08 October 1997
U.N. SAYS IRAQ STILL MISLEADING WEAPONS INSPECTORS
(UNSCOM reports on problems, progress in destroying Iraqi weapons) (1100) By Judy Aita USIA United Nations Correspondent United Nations -- Reporting "mixed" cooperation from Iraq, the Special Commission overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM) said October 8 that it "strongly believes that relevant materials and documents remain in Iraq and that there have been highly coordinated actions designed to mislead the commission." Despite Iraq's cooperation with the U.N., UNSCOM still has serious concerns that not all prohibited chemical, biological, and ballistic weapons have been accounted for and disposed of, according to a new UNSCOM report to the Security Council. The written report from UNSCOM Chairman Ambassador Richard Butler said that the commission feels it is crucial for the Security Council to insist that Baghdad fully disclose all its banned weapons programs and allow weapons inspectors access to sites throughout the country. Butler said that even though Iraq has turned over an enormous amount of significant data to UNSCOM in the past months, the commission "is convinced of the need for the council to insist that Iraq meet its obligation to fully disclose all of its prohibited weapons and associated programs." "There is no substitute for this whole truth, both as such and as the mainstay of the effective discharge by the commission of its mandate," Butler said in the report, which will be reviewed by the Security Council at a private meeting on October 16. Iraq's compliance with the weapons provisions of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement is linked to ending the mandatory oil embargo imposed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. "There has been important progress, but also, clearly there have been continuing difficulties," the UNSCOM report said, pointing to problems inspectors have experienced in the past six months. For example, in June Iraqi officials aboard U.N. helicopters took action to prevent the weapons inspectors on board from landing at specific sites, endangering all those on board. Iraq also denied the team access to three sites designated for inspection and refused to allow the team to interview Iraqi personnel. Between September 10 and 20, U.N. chemical weapons inspectors on three different occasions at three different sites recorded evidence of the removal or movement of documents and records, and the destruction of documents, the report said. In another incident in September, an UNSCOM inspector was manhandled on board a U.N. helicopter while he was attempting to take photographs of the unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection, the report said. The four UNSCOM inspectors allowed into the site "further reported that documents had been moved in or removed from the inspection site." In all, there were six serious incidents in a two-week period at the end of September, UNSCOM said. Other incidents in September "apart from raising serious concerns about the commitment of the Government of Iraq to ensure the safety of UNSCOM personnel ... raised fundamental questions about the way in which the modalities for inspection of sensitive sites were being applied by Iraq," the report said. In addition, UNSCOM reported "there have been occasions where Iraq's actions have included: delay in granting access to designated inspection sites, concealment and destruction of documents, failure to abide by the requirements of sensitive site inspection modalities, efforts to conceal ongoing activities at sites under monitoring by the commission and delays in the provision of Iraqi counterparts." "While they have occurred in a wide range of contexts, these events have each either invalidated the site inspection or have cast serious doubt on the veracity of Iraqi declarations about the issues and sites in question," the report said. Iraq's unwillingness to provide the full details of its past efforts to hide material and equipment from the commission reinforces concern about Baghdad's intentions, Butler said in the report. Butler also reported "significant progress" in discovering and destroying additional chemical weapons production equipment and analytical instruments and identifying new elements of Iraq's program to produce the most toxic chemical nerve agent VX. Butler also reported that the international panel of experts reviewing Iraq's "full, final, and complete disclosure" of its biological weapons program determined that the disclosure "is not acceptable ... because in substance, it is not different from the June 1996 version, which itself was rejected." While significant progress has been achieved in the past six months in accounting for ballistic missiles, "less progress has been accomplished" in obtaining evidence to support Iraq's claims that it destroyed missiles and missile launchers without the U.N. oversight, the report said. Over the last six years, UNSCOM has been able to account for 817 of Iraq's reported 819 ballistic missiles. UNSCOM also identified the remains of 14 mobile missile launchers and is still tallying the warheads and missile propellants. "At the present time, no verifiable material balance for many critical missile components and materials from Iraq's indigenous missile production programs can be established," Butler said. "Remaining issues, such as accounting for missile propellants, would not be insurmountable if Iraq would cooperate with the commission and provide the evidence required to complete the process of verification," the report said. In addition, Iraq has provided the U.N. with conflicting statements on how the launchers were destroyed, raising questions on Iraq's reasons for concealing the truth from UNSCOM, the report pointed out. It is Iraq's long-term deception of the U.N. on such issues as the events surrounding the unilateral destruction of launchers that "raises serious questions as to the purpose of such actions and their relationship to other concealment activities," Butler said. Thus, much of the commission's efforts in recent months has been to determine the extent of Baghdad's efforts after the Gulf War cease-fire agreement to conceal its chemical, biological, ballistic and nuclear weapons programs in order to rebuild in the future. For example, UNSCOM has determined that after agreeing to the cease-fire demands spelled out in Security Council resolution 687, Iraq decided to divide its missile force into two parts in order to give one part to UNSCOM for destruction and secretly retain the second part. Although Iraq has attributed virtually all of its concealment actions to the late General Hussein Kamel who fled Iraq in August 1995, it has not been any more forthcoming since that time, UNSCOM has reported. In the past six months, UNSCOM has encountered "a pattern of Iraqi blockages and evidence of removal and/or destruction of documents and material at 'sensitive sites' under inspection," the report said.
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