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Chapter 6

CA Methodology: Deliver

One of CFLCC's missions is to command the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, which has a forward headquarters in Kabul. The JCMOTF has elements throughout Afghanistan that are coordinating civil-military operations to support various nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance. Another mission is to oversee the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, which is an independent force for which the United Kingdom has stepped up to act as the lead nation...The ISAF's goal is to establish a safe and secure environment in Kabul to allow the new interim administration to function as a fully representative government. The long-term goals of the CFLCC are to continue the current operations in Afghanistan to destroy terrorist cells and to support the international humanitarian effort there. In addition, CFLCC officials said they will work with the interim government to ensure that Afghanistan becomes and remains a stable country, and to ensure it does not once again become a safe haven for terrorism.

Land Command Leads Fight Against Terrorists,
by PFC Gustavo Bahena,
CFLCC Public Affairs Office,




6-1.   During the develop and detect phase, CA elements initiated execution of the CA plan. They entered into the AO to establish relationships, develop rapport, and conduct deliberate assessments. They provided current, pertinent information that allowed commanders to cancel or execute the planned branches and sequels of the operation. Execution of these branches and sequels encompasses the deliver phase.

6-2.   During the deliver phase, CA generalists and specialists engage the civil component with planned or on-call CA activities-PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration. Executed in support of a commander's CMO according to a well-planned, coordinated, and synchronized campaign, the activities of this phase represent a COR by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and assets of indigenous populations and institutions. These activities may occur individually and selectively across the AO or simultaneously at various levels of operations and government.

6-3.   At the strategic and operational levels of operation, application of some CA activities can mitigate or facilitate application of others. For example, engaging the civil sector with CA activities during the execution of combatant command TEPs may reduce the need for rapid decisive operations. Should rapid operations occur, relationships and programs put in place during the TEP can facilitate certain operational aspects. As an illustration, systems, facilities, programs, and knowledge developed during emergency services, developmental MCA, or HCA projects conducted during peacetime can ward off potential crises caused by natural, man-made, or technological factors. In the event of a crisis, those same systems, facilities, programs, and knowledge can be useful in conducting HA, PRC, FNS, mitigating MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration.

6-4.   The CA activities apply equally to special and conventional operations. Chapter 6 in FM 41-10 and the FM 3-05.20 series of manuals contain information on the various SF operations. Other related doctrinal references include more information on how the CA activities support each of the SO missions and collateral activities.

6-5.   The products of the deliver phase include CA/CMO briefings and reports. The final outcome of this phase is an executed mission. This chapter will focus on the activities that support and occur during the deliver phase. Figure 6-1 depicts these activities, as well as the military operations that support CMO objectives.

Figure 6-1. Military Operations and CA Activities That Support CMO Objectives

Figure 6-1. Military Operations and CA Activities That Support CMO Objectives




6-6.   CA activities are defined as activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO. The six CA activities are-

  • FNS.
  • PRC.
  • HA.
  • MCA.
  • Emergency services.
  • Support to civil administration.

6-7.   The activities of FNS, PRC, HA, and MCA clearly fall under part (1) of the definition. Support to civil administration falls under part (2). The emergency services activity crosses both definitions.

6-8.   In general, the CA activities are the primary realm of the CA specialty teams. CA specialists are task-organized to meet the various strategic, operational, and tactical requirements of the CA activity. CA generalists participate in the CA activities as staff action officers and, when required, low-level executors of nonspecialized CA activity tasks. When called upon to perform specialized CA activity tasks in the absence of CA specialists, CA generalists seek clarification, support, and guidance in their tasks from CA specialists via reachback. The following sections define these activities in detail and discuss the CA roles at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for each activity.




6-9.   The preferred means of fulfilling certain CSS requirements of military operations is to obtain appropriate goods and services locally through FNS. FNS refers to civil or military assistance rendered to the United States or its allies by an HN or other member of the international community during peacetime, emergencies, or war. Such assistance is normally based on agreements mutually concluded between the nations, but FNS may also include support from countries that have no mutual agreements.


6-10.   According to JP 1-02, a host nation is a "nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory."

6-11.   An FNS agreement is a basic agreement normally concluded at government-to-government or government-to-combatant commander level. FNS agreements exist with numerous countries, and new agreements may be negotiated for a specific operation. These agreements may include general agreements, umbrella agreements, and MOUs. Depending on the theater and the circumstances of the agreements, FNS may be referred to by other terms, such as HNS, wartime host-nation support (WHNS), friendly or allied nation support (FANS), or CIMIC.

6-12.   More information on HN, HNS, and HNS agreements is available in JP 4-01, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, and JP 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.

6-13.   The FNS activity consists of the identification, coordination, and acquisition of FN resources-such as supplies, materiel, and labor-to support U.S. forces and operations.

6-14.   There are many sources of FNS, including various government agencies and private citizens in the theater of operations. The following is a list of some of these sources:

  • Government agencies. Local government agencies build, operate, and maintain facilities and systems that can support U.S. requirements. Examples of such systems include utilities and telephone networks. Police, emergency services, and border patrols may also be available to support U.S. forces.
  • Civilian contractors. Local, national, third-country, or U.S. contractors employing indigenous or third-country personnel may provide supplies and services. These could include laundry, bath, transportation, labor, and construction.
  • Local civilians. The need for manpower ranges from laborers, stevedores, truck drivers, and supply handlers to more highly skilled equipment operators, mechanics, computer operators, and managers. The foreign national labor pool may provide personnel with those skills.
  • Special U.S. units. These units consist of HN military personnel and may be assigned to help perform FNS-type functions. These units are configured to conserve U.S. manpower by substituting non-U.S. personnel in specified positions of selected units. An example of this configuration is the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program in Korea, which is part of an FNS agreement.
  • Indigenous military units. During war, indigenous military or paramilitary units may support all types of U.S. needs. Areas that are covered include traffic control, convoy escort, installation security, cargo and troop transport, and logistics AO.
  • Local facilities. U.S. forces may use local buildings, airports, seaports, or other facilities to serve as hospitals, HQ buildings, billets, maintenance shops, or supply facilities. These facilities may be nationalized, come under local government control, or be provided by contractual agreement.
  • Area support. A nation performs specific functions in a designated area or for a particular organization within its boundaries. Some examples are rail operations, convoy scheduling, air traffic control, decontamination, NBC reconnaissance, and harbor pilot services. These services normally operate under government control by authority of national power acts.

6-15.   Property control (a specific CA function) serves to protect property within established limits and to preserve negotiable assets and resources. It is based on a uniform and orderly system for the custody and control of property.

6-16.   There are four basic categories of property subject to property control: public movable, public immovable, private movable, and private immovable. Public property refers to government-owned property versus that owned by private individuals. Immovable property consists of real estate and land and those structures and property permanently fixed to the land (also known as fixtures). Houses and other buildings qualify as immovable property.

6-17.   The powers a military commander may exercise over property in enemy territory may be broadly classified as destruction, confiscation, seizure, requisition, and control. Each of these powers is discussed below.


6-18.   Destruction is the partial or total damage of property. With the exception of medical equipment and stores, property of any type or ownership may be destroyed if the destruction is necessary to or results from military operations either during or preparatory to combat. No payment is required. Destruction is forbidden except where there is some reasonable connection between the destruction of the property and overcoming enemy forces.


6-19.   Confiscation is the taking of enemy public movable property without obligation to compensate the state to which it belongs. The term applies only to public property because the Hague Rules (Article 46) specifically forbid the confiscation of private property and Article 55 only permits the occupant to act as a usufructuary for public immovable property. Private property taken on the field of battle that was used by the troops to further the fighting is also subject to confiscation on the theory that it has forfeited its right to be treated as private property. Otherwise, the confiscation of public movable property is generally limited to that property with direct or indirect military use.


6-20.   Seizure is the taking of certain types of enemy private movable property for use by the capturing state. Title does not pass to the occupying power. Such use is limited to the needs of the occupying force, but may be employed outside as well as within the occupied territory. Payment or compensation is normally made at the time a peace treaty is signed or hostilities end.


6-21.   A requisition is the act of taking private enemy movable or immovable property for the needs of the army of occupation. It differs from seizure in three basic respects:

  • The items taken may be used only in occupied territory.
  • Private immovable and private movable property may be seized.
  • The owners are to be compensated as soon as possible, without having to wait for the occupation to end or for the restoration of peace.

6-22.   Property within occupied territory may be controlled by the occupant to the degree necessary to prevent its use by (or for the benefit of) hostile forces or in any manner harmful to the occupant. As a general principle of international law, the occupation commander is required to maintain public order. Included within this general mandate is the requirement for the occupation force to take control of and protect abandoned property, to safeguard banks, and ensure looting, black marketing, and so on do not get out of hand.

6-23.   FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, paragraph 394c, states that property whose ownership is in question should be treated as public property until its ownership is ascertained. Religious buildings and shrines are to be respected and treated as private property. Similarly, hospitals enjoy a protected status under international law, but may be used in a manner consistent with their humanitarian purposes. The property of municipalities is afforded the same treatment as private property. Table 6-1 provides a summary of the commander's powers over enemy property.

Table 6-1. Summary of the Commander's Powers Over Enemy Property

Basis For

Will It
Be Used

Limits On

Of Power

Limits On

Limits On



Not Used





+ Private on Battlefield




Use Anywhere

Confiscation (Usufructuary)

Movable (Public Immovable)

Use Anywhere


Movable Only


Payment at End or Return

Use Only




Not Used





No Payment


6-24.   The CA role in FNS is one of support to the commander's logistics function. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Identifying or validating sources of FNS.
  • Consulting, enforcing, or monitoring existing FNS agreements.
  • Assisting in the agreement process where no FNS agreements currently exist or modification is needed.
  • Tracking costs associated with use of FNS assets.
  • Performing quality-control assessments of FNS products, services, and associated costs.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the use or misuse of FNS.

6-25.   CA specialties that participate in FNS include international law, public administration, public health, transportation, civilian supply, economic development, food and agriculture, environmental services, and others according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in FNS. The following examples describe coordination at the tactical level for various services.


Example Coordination at the Tactical Level for Utilization
of Local Supplies and Resources

S-5: Based on the requirements of the military force, in conjunction with S-3 (tactical needs), S-4 (logistical needs), and economy, makes provisions for local procurement of the required supplies and resources. Provides S-3 with information pertaining to the local resources, dumps, or depots that, because of distance, may justify the assignment of tactical troops to effect their capture.

S-2: Provides supplementary information of economy concerning supplies and resources, particularly food and oil products. Reports location of dumps and depots.

S-3: Receives from S-5 requests for "special missions" to seize local resources, dumps, and depots. When approved, assigns missions to tactical units.

S-4: Provides S-5 with military logistical requirements. Receives from S-5 report of availability. Recommends procurement policy. Establishes procedures for procurement. Selects purchasing and contracting officers. Continuously coordinates with S-5 on availability, impact on local economy, and location of local offices for procurements.

Special staff officers:

All: Within established policies, submit to S-5 requests for assistance in locating supplies.

SJA: Provides legal supervision of purchasing and contracts.


Example Coordination at the Tactical Level
for Procurement and Use of Labor

S-5: Based on the requirements for civil labor as determined by S-1, determines the availability, establishes channels for procurement, and furnishes information on the recompense and treatment of local civilian labor to S-1.

S-1: Within policy established by higher HQ, coordinates with S-5 and recommends wages, hours of employment, and individual space allocations of civilian support labor for CSS and tactical units. Receives report of availability from S-5.

S-2: Screens labor employed as established by PIR or IRs.

S-4: Receives requirements for labor from CSS units. Determines priorities and allocations for CSS units.

Special staff officers:

SJA: Examines command policies and labor contracts to ensure compliance with legal requirements.




6-26.   Military operations are rarely conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, combat operations can be disrupted by-

  • Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians about the battlespace.
  • Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities.
  • Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.

6-27.   The PRC activity consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. They are defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ populace control measures and resources control measures of some type and to varying degrees in military operations across the spectrum of operations. PRC operations are executed in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, military operations.

Populace Controls

6-28.   These provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers. DC operations and NEOs are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

On Aug. 13 [2001], a curfew was set in place by MNB(E) [Multi-national Brigade (East)] in the town of Cernica, following three acts of violence.

No one will be allowed to enter or leave the village without the authority of KFOR [Kosovo Force], officials said.

"We hope that we can, on the one hand determine who has committed these crimes, and on the other hand deter further acts of violence," said Maj. Jim Blackburn, 3-69th Armor Battalion executive officer.

3-69th Armor reported that an elderly Kosovo Serb woman's window had been broken by a rock at 1:30 a.m. that day. A patrol immediately responded and two Kosovo Albanian males, ages 14 and 18, were detained. The 18-year-old was transported to the Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility.

"Youth are being recklessly encouraged to perpetuate violent acts," said Col. Vincent Brooks, deputy commander of MNB(E). "The adults who teach or accept such behavior are irresponsible and negligent," said Brooks.

At 3 a.m. four Kosovo Albanians approached a traffic control point and reported that one man had been shot and killed in the village of Brasaljce. A KFOR patrol entered the house in the village and discovered the body. U.N. Mission in Kosovo Police (UNMIK-P) are investigating, officials said.

3-69th Armor again responded to an explosion inside a house in Cernica at 4:30 p.m. No one was killed or injured.

3-69th Armor, UNMIK-P, and the Multinational Support Unit have begun a joint investigation. Five Kosovo Albanian men are being questioned. "Acts of violence like these have no place in a society that dreams of prosperity," said Blackburn.

"It is quite clear that some individuals have no regard for property or lawful behavior," said Brooks. "We deem them a direct threat to a safe and secure environment, and we will use all of our authority to put an end to such behavior," said Brooks.


Army News Service,
15 August 2001

Resources Controls

6-29.   These regulate the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.


6-30.   The CA role in PRC is one of support to the commander's operations function. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Identifying or evaluating existing HN PRC measures.
  • Advising on PRC measures that would effectively support the commander's objectives.
  • Recommending command guidance on how to implement PRC measures.
  • Publicizing the control measures among indigenous populations and institutions.
  • Assessing the effectiveness of the measures.
  • Participating in the execution of selected PRC operations and activities, as needed or directed.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of PRC measures.

6-31.   CA specialties that participate in PRC include international law, public administration, public safety, transportation, public works and utilities, civilian supply, economic development, food and agriculture, civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency management, environmental services, and others according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in PRC.


6-32.   DC operations pertain to those actions required to move civilians out of harm's way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, as in a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, as in combat operations, social or political strife, or technological hazard emergency.

6-33.   DC operations include the planning and management of DC routes, assembly areas, and camps. They also include the HA support to the affected populace. Appendix I discusses techniques in DC operations.

6-34.   DC operations may occur in conjunction with military (combat) operations. They may also occur as a separate CMO mission supporting civil administration operations.

6-35.   In all DC operations, controlling agencies must care for the basic needs of the DCs-food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies also must be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of disease among the DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace, as well as the health of military forces.

Categories of Civilians

6-36.   During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians-those who remained in place and those who are dislocated. The first category includes the civilians who are indigenous to the area and the local populace, including civilians from other countries. The civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can take care of themselves, they should continue to remain in place.

6-37.   DCs are civilians who left their homes for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence can hinder military operations. They most likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be native to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term that is further subdivided into five categories. These subcategories are defined by legal and political considerations as follows:

  • Displaced person: A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundary of his country in time of war.
  • Refugee: A civilian who has left home to seek safety because of real or imagined danger.
  • Evacuee: A civilian removed from his place of residence by local or national military order.
  • Stateless person: A civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish his right to the nationality claimed.
  • War victim: A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.

6-38.   The status of individual DCs is not always clear, even to those in the international community or the UN who routinely address DC problems, as the following examples illustrate:

In some situations, the link between refugee problems and internal displacement is direct and clear.

  • When refugees and displaced persons are generated by the same causes and straddle the border, not only are the humanitarian needs similar, a solution to the refugee problem cannot usually be found without at the same time resolving the issue of internal displacement. UNHCR's involvement in northern Iraq during the Kurdish crisis was one such example.
  • In many situations, effective reintegration of returnees requires assistance to be extended also to the internally displaced in the same locality or community. In Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Guatemala, it has been operationally and conceptually difficult for UNHCR to differentiate between returnees and internally displaced. In Sri Lanka, refugees returned home only to become internally displaced, prompting UNHCR to refocus its programme [sic] on internal displacement. In Ethiopia, UNHCR participated in a cross-mandate operation with other agencies to promote reintegration of returnees and also stabilise [sic] other kinds of population movements.
  • Sometimes refugees have sought asylum across the border in areas where there are also internally displaced. For instance, refugees from Sierra Leone and the internally displaced in Liberia were found, not only living together, but also affected in the same manner by instability in the country of asylum. Not only is it operationally difficult and morally unacceptable to distinguish between people in such a situation, assistance targeting only refugees may aggravate their insecurity.

In other situations, the relationship between refugees and the internally displaced is more complex.

  • Refugees may be a minor component of massive internal displacement. Colombia and Chechnya are two such operations in which UNHCR is involved. Tajikistan was another instance of such involvement when geography and history dictated the flight of some 600,000 persons to other parts of the country and only a tenth of that number to neighbouring [sic] Afghanistan. In such cases, it makes little sense to base international assistance on location alone.
  • Internal conflicts of a secessionist nature have uprooted people within national boundaries, which have then become international borders. For instance in the former Yugoslavia and Timor, UNHCR decided to provide protection and assistance to the uprooted on the basis of humanitarian needs, rather than refugee status. Borders, which shift even as people move, cannot be the sole factor determining the legitimacy of international concern.
  • Sometimes it has been difficult to predict whether territorial disputes or ethnic violence will lead to a break-up of a state and exodus of refugees, but it has been felt that early action to protect and assist internal displacement might check the proliferation and prolongation of human suffering and promote regional stability. This was the basis of UNHCR's response, for instance, in the Caucasus.

Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
6 March 2000

CA Role

6-39.   The CA role in DC operations is one of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of DC control measures. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.
  • Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
  • Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
  • Publicizing the control measures among indigenous populations and institutions.
  • Assessing the effectiveness of the measures.
  • Participating in the execution of selected DC operations and activities, as needed or directed.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of DC control measures.

6-40.   CA specialties that participate in DC operations include international law, public administration, public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, civilian supply, food and agriculture, civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency management, environ-mental services, and others according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in DC operations. Appendix B of FM 41-10 and Appendix I of this FM provide additional information on conducting DC operations. The following examples describe tactical-level coordination for DC operations and control of DC traffic.


Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for DC Operations

S-5: Working alongside the S-2 to develop an estimate of expected DC flow in the area under the command's control, determines the amount and type of facilities required to handle DCs. Additionally, after determining amount and type of available local resources, recommends to the commander the amount and type of military assistance required to discharge the commander's responsibility in the CA field.

S-1: Advises impact of DCs on the health and morale of the military personnel. Recommends policy concerning relations between DCs and military personnel.

S-2: Works with S-5 to develop an estimate of number of DCs to be uncovered. Reports to S-5 location of large camps to be uncovered. Establishes procedures for screening.

S-3: Provides S-5 with area of future operations and the type of action expected. Recommends routes to be used for evacuation of personnel. Tasks military units to control large, unruly groups.

S-4: Coordinates logistical support requirements when requested and releases CA supplies for DCs. Provides military supplies as authorized. Submits recommendations concerning use of military transportation for movement of DCs.

Special Staff Officers:

ALO: Reports to S-5 the location of DCs located by air reconnaissance.

Assistant division signal officer (ADSO): Provides signal communications along route of evacuation.

PM: Plans for enforcement of evacuation routes. Recommends allocation of military police (MP) resources to control of civilian traffic to ensure minimum interference with current and planned military operations.


Example of Tactical-Level Coordination
for Planning Control of DC Traffic

S-5: In coordination with S-3, S-4, and PM through use of civil officials and organizations, plans for control of civilian traffic to ensure minimum interference with current and planned military operations.

S-1: Reviews plan to ensure proper allocation of MP efforts between civilian and military requirements.

S-2: Establishes procedures for screening civilian traffic to uncover agents and saboteurs.

S-3: Provides S-5 with tactical requirements for control of civilian traffic.

S-4: Provides S-5 the routes of traffic that must be reserved for logistical reasons; ensures that plan for control of traffic is coordinated with traffic control plan.

Special staff officers:

Division transportation office (DTO): Coordinates civilian traffic control plan with overall traffic regulation plan.

PM: Assists in developing civilian traffic control plan; estimates MP requirements; plans location of signs, roadblocks, patrols, and checkpoints; and enforces civilian traffic control as required.

  6-41.   Table 6-2, is an example of an operational aid used by tactical unit leaders to quickly determine the disposition of individuals encountered in their AO. It provides mission-specific guidance that supports the force commander's DC plan. CA/CMO planners produce a matrix such as this based on extensive METT-TC analysis of the situation in collaboration with operational, legal, interagency, HN, and international community planners and participants of the operation.

Table 6-2. Operational Aid for DC Operations



Known or


Not in


International Organization/


Resumption of

Security Risk,
Criminal Conduct

Hunger, Disease, Sleeper Combatants

Hunger, Disease, Sleeper Combatants

Sleeper Combatants

Unfriendly (No Threat if Friendly)


Treat as Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)

Civilian Internee

Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or Refugee (See DC Plan for More Info)

Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or Refugee (See DC Plan for More Info)

Local Resident

UN Recognized/ Supported International Organization/NGO

Task Force's

Fair Treatment,
Urgent Medical Care, Detention, Accountability

Fair Treatment,
Urgent Medical Care, Detention, Accountability

Assessment, Emergency Subsistence, Urgent Medical Care, Accountability

Assessment, Emergency Subsistence, Urgent Medical Care, Accountability

Fair Treatment, Accountability

Selected NEO, Limited Security, Limited HA Support, Accountability


Detain as EPWs, Segregate

Detain as Civilian Internees, Segregate

Report and Bypass (Unless directed otherwise)

Search, Direct to DC Route or DC Collection Points

Search, Direct Home (Stay-put Policy) or to HN Authorities

Direct to CMOC


Military Police

Military Police






6-42.   NEOs refer to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although normally considered in connection with combat operations, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country, including civil unrest when evacuation to safe havens or to the United States is warranted.

6-43.   DOD defines noncombatant evacuees in two primary categories:

  • U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority, including-
    • Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.
    • Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
    • Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
  • U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority, including-
    • Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated.
    • Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
    • Military personnel and dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces outlined above, short of an ordered evacuation.
    • Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

More information is contained in JP 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

6-44.   NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in an FN or an HN to safe areas or to the United States. Such operations are conducted under the direction of the DOS. The United States employs military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The DOS may request help in conducting evacuations to-

  • Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
  • Reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens at risk.
  • Reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness of military forces.
Types of Environments

6-45.   NEOs may be ordered for implementation in any of the following environments:

  • Permissive. NEOs are conducted with the full help and cooperation of the affected nation. Evacuation of noncombatants is mutually beneficial to friends and allies. The political stability of nations granting authority to evacuate noncombatants is secure. An example of a permissive NEO was the evacuation of Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines after the eruption of Pinatubo Volcano.
  • Uncertain. NEOs are conducted where overt or covert opposition to the evacuation exists. The opposition may come from the "host" government, from opposition forces, from outside forces, or from all three. Usually, a military show of force is sufficient to maintain control of the situation.
  • Hostile. Operations to prevent or destroy the NEO are occurring or can be expected to occur. Forced entry by military forces into the AO may be required, and as a minimum, combat operations to secure some evacuees can be anticipated. A good example of a hostile evacuation is the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, in 1975.

6-46.   The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. The Chief of Mission, normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DOS officer-in-charge, has the primary responsibility for conducting evacuation operations. Every U.S. Embassy must maintain a NEO plan. DOS in Washington, DC, maintains a copy of these plans. The Washington Liaison Group coordinates evacuation planning between DOS, DOD, and other affected agencies.

6-47.   NEOs are a political last step because they send a signal to the world that the United States has lost faith in the ability of the foreign government to protect U.S. personnel. The U.S. military plays only a supporting role in the implementation of a NEO. Military commanders have primary responsibility for the military involvement of the operation. This involvement could include support during all phases of a NEO. Military planners must consider the terrain, weather, hydrography, designation and number of evacuees, and other factors of the area, including dissidents.

CA Role

6-48.   The CA role in a NEO is one of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the NEO. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Participating in the writing and coordination of NEO plans.
  • Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community resources designated for use in the NEO.
  • Participating in the execution of selected NEO activities, as needed or directed.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of NEO plans.

6-49.   CA specialties that participate in NEOs include international law, public administration, public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, civilian supply, civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency management, and others according to METT-TC.




6-50.   HA encompasses programs conducted to relieve or reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. These conditions may be the results of natural or man-made disasters, including combat operations, or they may be endemic to an area. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, disease, civil conflicts, terrorist incidents, and incidents involving WMD.

6-51.   HA programs are normally the responsibility of the HN civil authorities. In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN HA efforts, literally hundreds of NGOs from around the world respond to disasters to provide HA in various forms and for varied duration.


6-52.   The HA activity refers to the assistance provided by U.S. military forces. HA can occur as part of DSO in CONUS and U.S. territories and possessions. HA in DSO normally involve Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) units operating in their state role. They may also involve Active Army and RC units, including ARNG and ANG units in a federal status, when authorized and directed by the SecDef.

6-53.   To differentiate foreign from domestic HA operations, JP 3-57 and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, refer to those operations conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions, as foreign humanitarian assistance. This discussion will use the term HA for both domestic and foreign operations.

6-54.   HA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration and is intended to supplement or complement the efforts of the agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing HA. U.S. military participation in HA operations can range from providing security (allowing civilian agencies to operate safely and uninhibited) to providing specific military capabilities applied in direct disaster relief roles (providing food and medical care, constructing basic sanitation facilities, repairing public facilities, and constructing shelters and temporary camps).

6-55.   HA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. HA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. HA operations require centralized coordination and control. Two organizations that aid in coordination and control are the HACC and the HOC.


6-56.   The HACC is a temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. Much like a CMOC with an HA focus, a HACC operates during the early planning and coordination stages of HA operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations at the operational level.


6-57.   The HOC is an interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large HA operation. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country, the UN, or a USG agency during a U.S. unilateral operation. The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the U.S. Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the UN, NGOs and international organizations, and other major players in the operation.


6-58.   A special form of HA is HCA. HCA is assistance provided to the local populace by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises supporting TEPs. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401, and is funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to-

  • Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
  • Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
  • Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
  • Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

6-59.   A special condition of HCA operations is that they must fulfill valid unit training requirements. The fact that HCA operations incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace is secondary. These operations are distinctly different from MCA projects, which are discussed later in this chapter.


6-60.   The CA role in HA is one of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the HA operation. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of HA operations.
  • Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community resources designated for use in the HA operation.
  • Participating in the execution of selected HA activities, as needed or directed.
  • Tracking costs associated with execution of HA.
  • Performing quality control assessments of HA activities and costs.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of HA operations.

6-61.   All CA specialties may participate in HA according to METT-TC. FM 41-10 includes a discussion of the HA environment and the various USG programs under which HA is administered. JP 3-07.6 contains additional information. Appendix H of this FM provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in HA. The following examples describe tactical-level coordination for HA operations.


Example of Tactical-Level Coordination
for Public Health and Sanitation Support

S-5: Determines the minimum requirements for the health and sanitation of designated or selected civilian areas. Determines requirements and recommends to the commander the amount and type of health and sanitation supplies, and construction of military medical assistance needed for the area under consideration.

S-1: Coordinates with S-5, surgeon, and engineer in determining areas and establishments to be placed off limits to personnel under unit control.

S-2: Provides intelligence on health and sanitation conditions.

S-3: Provides S-5 with information on future operations, particularly use of NBC weapons. Receives recommendations from S-5 and surgeon for use of military force for mass sanitation efforts, submits recommendations, and when these are approved, provides military units. Receives from S-5 and surgeon the location of dangerous health and sanitation areas for consideration in tactical plans.

S-4: When requested by S-5, releases CA supplies. Determines availability of military supplies and recommends emergency allocations.

Special staff officers:

Surgeon: Provides S-5 with technical assistance and advice for medical surveys, inoculations, spraying, dusting, and inspections. Determines supply and equipment requirements. Advises on impact of conditions on military personnel and recommends actions.

Chemical Officer: Advises S-5 on contaminated areas, on methods of decontamination, and on personnel and material requirements. May supervise decontamination.


Example Coordination at the Tactical Level for Provisions
of Emergency Food, Clothing, Fuel, and Shelter

S-5: Based on the tactical situation and the relative standard of living of the civil population, recommends to the commander the amount and type of food, clothing, fuel, and shelter materials required to discharge the commander's responsibilities under current agreements and national policy.

S-1: Includes in the personnel estimate the impact of civilians on the morale of military personnel.

S-2: Provides S-5 with information of the area concerning conditions and requirements. Provides commander and staff an estimate of the influence on military operations if assistance is not provided.

S-3: Provides S-5 with area of future operations and type of action expected. Recommends priorities and allocation of supplies and equipment for civilian assistance when tactical operations are affected.

S-4: Receives S-5 requirements for supplies from CA stocks. Plans for movement of supplies while in military channels. Provides data on availability of military supplies. Recommends priorities and allocations to S-5.

Special staff officers:

All: Provide S-5 with technical assistance for determination of need for assistance measures to relieve conditions and priorities and allocation of appropriate supplies on military efforts. DISCOM coordinates distribution of CA supplies or military supplies directly with S-5.




6-62.   MCA is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population. These projects occur at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others that contribute to economic and social development of the area. An essential feature of MCA is that the projects also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces and the indigenous government with the population.


6-63.   The MCA activity consists of employing U.S. military forces in a military-to-military role of advising or training foreign military forces in MCA projects in overseas areas. These projects are arranged by international agreement and may be supported by USG programs for HA, as discussed in FM 41-10.

6-64.   MCA projects are divided into two general categories. These categories are explained below:

  • Mitigating MCA projects are immediate-response, short-term projects designed to provide emergency assistance to a populace in the wake of a disaster and to reduce further damage or suffering, as in HA. The disaster could be from natural causes, such as earthquake, hurricane, famine, or flood, or from man-made causes, such as civil disturbance, accident, terrorism, or war. Some examples of mitigating MCA projects are-
    • Operating an emergency medical clinic.
    • Distributing food.
    • Building temporary shelter and sanitation facilities.
    • Conducting damage clean-up operations, including decontami-nation of HAZMAT spills or release of WMD.
  • Developmental MCA projects are long-term projects designed to enhance the infrastructure of a local area. They are often preventive in nature and include any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster. Developmental MCA projects require interagency cooperation and continuous support from government sources to be effective. Some examples of developmental MCA projects are-
    • Building or redesigning facilities to reflect better land-use management.
    • Building or reinforcing structures to withstand the destructive elements predominant to the area.
    • Building or rehabilitating water sources and sanitation facilities to eliminate or prevent the spread of disease.
    • Operating a long-term public health campaign to educate the populace on preventive health measures (a medical readiness training exercise [MEDRETE]).
    • Conducting some HMA programs.

6-65.   The CA role in MCA is one of support to the commander's operational function. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Identifying, validating, or evaluating MCA project nominations.
  • Synchronizing MCA projects with other programs, both military and civilian.
  • Participating in the execution of selected MCA activities, as needed or directed.
  • Tracking costs associated with execution of MCA projects.
  • Performing quality-control assessments of MCA activities and costs.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of MCA operations.

6-66.   All CA specialties may participate in MCA according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in MCA.




6-67.   The emergency services activity, formerly known as civil defense, encompasses the combined emergency management authorities and policies, procedures, and resources of local, state, and national-level governments to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all kinds. In the aftermath of a disaster, this effort includes incorporating voluntary disaster relief organizations, the private sector, and international sources into a national response network.


6-68.   One of the basic responsibilities of civil government is to support its citizens in times of disaster. This responsibility means addressing the complex and constantly changing requirements associated with natural, man-made, and technological disasters: saving lives, protecting property, meeting basic human needs, restoring the disaster-affected area, and reducing vulnerability to future disasters. This responsibility normally begins at the local level and elevates incrementally to the national level. Figure 6-2, depicts a national disaster response network, as described in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) national response plan. Natural disasters include the following:

  • Hurricanes.
  • Tornadoes.
  • Floods.
  • Earthquakes.
  • Volcanoes.
  • Forest fires.
  • Droughts.
  • Severe winter storms.

Man-made disasters include the following:

  • Wars.
  • Terrorist attacks.
  • WMD use.
  • Civil disturbances.
  • Major transportation (air/rail/sea) accidents.

Technological disasters include the following:

  • Nuclear accidents.
  • Industrial fires and explosions.
  • HAZMAT spill or release.
  • Power outages.
  • Communications failures.

Figure 6-2. A National Disaster Response Network

Figure 6-2. A National Disaster Response Network


6-69.   Emergency services resources include-

  • State and local emergency planners and personnel.
  • Law enforcement agencies.
  • Fire departments.
  • Search-and-rescue units.
  • Emergency medical technicians and other health and medical services.
  • Public works and utilities companies.
  • Transportation agencies.
  • Public communications systems and facilities.
  • Mass care and feeding organizations.
  • National Guard and selected Active Army and RC units.
  • Other resources based on METT-TC.

6-70.   Comprehensive emergency management (CEM) involves coordinating the proper mix of government, private, voluntary, and international resources in an organized effort to meet the needs of a populace before, during, and after an emergency. CEM consists of four phases:

  • Mitigation refers to activities that actually eliminate or reduce the chance of occurrence or the effects of a disaster.
  • Preparedness means planning how to respond in case an emergency or disaster occurs and working to increase resources available to respond effectively.
  • Response refers to those activities that occur during and immediately following a disaster to provide emergency assistance to victims of the event and reduce the likelihood of secondary damage.
  • Recovery refers to returning all systems and operations to normal or near-normal. Short-term recovery returns vital life-support systems to minimum operating standards. Long-term recovery may continue for years until the entire disaster area is completely redeveloped, either as it was in the past or for entirely new purposes that are less disaster-prone.

6-71.   U.S. forces involvement in emergency services, both in CONUS and OCONUS, is often most visible in the response phase, normally in the form of HA operations. U.S. forces may also participate in mitigation, preparedness, and recovery operations through MCA and HCA projects. For operations OCONUS, these projects are initiated at the request of a foreign nation, through the U.S. Embassy. Within CONUS, they are initiated at the request of the executive office of a U.S. state, possession, or territory to the President of the United States.

6-72.   U.S. military support to emergency services differs between combat, theater engagement programs, and response to national, regional, or international disasters. It also differs between CONUS and OCONUS operations.

6-73.   In any emergency, however, strong emergency services plans, programs, policies, and organizations reduce the need for military forces to support civil emergency services efforts. Emergency services plans are especially important during combat operations when tactical and operational forces may be unable to divert military assets from combat, combat support, or CSS missions. Military forces may be required, however, when the situation is beyond the capabilities of emergency services officials or when civil government authorities cannot or will not take appropriate action. Laws and regulations closely regulate the use of U.S. military forces in support of CONUS or OCONUS emergency services operations.

6-74.   The terms crisis management and consequence management are used when emergency services operations involve a terrorist event and the potential or actual employment of WMD. The following are definitions:

  • Crisis management: Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. (FBI definition cited in the Federal Response Plan.)


  • Crisis management: Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02, according to JP 3-07.6.)
  • Consequence management: Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. (FEMA definition cited in the Federal Response Plan.)


  • Consequence management: Measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. (This term and its definition are provided for information in JP 3-07.6 and proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.)

6-75.   These terms apply to both domestic and foreign terrorist incidents. According to presidential directives and the Federal Response Plan, the LFA in domestic crisis management is the FBI while the LFA for domestic consequence management is the FEMA. During foreign crisis management or consequence management, the LFA for U.S. support to a foreign government is DOS.

6-76.   The fundamentals of emergency services mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery apply to both crisis management and consequence management. These operations require increased awareness and emphasis on operating in an NBC environment. They will also normally include teams or units specializing in NBC detection, containment, and decontamination.


6-77.   The CA role in emergency services is one of support to the commander's operational function. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community emergency services plans and resources designated for use in emergency services operations.
  • Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of emergency services operations.
  • Participating in the execution of selected emergency services activities, as needed or directed.
  • Tracking costs associated with execution of emergency services.
  • Performing quality-control assessments of emergency services activities and costs.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of emergency services operations.

6-78.   All CA specialties may participate in emergency services according to METT-TC. FM 41-10 contains a discussion of emergency services in CONUS and OCONUS. Additional information on the role of U.S. forces in DSO is in FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, and the Federal Response Plan, http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp/. CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, has additional information and guidance on foreign consequence management. Appendix H of this FM provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in emergency services.




6-79.   Military operations that help to stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population, are known as support to civil administration. Support to civil administration occurs most often in stability operations and support operations. Some support to civil administration is manifested in other CA activities, such as PRC, HA, MCA, and emergency services.


6-80.   The support to civil administration activity consists of three distinct mission activities-

  • Civil assistance: Short-term military support to an established government or populace, in advance of or in the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities or disasters, that does not incur a long-term U.S. commitment. Examples of support include maintaining order, providing life-sustaining services, and controlling distribution of goods and services.
  • Civil administration in friendly territory: Geographic combatant commander's support to governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. Examples of support include advising friendly authorities or performing specific functions within limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.
  • Civil administration in occupied territory: The establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory which U.S. forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

IFOR (Implementation Force)...faced a situation somewhat remi-niscent of World War II but without a mandate to govern or restore essential services. The peace agreement and other accords assigned nation building to civil agencies. For instance, OHR (Office of the High Representative) would reactivate the civil infrastructure and joint civilian commissions dealt with communications, transport, and economic development. Elections, however, were relegated to the warring parties, international agencies, and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

Stabilizing the situation; separating and disarming the various parties; and providing limited assistance, adequate security, and freedom of movement for all civilians as well as NGOs charged with effecting the peace was left to the military. That mission would develop into one of the most extensive civil-military operations in U.S. and NATO history. Furthermore, despite the concern over excessive IFOR involvement ('mission creep') and the effort to limit the military role to the letter of the agreement, the civilian implementation of the peace mandate could not be accomplished without active participation by the military in civilian support organizations.

An unforeseen and lesser-known concern was the judicial system. After 4 years of war and the physical separation of the factions, it was in dire need of rejuvenation.

Over two-thirds of the judicial positions were vacant, statutes were difficult if not impossible to locate, and legal texts were nearly nonexistent. Despite this state of affairs, neither the agreement nor the various NGOs envisioned helping this critical institution. CA personnel were the first to identify this problem and immediately render assistance using their civilian expertise.

If the judicial system was sick, the electoral process was comatose. The last countrywide election had been held in 1991. There were no election laws to which all parties could agree and no voter registration lists. OSCE was overwhelmed by the task of registering 3.5 million voters in Bosnia and 20 other countries. Virtually every phase of the process required support. Again, CA personnel proved valuable for this NGO, which is not to say that the military provided unusual services or that individuals in uniform drove the judicial and electoral systems.


The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations,
by John J. Tuozzolo,
Joint Forces Quarterly,
Summer 1997 (No. 16)


6-81.   During civil administration in occupied territory, the following terms apply:

  • Military governor: The military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior. (JP 1-02. Term approved for DOD and NATO use.)
  • Military government ordinance: An enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control. (JP 1-02.)

6-82.   The CA role in support to civil administration varies between civil assistance, civil administration in friendly territory, and civil administration in occupied territory. In either case, however, the CA role is one of support to the commander's operational and support function with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation. General CA soldier tasks include-

  • Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN infrastructure.
  • Understanding the needs of the indigenous populations and institutions in terms of the 16 functional specialties.
  • Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the indigenous populations and institutions in terms of the 16 functional specialties.
  • Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
  • Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil administration activities.
  • Participating in the execution of selected support to civil administration activities, as needed or directed.
  • Performing quality-control assessments of support to civil administration activities and costs.
  • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil administration operations.
  • Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to civil administration operations from military to indigenous government or international community control.

6-83.   All CA specialties may participate in support to civil administration according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in support to civil administration. The following three examples describe tactical-level coordination in support to civil administration operations.


Example of Coordination at the Tactical Level
for Restoration and Use of Public Service

S-5: Based on the tactical situation and economic situation affecting the area, recommends to the command those public services, in priority, which should be restored and estimates the amount of public utilities required to discharge the civil activities essential to the physical and moral well being of the area.

S-1: Advises on the influence poor service will have on morale of military personnel. Recommends allocation of public morale services (radio and TV) for military use.

S-2: Provides information of the AO and an estimate of the influence of conditions on military operations. If public communications are reestablished, recommends security measures. Recommends consistent policy for communications media.

S-3: Coordinates with S-5 on use of signal, chemical, and aviation efforts for civil assistance when tactical operations are affected. Recommends priority and allocation of military capabilities for civil assistance when tactical operations are affected. Recommends use of public communications and transportation by military. Receives location of vital elements to be saved from destruction if tactical situation permits.

Special staff officers:

All: Provide S-5 with technical advice and assistance in determination of need for assistance, measures to restore, and recommendations for restoration of public services of value to particular staff officer's activities.

FSCOORD: Receives from S-3 location of vital elements to be saved from destruction by fire support means, if possible.


Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Protection
of Arts, Monuments, and Archives

S-5: In conjunction with S-2, determines the location of archives, monuments, and objects of art considered to be of value to the United States, allies, or the civil government. As appropriate, recommends to S-3 those items which, because of political, cultural, or economic value, justify the use of combat elements for their seizure and security. As appropriate, recommends to the commander the disposition of such items.

S-1: Publishes appropriate instructions for military personnel concerning treatment of arts, monuments, and archives.

S-2: Coordinates with S-5 in locating and searching archives. May provide archives team for intelligence search. Returns archives to S-5 after intelligence processing. Recommends to S-5 the safeguarding of archives.

S-3: Prepares recommendation for adjustment of tactical plans to prevent destruction of arts, monuments, or archives. Assigns special missions to tactical units to secure and safeguard.

Special staff officers:

PM: Provides security guards or may support local civil police in such operations.

FSCOORD: Receives location from S-3 for prevention of destruction by fire support.


Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Prisoners of War
and Recovered U.S. Prisoners of War

S-5: Furnishes data on availability of local suppliers for food and clothing and availability of facilities and/or material for use in construction of cages or camps.

S-1: Plans for and supervises custody, administration, utilization, and treatment of prisoners of war (PWs) from capture or taking custody to evacuation repatriation or parole. Coordinates and supervises initial steps (furnishing food, clothing, and medical attention) for the rehabilitation and processing of U.S. or allied personnel recovered from enemy control. Arranges for prompt notification to higher HQ, prompt evacuation from the combat zone, private use of Army communication means, and intelligence debriefing.

S-2: Estimates the number and capture rate of PWs, ensures continued interrogation of selected PWs, and ensures screening and debriefing of recovered personnel.

S-3: Considers requirements for additional troop units as guards.

S-4: Provides housing, food, transportation, and evacuation for PWs. Plans uses for labor.

Special staff officers:

PM: Supervises and administers collection, evacuation, processing, interment care, treatment, discipline, safeguarding, utilization, education, and repatriation of PWs.

SJA: Provides legal advice with Rule of Land Warfare, Geneva Convention, laws, treaties, and agreements.

Engineer: Plans and supervises construction, maintenance, and repair of camps and facilities for PWs under control of the command.

DISCOM: Provides food and clothing, as required.

Surgeon: Coordinates PW medical operations and provides medical support augmentation.

Transportation: Provides transportation, as required.

PAO: Provides news and press releases.




6-84.   The deliver phase is characterized by the execution of CA activities by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, international organizations, NGOs, and HN assets as part of a COR to the civil component of a situation. The duration of the deliver phase will vary based on the factors of METT-TC. While executing these activities, CA soldiers generate routine CA/CMO briefings and reports according to unit SOP. These briefings and reports feed directly into the evaluate phase in which soldiers monitoring CA operations determine when the deliver phase is over and transition phase may begin. Some examples of CA/CMO briefings and reports are in Appendixes C and D.

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