Iraqi Delivery Systems
Iraq Survey Group Findings
In its 2004 report, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) concluded that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems once sanctions were lifted and that the systems potentially were for WMD. After the Gulf War, it pursued this goal by retaining missile expertise in its U.N. permitted missiles, which had ranges less than 150 km. After accepting the Oil for Food (OFF) program in 1996 and kicking out UNSCOM inspectors in 1998, Iraq began to develop prohibited missiles. ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and only one reportedly passed the design phase. After 1998, Iraq also pursued foreign materials and expertise for its long-range missile program. ISG concluded, however, that although many of Iraq's delivery systems had the capability to be used in Chemical or Biological Weapons (CBW) missions, ISG found no evidence to support that prewar estimate. For information on specific missile programs, see the individual missile pages here.
Accounting for 2002 NIE Conclusions
The October 2002 NIE stated the IC judgement that Iraq posessed a covert arsenal of a few dozen Scud missiles based on accounting inconsistencies between Iraqi declarations and know weapons holdings. ISG determined, however, that Iraq destroyed its 819 russian-bought Scud missiles in 1991. Inspectors found a document containing information on all of the 819 Scud missiles imported from the Soviet Union with a break down by serial number of their disposition. This document-reportedly never shared with the UN, although the contents had been discussed with UN officials-provided an Iraqi analysis for the discrepancies in the accounting for its Scud missiles to the UN. Although some former high-level officials offered speculation and suspicions that Iraq has retained Scud-variantmissiles, exhaustive investigation by ISG did not yield evidence supporting these claims.
Prewar intelligence also estimated that Iraq was building Unmaned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) for use in biological weapons programs. ISG's postwar conclusion agreed with the Air Force intelligence estimate that these UAVs were not intended for CBW missions, but instead for battlefield reconnaissance missions and electronic warfare (see Al Musayara-20 and Al Quds pages for details). Included in the October 2002 NIE was an estimate that Iraq was building these UAVs in order to attack the U.S. homeland. This estimate was based on the estimated range of observed UAV tests and reports of Iraqi attempts to purchase U.S. mapping software for use in the UAVs. ISG looked into this claim, but found that the U.S. software was inadvertantly purchased, coming as a smaller portion of a software package.
Delivery System Infrastructure
The steady improvement in Iraqi missile infrastructure seen after the Gulf War was accelerated after 1996. Iraq expended great efforts reconstituting destroyed or unusable equipment in order to restore required production and deployment capabilities for the Al Samud II and Al Fat'h. These capabilities could have been used to develop and produce missiles with ranges longer than allowed under UNSCR 687. No restraints were applied to achieving this objective, including clear breaches of international treaties and the use of foreign expertise and assistance.
ISG found evidence of attempts to resume solid-fuel motor production at Al Amin, where it found an aging oven originally installed for the first stage of the proscribed BADR-2000 ballistic missile. Although the oven was "destroyed" by UNSCOM, it had been repaired. Iraq also constructed a much larger annealing furnace, and an existing annealing furnace at a nearby Saddam General Company (now known as Al Ikha' Company) was used in the manufacturing process for the Al Fat'h motor. This annealing capacity greatly exceeded the requirements of the Al Fat'h and Al 'Ubur missile systems and provided Iraq with the ability to create motor casings greater than 1 meter in diameter and 6.5 meters in length, consistent with the plans now revealed for a larger, longer range missile. Iraq also attempted to increase its solid-propellant production capability by repairing the prohibited 300-gallon mixers declared "destroyed" by the UN.
The capability to cast large solid-propellant rocket motors also increased with the repair of two previously destroyed (and prohibited) casting chambers and the construction of an even larger chamber. A new, even larger casting chamber, approximately 1.56 meters external diameter by 6 meters deep, had been built for possible use in the production of a motorcase up to 1.25 meters in diameter. Reports also indicated that Iraq had planned to increase its production of ammonium perchlorate (AP), which constitutes the greatest mass of composite solid-propellant. Iraq obtained assistance in the expansion of its AP production capabilities from NEC Engineers Pvt Ltd., an Indian Company, according to multiple sources. This facility was located at the former nuclear plant at Al Athir and was designed to produce 180 ton per year. However, this plant was not fully operational prior to OIF and produced only a limited quantity of AP. According to a high-ranking official in the Iraqi missile program, Iraqi universities attempted to revive the Hydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB), a solid-propellant binder, plant at Al Ma'mun. This plant, purchased from Egypt in 1987, was supposed to supplement existing stockpiles. The source claimed that, although the plant had the necessary equipment, it never had the technology to use the equipment in HTPB production. If Iraq had been able to bring this facility on line, they would have reduced if not eliminated reliance on imported HTPB.
Iraq was undertaking a planned, long-term research program into solid and liquid propellants, in order to be self-sufficient in propellant-related chemicals denied to them by UN sanctions and to create higher energy propellants, which could enhance the performance of existing and future ballistic missile systems. In 2001, Iraq began an extensive program researching higher energy composite solid-propellant ingredients including nitronium perchlorate (NP), nitro-hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), azido-HTPB, and ammonium dinitramide (ADN). The research was conducted in Basrah University and the Ibn Sina' Company. Only a few grams of each were manufactured and possibly delivered to Al Rashid, but no serious production efforts were undertaken. Starting in the late 1990s, Iraq also conducted research, testing, and limited production of higher energy liquid propellants such as unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH), AZ-11, AK-40, and 95%-99% pure hydrogen peroxide. This research and pilot production was conducted at several facilities including Ibn Sina' Company, Mosul University, Al Kindi General Company, and Al Raya' Company. From all available evidence, ISG believes that Iraq was not able to manufacture large quantities of these propellants. Starting in the late 1990s, Iraq also began research into production of propellants for its missile forces. These attempts at pilot production included xylidene, triethyl amine (TEA), nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), and inhibited red-fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). While Iraq was somewhat successful at regenerating or producing some AK-20 (mixture of 80% nitric acid and 20% N2O4) and TG-02 (50-50 mixture of xylidene and TEA), they were unsuccessful at producing large quantities of these propellants or any new propellants. Iraq was reportedly successful in acquiring quantities of these chemicals from abroad for use in propellant production.
Through its efforts to reverse-engineer SCUD missile designs before 1991, Iraq gained an understanding and ability to produce graphite nose tips that would satisfy the technical requirements of warheads that could be used on systems from short to very long ranges. Graphite is used in ballistic missiles in areas that suffer high thermal and erosive stresses such as nose cone tips, solid-propellant nozzle throat inserts, and thrust vector control vanes.
Starting in 2001, Iraq began a program to develop carbon fiber filament winding capabilities for use in weapons-related applications. This initiative only proceeded as far as the production of plain cylinders. The properties of carbon fiber could provide a 30-40% weight savings over components made from steel. As an example, the Al Fat'h steel motor case, nozzle and end dome make up approximately 200 kg of the 1,050 kg total mass of the motor. A carbon fiber design could save approximately 60-80 kg of weight from the roughly 1,050 kg total weight. This savings could be applied to additional warhead capacity or towards increasing the range.
Even with these improvements, ISG judged that Iraq's existing static test facilities for liquid rocket engines and solid rocket motors were in no physical condition to continue to support development and testing of Iraq's liquid-propellant rocket engines.
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