Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Nuclear, Missile, Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities of Iraq Before, During and After DESERT STORM Filename:003bk.00d IBackground Paper for JS SUBJECT: Nuclear, Missile, Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities of Iraq Before, During and After DESERT STORM l. PURPOSE: To provide J5 with information on Iraqi nuclear, missile, and chemical and biological warfare capabilities before, during and after Operation DESERT STORM. 2. POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: a. The bombing campaign against the chemical and biological warfare (CBW) target set progressed generally In three stages, although with a great overlap between the stages. The first stage targeted both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) R&D/production and CW filling capability. The second stage targeted BW storage, followed by CW storage. During the second stage, much of the R&D/production capability that survived the first stage was revisited and destroyed. The third stage targeted delivery systems in the field, while targets not destroyed in the first two stages were revisited. BIOLOGICAL: a. Initially, there were four facilities in the area of BW R&D/production--the Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Clostridium Vaccine Plant, the Taji Suspect BW Production Facility, and the Salman Pak R&D/Suspect Production and Support Facility. A fifth facility, the Latifiyah BW Production Facility, was added to the 1st in February 1991. At these five facilities, there were a total of 13 major buildings assessed to associated with BW R&D and production. As a result of coalition bombing, 11 of the 13 buildings were destroyed and two severely damaged. All five facilities were assessed to be unable to support BW R&D and/or production. b. BW storage initially include 19 twelve-frame environmentally controlled bunkers at 11 locations and the Taji Suspect BW Storage Facility. During February 1991, two additional twelve-frame bunkers were Identified, bringing the total to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 bunkers and theTaji Suspect BW Storage Facility were all destroyed or severely damaged. The final two bunkers were discovered too late in the campaign to be attacked. CHEMICAL: a. CW production included the Samarra Chemical Weapons Production and Storage Facility, and the Habbanlyah I, II and III precursor production facilities. Production at Samarra occurred in six un-bunkered buildings and four bunkered buildings. Five of six unbunkered buildings and none of the bunkered buildings were destroyed. Of the four surviving bunkered production buildings the most significant was P-6, which is capable of producing 50-70 MT of nerve agent per month. About 70 percent of Samarra's total production capacity was destroyed. The three Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed and with them most all ability to produce CW agent precursor chemicals. Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions filling and all three buildings were destroyed. b. CW storage capability was in the form of eight cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S"-shaped bunkers at 14 locations. Of the eight cruciform bunkers, one was destroyed and the remaining seven sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped bunkers, 16 were destroyed and six suffered serious damage. Although these bunkers were Identified as CW-related bunkers and included in the CW target set, bunker architecture is not relevant to its ability to store agent or weapons, which would have an important impact on Iraq's ability to reconstitute its CW storage system in that Iraq would not need to reproduce the 22 "S"-shaped bunkers to have significant CW storage capability. 3. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Biological Warfare: It is extremely difficult to verify or establish effective international controls on BW development and production since the same technologies and techniques are used in legitimate biological/medical R&D as that used for BW. The capability to perform BW R&D exists at the University of Baghdad and other universities and at various pharmaceutical facilities. A BW agent production capability could be re-established in a matter of weeks to months utilizing equipment at pharmaceutical facilities such as Samarra Drug Industries. Production, however, would be at a much reduced and limited capacity and unsafe compare to dedicated BW plants. In order to reproduce the entire BW system as it existed on 15 January 1991, including the facilities at Salman Pak, Abu Ghurayb, Taji, Latifiyah and all the destroyed bunkers, Iraq would need to spend 100-200 million dollars and 5-8 years. However, the complete BW system was a multi-facility R&D and production system with redundancy and back-up capabilities. Additionally, not all the bunkers would be required to store a militarily significant amount of BW agent. Iraq could re-establish a significant BW capability with dedicated labs, containment facilities, storage and filling capacity without duplicating the prewar system. Such a BW system without the prewar redundancy and back-up could be built within 3-4 years for less than 100 million dollars. Chemical Warfare: Iraq's ability to produce chemical agent has been severely degraded but not eliminated. It is assessed to have the equipment necessary to produce 50-70 MT of nerve agent per month and about five metric tons of precursor material or mustard agent per month. In order to produce this agent, Iraq will need to import several precursor chemicals. It will also need to bring the system back into a rational order, e.g. powering up production lines, getting chemical precursors into the system, supplying casings for weaponizing, etc. Iraq could be making chemical munitions as soon as the electrical power grid is back In operation. Some munitions, such as aerial bombs and missile warheads, could be filled by hand. To reproduce the Samarra facility, Iraq would need at least several hundred million dollars and 3-5 years. To rebuild the three Habbaniyah facilities would take 200-400 million dollars and 3-5 years. This is assuming that Iraq has access to the required materiel on the international market. PREPARED BY: [ (b)(6) ]