported unit.
    • Aids in dealing with foreign militaries.
    • Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.
    • In some environments, can present a more visible target.
    • Makes it difficult to present the local environment as "safe and secure" to the local populace.
    BDU complete without combat equipment, with or without concealed weapon.
    • Professional military appearance.
    • Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide.
    • Aids in dealing with supported unit.
    • Aids in dealing with foreign militaries.
    • Reduced level of combat readiness.
    • Reduced level of force protection.
    • Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.
    BDU complete without specified badges and insignia, without combat equipment, and with or without concealed weapon.
    • Aids in dealing with HN military and civilian population by addressing local stereotypes and taboos.
    • Professional military appearance.
    • Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide.
    • Reduced level of combat readiness.
    • Reduced level of force protection.
    • Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.
    • In some environments, can present a more visible target.
    Civilian clothes with or without concealed weapon.

    Modified grooming standards.

    • In some environments, can increase level of force protection.
    • Creates a lower profile.
    • Can make it easier to deal with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.
    • Greatly increases the possibility of fratricide.
    • May present decreased professional military appearance.
    • Greatly reduced level of combat readiness.
    • Can make it difficult to deal with supported unit.
    • Can make it difficult to deal with foreign militaries.
    NOTE: All options listed in this table are available only in operations short of international armed conflict. CA personnel are required to wear the BDU or other uniform in an active theater of operations in international armed conflict.



    4-96.   The decide phase is characterized by the processes that develop and analyze COAs and create plans and orders. CA soldiers develop products throughout the decide phase to facilitate the planning process, including requests for information (RFIs), MSRs, the supported commander's intent for CMO, civilian named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs), CCIR, the CA unit mission statement, and risk assessments. The final products of the decide phase include CA/CMO MOEs (including who, what, when, where, and how MOEs will be observed), TPFDD worksheets, synchronization matrixes, and the CA annex to a campaign plan, OPLAN, CONPLAN, functional plan, supporting plan, or OPORD. These products help orient the force to creating a COE, which will begin in the develop and detect phase. Examples of these products are in Appendix C.

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