Iran Missile Program
On 01 April 2024, Israel bombed Iran’s diplomatic compound in Syria, killing seven Iranian military advisers (three senior commanders included) and two Syrian civilians. Iran’s retaliation took a while, but it sure came: almost two weeks later, on Saturday night (April 13), the attack was launched. It involved over 30 cruise missiles, 120 ballistic missiles, and 170 drones, and lasted around five hours. The explosions were heard in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and in cities across the country, with air raid sirens sounding in over 700 locations. Most projectiles were successfully intercepted, with the help from the Unites States, France, the United Kingdom, and also Jordan, which shot down some of the missiles. Zero Israelis were killed, and there was some minor damage to military infrastructure in southern Israel.
US President Joe Biden responded on 14 April 2024 by saying that “Israel demonstrated a remarkable capacity to defend against and defeat even unprecedented attacks, sending a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten the security of Israel.” He added that he would “coordinate a united diplomatic response” to the Iranian attack – without any mention of military action, though.
French entrepreneur Arnaud Bertrand nailed it thusly: “Iran communicated about its plans for its strike 72 hours in advance to everyone, including America (via the Saudis). It was meant to be intercepted, a mere performative show, and despite this you still had 7 missiles pierce through Israel’s defenses. Imagine the impact a surprise strike would have. I think Iran’s message was therefore ‘we show that we can hit you – this time we warn you in advance so you can defend yourself, but next time we won’t’.”
Paul R. Pillar (a fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and at the Geneva Center for Security Policy), in his April 5 piece, pointed out that, by “imagining [what] if the roles were reversed”, one can grasp just how much Iranian authorities must felt pressured to respond with full force: “If Iran had bombed an embassy of Israel or the United States, a violent and lethal response would be not just expected but demanded by politicians and publics alike.” “Popular sentiment”, as he describes it, indeed can play a role in the calculations of decision-makers everywhere – including in Israel.
In Pillar’s words: “the attack was part of an effort to escalate Israel’s way out of a situation in which its declared objective of “destroying Hamas” is out of reach, the worldwide isolation of Israel because of its actions in Gaza is becoming undeniable, and even its habitually automatic U.S. backing has patently softened. For Netanyahu personally, escalating and expanding the war, insofar as this also means continuing it indefinitely, is also his only apparent hope for staving off his political and legal difficulties.”
Analysts told the Washington Post that the first direct Iranian attack on Israel, on Saturday night, demonstrated the country's military strength and the progress it had made in its domestic weapons program, but it also revealed the "limitations" of its arsenal, according to the newspaper's expression. Although Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles in its latest multi-level attack, in the largest display of conventional military power in its history, the resulting damage was relatively limited. According to the American newspaper, this can be partly attributed to prior coordination of the attack, which gave Israel and the United States ample time to deploy and activate air defense systems. However, the reason may also be due to the weaknesses and shortcomings in the capabilities of Iranian medium- and long-range weapons, which limits the effectiveness of its strikes and reduces their impact despite their large size.
During its attack on Israel, Iran used self-detonating “Shahed 136 and 131” drones. The Shahed 136 aircraft is about 3 meters long, two meters wide, weighs approximately 200 kg at take-off, and reaches a speed of 185 kilometers per hour. The Shahed-131 is the initial version of the Shahed-136, with a similar operating principle, and their design and aerodynamic geometry are also identical, except for the relatively small size of the Shahed-131.
Tehran also used a Pawh cruise missile, which was introduced in 2023 and has a range of 1,650 km.
The Iranian forces used three types of ballistic missiles in their attack, the first of which is the “Emad,” an Iranian-designed ballistic missile that runs on liquid fuel, and was first revealed in 2015. This missile is 16 meters long, 1.2 meters in diameter, and has a range of 1,700 km, while the warhead weighs 748.4 kg. The second model used is the Ghadr missile, which is an improved version of the Shahab-3A missile. It is also referred to as the Ghadr-101 and Ghadr-110. Its length reaches 16.5 meters, its diameter reaches 1.25, its maximum range reaches 1,950 km, and its warhead weighs 800 kg.
The third missile, the “Khyber Sheikh,” is a solid-fueled ballistic missile designed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, presented by Iran in 2022. It has the following specifications: length: 10.4 meters, diameter: 0.8 meters, maximum range: 1,450 km, and warhead weight: 500 kg.
Since Israel had launched a direct strike on Iran’s diplomatic mission in Damascus, the Islamic Republic ran out of “strategic patience” and carried out a direct operation against the enemy inside the occupied territories single-handedly to give a slap in the Zionist regime’s face and prevent a recurrence of attacks against Iran. As Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri clarified, the operation was zeroed in on two main targets that were directly involved in the April 1 airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, namely an espionage base in the Golan Heights and the Nevatim airbase from which the Israeli fighter jets had taken off. The three main weapons utilized in Iran’s punitive operation against the Israeli regime included drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, known as the three main branches of the IRGC Aerospace Force’s offensive weapons. The first wave of the operation began with the launch of suicide drones, all or most of which were Shahed-136 equipped with propellers. The Iranian drones had to travel a distance of 1,000 kilometers to hit the enemy. Considering their low speed and the air defense coverage of the enemy, the employment of Shahed-136 raised questions for many observers. It appeared that the wave of Iranian drones was indeed part of a false flag operation in order to occupy the attention of the air defense of the Zionist regime and the coalition assisting it. Given the duration of the drone operation, Israel’s aerial capability was practically engaged in detecting and shooting down the drones, so the possibility of a counterattack against Iran’s missile silos was minimized. The IRGC had reportedly not employed jet-powered suicide drones, namely the Shahed-238 class. The Shahed-136 drones utilized in the operation have been flown from mobile launchers on vehicles. The second wave of the strike included cruise missiles. Images indicate that the IRGC Aerospace Force has fired the first generation of Paveh cruise missiles with fixed wings. The missiles have been fired from mobile launchers carried by trucks. Equipped with a turbojet engine, Paveh cruise missile has a range of over 1,000 kilometers and flies at cruising speed of 700 to 900 km/h. The main wave of the Operation True Promise began with the launch of ballistic missiles in the early hours of April 14. Thanks to their high velocity, the Iranian ballistic missiles entered the airspace of the occupied territories within minutes. The released information illustrated that the IRGC had not fired Sejjil, Khorramshahr, Haj Qassem, Kheibar-buster 2, or Fattah hypersonic missiles in the operation. One series of images purportedly of the parts of Iranian missiles brought down by the air defenses suggest that the projectiles contained micro munition payloads, or fragmentation warheads. Such projectiles were illuminated in the videos, resembling a burning object or a component of a downed missile, while this type of projectile would scatter across various directions when it gets hit. The utility of fragmentation warheads seems to have been aimed at attracting the thermal seekers of the air defense missiles or the ground-based thermal detection systems. Since the size and weight of this type of projectile mirror those of real ballistic missiles, they are hardly recognized by the enemy’s air defense. These projectiles can well keep the enemy’s air defense busy and result in the depletion of the ready-to-fire missiles. Thus, the air defense system becomes outnumbered. In a series of videos, heavy warheads are successively hitting a specific location on a flat surface at short intervals, purported to be Nevatim airbase. The images indicate that the warheads used in the attack are of the type that can be guided until final engagement moment. Apart from the Kheibar-buster, which is a modern missile, the other missiles have been probably furnished with new warheads. Definitely, a number of missiles with old single (non-fragmentation) warheads have been employed to deceive or saturate the enemy’s air defense system. Iranian missiles employed in the operation had detachable warheads. The fuselage of the missile conventionally falls down hundreds of kilometers away from the target. Unofficial sources say at least 15 missiles hit Nevatim airbase, while the Zionists are attempting to save face by announcing that only 7 missiles have hit unimportant spots of the airbase. https://www.militantwire.com/p/analysis-of-ballistic-missiles-launched">Analysis of Ballistic Missiles Launched by Iran in 2024 WAR NOIR - APR 18, 2024 "Khaybar Shekan MRBMs were among the rockets launched against Israel in April during “Operation True Promise”. Another missile used in the attack against Israel is the "Ghadr-110" (Shahab-3B) MRBM.... Another Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) launched by Iran against Israel is the "Emad" missile." In the mid-1980s, Tehran acquired Scud missiles from Libya, Syria, and North Korea, and also began adapting the technology to produce its own versions. During the eight-year war with Iraq, Iran relied mainly on Scud-B missiles with a range of 298 km. From 1994 to 2001, Iran developed its own version of the Scud-B missile, the Shahab-1, and used it from 1994 to 2001 to bomb bases in Iraq used by the opposition Mujahedeen-e-Khalq group. The range of the Shahab-1 missile is about 300 km. After 16 years without launching new missiles, Iran demonstrated its technological progress in 2017 when it attacked an ISIS command center with six “Zulfiqar” missiles with a range of 700 km. In early 2024, it launched strikes against ISIS targets in northwestern Syria, using Khyber-Shakan missiles, which traveled a distance of 1,200 km from Iran to Syria.
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) fired six mid-range surface to surface missiles from western Iran into Syria's Deir al Zour province on 18 June 2017, to punish perpetrators of recent terror attacks in Tehran. After the Takfiri terrorists' June 7 attacks in Tehran which left 17 killed and dozens more wounded, the IRGC had announced that the spilling of innocent blood will not go unanswered.
This was the first attack of its kind carried out by the Islamic Republic in years. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered weekend missile strikes on Islamic State targets in Syria, the Guards said, contradicting a previous report that they were authorized by the country's security council.
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri said on 19 June 2017 that due to the efforts of the Iranian scientists, Islamic Republic is now among top countries in terms of missile power. General Baqeri noted that Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution inspired several freedom-seeking movements in the world. The dominant powers and the Zionists are manipulating Takfiri ideology against the Islamic Revolution to prevent its spread in the world, he said.
In 2018 Iran missiles attacked Koya, Iraq: against Kurdish opponents. Abu Kamal, Syria: Ballistic missiles against ISIS. Missiles used: Zulfiqar, Fateh-110. In 2019 Iran missiles attacked Abqaiq and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: 18 drones + 7 cruise missiles targeted oil facilities. In 2020,
Before the 2024 attack on Israel, the most important Iranian use of ballistic missiles was in 2020, after an American drone attack, which led to the killing of the prominent Iranian commander, Qassem Soleimani. Iran launched more than 10 ballistic missiles at two American military bases in Iraq, one in the west of the country and the other in the north. Although there were no deaths, dozens of American service members suffered traumatic brain injuries.Iran missiles attacked Erbil, Iraq: A ballistic missile targeted American forces. Then, 15 to 22 ballistic missiles were launched at Ain al-Assad base. Missiles used: Qiam, Zulfiqar and Fateh-313. In 2022 Iran missiles attacked Erbil, Iraq: More than 10 ballistic missiles were launched against what Tehran considered “Israeli strategic centers.” Missiles used: Fateh-110. Iran missiles also attacked Roya and Sulaymaniyah, Iraq: 73 ballistic missiles and explosive drones were launched against Kurdish opponents.
In 2023 Iran missiles attacked targets in Syria: 7 ballistic missiles targeted ISIS. Missiles used: Khyber Shekhan. In the same location, it launched strikes against what it considered to be Israeli “spy headquarters,” with 7 ballistic missiles. Iran missiles also attacked Balochistan, Pakistan: Ballistic missile attack against Jaish al-Adl.
After analyzing the munitions used in the attack and the success of regional defense systems in repelling it, researchers tell The Washington Post that it is unclear how Iran could inflict greater harm on Israel through its conventional military means. “Iran has basically thrown everything it has that can reach Israeli territory,” John Krzyzaniak, a researcher who studies Iran’s missile programs at the Wisconsin Nuclear Arms Control Project, told the newspaper. The same spokesman added that Tehran "used some of all its existing systems." Experts said that it is logical to exclude the "Sejil-1" and "Shahab-3" missiles from the attack.
The Shahab 3 “was not used because it is too old,” said Fabian Hinz, an Iran analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Berlin. "The Sejil missile is a somewhat mysterious missile," he added, adding that Iran "used it very little during the maneuvers." Other analysts noted that Sejil was expensive to manufacture and may no longer be in production. The amount of munitions used also provides new insights into Iran's capabilities. The deployment of more than 100 ballistic missiles during one wave indicates that previous estimates that Iran has about 3,000 ballistic missiles in stock may be accurate, or may be even less.
“If this is just one round of an unknown number of rounds to come, you won't release a large portion of what you have just in the first round,” Krzyzaniak said. He added that the launch of more than 100 ballistic missiles within a few minutes indicates that Iran has at least 100 launch pads, which is a new data point for researchers. He added: "This indicates that Iran has not faced virtually any restrictions in producing missiles and launchers locally."
According to the Washington Post, Iran's ballistic missile arsenal, the largest in the Middle East, is almost entirely home-made. In recent years, Iran has demonstrated its ability to modernize some systems and improve their range and accuracy. Iranian Armed Forces spokesman Abolfazl Shekarchi said the munitions used in strikes against Israel represented only a "small portion" of the country's military strength, according to a statement published on state-run media.
The attack on Israel indicates that many Iranian munitions are of low quality. The Israeli army said that 99 percent of the missiles and drones launched by Iran were intercepted or failed to launch. “We have seen that precision and mastery remain a challenge for Iranian weapons,” Behnam Ben Talebloo, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies who has written extensively about Iran’s missile program, told the newspaper, noting that current weapons alone “will not win the war for Iran.”
Iranian drones constituted the first wave of the attack. These aircraft are cheap, effective, and easy to produce, and have been used in attacks throughout the Middle East for years. Iran also supplied Russia with drones for its war in Ukraine, where they were deadly. During the attack on Israel, slow-moving drones were likely deployed to occupy air defenses and allow more advanced munitions to pass through. The Israeli army said that all drones were shot down before they entered Israeli airspace.
Ali Hami, a Lebanese military analyst, told the American newspaper that Iran may have learned important lessons about Israeli air defenses. Commentators on Iranian state television offered similar views. Hami continued: “This may have been a test attack, and Iran got what it wanted. Overcoming air defenses is not just a symbolic victory, but a real victory.”
One of the few missiles that managed to penetrate the interception systems hit an Israeli air base in the Negev Desert. Images of the strike were shown repeatedly on several Iranian state channels in the days following the attack. Israel described the damage as minor.
In addition to analyzing Israel's air defenses, Tehran will likely also study problems with its missile systems that are said to have led to failures at launch and in flight, according to Afshon Ostovar, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in California. Speaking to the Washington Post, he added: “Another attack may be more effective.” But ultimately, the kind of approach demonstrated in Saturday night's attack is "not really sustainable over the course of a long-term conflict." He said that even if Iran changed the pace of attacks and modified the munitions used, “it would still have to fire so many projectiles that only a few (munitions) could get through.”
Some Iranian officials indicated that they had not been informed about their most dangerous weapons. Abu Al-Fadl Al-Amowi, parliamentary national security spokesman, said in an interview with the Lebanese Al-Mayadeen channel: “We are ready to use weapons that we have not used before,” adding, “We have plans for all scenarios.” But analysts say it is unlikely that any type of munition will be a game-changer. Instead, Iran will likely use the same munitions in a future attack, but in a different way: providing less warning, or launching a barrage of missiles in coordination with allied armed groups in the region, which did not play a major role in the attack.
The Biden administration announced 18 October 2023 that it was committed to countering Iran’s missile and drone program hours after a UN arms embargo on Tehran expired. UN restrictions on Iran’s missile-related activities under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which expired as the European Union and Washington failed to extend the ban. “Iran’s development, procurement, and proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology remains one of the greatest challenges to international peace and security,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said.
The UN arms embargo expired as part of the now-defunct 2015 nuclear deal, which the Obama administration brokered. Despite a strong willingness by the Biden administration to revive the agreement, which former President Donald Trump withdrew from, Washington’s efforts have thus far failed. Iran’s supply of drones to Russia for its war on Ukraine, Tehran’s bloody crackdown on protesters inside Iran, and attacks on US troops by Iran-backed proxies in the Middle East upended those efforts. Blinken said the “horrific impact” of Iran’s provision of missiles and drones to terror organizations and militant proxies directly threatened the security of Israel and Gulf partners.
As part of efforts to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior, the US announced additional designations on individuals and entities related to Iran’s missile, conventional arms, and UAV activities. The US Treasury Department sanctioned 11 individuals, 8 entities, and one vessel based in Iran, Hong Kong, China and Venezuela for enabling Iran’s destabilizing ballistic missile and drone programs. “It is a dereliction of duty and diplomatic abdication to allow the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism to legally peddle its dangerous wares across the world. As of today, China could sell Iran an ICBM that could hit New York City or Paris. The Iranian regime can now legally sell Russia, Hamas, and Hezbollah ballistic missiles and suicide drones. This makes the world war more dangerous and our allies far more vulnerable to attack,” said Gabriel Noronha, a former State Department senior advisor on Iran. Iran claimed 23 May 2017 to have built a third underground ballistic missile production facility and said it will continue developing its missile program, a move that will surely increase tensions between the country and the United States. Speaking with the semi-official Fars news agency, General Amir-Ali Hadjizadeh, the head of Iran’s aerospace program, said the facility had been completed in “recent years.” "We are going to develop our ballistic power. It's normal that our enemies, that is to say the United States and Israel, are angry when we show off our underground missile bases because they want the Iranian people to be in a position of weakness," he said.
The US Treasury Department announced 03 February 2017 new sanctions on Iran in response to the country's recent missile test launch. Thirteen individuals and 12 entities were sanctioned. Some are based in China, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Iran remained undeterred by U.S. threats. "Iran unmoved by threats as we derive security from our people," Zarif wrote.
Iran confirmed 01 February 2017 that it carried out a missile launch 29 January 2017, but said this did not violate the nuclear agreement by six world powers and Tehran in 2015. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted after the nuclear deal was reached, called on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles, but it did not specifically ban such activity.
Trump's national security adviser, Michael Flynn, condemned the missile launch 01 February 2017, declaring it "just the latest in a series of incidents" in which Iran has threatened the U.S. and its regional allies over the past six months. He said leaders in Tehran had been emboldened to take such action now because the nuclear agreement was "weak and ineffective," and because the other nations involved in the agreement failed to rein in Iran's military ambitions.
“The Obama administration failed to respond adequately to Tehran’s malign actions — including weapons transfers, support for terrorism and other violations of international norms,” Flynn said. “The Trump administration condemns such actions by Iran that undermine security, prosperity and stability throughout and beyond the Middle East and place American lives at risk.”
Flynn added, "As of today, we are officially putting Iran on notice." He did not explain his comment further or threaten any specific action against Tehran.
Donald Trump said 02 February 2017 that "Iran has been formally PUT ON NOTICE for firing a ballistic missile. Should have been thankful for the terrible deal the U.S. made with them!... Iran was on its last legs and ready to collapse until the U.S. came along and gave it a life-line in the form of the Iran Deal: $150 billion."
Later, at a White house meeting with Harley-Davidson executives and union members, Trump said "nothing is off the table" in response to a reporter who asked whether military action against Iran was an option.
Progress on indigenous missile production was often reported by one source or another in Teheran, perhaps falsely, to demonstrate that Iran was a growing power against Israel and to intimidate its other enemies in the region. However, Iran continued to rely primarily on limited North Korean missile production capacity. North Korea's perilous economic condition and the consequent possibility that it would have to moderate its "rogue state" character in order to survive, could leave Iran without an adequate and reliable supplier of missiles in a war.
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the US exerted great pressure on Russia, China, India, and other countries to withhold nuclear reactor technology from Iran. Despite occasional reports that Iran had acquired weapon-grade fissile materials from external sources or had produced such material from its own reactors, into the mid-1990s there was no hard evidence that Iran had been hiding a nuclear weapons development program. Ambiguous statements from various Iranian officials about progress in acquiring nuclear weapons could have, like reports of indigenous missile production, reflected a deliberate policy of magnifying Iran's power by exaggerating its capabilities. The statements could also have reflected an indecision by Iranian authorities about the need for such weapons.
Indeed, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities in 1992 and 1993 did not reveal any activities inconsistent with peaceful power development and Iran's obligations as a signatory to the NPT. Still, it was felt that the relentless US opposition to Iran's (legal) nuclear power development and pressure on potential suppliers of nuclear technology significantly impeded any program Iran could have had underway at the time to acquire nuclear weapons, substantiating US and Israeli estimates that acquisition of nuclear weapons could take Iran as long as 7 to 15 years (from 1995).
Iran had developed a chemical warfare capability as a response to Iraqi chemical attacks on Iranian troops during the Gulf War. By the end of the war, Iran was said to have been producing nerve agents and other offensive chemicals for delivery by artillery shells and aerial bombs. Jane's estimated Iran's stockpile of various agents in the 1990s at between several hundred and 2,000 tons. Syria and North Korea, both having missiles with chemical warheads, could also have assisted Iran in developing such warheads for its missiles. Reports that Iran had been sponsoring work on biological weapons were unconfirmed.
Iran was still recovering economically and militarily from the destruction of the Gulf War with Iraq by the end of the 20th century, and according to various sources the process was still ongoing after 2000. Although suspected by the US (and other countries) of sponsoring terrorist acts against American personnel and facilities, Iran did not possess a direct ballistic missile or other military threat to the continental US, Hawaii, or possessions. Moreover, Iran was not seen as likely in the near-term to develop an indigenous capacity to produce nuclear payloads for any of its missiles or strike aircraft. Iran could have been building a capacity for weaponizing chemical and biological agents, but whether producing these "poor man's atomic bombs" were for offensive or deterrence purposes was not readily evident.
Most of the Iranian missile development industry was located in Karaj, outside Tehran. Iran's missile infrastructure also included a Chinese-built missile plant near Semnan, larger North Korean-built plants at Isfahan and Sirjan (which could produce liquid fuels and some structural components), and missile test facilities at Shahroud and the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group research facility just south of Tehran. Historically Iranian missile "production" largely consisted of the assembly of kits of imported parts. However, the Scud B system was said to be produced using a significant proportion of locally manufactured components.
Iranian missile inventories, as with much of their arsenal, were historically highly uncertain, though lower estimates were perhaps somewhat more credible than the upper range of the higher estimates. Iran was estimated to have at least 50 and as many as 300 Scud Bs, with a range of about 200 miles, and at least 50 and as many as 450 Scud Cs, with a range of some 300 miles. In 1995 the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated in their annual publication The Military Balance, that Iran had approximately 210 Scud B/C type missiles, and another 200 Chinese M-7 (DF-7/CSS-8) missiles, reportedly imported in 1989. These estimates remained static through 2000, but by 2005 their estimates of Scud types had gone to 300, and their estimates of M-7s to 175 (though they did report unknown numbers of the Nazeat series, also known as the Mushak series, which were copies of the Chinese missile). These subsequent estimates remained static through 2008.
Also in development in the late 1990s were derivatives of North Korea's No-Dong missile, which entered service in 2002. Called Shahab-3 (meteor or shooting star in Farsi) the missiles gave Iran a capability with twice the range of the existing Scud-C/Shahab-2 missiles it had in service, with a range of 1,300 kilometers. Iran was estimated of have anywhere from 25 to 100 of the missiles in service. In development were Shahab-4/5/6, successors to the Shahab-3 and also based on North Korean designs (No-Dong and Taepo-Dong designs).
Iran had been eager to acquire China's M-9 (600 km/500 kg) and M-11 (300 km/500 kg) single-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles, but US pressure on China had prevented transfers. The Tondar-68 (1,000 km/500 kg) and the Iran-700 (700 km/500kg) were other reported development programs that depended on continuing Chinese assistance, according to Jane's. China was also believed to be assisting Iran in extending the range of the operational HY-1 (85 km/400 kg) and the HY-2 (110 km/500 kg) cruise missiles, which posed a greater threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf.
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