Iraqi Delivery Systems
2003 Prewar Assessments

In the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the Intelligence Community (IC) claimed that Iraq maintained a small missile force and several development programs, including for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent (BW). Specifically, IC concluded that Iraq maintained an arsenal of a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km; Iraq was deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit; Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities; and that Iraq was developing a UAV capable of delivering BW to the U.S. homeland. Although a later NIE in January 2003 withdrew the claim that Iraq was pursuing UAVs capable of hitting the U.S., only the US Air Force (USAF) Intelligence service disagreed with the NIE's judgement that the UAVs were for BW use (see below for details). In his speech before the UN in February 2003, Fmr. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated that these weapons were built for power projection and not for self-defense.

Evidence for Assessments

Missiles

The IC's assessment that Iraq still posessed a small assortment of Scud-type missiles was largely based on gaps in Iraqi declarations. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) data and reports showed that the UN had been unable to account for two of 819 Scud missiles Iraq acquired from the Soviet Union, seven indigenously produced al Husayn Scud-type missiles, 50 conventional Scud warheads and over 500 tons of proscribed Scud propellants Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally. In addition to these accounting discrepancies, more than twenty intelligence reports from at least ten different human intelligence (HUMINT) sources of varying reliability provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq retained prohibited Scud missiles, used trucks to carry and conceal them and hid the missiles, launchers, and missile components at various sites in Iraq. This information contradicted interviews with Hussein Kamel (Saddam Hussein's son in law who defected from Iraq in 1995), in which Kamel claimed that Iraq had destroyed all of its Scud missiles after the Gulf War. Finally, the post-war Senate Intelligence Committee noted that it was unclear exactly how the IC established the estimate that Iraq may have retained "up to a few dozen" Scuds. Analysts told Committee staff that the number was estimated based on Scud missiles and components for which the UN could not adequately account, but the IC had no estimate of the number of components that may have been withheld from inspectors.

The judgement that both the al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles had ranges beyond 150 km was based on a combination of observed tests, engine specifications, and Iraqi admissions. Since at least 1998, the IC had assessed that the al Samoud had a range greater than the 150-km allowed by the UN. This assessment was based on information extrapolated from Iraq's UN declarations in which Iraq provided details of the missile and engine parameters. A report provided to the Senate Intelligenc Committee assessed that in August 2002 two al Samoud missiles flew to ranges above the UN permitted range. Additional intelligence indicated that the missile had been deployed. Iraq's full and complete discolsure in December 2002 confirmed these assessments. Iraq admitted to developing an al Samoud II variant, but said the range of this variant was also 150 km. Iraq admitted that the missile had flown beyond 150 km during 13 of 23 flight tests, but only by at most 33 km. Intelligence regarding the Ababil-100 indicated that it had been flight tested 18-20 times since 2000. In late May 2002, Ababil-100 launch boxes were seen at a tactical missile and support facility and Ababil-100 missile launchers were found at a barracks and training facility. The deployment was not assessed to be complete, however.

The IC assessed in the 2002 NIE that Iraq was developing medium-range missile capabilities. The NIE showed that Iraq Baghdad has been building a new test stand at the Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Facility that is larger than the test stand associated with al-Samoud engine testing and the defunct Scud engine test stand. According to Colin Powell's 2003 speech to the UN, these missiles would have had ranges far beyond the UN limit of 150 km, extending to 1,200 km. In addition to an indigenous medium range missile, intelligence indicated that Iraq had been trying to purchase North Korea's Nodong MRBM. The report said that an Iraqi delegation had visited North Korea in 2001 where they discussed and reached agreement to purchase the Nodong missile.

Prewar intelligence also detected work on materials associated with the proscribed Badr-2000 missile. At the Al-Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT&E Facility, IC estmated that Iraq, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, had rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf war and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also had built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant. Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis had rebuilt two structures used to "mix" solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile. The new buildings-about as large as the original ones-were ideally suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers. In fact, the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings was that Iraq intends to develop longer-range, prohibited missiles.

UAVs

The IC's estimate that Iraq was developing a small UAV in order to carry out BW attacks was partially based on Iraq's previous UAV programs. Its first attempt at creating a UAV for BW use was immediately before the Gulf war, when Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into a UAV to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the program to develop the spray system was successful, but the conversion of the MiG-21 was not. Beginning in 1998, the IC became awar that Baghdad began a program to convert some of its L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG-21. At the time of the NIE, the IC assessed that the status of the L-29 program was unknown because, after an L-29 crash in October 2000, no flight tests had been observed by intelligence. In additon, IC analysts pointed to 1991, where inspectors discovered eleven drones at the Salman Pak BW research, production, and storage facility, although Iraqi declarations claimed that these drones were not for BW use. Another report stated that during the Gulf War Iraq had stored about ten drones, designed and produced to deliver biological agents, at the Nasir State Establishment. In its 1996 declaration, however, Iraq claimed that these drones were for reconnaissance work.

The main concern discussed in the NIE was IC's determination that Iraq was producing smaller UAVs. With its historic pursuit of UAV capability for BW use, IC determined that these smaller UAV were "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents." Analysts' judgments that Iraq's small UAVs were intended for BW delivery were based on the following logic: the Iraqis had admitted that the MiG-21 program was intended for BW delivery, and analysts judged that the L-29 program, for which there was some evidence of a BW-delivery mission, was the successor to the MiG-21 program. Because the L-29 program had suffered set-backs in late 2000 after a crash, analysts then deduced that Iraq's new, small UAVs may have been designed to replace the L-29 effort, and that they were therefore also intended to deliver BW agents.

This conclusion was not shared by all agencies. USAF presented a dissenting opinion regarding these smaller UAVs. It concluded that the small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery would be an inherent capability. This conclusion was based on the USAF judgement that the small UAVs were too small to be effective as BW delivery agents and that the intelligence reporting did not present convincing evidence for a BW mission, but showed other possible missions. Although only USAF dissented in the NIE, analysts from other intelligence agencies agreed with its judgement when asked by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Iraq UAV analyst told Committee staff that he agreed with the USAF's footnote that the small UAVs could be used for BW delivery, but were primarily intended for other missions. DIA analysts told Committee staff that they believed Iraq's UAVs had missions other than CBW delivery and agreed with the USAF that the small UAVs were primarily being developed for reconnaissance.

The NIE also included a judgement that Iraq's UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland if brought close to, or into, the U.S. This judgement was based on the UAV's alleged range of 500 km. Although Iraq's December 7 declaration claimed that its UAVs had a range of only 80 km, IC detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern (see below). This range, combined with reports that the UAV could be launched either from a truck or small boat indicated the capability to hit the U.S. The only piece of evidence of Iraqi intent to carry out such a mission was its attempt to purchase U.S. mapping software for its small UAVs. This alarmed CIA analysts, who concluded that the software would only be usable for route planning in the U.S., indicating Iraq's intent to strke the U.S. After the publication of the October 2002 NIE, the IC backed off this judgement. In the January 2003 NIE on Nontraditional Threats to the U.S. Homeland Through 2007, the IC judged that the purpose of the Iraqi request for route planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic mapping capability - a goal that was not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. Homeland.