Military

5-30.   An interview may take place under varying conditions or environments. The interviewer should strive to conduct the interview in the best conditions possible, but he must remain flexible and focused enough to obtain information in any situation. He must also act in a manner that facilitates approaching the interviewee as a source of additional information at some future time. The following techniques apply to every interview. The interviewer should-

• Set the proper atmosphere by doing the following:
• Schedule the interview meeting at a mutually convenient time to avoid distractions or interruptions.
• Allocate sufficient time-whole morning or afternoon sessions versus several shorter periods, if possible.
• Coordinate for a quiet location, if recording-a quiet office or room or under a tree away from big crowds.
• Relax and put the interviewee at ease-ground field gear if security conditions allow, provide refreshments if possible, or accept refreshments if offered.
• Explain the overall purpose of the interview and how the session will be conducted; explain that questions and follow-up questions will be asked.
• Explain the role of each team member, if employing an interview team consisting of two or more individuals (for example, interviewer, interpreter, notetaker), to avoid the impression that the team will "gang up" on the interviewee.
• Remind the interviewee that there is no rush to answer just because the recorder is running; ensure the recorder is properly set up and is functional by testing it in advance.
• Conduct the interview as follows:
• Be confident. Through preparation and background research, the material to be covered should be familiar.
• Maintain control of the interview. The interviewer should try to pace the session so that sufficient time is given to ask all of the questions and get the information wanted from the interview.
• Avoid asking leading questions, but phrase queries to elicit detailed responses. An example of a leading question is: Is it true that your family or village is suffering from a lack of access to food, water, security, and health care? A better phrasing of the question might be: What immediate concerns do you have for your family or village? This facilitates follow-up questions like: To what do you attribute this lack of access to food, water, security, and health care? This method should provide a wealth of detailed information.
• Ask direct questions to avoid ambiguity. Direct questions give the interviewee a starting point around which to organize a response.
• Ask follow-up questions. The interviewer should be careful not to confront the interviewee in a manner that challenges his integrity. A frequently successful approach is to acknowledge some confusion before asking additional questions.
• Take notes. Interview notes are useful for indicating when follow-up questions are needed, for organizing one's thoughts, and for preparing a preliminary list of items requiring verification. The interviewer should try not to be distracted or distracting when taking notes; it is often helpful if someone other than the interviewer takes notes.
• Have the interviewee explain the meaning of any unfamiliar terms, as well as provide additional information on unfamiliar subjects or individuals mentioned during the interview. The interviewer should ask the interviewee to provide proper spellings and draw diagrams, if possible.
• Do not interrupt the interviewee in the middle of an answer. The interviewer must be respectful, courteous, and attentive.
• Do not be afraid of silence. A pause may signify that the interviewee is thinking of additional information that could be lost if the interviewer is too quick with the next question.
• If the discussion digresses from the subject, return to the interview plan by tactfully asking a question from the list.
• Limit sessions to no more than 2 hours and take short breaks. Otherwise, both the interviewee and interviewer will become fatigued. If the interview is being recorded, a good time to take breaks is when it is time to change tapes.
• Show appreciation. The interviewer should thank the interviewee for his time, in the interviewee's language, if possible, and render the appropriate parting gesture, such as shaking hands with or bowing to the individual.
• Take into account the following additional considerations:
• Remember the customs and courtesies of the community. Seemingly little things like rendering the appropriate greetings or accepting food and drink from the hosts, for example, often win the respect of the interviewee, gain his cooperation, and help dispel the ugly American myth.
• Use local phrases appropriately or not at all. The interviewer should not risk offending the interviewee. If using local phrases, the interviewer should practice the correct pronunciation and usage in advance.
• Know how to use interpreters (Appendix F).
• Don't mislead an interviewee while soliciting information. The interviewer loses credibility and the ability to approach the interviewee, as well as others in the community, for information in the future.
• Don't make promises. This is the number one rule when interacting with foreign nationals. CA soldiers are usually not in a position to commit U.S. resources to anything. If a CA soldier promises something and fails to produce, he has just reduced his credibility and provided propaganda material for his adversaries.
• Protect EEFI. The interviewer must ensure that he does not inadvertently release critical aspects of a friendly operation to the interviewee.

5-31.   Actions taken after the interview are as critical as gathering the information. The interviewer should, at a minimum, take the following actions:

• Debrief all participants of the interview team-interviewer, notetaker, interpreter, and security personnel. Compare notes and observations of all team members to obtain a more accurate understanding of the reliability, attitude, and intentions of the interviewee as well as any other individuals encountered during the interview process.
• Package all notes, recordings, and report of findings according to unit SOP. The SOP should consider the classification and disposition of transcripts, diagrams, maps, and photos as well as courier requirements for the interview products.
• If the situation permits, or as appropriate, send a brief letter thanking the interviewee for participating in the session.

TECHNIQUES IN REACHING AGREEMENTS

5-32.   The very nature of CA activities often puts CA soldiers in contact with people who have differences of opinion over what they can or cannot and should or should not do in specific situations. The CA soldier must be able to influence the actions of people to meet both the objectives of a commander and the national policies and objectives of the United States. He must be able to do this in any scenario.

5-33.   When resolving disagreements between parties, CA soldiers must display a combination of patience, tenacity, creativity, and focus to succeed. They must-

• Be tolerant. Build upon successes to instill trust and cooperation.
• Be patient. The process of reestablishing stability and peace is slow and methodical.
• Take charge. Initiate the process quickly but be thorough when executing an agreement.
• Be prepared. Know the situation from all aspects.
• Expect change. No two situations are the same.
• Be innovative. Exploit unexpected advantages.
• Be flexible. There are no hard-and-fast rules, just guidelines.
• Be resourceful. Use what is available.
• See the mission through. Vigilance is critical to long-term success.

Examples of the range of challenges CA soldiers may encounter include-

• Getting the leaders of a local populace to support and implement a stay-put policy to prevent DC movement during combat operations.
• Appeasing competing vendors who disagree with HNS contracts let by logistics representatives in rear areas.
• Assisting representatives of formerly warring factions to work out movement agreements during posthostilities operations.
• Deconflicting HA activities of NGOs and international military forces during HA operations.

5-34.   Each of these examples represents a significant CMO event that requires the full knowledge and support of the commander responsible for the AO. Each example also demonstrates that the CA soldier must be properly trained and prepared to meet many similar, yet different, challenges.

5-35.   Before entering an agreement process, the CA soldier must know what a good agreement looks like. A successfully negotiated agreement meets four standard criteria:

• Fairness implies that all or both sides are treated alike, without reference to the feelings or interests of the negotiator.
• Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with a minimum of effort, expense, or waste.
• Wisdom pertains to judging rightly and following the soundest COA.
• Durability refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the agreement to last. Durability generally follows from success in the first three criteria.

5-36.   The following discussion provides techniques to assist the CA soldier in bringing a successful conclusion to situations that require two or more parties to come to a mutual agreement. Knowledge of these techniques does not qualify a CA soldier to act as a hostage negotiator or a trade negotiator for international, national, or regional trade agreements. These types of agreements require specific expertise and legal status that are beyond the normal scope of CA activities.

5-37.   There are three basic methods one can use to bring opposing sides together to reach an agreement: negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. Each method has its place in CA operations, as explained below. Negotiation and arbitration are likely to place the CA soldier in a position of opposition to one or more of the local parties. As the most effective and least divisive of the three, mediation is the preferred method of reaching agreements.

5-38.   Negotiation is conferring, discussing, or bargaining to reach an agreement. Negotiation is a central technique in conflict resolution. Although they will rarely be called on to negotiate a major agreement in a postconflict environment, CA soldiers at all levels must be competent and knowledgeable in the art of negotiation. Under normal circumstances, the DOS conducts international negotiations on behalf of the United States. Typically, exceptions to this rule occur when details of a status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) need clarification or when the U.S. military requires goods or services from a local provider.

5-39.   When a U.S. military representative is a party to a negotiation, he is then injected into the problem and is seen as a competitor and not as a disinterested party. Once any of the local representatives regard the United States as an interested party, the United States surrenders the cloak of neutrality, and all actions become suspect. It is very difficult to shake the ensuing suspicion and mistrust, even by subsequent U.S. actions or representatives.

5-40.   To be effective, CA soldiers must develop competencies in conflict style management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and cultural awareness.

5-41.   Negotiators must appraise and evaluate personality traits and profiles in relation to conflict. These appraisals give insight into how individuals and groups react to, and interact in, a conflict situation. Since all individuals are different, the negotiator must be flexible but assertive. Learning to recognize his styles of communication and the styles of others and to adapt his processes can lead to more sustainable agreements.

5-42.   CA soldiers will be called upon to resolve conflict when not all parties are willing to engage in negotiation or mediation processes. Moreover, CA soldiers will have to negotiate fair outcomes when there is an uneven power dynamic between the parties. Many issues will involve intractable conflicts that are considered nonnegotiable when the communication channels have broken down. Parties frequently attempt to use force to prevail in these situations. Although force can sometimes work quickly and effectively, it has many dangers.

5-43.   The success or failure of a negotiation is directly related to the depth of communication achieved by the parties involved. Problems often arise because intentions are miscommunicated. The assumptions and perceptions about a person, group, or situation affect the outcome of communication; listening skills and questioning techniques are important.

5-44.   Cross-cultural training increases the awareness and understanding of other cultures. This ability enables the CA participants to interact successfully with the population in the host country, and provides a framework in which to work. An understanding of one's own culture allows him to see cultural differences and similarities with other cultures.

5-45.   As it becomes necessary to act as a negotiator, the CA soldier must do the following:

• Establish the objectives of the negotiation session, which involves understanding the needs of the participants (physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and self-actualization).
• Establish the schedule and location, which involves coordinating participants' schedules, determining optimum timing, and considering neutral sites.
• Plan and prepare the facility, which involves determining the size and shape of the negotiating table, determining seating arrangements and room decor, providing audiovisual aids, and setting the lighting and noise conditions. It also involves considering accessibility and satisfying the basic needs of the participants.
• Establish the rules, which involves determining who will attend, setting an agenda, sequencing presentations, and sticking to the issues.

Additionally, the CA soldier will find the following tactics or ploys useful during the negotiation process:

• Crossroads:
• Provide options and alternatives.
• Be flexible.
• Satisfy needs (the CA soldier's and theirs).
• Surprise:
• Shift methods and approach suddenly (overcome preconceived attitudes and notions).
• Introduce new information.
• Put the ball in their court.
• Fait Accompli:
• Take action in advance.
• Present as accomplished fact.
• Is irreversible.
• Association:
• Present issue in the best light.
• Use positive images.
• Cite examples of success.
• Salami:
• Resist the temptation to go for broke.
• Break large requests into more manageable pieces.
• Prevent perception of overload.
• Participation:
• Lay the groundwork first.
• Appeal to self-interest of others.
• Enlist aid of influential others.
• Changing Levels:
• Change viewpoint.
• Change physical attitude.
• Be prepared to show benefits at every level.

5-46.   Arbitration is a conflict settlement with the decision made by a neutral party. There are two forms of arbitration: binding and nonbinding. Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree to comply with the arbitrator's decision. Nonbinding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not compelled to comply with the arbitrator's decision. In CA operations, either form of arbitration is ineffective because the arbitrator acts as judge, and as such will make a decision that will adversely affect one or more parties. Since this is virtually always a decision on a subject where contention is so rampant that the participants could not bring themselves to agree, the arbitrator's decision will in all likelihood anger everyone involved and decrease the chances of future cooperation with U.S. policy goals.

5-47.   For the CA soldier, the only tangible advantage in acting as an arbitrator is that a quick and decisive decision can be made. Without local support, however, implementing the decision can be extremely difficult or impossible. Without local support for the arbitrator's decision, the local commander, and, for that matter, the U.S. military as a diplomatic player, must be prepared to lose prestige and influence. Unless the United States is willing to commit sufficient resources to enforce compliance, it will appear weak and ineffective. In those situations where the U.S. military is willing to commit resources to enforce compliance, the U.S. military commander must be advised that a potential long-term negative effect may be lasting resistance to future U.S.-led efforts designed to enhance stability.

5-48.   Mediation is a conflict settlement with the decision made by the opponents with the assistance of a neutral third party. During mediation, the role of the CA soldier is to act as a facilitator whose aim is to guide the local parties toward an agreement that supports the policy goals of the U.S. government. The mediator is not representing the aspirations of any of the opposing sides, but acts solely to further the altruistic goals of lasting peace, stability, and cooperation within the framework of the military commander's intent and the international agreements that authorized U.S. involvement.

5-49.   Although the goals are altruistic, the mediator should not assume there would be little or no resistance from the indigenous population or institutions. There are numerous groups and individuals that will actively or passively hamper attempts to establish peace. In mediation, the United States is not in a position to support the aims or goals of one of the opposing parties, and therefore the likelihood of persistent animosity and aggression directed at the United States or U.S. representatives is reduced.

5-50.   During the mediation cycle, the mediator may find that he may have to enforce a decision that has a disproportionate benefit to one participant over another. The mediator will have to prepare for that situation by ensuring that throughout the mediation cycle he has remained impartial, clearly outlined what behavior was expected from the participants, and what rewards or punishments would be apportioned. Mediation includes the risk of upsetting a participant. However, the mediator can prevent long-term friction through effective communication and by eliminating the possibility that the mediator's actions appear arbitrary.

5-51.   The CA soldier must remember that mediation, if at all possible, is the preferred method when pursuing an agreement between two opposing parties. Appendix G contains additional guidelines on how to successfully reach an agreement.

CONDUCTING MEETINGS

5-52.   A meeting is a gathering of people who come together to discuss or decide on matters. CA soldiers often find themselves responsible for setting up meetings for various reasons or occasions. Some examples include the following:

• The CA team needs to coordinate with local leaders or facility managers to facilitate access to areas, structures, and people in support of a detailed assessment or survey.
• Local NGO representatives desire to voice their concerns to the commander regarding the nature of military operations in the area and to resolve conflicting priorities.
• The ranking military officer in the theater, region, or local area would like to introduce himself to prominent political leaders and discuss issues of significance to all parties.
• A serious incident occurred in which coalition or U.S. forces are implicated and military investigators must work with local authorities to investigate the incident.

5-53.   It may be necessary to conduct periodic meetings with certain groups for specific recurring or sequential topics. Weekly meetings may be appropriate for planning operations, tracking progress, and managing projects. Monthly meetings provide a better chance to look at certain long-range or developmental subjects in greater depth.

5-54.   Every meeting ought to be assigned to a single meeting coordinator. The meeting coordinator is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of the meeting. Depending on the circumstances and level of the meeting, the meeting coordinator may or may not also serve as the moderator of the meeting.

5-55.   Successful meetings require detailed planning regardless of the location, circumstances, timing, or frequency. Successful planning requires the meeting coordinator to approach the task professionally and systematically. He must understand the purpose, expected outcome, and implications of the meeting. He must be aware of the agendas of attendees and satisfy their need to perceive benefit from attending this and future meetings. The more care taken in preparing and structuring the meeting, the more likely the outcome of the meeting will be favorable. When planning the meeting, the meeting coordinator should-

• Determine the purpose of the meeting, the desired results of the meeting, and implications of the meeting on ongoing operations and initiatives.
• Make a list of the desired attendees, and identify individual ranks, status, and protocol requirements. He should also identify potential agenda items among the attendees that may surface before, during, or after the meeting.
• Select an appropriate location and consider security of the site, clearance of routes, and travel passes, if needed. He should consider the neutrality of the location and the possible message it may send to participants, as well as nonparticipants, and ensure that the location implies no favoritism.
• Invite the attendees and, when appropriate, confirm their attendance.
• Determine appropriate seating arrangements. He should consider the number of participants, the rank and status of the participants, the size and shape of the room, and local culture and customs. (Local culture and customs may dictate, for instance, that participants sit in a circle on the ground.)
• Consider local ceremonial customs and ensure the members of the U.S. or coalition party are aware of what will be expected of them in such ceremonies. Ceremony may be an important part of some types of meetings. What some might consider eyewash may be the gauge by which others determine commitment to subsequent or preceding terms of the meeting.
• Be familiar with other cultural idiosyncrasies, such as the exchanging of gifts before or after a meeting, or how much small talk is acceptable before "jumping in to business." Such cultural awareness is invaluable to defusing cultural barriers that can derail or hinder the purpose of the meeting.

During the meeting, the meeting moderator should-

• Welcome all participants and allow for introductions.
• Orient the participants to the layout of the meeting area, including locations of break areas, rest rooms, telephones, FAX machines, and other administrative support.
• Provide an overview of the meeting's purpose and objectives, relevant background information and assumptions, the time allotted for the meeting, and the expected outcome at the meeting's conclusion.
• Publish clear and concise ground rules for behavior. For example, participants must arrive on time, there should be no interruptions to take phone calls, topics not on the agenda will be tabled for a follow-up meeting, and meetings should always strive to finish on time. Other rules might include guidelines on sending proxies or on the need for confidentiality. In a volatile environment, full constructive challenge, as opposed to destructive confrontation, should be encouraged.
• Propose and formalize an agenda that is agreeable to all parties. Designate an individual to enforce the agenda by keeping time or reminding participants when they are straying from the approved topics.
• Pay particular attention to satisfying the needs of all participants; for example, stay away from "one-way" meetings in which it appears military participants are pulling information from civilian participants and giving little information in return.
• Designate an individual to perform as the official recorder and notetaker. It is almost impossible to effectively run a meeting and take thorough notes at the same time. Legal clerks from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) section, if available, may be helpful.
• Monitor the composition and skills of the attendees to confirm that the right people are attending.
• Provide the opportunity for people to be creative and spontaneous. Encouraging participation fosters a sense of common purpose and accomplishment. In some meetings, participants might not be vocal with their ideas. To obtain the feedback necessary to resolve issues, the meeting coordinator may have to extract the information by asking direct questions.
• Break large groups into smaller working groups (no more than 10) to facilitate communication and participation, if necessary.
• Use the last few minutes of a meeting to review the group's decisions and define the required next steps, if appropriate. If follow-up action is necessary, it is important to be specific so that it is clearly understood which individual will handle each outstanding task. Assign due dates for each assignment, as well.

After the meeting, the meeting coordinator or moderator should-

• Produce a complete report consisting of, at a minimum, the following:
• List of attendees.
• Copy of the agenda.
• A synopsis of all issues and discussions covered during the meeting, decisions made, agreements drafted, topics tabled for future meetings, and further actions to be taken.
• The dates and subjects of future meetings.
• Provide copies of the report to each attendee.
• Follow up on outstanding issues or actions to be taken, as appropriate.

5-56.   Although the processes of planning and conducting meetings should be approached as any other military operation, the meeting coordinator must be careful not to overconstrain the meeting agenda or participation. If the atmosphere is too tense or rigid, nommilitary participants may be intimidated or alienated and, therefore, may resist attending future meetings. On the other hand, the meeting moderator must be aware of certain skills or tactics that he or meeting participants may try to employ to turn the meeting in his favor. The use of the following skills or tactics is situational-dependent.

5-57.   Psychologists differentiate between angry aggression and instrumental aggression (aggression designed to achieve a specific goal). There is no place for angry aggression in meetings. Instrumental aggression should be employed sparingly but forcefully. Tone of voice and body language will often suffice. If an individual sounds furious, people will believe he is furious. He who loses his rage completely will usually regret it.

5-58.   Conciliation is usually the best way to defuse aggression. An aggressive opponent can be temporarily pacified with appeasement signals and submissive gestures. As with aggression, conciliation must be used sparingly. Admitting one is wrong about something can be a mark of strength, not weakness. Often, a well-timed apology can put even the most abusive attacker off guard and bring a situation back under control.

5-59.   Unlike aggression and conciliation, enthusiasm is encouraged. Enthusiasm fosters participation by reinforcing the feeling that each participant's idea counts. The meeting moderator should be wary, however, of giving the impression of false enthusiasm.

5-60.   Interrogation in the context of meetings means making interrogative statements rather than making speeches. Asking pointed and relevant questions is often a more effective means of promoting communication.

5-61.   Patience allows the listener to hear the arguments advanced by all sides with an open mind. It enables the listener to assess the general trends of discussion, formulate arguments, and identify moments when it is most appropriate to act.

5-62.   Sulking is a way of eliciting sympathy from other meeting attendees to get one's way against seemingly insurmountable odds. As with aggression and conciliation, sulking should be used sparingly.

5-63.   Withdrawing from a meeting is a tactic of last resort and should be used most sparingly of all. The purpose of withdrawal is to shock the remaining participants into confusion and disarray and cause them to reconsider the position that prompted the withdrawal. It is an extremely risky tactic, as the withdrawing party no longer has control over what transpires in the meeting once he has left.

ATTENDING MEETINGS

5-64.   CA soldiers will often attend meetings run by NGOs, IROs, or local civilians. These meetings are an excellent opportunity to share information, network with influential individuals, and build relationships beneficial to the military mission. CA soldiers must understand their role in such meetings and how to maximize the value of the opportunity. Their effectiveness in future collaborative efforts will often be influenced by their military rank, where they sit, how they behave, and what they say or do not say during these meetings.

5-65.   Nonmilitary participants of a meeting will often relate the military rank of the attendee to the level of importance the commander places on the meeting participants or subject matter. Lower-ranking soldiers may consider carrying an official letter of introduction from the commander, especially to initial meetings with nonmilitary groups.

5-66.   At times, CA soldiers may intend to be passive observers at a particular meeting or series of meetings. Depending on the status of the military in certain environments, however, the mere presence of military representatives at a meeting is a statement in its own right. CA soldiers must display competence, reliability, and professionalism at all times.

5-67.   Often, the most productive coordination is made between individuals during breaks and after adjournment of a meeting. CA soldiers must prudently observe meeting protocols. They must understand what information is appropriate for presentation to the group, when to present it, and when to keep information for appropriately timed "sidebars." Additional meeting attendance guidelines for the CA soldier include the following:

• Understand and respect local customs, especially during interaction with community and government leaders.
• Pick seating location carefully. Sitting next to or behind someone could be interpreted as implicit support by the military of that person or organization.
• Understand your level of authority; don't agree to conditions or make commitments beyond that authority.
• Ask questions to clarify points, keep a meeting focused, and address issues of importance to the military, but avoid the appearance of taking over the meeting.
• Speak up to counter incorrect or misleading statements. For example, if a meeting participant states that the military can or will perform certain services, or that the military did or did not do something, the CA soldier's silence may be interpreted as concurrence. Organizations or individuals with antimilitary agendas will attempt to bait the CA soldier into making explicit or implicit statements.

MANAGING AND CLASSIFYING CA AND CMO INFORMATION

5-68.   During the initial planning stages of CA operations and CMO, much of the information used by CA/CMO planners is characterized by the completed area study based on the format found in FM 41-10. This information, kept current through routine and continuous study and research, is obtained using a combination of open-source and restricted source materials. Open-source materials include political, economic, military, cultural, and informational journals, the CIA source book, and numerous public web sites. Restricted source materials include the CA database and the OSIS.

5-69.   As operations mature and CA soldiers begin conducting hasty and detailed surveys, the information used by CA/CMO planners becomes more sensitive in terms of how it was obtained and to what uses it will be put. Characterized by personal contact and direct observation, this information has associated costs in terms of soldiers' time, effort, and resources, as well as the potential requirement to protect information sources.

5-70.   While conducting assessments, CA soldiers may uncover information that is politically sensitive, proprietary in nature, or potentially harmful to the source if the information is obtained by the source's adversaries or competitors. In the first case, dissemination of politically sensitive information may hurt reputations, cost lives, or hinder the attainment of U.S. goals and objectives. In the second case, release of proprietary information may diminish the CA soldiers' ability to obtain useful or important information in the future. In the latter case, information obtained in confidentiality must be protected according to the desires of the confidant.

5-71.   Whether compiled from open-source materials, restricted source materials, personal contacts, or direct observation, the information gathered by CA soldiers must be carefully managed to ensure-

• It gets to the right end users according to a well-coordinated plan.
• It retains its integrity.
• Sources are protected, as applicable.
• Sensitive information is not released to unauthorized groups or individuals.
• Proper and adequate documentation of CA operations is maintained according to federal law (Title 18, United States Code [USC], Section 2071) and AR 25-400-2, The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS).

5-72.   Information pertaining to CA operations and CMO must be carefully catalogued and managed during all phases of operations. This requirement is especially important during long-term operations when continuity is paramount to success, and knowledge of previous actions must be passed to succeeding CA teams and interagency participants. The CMOC, as the repository for all CA and CMO information, must establish a system that achieves this objective. The system must be initiated early in the operation, simple to maintain, and easily shared with other agencies, as applicable, to facilitate planning and operations.

5-73.   A paper-based system that achieves the purpose of cataloguing and managing CA/CMO information uses the daily staff journal (DA Form 1594), the CA (G-5) Workbook, CMO situation maps and overlays, and a resource card file, as discussed below:

• The daily staff journal is the official chronological record of CA and CMO events that includes summaries of all messages received by the CMO staff officer or CMOC.
• The CA Workbook is organized by each of the 16 functional specialties, contains detailed and current information about the AO, and is used to prepare CA periodic reports and CMO estimates.
• CMO situation maps depict current and future dispositions of pertinent friendly, enemy, and civilian organizations, resources, plans, and events. CMO overlays show how the situation changes over time, and provide a historical record of events. Separate overlays can be prepared that show demographics of an area, locations of civil supply support, locations and status of public utilities or health service facilities, routes and disposition of DCs, locations of protected targets, and many others. GIS products from NIMA can be used for this purpose.
• A resource card file helps keep the various overlays from becoming too cluttered. It also provides a record of resources and services used or provided by military organizations for accounting purposes.

Examples of each of the items listed above can be found in Appendix D.

5-74.   An automated system that achieves the purpose of cataloguing and managing CA/CMO information might be preferable in some environments. An automated system maintains the same data as the paper-based system yet offers the advantage of being more versatile and more easily shared with other participants for collaborative planning. If compatible with ABCS, this automated system expands the COP, provides greater visibility of CMO and CA operations to the supported commander and his subordinates, and reduces the potential for misinterpreting information transmitted between units.

5-75.   The automated CA/CMO information system should incorporate several features. These features include-

• A database and information management system that contains records of events (both past and future-planned), assessments (including video and audio files), facilities, services, and resources, and a powerful search engine that allows users to find information instantly.
• A mapping application that allows users to "see" data (roads, facilities, schools, and military, HN, and NGO assets), display this information on computer maps, and print the information on area maps.
• A modeling application that allows users to predict potential results of hazardous conditions or military COAs on civil populations and areas.

5-76.   OPSEC is an operations function and a command responsibility. The OPSEC assessment is mission-specific. Its purpose is to protect sensitive and critical CA/CMO information from unauthorized disclosure. The unit collecting the information must take the time, before and during an operation, to determine-

• What information needs to be protected (critical information components or categories of critical information)?
• What adversaries might want to obtain that information?
• What methods might those adversaries use to obtain the information?
• How vulnerable is the unit to collection and exploitation by an adversary?
• What countermeasures should the unit take to prevent adversaries from obtaining the information?

Common measures used to protect information include the following:

• Verify clearances; confirm and strictly enforce "need-to-know" as defined in paragraph 5-92.
• Conduct OPSEC awareness training for all individuals, including nonmilitary participants in the CMOC.
• Implement appropriate physical, communications, computer, and personnel security measures.
• Conduct classified or sensitive conversations only in designated areas; be cautious of surroundings and the possibility that conversations, including telephone discussions, may be overheard; and use secure radios and telephones for both classified and sensitive unclassified communications.
• Ensure proper markings are applied, and cover sheets are attached to classified or sensitive documents, diskettes, and other media.
• Exercise positive control over all classified and sensitive materials at all times.
• Keep unauthorized personnel out of sensitive activities restricted areas.
• Examine trash receptacles for all waste paper, scratch (unclassified) notes, envelopes, Post-it notes, carbon paper, personal papers, and similar materials; determine if they should go into a burn bag and be destroyed as classified material; and as a minimum, tear all paper into at least four pieces.
• Degauss all diskettes and tapes before destruction; destroy in the same manner as classified material.
• Take no measures. This is acceptable only after using the OPSEC process and the commander determines that no critical information requires protection or that the costs outweigh the risk.

5-77.   Additional information on OPSEC can be found in USASOC Directive 530-1, Plans and Operations: Operations Security. NATO security procedures are contained in the International Programs Security Handbook.

5-78.   AR 380-5, Information Security, governs the DOD Information Security Program and takes precedence over all DOD component regulations that implement that program. It establishes, for the DOD, uniform policies, standards, criteria, and procedures for the security classification, downgrading, declassification, and safeguarding of information that is owned by, produced for or by, or under the control of the DOD or its components. Accordingly, information is considered for classification if it concerns-

• Military plans, weapons, or operations.
• Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security.
• Foreign government information (explained below).
• Intelligence activities, including special activities or intelligence sources or methods.
• Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States.
• Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.
• USG programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities.
• Cryptology.
• Confidential sources.
• Other categories of information that are related to national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the SecDef or Secretaries of the Military Departments.

5-79.   Information can only be classified by an original classification authority or an individual who has delegated original classification authority according to the provisions of AR 380-5. Delegated original classification authority limits the number of individuals with such authority and the classification levels delegated to those individuals.

5-80.   The classification levels denote the degree of damage to national defense or foreign relations of the United States in the event of unauthorized disclosure of the information. They also denote the degree of protection such information requires. Classification may not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; or to restrain competition.

5-81.   The three classification levels are-

• Confidential (C). Applied to information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. Examples of Confidential information include the compromise of unit status reports, movement plans, and system vulnerabilities.
• Secret (S). Applied to information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of Secret information include OPSEC measures, subversion and espionage directed against the Army (SAEDA) incidents, and military training to foreign governments.
• Top Secret (TS). Applied to information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of Top Secret information include the location of remote communications sites, special operations research and development projects, deception plans, national defense plans or complex cryptology and communications intelligence systems, and sensitive intelligence operations.

5-82.   A fourth category-Unclassified (U)-is applied to a wide range of unclassified types of official information, which, although not requiring protection as national security information, is limited to official use and is not publicly releasable. Markings such as For Official Use Only (FOUO) and Limited Official Use are not used to identify classified information.

5-83.   Classifiers of information produce classification guides. Classification guides-

• Identify the information elements to be protected, using categorization to the extent necessary to ensure that the information involved can be identified readily and uniformly.
• State which of the classification designations (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) applies to each element or category of information.
• State declassification instructions for each element or category of information in terms of a period of time, the occurrence of an event, or a notation that the information shall not be declassified automatically without approval of the originating agency (normally, events identified for declassification will be finite; statements such as "Declassify 6 years from the date of generation of document" are prohibited).
• State any special public release procedures and foreign disclosure considerations.

5-84.   The classification guide is approved personally and in writing by an official who is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide. This official will also approve personally and in writing all changes, errata sheets, and revisions to basic guides that affect a classification.

5-85.   CA soldiers must be familiar with the contents of the classification guide, its application to CA/CMO information, and what to do if CA/CMO information is not addressed properly. The best way to influence changes to the guide is to coordinate with the G-2 or S-2 of the supported unit.

5-86.   If a CA soldier originates or develops information that he believes should be safeguarded, he should take the following measures (according to AR 380-5):

• Safeguard the information in the manner prescribed for the intended classification.
• Mark the information (or cover sheet) with the intended classification designation.
• Transmit the information under appropriate safeguards to an appropriate classification authority for evaluation. The transmittal shall state that the information is tentatively marked to protect it in transit. If such authority is not readily identifiable, the information should be forwarded to a HQ activity of a DOD component, to the HQ office having overall classification management responsibilities for a DOD component. A determination whether to classify the information shall be made within 30 days of receipt and the originator will be notified promptly.
• Upon decision by the classifying authority, the tentative marking shall be removed. If a classification is assigned, appropriate markings shall be applied.
• In an emergency requiring immediate communication of the information, after taking the action prescribed by the first two bullets above, transmit the information and then proceed IAW the third bullet above.

Additionally, CA soldiers must treat the following as sensitive or close-hold:

• Information discovered during assessments or operations that may be embarrassing to the facility or individuals involved.
• Vulnerabilities of a security, economic, or political nature.
• Criminal activities.

5-87.   Foreign government information is defined by Executive Order 12356 as-

• Information provided to the United States by a foreign government or international organization of foreign governments, or an element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, its source, or both, are to be held in confidence.
• Information produced by the United States under an arrangement with a foreign government or international organization of foreign governments, or any of their elements, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, be held in confidence.

5-88.   Executive Order 12356 states that there is a presumption of damage to national security in the event of unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information. For this reason, foreign government unclassified information that is provided in confidence is to be classified at least Confidential. It should be classified higher whenever the damage criteria for Secret or Top Secret are met. Unclassified foreign government information provided in confidence must be classified by an original classification authority. If there is uncertainty concerning whether the information is to be handled "in confidence," the providing government or international organization should be consulted to reach agreement on controls to be applied.

5-89.   Foreign government information must retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification designation that will provide protection equivalent to that provided by the furnishing government or organization. When unclassified foreign government "in confidence" information is involved in an international program, program documentation (the memorandum of understanding [MOU]) should include procedures on handling the information.

5-90.   U.S. documents that contain foreign government information must be marked with a notation that states "THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION." In addition, the portions containing foreign government information must be marked to identify the country of origin and classification level (for example, UK-C or UK-R). The foreign government document or authority on which the classification is based, in addition to the identification of any U.S. classification authority, must be identified on the "Classified by" line. A continuation sheet should be used for multiple sources, if necessary.

5-91.   Foreign government information cannot be disclosed to nationals of third countries, including intending citizens, or to any other third party, or used for other than the purpose for which the foreign government provided it without the written consent of the originating government. Government agencies must submit requests for other uses or further disclosure to the originating government.

5-92.   No person may have access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized Government purposes. That is, the person must have the appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know. Further, cleared individuals may not have access until they have been given an initial security briefing.

5-93.   Units at every level must establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information. In the end, every individual who has authorized possession, knowledge, or control of classified or sensitive information has the final responsibility for determining that a prospective recipient's official duties require possession of, or access to, any element or item of classified information and whether the individual has been granted the appropriate security clearance by proper authority.

5-94.   CA/CMO information can be transmitted by various methods, including oral, hard copy, and electronic. The method chosen must conform to published policies and procedures put in place to protect loss or accidental disclosure of that information to unauthorized individuals. In the absence of published policies and procedures, CA soldiers should use common sense to ensure OPSEC.

5-95.   Oral transmission includes formal and informal briefings, personal conversations in public or private places, and telephone or radio conversations. Before transmitting CA/CMO information orally, CA soldiers must take precautions to protect the information commensurate with its classification. Examples of protective measures include-

• Discussing classified information only in areas cleared to the highest level of material to be discussed.
• Controlling access to areas where classified information will be discussed.
• Announcing the security classification of information and materials before and after discussion.
• Ensuring all individuals within earshot are properly cleared to receive the information.
• Ensuring all individuals within earshot have a need to know the information.
• Using radios and telephones that have communications security devices that are approved, authorized, functioning properly, and appropriate to the classification of the information.

5-96.   Hard-copy transmission includes handcarrying, sending by authorized courier, and mailing. AR 380-5 governs the marking, transmission, and safeguarding of hard-copy classified information. CA soldiers should also consult with their local S-2 or G-2 section for the existence of any additional command guidelines regarding handling classified materials. Electronic transmission includes FAXs, E-mail, and posting on web sites and common network drives. Examples of protective measures for electronic media include-

• Ensuring FAX machines and computers are accredited for the classification of information being transmitted.
• Separating classified machines from unclassified machines (both physically and electronically) to prevent inadvertent transmission of classified materials over unclassified systems.
• Following published policies and procedures for the use of computers, E-mails, common drives, and web sites.

OPERATING WITH THE MEDIA

5-97.   DOD and major news organizations reached agreement on guidelines that apply to media coverage of U.S. military forces engaged in armed conflict. The rules listed below have been endorsed by DOD and most major news organizations, and will govern media coverage of future U.S. armed conflicts:

• Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
• Press pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (within 24 to 36 hours when possible). The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
• Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
• Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
• Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
• Military PAOs should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
• Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.
• Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlespace situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.

NOTE: CA soldiers must always work through the PAO, as well as notify and get approval from their chain of command before talking to the press.

5-98.   What CA soldiers do before they meet the media is as important as what they do when they actually meet them. Often, it is the preparatory activities that will determine the success or failure of a media interview. By being prepared, CA soldiers will not only be more confident and comfortable, but will also be able to get their story across to the audience.

5-99.   CA commanders should always ensure that their unit members are fully prepared to meet and speak with media personnel. The following suggestions are for the soldier who is preparing for an interview. He should-

• Find out who the reporter is.
• Find out why he was asked for the interview.
• Establish ground rules on what will be covered.
• Set how much time will be allowed for the interview.
• Anticipate questions and think through his responses.
• Do his homework. He should make certain he is familiar with the facts supporting his position and that they are up-to-date. Even if he is the expert, a quick brush-up will help.
• Know the key points he wants to make. He might want to type them up on a card and put the card in a prominent place on his desk. Before the interview, he should review them often. Are they honest, meaningful, and to the point?
• Not memorize a statement-he will look stilted or pompous.
• Question his own position and have his PAO or other staff experts play devil's advocate. If possible, he should practice his responses before a television camera and view the playback with members of his staff to conduct a critique. He should not be thin-skinned-it is better to correct errors before friends than commit them before millions of viewers.
• Read the morning paper and listen to the radio or TV before his interview in case a late-breaking news story affects his command.

FORCE PROTECTION

5-100.   Force protection refers to measures designed to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment that conduct or support national defense missions. JP 1-02 defines force protection as "Security program(s) designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs."

5-101.   Force protection is a concern for all commanders and soldiers in military operations across the spectrum of conflict, both CONUS and OCONUS. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia states-

5-102.   DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, directs regional and functional combatant commanders to establish command policies and AT/FP programs for the protection of all assigned forces. The responsibility of geographic combatant commanders extends to all forces in the AOR, as well as forces conducting operations, training, or exercises in countries not assigned to a geographic combatant commander for whom the combatant commander has operational control. These programs include family members (dependents), resources, and facilities. These programs generally require prescribed levels of awareness and training for every applicable individual, as well as coordination with the officials of indigenous (and domestic, in the case of DSOs) populations and institutions on matters involving AT/FP policies and measures.

5-103.   When the threat of terrorism exists, commanders implement and enforce measures according to the force protection condition (FPCON) procedures outlined in JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, and Appendix BB of DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence. These FPCON levels are discussed below:

• FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.
• FPCON ALPHA applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
• FPCON BRAVO applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.
• FPCON CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this FPCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.
• FPCON DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.

5-104.   Force protection initiatives at all levels must be coordinated closely with the appropriate security, intelligence, and investigative forces, given their knowledge of threat possibilities and appropriate responses. Effective force protection planning includes input, guidance, and decisions from other interested agencies and personnel. These may include civil government and law enforcement officials and, in some cases, private security firms (as in the proprietary security offices of multinational corporations in the AO which may be more organized or better informed than local authorities). Ultimate responsibility for force protection rests with the force commander, and any actions taken must be consistent with the commander's decisions. More information is contained in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H.

5-105.   CA soldiers focus on force protection at two distinct levels: the individual or team level and the supported force level. These levels are discussed below:

• At the individual or team level, CA soldiers employ measures to counter threats to individual or team members from all sources while conducting CA activities. Threats to CA soldiers include enemy direct and indirect fires; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack; ambush; landmines; enraged or disaffected civilians, thugs, and criminals; and theft of equipment. CA soldiers follow command guidance and unit force protection SOPs.
• At the supported force level, conducting routine CA activities can enhance protection of the supported force from threats from the civil component of the AO. Threats to the supported force include disaffected or dislocated civilian populations, unfriendly political organizations, seasonal cycles, disease, hazardous material sites, terrorist incidents, and theft of equipment.

5-106.   CA soldiers enhance force protection in any operation by doing their normal duties. This means they must-

• Circulate among the populace.
• Establish rapport with ordinary citizens, key leaders, and representatives of international organizations and NGOs.
• Establish and maintain an accessible CMOC.
• Conduct continuous deliberate assessments.
• Conduct CA activities.
• Provide input to all-source analysis centers on conditions, attitudes, and intentions of the populace.

5-107.   As stated in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, "Force protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering.In some military operations other than war (such as peacekeeping), the term 'information gathering' is used rather than the term 'intelligence' because of the sensitivity of the operation." Since information gathering is an inherent part of CA operations, CA soldiers must be sure to share their observations with the intelligence community. It is critical, however, that CA soldiers be careful not to misrepresent themselves as gatherers of intelligence.

5-108.   Commanders plan force protection operations using trained organic or attached force protection specialists. CA/CMO planners support the force protection plan by integrating CA operations into the plan and sharing information contained in routine CA reports. While subordinate units and teams comply with the senior commander's force protection plan, they also augment the plan by planning at their own level to account for nuances specific to their AO and operations. For example, a CMOC operating outside the security perimeter of a supported unit may require additional force protection considerations than the CMOC inside the perimeter.

5-109.   CA soldiers planning force protection operations follow basic security planning steps and principles. The following steps and principles apply whether planning at the individual or team level or the supported force level:

• Conduct a threat assessment.
• Conduct a vulnerability assessment.
• Determine appropriate countermeasures.
• Implement countermeasures.
• Evaluate effectiveness of the countermeasures.

These steps and principles also apply to CA teams conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. The CA teams are focused not only on terrorist threats, but on all threats.

5-110.   The first step in developing a force protection program is to identify and characterize the potential threats to the force. Understanding the threat enables CA soldiers to assess their vulnerability to attack and to develop effective protective and response measures. The following is an overview of the elements within a threat assessment.

5-111.   Threat Identification. CA soldiers identify threats from the civil component during preliminary and deliberate assessments. Their analysis of the situation using CASCOPE yields potential threats to the force from CASCOPE. Examples of threats for each of the CASCOPE factors are as follows:

• Areas:
• Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.
• Rubbled or contaminated towns, villages, or cities.
• Structures:
• Nuclear power plants.
• Facilities that employ chemicals in production processes.
• Structurally unsound buildings.
• Capabilities:
• Indigenous communications networks.
• Propaganda mechanisms.
• Ability to organize and mobilize.
• Existence of legal or illegal arms among the populace.
• Martial arts and other warrior skills found among the populace.
• Organizations:
• Radical social, political, religious, or criminal organizations.
• Terrorist organizations.
• People:
• Enemy sympathizers.
• Organized criminals.
• Common thieves.
• Events:
• Internal feuding between competing factions.
• Political or anti-U.S. and coalition force rallies.
• Accidental release of hazardous materials.
• Rainy, windy, or drought seasons.
• Outbreak of disease among the populace.

5-112.   When considering terrorists or other human threats, threat identification focuses on three components: aggressors; tools, weapons, and explosives; and tactics.

• Aggressors generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities, and equipment. Their objectives include-
• Inflicting injury or death on people.
• Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
• Stealing equipment, material, or information.
• Creating publicity for their cause.

Aggressors may use the first three objectives to accomplish the fourth.

• Tools, weapons, and explosives, as described below, are used by aggressors to achieve their objectives:
• Tools, such as forced entry tools, vehicles, and surveillance tools.
• Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons and mortars, and NBC agents (also called weapons of mass destruction [WMD]).
• Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and vehicle bombs.
• Tactics refer to the offensive strategies employed by aggressors, reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more common tactics include-
• Moving vehicle bomb. The moving vehicle bomb is a suicide attack where an explosive-laden air, ground, or waterborne vehicle is flown or driven into a site and detonated.
• Stationary vehicle bomb. This type of bomb may be detonated by time delay or remote control.
• Exterior attack. This attack is at close range of a facility or exposed asset. Using clubs, rocks, improvised incendiary devices, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs, the aggressor attempts to inflict destruction and death.
• Standoff weapons attack. These attacks are executed using military or improvised direct- and indirect-fire weapons, such as antitank weapons and mortars.
• Ballistic attack. Using small arms at varying distances, the aggressor attempts to inflict death.
• Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter the facility covertly using false credentials. The aggressor may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the site or facility or attempt to remove items or information from the site.
• Mail bombs. Small bombs or incendiary devices are incorporated into envelopes or packages that are delivered to the targeted individual.
• Supplies bombs. Bombs or incendiary devices, generally larger than those found in mail bombs, are incorporated into various containers and delivered to facilities or installations.
• Airborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical or biological agents to contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation.
• Waterborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation.

5-113.   Threat Definition. Once the threat is identified, the CA soldier determines the negative effects of the threat on the force. For example-

• Rubbled or contaminated areas pose a safety risk to soldiers passing through those areas.
• The capability to organize and mobilize great numbers of civilians, armed with firearms, pitchforks, clubs, or stones, can overwhelm a force operating among or near the mobilized population.
• Nuclear power plants or facilities that employ chemicals in production processes are vulnerable to accidents that can harm soldiers operating nearby.
• Criminals can steal equipment or information that can be used to inflict casualties against the force.
• Political or antiforce rallies can quickly deteriorate and pose a safety risk to soldiers in the area.

5-114.   Terrorists operate in a clandestine mode, so the information needed to define and analyze a terrorist threat is often more difficult to acquire than information dealing with less esoteric military threats. To build a composite picture of threat conditions, police and intelligence personnel gather information from numerous sources, such as newspapers, criminal records, government records, local organizations and people, and other intelligence organizations. As outlined in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, DOD has identified six factors to be used in the collection and analysis of information from all sources bearing a terrorist threat:

• Existence. A terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or able to gain access to a given country or locale. The analysis of information regarding the existence of a terrorist group addresses the question: Who is hostile to existing organizations and social structure?
• Capability. The acquired, assessed, or demonstrated level of capability to conduct terrorist attacks. An analysis of terrorist group capabilities addresses the questions: What weapons have been used by terrorist groups in carrying out past attacks? What infrastructure is necessary to train, equip, target, and execute attacks?
• History. Demonstrated terrorist activity over time. The analysis of terrorist group history addresses the questions: What have the terrorists done in the past? What is the terrorist group's method of operations? How did they acquire the capacity they demonstrated? Where did they obtain support? What additional attacks did they mount?
• Intentions. Recently demonstrated anti-U.S. terrorist activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity. An analysis of terrorist group intentions addresses the questions: Why do groups engage in terrorist acts? What do they hope to achieve?
• Targeting. Current credible information on activity, indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations. Targeting addresses the questions: Who is likely to be attacked, why are they likely to be attacked, and what is the basis for accepting reports that such attacks are planned?
• Security environment. The internal political and security considerations that impact terrorist element capability to carry out their intentions. The parameters examined within the security environment of a country include training of national law enforcement, paramilitary, and military institutions to deal with terrorist incidents and to maintain social order; quality of equipment available for law enforcement and internal security forces; and distribution of internal security forces throughout a country.

5-115.   Each of the Services maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Differences in perspective among DIA, Services, or combatant command threat analysis may lead to divergent conclusions about specific terrorist threats. While the threat to all DOD assets in a country may be at one level, the local commander may decide it faces no threat or a greater threat of terrorism in the country or locale in question.

5-116.   Threat Level. Force protection planning responds to the threat level. The threat level for an area is determined after information on the threat factors is gathered and analyzed. The greater the presence of threat factors, the higher the threat level. Five of the six factors are used together to define the threat level; the sixth, security considerations, is used separately as a modifying factor. Table 5-2 depicts the relationships of the threat factors and threat levels. (Additional information is in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, Chapter 5.)

5-117.   Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the installations, resources, and personnel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) determines threat levels in CONUS, and DIA determines threat levels OCONUS for DOD installations. Commanders at all levels establish the FPCONs mentioned above based on the FBI or DIA threat level and locally developed information. This information, coupled with the vulnerability assessment discussed in the following section, will influence decisions as to which force protection measures are applied to installation assets.

5-118.   A vulnerability assessment addresses the susceptibility of the force to the threats identified during the threat assessment. A vulnerability assessment applies to fixed sites as well as to mobile operations. It is an ongoing process that includes all three components of threat assessment. This very essential step helps to identify and prioritize the resources required to defeat the threat, providing a basis for determining antiterrorism measures that can protect personnel and assets from terrorist attacks.

5-119.   A vulnerability assessment looks at several aspects of security related to the force and its operations. These aspects include-

• OPSEC. According to JP 1-02, OPSEC is "a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation." An assessment tool for OPSEC is the OPSEC survey.
• Physical Security (PHYSEC). PHYSEC is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. An assessment tool for PHYSEC is the physical security survey.
• Personnel Security (PERSEC). PERSEC is the application of standards and criteria to determine whether or not an individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment to or retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in the total Army consistent with national security interests. For CMO, when dealing with individuals who are not in the U.S. Armed Forces and who do not have access to classified materials (civilians working in and around a CMOC), PERSEC refers to the assurance that individuals are trained, trustworthy, and reliable when dealing with information, equipment, and other mission-related items. Assessment tools for PERSEC include the single-scope background investigation (SSBI), the periodic reinvestigation (PRI), the national agency checks with local agency and credit checks (NACLC), civilian employment history and reference checking, and drug screening.
• Information Assurance (IA). IA provides the means to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information processed by the Army's information-based systems. IA includes security of information and related systems (information systems security [ISS]), C2, physical, software, hardware, procedural, personnel, network, communications, operational, and intelligence. IA seeks to maintain effective C2 of friendly forces by protecting critical information infrastructures from unauthorized users, detecting attempts to obtain or alter the information, and reacting to unauthorized attempts to obtain access to or change information. These measures focus on the integrity, confidentiality, availability, authentication, verification, protection, nonrepudiation of the infrastructures, and the information contained within. Assessment tools for IA include security surveys and virus screening software.

5-120.   During the vulnerability assessment, CA soldiers identify any shortcomings in each of these areas as they apply to team or site operations. DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H contains guidelines and sample survey checklists that can be applied to a CA/CMO vulnerability assessment.

5-121.   The results of the vulnerability assessment are evaluated against the type of threat and identified threat level to determine the appropriate level of protection. Figure 5-3 shows the steps to conduct a vulnerability assessment.

5-125.   CA soldiers must keep in mind that countermeasures are most effective when endorsed by the commander, understood by all participants, war-gamed, written into operations and contingency plans, resourced, and exercised or rehearsed. Failure to achieve any of these reduces the chance a countermeasure will succeed.

5-126.   Countermeasures must be implemented as soon as possible after a threat has been identified. The least costly and often the most effective protection measures are those incorporated during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate force protection measures at the planning stage can preclude the need for piecemeal and costly security enhancements later on.

5-127.   Over time, threats change as situations change. Countermeasures that may have been effective one day may no longer be effective today. As CA soldiers conduct continuous assessments, they reevaluate the threat and the countermeasures arrayed against the threat. They develop new countermeasures as old ones are determined to be no longer effective. As before, they ensure the new countermeasures are endorsed by the commander, understood by all participants, war-gamed, written into operations and contingency plans, resourced, and exercised or rehearsed.

PRODUCTS OF THE DEVELOP AND DETECT PHASE

5-128.   The products of this phase are both tangible and intangible. They include working relationships and rapport with nonmilitary participants in an operation; detailed deliberate assessments; and CA/CMO briefings and reports.

5-129.   The duration of the develop and detect phase will vary based on the factors of METT-TC. The briefings and reports produced during this phase influence the timing of, and activities implemented during, the execute phase.

5-130.   Commanders and senior civilian leaders make decisions based on the information provided to them by their subordinate commanders and staff members. This information is presented formally in the form of briefings and reports. Briefings are presented orally and may include an orientation to maps, diagrams, charts, photos, or other documents that improve the commander's understanding of the information. Reports are presented in written form and usually follow an approved format. They are stand-alone documents that serve as historical records. As such, reports contain as much detail as possible of the events about which they are written.

5-131.   CA officers and senior NCOs are adept at conducting briefings and writing reports. Formats for briefings and reports are found in Appendixes C and D. The following are examples of the types of briefings and reports CA personnel use to present CA/CMO information:

• Briefings:
• Capabilities briefing to supported commander.
• Course of analysis briefing in support of MDMP.
• CA/CMO portion of supported unit operations order briefing.
• BUB.
• TOC shift-change briefing.
• Operations briefing to CA unit or team.
• Reports:
• Predeployment area assessment.
• Results of CA initial/hasty assessment.
• Periodic CA report.
• CA/CMO spot report.
• OPSUM.
• Trip report.
• AAR.

5-132.   The capabilities briefing to the supported commander or senior civilian leader is tailored to the situation. A thorough briefing would generally contain the following information:

• Mission of the CA unit, team, or individual.
• Task organization and equipment of the CA unit or team.
• Assignment of CA assets within the supported organization and two levels up.
• General capabilities, such as staff analysis and planning focused on the civilian component of the AO, enhancing the commander's awareness of the situation by monitoring and interacting with civilians in the AO, providing advice and training to military organizations in support of the commander's CMO responsibilities, and setting the conditions for successful transition of military operations to follow-on civilian control.
• Specific capabilities, such as functional specialist skills organic to the unit or team.

5-133.   A current CA/CMO briefing, such as that given during the BUB or TOC shift-change, provides a "snapshot" of CA activities and CMO conducted during a specified period of time. Using the principles of CASCOPE, a typical briefing might be organized as follows:

• Orientation to civil component of the AO:
• Names, locations, and size of population centers and other key civil areas pertinent to military operations.
• Civilian structures and resources available for military use.
• Nature of the local, regional, and national governments and the capability of each government level to sustain and control the populace.
• HN and international organizations, NGOs, and their capabilities pertinent to military operations.
• Key communicators among the civilian populace, including elected officials, as well as nonelected formal and informal leaders.
• Civil events that may affect military operations.
• Military events that may affect civilian activities.
• Attitude of the local populace toward current operations and events.
• Effects of enemy PSYOP, disinformation, or terrorism campaigns.
• Location, mission, and objectives of all CA elements in the AO.
• Additional issues, conclusions, and recommendations.

5-134.   An effective briefing technique is to use overlays, sector sketches, and execution matrixes that demonstrate how CA activities and CMO are integrated into the supported organization's scheme of maneuver or action plan. These can be depicted on a CA support matrix. An example of this technique is contained in Appendix C.

5-135.   Reports contain information that is essential to the military decision-making process at all levels of command. Detailed, accurate, and timely reports help planners create appropriate and realistic COAs that, in turn, help commanders make informed decisions.

5-136.   Reports vary in their submission requirements. Some reports are periodic (daily, weekly, and monthly situation updates), some are routine (upon completion of an action such as an area assessment, a site visit, or a coordination meeting), and some are time-sensitive (serious incident reports).

5-137.   All reports must be handled in a manner appropriate to their classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, or Unclassified). They are disseminated according to unit SOP, usually to all parties that have an interest in and are granted a need-to-know status on the reported information. The following list provides examples of the various means by which reports may be transmitted:

• Face-to-face.
• Courier.
• Routine distribution.
• National postal service.
• FAX.
• Secure E-mail.
• Unsecure E-mail.
• Posting to a web page on an intranet or Internet.
• Posting to a common drive on a local area network (LAN) or WAN.

5-138.   Figure 5-4, shows a typical dissemination of CA reports that contain information pertinent to multiple organizations and agencies. This figure also describes the routing of requests for information or assistance. The diagram assumes operations in a digital environment.