Al QaQaa Chronology
1987
The involvement of the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment in support of the development of the implosion package began in 1987.[SOURCE]
1988
In April 1988, the US Defense Intelligence Agency indentified sixteen facilities as possibly associated with the Iraqi offensive BW effort. [GulfLINK] As more information became available over the years, this list was reduced to four confirmed BW facilities - the Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Clostridium Vaccine Plant, the Taji Suspect BW Production Facility, and the Salman Pak R&D/Suspect Production and Support Facility. A fifth facility, the Latifiyah BW [future] Production Facility within the Al QaQaa Military Complex just southwest of Baghdad, was added to the list in February 1991. At these five facilities, there were a total of 13 major buildings assessed to associated with BW R&D and production. [GulfLINK]
The Latifiyah facility was first noted under construction in 1987, and was for the most part externally complete in late 1988. Internal fitting out had continued for some time after. All but one of the major buildings in the facility exhibit considerable air handling/processing capability. It was believed that this facility is associated with handling of botulinum toxin, probably from the weaponization aspect. Information available indicated that the area served as a botulinum toxin weapons fill facility. The BW facility is located at the eastern end of the complex which is part of an overall complex known as the Latifiya Explosives and Ammunition Plant al Qa Qaa. [GulfLINK] [SOURCE]
Besides production of Botulinum Toxin, the Iraqis will produce R&D quantities of other bacteria and bacterial products (TOXINS) for their biological arsenal. It is possible that CW/BW munitions are produced at QaQaa, which is a military munitions factory near Iskanderiyeh //Geographic Coordinates 32-53N/ 044-21E//, Iraq. There is no definite proof of this however.[SOURCE]
1991
Identification of BW Related Facility at Filename:0620rpt.91f DTG: 080626 FEB 91 FM: [ (b)(6) ] VIA: NMIST NET TO: CENTCOM FWD/CCJ2-T SUBJ: Identification of BW Related Facility at Latifiya C. This facility is part of an Latifiya explosives and ammunition plan al Qa,Qaa. The actual Iraqi name for the complex is Al Qa Qaa Government Enterprise. The complex consists of at least a solid propellant facility, a suspected SCUD production facility, a suspected scud production facility, a SSM equipment production facility, a U/I facility under consstruction, and the newly identified BW facility. [SOURCE]
1992
July 21
The intelligence community had considerable information related to the weapons related activities of factories in Iraq. A compilation of these facilities contained in a report July 1990 is titled, `Iraq's Growing Arsenal: Programs and Facilities.' This report contains a section called `Defense Industrial Facilities.' A partial list of the weapons facilities includes: 1. Nassr State Establishment for Mechanical Industries [NASSR]; Badr General Establishment [BADR]; Saddam State Establishment [SADDAM]; Al Kindi Research Complex, formerly SAAD 16; Salah Al Din State Establishment; Al QaQaa State Establishment [AL QAQAA]; and Hutteen State Establishment [HUTTEEN].
The U.N. Special Commission has also identified these entities as being involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and missile programs. [SOURCE]
August 10
The intelligence community had abundant information showing that Iraq used many ostensibly civilian factories as fronts to procure equipment for military use. A July 1990 CIA report entitled `Beating Plowshares into Swords' discusses how MIMI used 25-30 Iraqi establishments primarily to produce military supplies, spares or weapons. The Agency knew that civilian entities worked alongside military organizations to procure equipment and technology needed for the weapons program.
The CIA had information showing the location and many of the activities of these entities. A July 1990 CIA report entitled `Iraq's Growing Arsenal: Programs and Facilities' contains a section called `Defense Industrial Facilities.' Among others the report identified: Nassr State Establishment and Mechanical Industries [NASSR]; Badr General Establishment--Badr; Saddam State Establishment--Saddam; Al Kindi Research Complex--formerly Saad 16; Salah Al Din State Establishment; Al QaQaa State Establishment--Al Qaqaa; and, Hutteen State Establishment--Hutteen or Huttin. [SOURCE]
Al-Arabi was controlled by a subordinate of MIMI called the Technical Corps for Special Projects [TECO or Techcorp]. Techcorp was in charge of Iraq's highest priority weapons projects like the Condor II ballistic missile, the Big Gun and Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program. Al-Arabi acted as a holding company for over a dozen front companies in Europe and the United States. These firms appear to have been the main supplier of Western equipment and know-how for NASSR's weapons production activities. The Al-Arabi network also sought out and obtained equipment and know-how for other Iraqi military industrial complexes that I mentioned above including Al-QaQaa, Badr, Hutteen, Saddam, and Salah al Din. A June 1989 CIA report identified the Al-Arabi network as a major European military procurement network for Iraq's defense industries and discussed how the network connected Iraq to suppliers of precision machine tools, uranium gas centrifuges, and all kinds of other technologies for weapons development projects that included chemical, missile, biological, and nuclear programs. [SOURCE]
1993
June 21
Based upon the results of IMT1a, the Commission dispatched to Iraq a new team of interim monitors, IMT1b, to relieve IMT1a on 27 March 1993. The purpose of the team was mainly to investigate and assess Iraq's capabilities to produce solid propellant missile systems and to establish the relationships between the various facilities involved in such activities within the Military Industrialization Corporation. It conducted its activities over a 52-day period 27 March to 17 May 1993, centred around 2 facilities: the Al Rasheed Factory, comprising the 3 plants, and the Al Qa'qaa' Establishment.[SOURCE]
November 5
The second interim monitoring team conducted its activities over the period 27 March to 17 May 1993. Activities centred around two facilities: the Al Rasheed Factory, comprising the three plants, and the Al Qa'qaa' Establishment..The activities monitored included details of Iraq's missile designs; Iraq's knowledge of solid propellant technology; Iraq's general capabilities in missile production, both of complete systems and of components; Iraq's ability to increase the range of existing systems; the current status of Iraq's production facilities; and its plans for missile research, development, testing and production.[SOURCE]
1994
March 2
Iraq was producing biological warfare (BW) agents at the Salman Pak BW facility, located approximately 32 km southeast of Baghdad. Other sites suspected of producing BW agents were the Taji suspect BW Facility just north of Baghdad, the Abu Ghurayb Vaccine Plant, Al Kindi in the west Baghdad suburbs, and a plant at Latif iyah, within the Al QaQaa Military Complex just southwest of Baghdad. Iraq had the capability to deliver BW munitions by aircraft or by missile. [SOURCE]
1995
September 4
An oral description was given of the progress made by the Al Atheer project team responsible for the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons during the second half of 1990 including an explanation of the extent of the contribution by the Al Qa Qaa establishment in the development of the implosive package.[SOURCE]
1996
August 12
The involvement of the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment in support of the development of the implosion package was for the first time acknowledged by Iraq and declared to have begun in 1987.[SOURCE]
1997
October 8
Iraq's declaration also listed 23 buildings on the Tuwaitha site of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the uranium yallowcake production facility at Al Qaim. However, the declaration failed to include.the nuclear weapons development and production facilities at Al Atheer and Al Qa Qaa
Despite Iraq's prevarication, the IAEA carried out a comprehensive campaign of destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the practical assets of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. This campaign involved the extensive destruction of buildings and equipment.and at the nuclear weapons development and production sites at Al Atheer and Al Qa Qaa
Two inspection campaigns (IAEA-28 and IAEA-29) ware mounted, in September and October 1995, respectively, to review the information revealed by Iraq. In the course of these inspections it became evident that Iraq had made significantly more progress than previously declared in the development of the implosion package, largely through efforts at the Al Qa Qaa establishment; had accumulated more experience in uranium metallurgy than previously admitted; was, in January 1991, ready to commence the recovery of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the safeguarded research reactor fuel; and had begun work to accelerate the integration of the nuclear weapon with a missile delivery system.[SOURCE]
IAEA carried out a comprehensive campaign of destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the practical assets of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. This campaign involved the extensive destruction of buildings and equipment at the EMIS sites at Tuwaitha, A1 Tarmiya and A1 Sharqat, and at the nuclear weapons development and production sites at A1 Atheer and A1 Qa Qaa; of the laboratory-scale reprocessing facilities at Tuwaitha; and of gas centrifuge related materials, components and equipment. In total, more than 50,000 square metres of facility floor space were destroyed by explosives and more than 1,900 individual items and 600 tons of sensitive alloys, useful in a nuclear weapons programme or in uranium enrichment activities, were destroyed or rendered harmless.[SOURCE]
December 3
5- Al Qa Qaa: This site was responsible for the explosive filling of long-range missile warheads. Warhead processing facilities at the site were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Located 38 km S of Baghdad.[SOURCE]
1998
July 27
During the June/July 1998 discussions, IAEA again raised with Iraq the matter of Iraq's declared inability to provide certain drawings, documents and experimental test data. Specifically, Iraq has maintained that it no longer has in its possession weapon-design engineering drawings, the Al QaQaa drawing register, experimental data on the results of PC-3 (the cover organization of the clandestine nuclear programme) related experimental work carried out at Al QaQaa after 1988, drawings of explosive lenses or the drawings received from foreign sources in connection with Iraq's centrifuge uranium enrichment programme. [SOURCE]
July 30
On Mon, Jul 27, the IAEA submitted its interim report on Iraq's nuclear program to the UNSC and on Wed, the head of the IAEA's Iraq action team briefed the UNSC..."...Iraq has maintained that it no longer has in its possession weapon-design engineering drawings, the Al QaQaaa drawing register, experimental data on the results of PC-3 (the cover organization of the clandestine nuclear programme) related experimental work carried out at Al QaQaa after 1988, drawings of explosive lenses or the drawings received from foreign sources in connection with Iraq's centrifuge uranium enrichment programme." [SOURCE]
2002
November 30
In addition, by going to Al Qa Qaa Company, a team of two inspectors completed the removal of the last of four air samplers previously installed and planned to be refurbished, upgraded and reinstalled in the near future.
Um Al Maarik Company, which the IAEA team visited today was notified by the IAEA team in advance that two of their technicians would review the status of the remaining video surveillance. Al Qa Qaa Company, which the IAEA team visited was also requested on Thursday afternoon to provide assistance to facilitate removal of sampler. This type of advance notification is sometimes given to facilitate their work on monitoring equipment.[SOURCE]
December 9
The IAEA inspected three sites: Tuwaitha, Ash Shakyli and Al Qa Qaa. An IAEA team at Al Qa Qaa began inventorying known explosive materials from the past nuclear programme that were previously under the control of the IAEA. Other tasks involved inspecting a number of key buildings and outdoor sites within the huge Al Qa Qaa complex.[SOURCE]
December 10
A team investigated an outlying site of the Al Qa Qaa explosives plant. (The main Al Qa Qaa complex was inspected on Monday.) The outlying site, called Sumood-4, is near the city of Mussayib and was associated with a past program. Sumood-4 is co-located with the Sadda Cement Factory. The cement plant was also inspected for dual-use capabilities.[SOURCE]
December 14
One UNMOVIC chemical team inspected two facilities within the Al Qa Qaa complex: a high concentrated (oleum) sulpheric acid plant and all storages in the main storage area. Equipment and chemicals present at both sites were verified. The Director General of the complex informed the team about the changes that had occurred since 1998. The inspection went smoothly.[SOURCE]
December 15
The UNMOVIC chemical team continued inspection of the Al Qa Qaa complex, updating information about selected facilities, namely a sulfuric acid plant, an explosives production plant and storages. Inspection focused on a new production unit, which was built in the period between 1998 and 2002.[SOURCE]
December 25
In a cooperative venture, the IAEA team joined with Iraqi auditors at the Al Qa Qaa explosives plant. They together made item counts of important dual-use materials and compared results. Hundreds of items were counted. The results will be used as part of a verification of Iraq's use of special metals.[SOURCE]
December 28
An UNMOVIC team of missile inspectors inspected the Al Qaib Warhead-Filling Factory of the Al Qa Qaa complex. This site undertakes filling of warheads of Al Samoud and Al Fatah missiles. [SOURCE]
2003
January 11
Meanwhile, specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspected the Saddam GE Plant, 126 kilometres southeast of Baghdad, and the Qa Qaa Sumood Explosives Plant, 60 kilometres south of Baghdad. "The Saddam GE Plant has an engineering machine tools capability and the Sumood Plant produces civilian as well as military explosives," explained Mr. Ueki.[SOURCE]
The IAEA inspected the Saddam GE Plant, 126 km southeast of Baghdad, and the Qa Qaa Sumood Explosives Plant, 60 km south of Baghdad. The Saddam GE Plant has an engineering machine tools capability and the Sumood Plant produces civilian as well as military explosives.[SOURCE]
The IAEA inspected the Saddam GE Plant, 126 km southeast of Baghdad, and the Qa Qaa Sumood Explosives Plant, 60 km south of Baghdad. The Saddam GE Plant has an engineering machine tools capability and the Sumood Plant produces civilian as well as military explosives.[SOURCE]
January 14
The IAEA inspected four sites.The Qa Qaa Stores is used to store high explosives.[SOURCE]
January 18
An UNMOVIC chemical team went to the Al Qa Qaa complex and conducted a survey employing multi-frequency electromagnetic detectors.[SOURCE]
January 19
Another chemical team returned to the Al Qa Qaa complex to inspect storage facilities. Mobile sampling equipment was utilized during the inspection.[SOURCE]
January 20
An UNMOVIC missile team traveled 90 km south of Baghdad to inspect the Al Qa Qaa Static Test Stands used to test small rocket motors. These test stands are located within the Al Qa Qaa complex. Another missile team went to the Al Harith Workshop to re-tag SA-2 missiles, whose tags had been removed the week before for maintenance, and to remove tags from other SA-2 missiles that will go through a maintenance cycle next.[SOURCE]
January 21
An UNMOVIC chemical team re-visited the Al Qa Qaa complex and inspected some units producing chemicals, such as propellant stabilizers. A portable analytical instrument was used, as was a metal analyzing instrument.[SOURCE]
January 23
An UNMOVIC chemical team continued its rebaselining of the Al Qa Qaa complex for the sixth day. The complex is a large site. A metal analyzer was used during the inspection.[SOURCE]
Meanwhile in Iraq, an UNMOVIC team of missile inspectors flew by helicopter to the al-Kindi research facility in the northern "no-fly" zone. "This was the first such flight since an agreement was reached on procedures" earlier this week, said Hiro Ueki, spokesman for UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Baghdad. He noted that it was also the first time that a joint inspection was conducted by teams arriving from separate UN bases using different modes of transportation.
Other activities included an inspection of the Taji Resin Establishment by a second UNMOVIC missile team, continued rebaselining of the Al Qa Qaa complex using a metal analyse and a visit to the Department of Biology of the College of Science at Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad as a biological team inspected the Medical College of the same University to verify the Iraqi declaration. [SOURCE]
January 24
United Nations weapons inspectors re-visit what is called here "the al Qaqaa chemical company" a few days before their report is due to the UN Security Council. This is after several prior visits to the site after the November, 2002 return of inspectors to Iraq.[SOURCE]
An UNMOVIC chemical team returned to the Al Qa Qaa complex for the seventh day. The team inspected the Research and Development Centre and a waste treatment facility. Thereafter, the team went to the Mamoun Factory, which belongs to the Al Rasheed Company and is located next to the Al Qa Qaa complex. The factory produces munitions and chemical materials for munitions. The team then proceeded to the Al Basil Centre in the Jadriyah complex in Baghdad to assess its current activities. The Al Basil Centre is primarily a research centre for chemical products [SOURCE]
January 25
Meanwhile, inspectors continued their activities, including visits to the Al Rasheed State Company at Al Mamoun, the Sumaykah surface-to-surface missile support facility, the College of Veterinary Medicine and the College of Education at Quadisiyah University, the Al Qa Qaa complex, the North Oil Company and the Colleges of Education and Engineering at Tikrit University.[SOURCE]
An UNMOVIC chemical team returned to the Al Qa Qaa complex for the eighth day to rebaseline the site. A Mosul-based multidisciplinary team inspected a storage area of the North Oil Company. The site stores chemicals and spare parts for the oil industry.[SOURCE]
February 2
An UNMOVIC joint missile and multi-disciplinary team traveled to Al Qa Qaa State Company, approximately 60 km southwest of Baghdad, and inspected the Nitric Acid Factory.[SOURCE]
February 3
Four UNMOVIC missile teams inspected four separate sites..and Al Qa Qaa that produces double-base solid propellant for missiles.[SOURCE]
February 4
Two IAEA teams conducted two inspections. One team inspected the Al Mamoun plant of the Al Qa Qaa Establishment south of Baghdad. A second IAEA team, with support from UNMOVIC, inspected the former site of the Al Salam Company, formerly associated with biological weapons development, in the Salman Pak area south of Baghdad.[SOURCE]
The International Atomic Energy Agency conducted inspections at the Al Mamoun plant of the Al Qa Qaa Establishment and, with support from UNMOVIC, at the former site of the Al Salam Company, which had been associated with biological weapons development, in the Salman Pak area south of Baghdad.[SOURCE]
February 25
Four UNMOVIC missile teams performed five inspections. One team inspected the Al Rasheed Company, which is involved in the design and production of solid propellant missiles, and also inspected the Al Fatah Factory, which is involved in the design of solid propellant. A second team inspected the Electronic Base factory, which repairs electronic equipment for the Iraqi army. A third team inspected the Al Kadhimiya Company, which is responsible for the assembly of the Al Samoud 2 missile. And a fourth team inspected the Al Qa Qaa Storage, where missile-related raw material and chemicals are stored. [SOURCE]
March 1
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted activities at the Mahmoun Plant of the Al Rashid Company, which makes materials used in missile systems, the Qa Qaa State Company, an explosives manufacturer, and the Salam Factory in northern Baghdad, which produces electronic components for communications and control systems. In addition, the IAEA conducted a car-borne radiation survey north of Baghdad. [SOURCE]
One IAEA team inspected the Mahmoun Plant of the Al Rashid Company that makes materials used in missile systems. A second team inspected the Qa Qaa State Company, which is an explosives manufacturer. These companies are adjacent to each other about 60 km south of Baghdad. A third IAEA team inspected the Salam Factory located in northern Baghdad. This factory makes electronic components for communications and control systems. A fourth team performed a car-borne radiation survey north of Baghdad. [SOURCE]
March 8
UN missile experts visited the Al Qa Qaa complex to verify the emptying and tagging of warheads for Al Samoud 2 missiles. An UNMOVIC chemical team inspected a sulphuric acid plant in the Al Qa Qaa complex, while an UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team inspected the "Yellow Corn Workshop /Al Haydaria" located approximately 100 kilometres south of Baghdad.[SOURCE]
March 9
A UNMOVIC missile team went to the Al Qaa Qaa storage site for the verification of emptying and tagging of warheads for Al Samoud-2 missiles. The team then inspected the Al Qa Qaa solid propellant production plant.[SOURCE]
March 10
A third missile team visited the Al Qa Qaa complex for the verification of emptying and tagging of warheads for Al Samoud 2 missiles. An UNMOVIC chemical team inspected a sulphuric acid plant in the Al Qa Qaa complex.[SOURCE]
April 3
U.S. troops discovered boxes of powder at Al QaQaa believed to be explosives. Also discovered were substances used to counter the effect of chemical or nerve agent attacks.[SOURCE]
April 12
Powder discovered at Al QaQaa appears to not be chemical warfare agent. [SOURCE]
June 28
Third Infantry Division Support Command assisted in the restoration of clean water to the towns of Al Janabai and Al Qaqaa providing water to more than 2,200 families. They also aided in plumbing repairs and construction of new fences at an elementary school and middle school. .[SOURCE]
December 16
Another IAEA team visited four sites: Al Qa Qaa, Mussayib Army Munitions Depot, Al Motaseem Factory, and the Hatteen Establishment's testing range. The team monitored the production of small rockets. These sites work as a unit in the Iraqi military armaments structure to produce and test munitions. [SOURCE]
December 21
One UNMOVIC team of missile inspectors inspected the Al Qa Qaa double base propellant plant. The inspection was part of the ongoing monitoring of Iraqi missile propellant capability, including the propellant for the Arabil 50. Over 40 buildings were inspected during the four-hour inspection. [SOURCE]
2004
October 10
Iraq's Ministry of Science and Technology informs the IAEA of more than 340 tons of explosives missing from Al QaQaa, cliaming the materials had been looted after the U.S. invasion due to lack of security.
October 25
IAEA sent a letter to the UN Security Council regarding 342 tons of explosives missing from Al Qa Qaa.[SOURCE]
October 27
U.S. Army commander says enemy removal of missing explosives after invasion unlikely.[SOURCE]
2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division commander discusses the condition of Al Qa Qaa when his unit arrived at the beginning of April 2003, knowledge of IAEA-controlled materials at the site, and the extent of his unit's inspection of the materials.[SOURCE]
October 29
The Pentagon held a briefing to address the controversy over the missing explosives, claiming that many tons of materials from Al QaQaa were destroyed by U.S. forces. However, they admit that there is no evidence any of the materials destroyed were those under question.[SOURCE]
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