Bomber Weapons
| Russian Designation | Western Designation | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| DIA | NATO | ||
| Tu-100 | --- | ||
| Tu-113 | --- | ||
| KS-1 | Kometa | AS-1 | KENNEL |
| K-10S | AS-2 | KIPPER | |
| Kh-20 | AS-3 | KANGAROO | |
| Kh-22 | AS-4 | KITCHEN | |
| KSR-2 | AS-5 | KELT | |
| KSR-5 | AS-6 | KINGFISH | |
| Kh-32 | AS-4B | ||
| Kh-45 | |||
| Kh-50 | |||
| Kh-55 | RKV-500 | AS-15 | KENT |
| Kh-65 | Kh-SD | AS-15 | |
| Kh-BD | AS-26 | ||
| Kh-90 | BL-10 | ||
| Kh-95 | |||
| Kh-101 | |||
| Kh-555 | AS-15 | ||
| 3M25 P-750 | AS-19 | KOALA | |
| 9M730 Dagger | |||
But the development of "Quantum" guidance system failed, and in early 1937, many managers of plant No. 23 and KB-21 were repressed for political reasons. In September, KB-21 was disbanded, and the topic was transferred to the Special Design Bureau of the People's Commissariat for the Defense Industry (Oskonbyuro) in Podlipki. The TB-7 heavy bomber was identified as the carrier.
In 1936, at the NII-3 NKOP under the leadership of S.P. Korolev began the development of an "air torpedo" (cruise missile) of a ground launch "object 216", and then an improved "object 212" with a programmable autopilot. At a distance of 50 km, its deviation from the aiming point should not exceed 830 m.
At this time, an underground Trotskyist organization was opened at NII-3, and arrests began at the institute. During interrogations, Korolev confessed to sabotage, but he refused to do so at the trial and did not admit his guilt at the re-investigation. Nevertheless, according to the testimony of former colleagues, he was accused of the fact that “... knowing in advance that the main parts of this torpedo - devices with photocells - cannot be manufactured by the central laboratory of wire communications, Korolev, in order to load the institute with unnecessary work, intensively developed a rocket parts of this torpedo in two versions. As a result of this test, four torpedoes built by Korolev showed their complete unsuitability, which caused damage to the state in the amount of 120,000 rubles and delayed the development of other more relevant topics ... " .
In September 1944, when the wreckage of the world's first operational projectile aircraft, the German V-1, was delivered to one of the Moscow design bureaus. However, following in line with the ideas of German designers was only the initial stage of work on domestic weapons of this type. Then the Soviets had to find their own way, creating unique technical solutions.
In September 1944, the Design Bureau of Plant No. 51 (it is located in Moscow, not far from the Dynamo metro station) was headed by Vladimir Chelomey. By his 30s, he managed to become a recognized specialist in the field of the theory of oscillations, in particular oscillations in aircraft engines. In addition to theoretical work, Chelomey also had experience in practical design. Back in 1942, heading a department at the Central Institute of Aviation Motors, he developed, built and tested a pulsed air-jet engine (PUVRD). The German V-1 was equipped with an engine of the same type, and therefore it is not surprising that it was Chelomey who was offered to lead the work on the creation of the Soviet projectile, in particular on the basis of captured technologies.
The military situation required the design bureau designers to work at the highest pace and in the shortest possible time. So, having started on September 27, 1944, the production of drawings of the airframe compartments, wings, propulsion system and other components of the future rocket, already on October 16, the Design Bureau transferred all the drawing documentation to manufacturers. Chelomei gave the projectile the name 10X. The letter "x" in the index was supposed to emphasize the unusualness and secrecy of the project.
By February 1945, Soviet troops crossed the German border and occupied bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder, and at the same time, among the sand dunes in the vicinity of the Uzbek city of Jizzakh, preparations began for testing the first Soviet cruise missile. Now it is almost impossible to establish why it was decided to carry out the 10X launches in Central Asia. That was a time of trial and error: such tests were carried out for the first time, and, of course, specially equipped test sites for them simply did not exist.
On March 20, 1945, a Pe-8 bomber took off into the sky over the desert and launched the first "product 10". Testing continued until mid-summer. In total, the Pe-8 and YOR-2 aircraft "shot" 70 projectiles near Jizzakh. In 1948, the 10X was recommended for adoption by the Air Force.
The Design Bureau of Plant No. 51 did not stop there: 10X was followed by new developments, which, in terms of technical parameters, were already significantly superior to the German base. Chelomey and the Design Bureau headed by him really managed to significantly improve the technical characteristics of the Pulsating air-jet engine (PUVRD). Improvements were made to the design of the air intake, valve grill, exhaust nozzle, and the ratio of the sizes of individual nodes also changed. If the 10X projectile had a range of 230 km with a maximum speed of 620 km / h and a warhead weight of 500 kg, then the 16X twin-engine air-launched missile, although it flew 200 km, had a maximum speed of 900 km / h and carried a charge weighing 900 kg. They also tried to find new applications for the PuVRD. It was believed, for example, that such an engine would help aviation reach supersonic speeds. But PuVRD and cruise missiles which traced their ancestry from the V-1, turned out to be a dead end. In March 1953, the Design Bureau of Plant No. 51 was disbanded, and the territory of the enterprise was given over to another chief designer, A.I. Mikoyan.
Under the new conditions, the creation of long-range and naval aviation, armed with atomic weapons and capable of effectively performing tasks in the face of enemy opposition, became a matter of life and death for the Soviet Union. New aircraft were needed, but also new weapons for them - capable of independently overcoming the farthest line of air defense, since the development of anti-aircraft artillery and interceptor fighters, as well as the expected appearance of anti-aircraft missiles, left no chance for ordinary bombers and torpedo bombers. They had to be armed with long-range projectiles.
A decision was made that determined the entire logic of the development of such weapons in the USSR for many decades to come: focus not on an autopilot or an inertial guidance system for firing at areas, but on homing to a small point object, the coordinates of which are determined by the carrier’s radar immediately before launch. This made it possible to solve not only the problem of accuracy, but also the preliminary reconnaissance of targets deep in enemy territory. For this the Soviets did not have the technical means. They could be created, but the Soviet leadership deliberately refused to conduct aerial reconnaissance over the territories of other countries in peacetime, believing that this could cause extremely undesirable consequences - up to war. In addition, the homing of the projectile according to a radar or other principle allowed it to destroy not only any targets in the land theater of operations, but also warships on the move. That is, the Soviets received a universal strategic purpose system!
Early 1950s, the height of the Cold War, Soviet nuclear weapons had already been created, but there were neither ballistic intercontinental missiles nor strategic aviation to use them, if necessary, to deliver an atomic strike on US territory. America does not have all this either, but it does have allies in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet borders. Bomber airfields are located in NATO countries, and in 1954 tactical missiles with nuclear warheads appear in Western Europe.
The Soviet leadership was pretty worried about the growing presence of the US Navy in almost all possible theaters of war (theatre). Carrier groups were of particular concern. And at the same time, the Soviet fleet was significantly inferior to NATO in the quantity and quality of warships. And back in 1956, Chelomey proposed creating a new generation of cruise missiles capable of hitting enemy point targets, including moving surface ships (cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers). This could become an "asymmetric" response to a potential enemy and give parity in the maritime theaters of operations at significantly lower armament costs.
None other than G. M. Beriev sent a report to the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which he unambiguously called Chelomeev's ideas "technical adventurism." Well, it was not the first time that Chelomey had to face criticism of his ideas, and, sometimes the criticism was fair.
Under the code "Kometa-1" (K-1), the airborne radar of the carrier aircraft was being developed, the homing head received the designation "Kometa-2" (K-2), and the missile itself had the code "Kometa-3". On the experimental version of the "Kometa-3" 14X K-1, a pulsating D-6 engine was installed. However, he could not provide the necessary speed, and it was decided to abandon its use.
OKB-155 was connected to the development under the leadership of Artem Mikoyan, and in November 1949 a new draft project of the projectile was presented - its body outwardly resembled a reduced copy of the MiG-15 fighter, in which, instead of the cockpit, there was a control system equipment compartment and a high-explosive -cumulative warhead. This version of the Comet was equipped with RD-500 K turbojet engines. This was the final choice.
To speed up the testing of the latest weapons for that time, four prototypes of the projectile aircraft were made manned. They were designated "Products of SDK" - "backup aircraft" Kometa ". The cockpit was located on the site of the warhead. The flight speed for that time was unusual - at an altitude of three kilometers, the Kometa developed about 1060 kilometers per hour, the landing speed was 270- 290 kilometers per hour. Tu-4 was chosen as the carrier aircraft. Tests of "Kometa" were carried out off the coast of Crimea between Kerch and Feodosia. On January 4, 1951, the first flight on the KFOR product was made by the legendary test pilot, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan. In total, a group of four pilots performed about 150 manned flights on the projectile.
The Kometa complex was officially adopted in 1953. A year later, on its basis, it was decided to create two more modifications - a ship complex for Project 67 cruisers and a coastal one - Strela. After the creation of the prototype, the first was abandoned, and for the second, the construction of the world's first underground missile complex was soon begun.
"Comet" was thought to be used against ground targets, but it remained an exclusively naval weapon, yielding at the turn of the 60s. place for the first universal cruise missile KSR-2, which could be equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads. On its basis, the KSR-11 anti-radar projectile was created, which marked a new stage in the development of domestic aviation - now she herself could fight directly with the enemy’s air defense, or rather with its key link - target detection systems and guidance of missiles and interceptors.
The next stage in the development of our missile weapons was supersonic projectiles - X-20 for long-range aviation intercontinental missile carriers Tu-95K and K-10 for naval Tu-16K-10. They entered service almost simultaneously with the KSR-2. This was a major step towards establishing strategic parity with our main enemy in the Cold War. And this was done not by copying what the enemy was doing, but in his own way - it was a typical example of "asymmetric warfare".
The appearance of missile-carrying aviation in the USSR and the high quality level of new weapons largely compensated for the still remaining numerical superiority of the United States and NATO both in aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and in surface ships. Together with ballistic missiles in silo launchers and on submarines, they made up the "nuclear triad" - a stable grouping of strategic forces that could no longer be disabled by a single sudden disarming nuclear strike. The answer to it would be provided.
Increasing the speed, range, altitude and accuracy of cruise missiles was put at the forefront when creating the next generation of domestic cruise missiles, and in 1967 the world's first supersonic long-range missile carrier Tu-22K, armed with an X-22 projectile with an active radar homing system, entered service. It was intended for firing at point ground and sea targets, and its inertial modification Kh-22PSI was created to destroy industrial areas or entire squadrons of enemy ships. Finally, the Kh-22P missile was supposed to fight the new long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, interceptor guidance systems and, in general, any enemy radio equipment.
They managed to “bring it to mind” far from immediately, but Soviet long-range and naval aviation nevertheless received this weapon in an updated version. Continuing the improvement of a successful product, the Raduga Design Bureau created its subsequent modifications Kh-22M and H with the same three guidance options, but on a new element base, and the Tupolev MMZ developed a new medium-range supersonic missile carrier Tu-22M3 and modernized the fleet intercontinental Tu-95KD/KM. The updated Tu-95K22 could carry not one, but two missiles in a sortie, and three for transportation.
The experience of creating the Kh-22 formed the basis of the reduced KSR-5 rocket - two such products could be suspended under the wing of the Tu-16K-11-16, Tu-16KSR and Tu-16K-10 aircraft. On such aircraft, upgraded by the installation of the K-26 complex, they replaced the KSR-2, KSR-11 and K-10S in all their variants, both with conventional and nuclear warheads, ensuring that the combat effectiveness of the Tu-16 in the face of the emergence of NATO in the 70s. new air defense systems.
The introduction of space reconnaissance equipment allowed the USSR and the USA, without violating foreign sovereignty, to obtain not only data on the location of military facilities, but also to compile accurate digital relief maps of the entire planet. These data were used for fundamentally new guidance systems that ensured a hit accuracy of the order of 100 m at a distance of 3000 km. The Soviet Union, following its adversary, took advantage of this and created the X-55 cruise missile, which passed the air defense lines due to its reduced visibility and strafing flight.
Its dimensions turned out to be so small that the Tu-95MS aircraft could take 6 or 16 of them, and the Tu-160 - 12. These were newly built aircraft. The Americans failed in their attempts to arm their new B-1B bombers with similar AGM-86B missiles, and the old B-52s were mostly decommissioned by that time (only the latest G and H modifications remained). This, along with the rearmament of the Strategic Missile Forces and the submarine fleet, allowed the Soviet Union to reach full parity with America in intercontinental nuclear delivery vehicles, while maintaining superiority in similar medium-range systems.
Tu-22M3 aircraft with new Kh-22N/NA/NP missiles firmly controlled the whole of Eurasia, and the next step in increasing their combat capabilities was the adoption of the Air Force at the turn of the 1990s. aeroballistic missile Kh-15. One Tu-22M3 could carry 6-10 of them, their speed came close to hypersound, and the West had nothing to answer to this.
Along with the nuclear versions of the Kh-55 and Kh-15 missiles, modifications with a conventional warhead and a radar homing system were already created at that time, which significantly expanded the possibilities of using the Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3 and Tu-160 aircraft in combat operations of various scales . Along with this, programs for the creation of fundamentally new Kh-32, Kh-65S, Kh-90 and Kh-101/102 cruise missiles were entering the final stage. However, “perestroika”, and then the collapse of the USSR, the political and economic crisis that began the history of the new Russia, slowed down work on them.
At the turn of the new century, the revival of Russian strategic aviation and its re-equipment with new cruise missiles began - they finally began to enter combat regiments, replacing old products whose resource is running out. And some have already managed to "smell gunpowder" on the Syrian front.
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