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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

North Korean, Iranian, & Pakistani Common Russian, Chinese Nuclear Weapons Heritage & Tests, What Does it Reveal About the Missile-Borne Warhead Development Status?

PART-II

By © C. P Vick, 2006-7, All Rights Reserved

09-21-09

Disclaimer

The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the authors and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and reverse engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in progress.

North Korean Nuclear Tests Record

Date Yield – remark Success/Failure
     
A. Suggested 1990 1 St. Nuclear Device Developed Partial confirmation
1. Suggested 1993 ? North Korean test Not confirmed
  [Attempt to purchase 4,400kg of Beryllium from Russian mafia group thwarted 1993]  
2. May 30, 1998 12Kt - Joint Pakistani/North Korean Fuel supplied by North Korea confirmed by two separate sources Success confirmed
3. October 9, 2006 4 Kt North Korea Less than 1 Kt performance Partial success confirmed
4. May 25, 2009 4-5 Kt North Korea suggested 4 Kt performance success not confirmed until May 2010

Introduction

Intelligence guessing the actual relationship of strategic technological transfers between nations verses what we actually know are two very different worlds that only previous historical events and their identifiable characteristics can define them though modified as repeating historical precedents. One can ill afford to ignore the full systems infrastructure trends development in Iran and North Korea , both in the variety of longer range performance missiles and the re-entry vehicle designs of the carrier’s of the nuclear weapons device developments. They are directly related and absolutely reflect previous development trends seen in other countries that did develop and deploy nuclear weapons as well as indicate the direction and status of those interrelated developments. One must walk away from delusional self denial in the face of these realities because these realities are directly related to the North Korea and Iran , State intent. After all no nation demonstrates missiles with re-entry vehicle warheads of 650 kilograms traversing 2,000-4,000 km or develop those capable of traversing up to 8,000 -12,000-14,963.7 kilometers ranges to carry mere firecrackers. What does the evidence trend seem to indicate from the last few years of long range missile and warhead re-entry vehicle (RV) related hardware developments especially in the face of the direction of the nuclear materials processing supporting facilities infrastructure development?

This reverse analysis has its limits based on the powerful revealing open sources available and their trend assessment along with the facts established. There are certain technical details that are not established or are limited in their certainty. Taking this into account the known facts does allow for reasonable certainty in the conclusions.

Missile Systems Nomenclature

North Korea Iran Pakistan

Liquid Propellant Launch Vehicles

1. Scud-B =Shahab-1  
2. Scud-C =Shahab-2  
3. No-dong-A =Shahab-3,3A &3B, =Ghauri-II
4. No-dong-B =? Shahab-4 n/a
5. Taep’o-dong-1 =Taep’o-dong-1A? n/a?
6. n/a =Shahab-3D/IRIS n/a
7. Taep’o-dong-2,2A =Kosar-Shahab-5 n/a
8. Taep’o-dong-2B? =? n/a
9. Taep’o-dong-2C/3 =Shahab-6 n/a

Solid Propellant Motor Launch Vehicles

1. n/a Ghadr-101 =Shaheen-1?
2. n/a Ghadr-110 =Shaheen-2?
3. n/a Ghadr-110A =Shaheen-3?
4. n/a Space L. V./ICBM Space L. V./ICBM

Community Realization

For over two and a half years ago now it has been apparent that Iran and NK had the nuclear weapon design with NK having the fuel and Iran acquiring it all in turn thanks to Russia, China (PRC), and Pakistan all knowing Dr. A. Q. Khan missile and nuclear technology transfer network. I think Iran has the missile born nuclear warhead design in hand waiting for the fuel and North Korea has it tested and deployed in its first and possibly its second generation configuration. I think the intelligence is still behind in understanding this reality as it looks at the overall evidence until late July 2006. Many are now of the opinion that they have done this nuclear warhead and nuclear device to missile design marriage with a probability of 80% or more in certainty. To be credible they must deploy not just one but many nuclear warhead armed missiles that work and that is what is being completed as the fuel is produced. Much like the missile programs demonstrated in July 2006 the nuclear weapons programs have matured to the point of requiring tests as carried out by North Korea on October 9, 2006. (1) The missile systems and re-entry vehicles (RV’s) are a pace ahead of the nuclear device fuel development programs for the RV’s. In early January 2007 a senior Iranian delegation visiting North Korea suggesting it was seeking the more advanced missile and new warhead technology for mutual transfer purchase they had financed and exchange for the Uranium enrichment processing technology program data from Iran for North Korea. This was in addition to the on going missile and nuclear weapons R&D financing of the North Korean efforts for both.(2) It is apparent that North Korean help for the Iranian nuclear weapons development program and in turn help for the North Korean program from Iran has jumped considerably since November 2006 and is expected to mature with a full nuclear test by Iran inside one or two years or perhaps less for both countries.(2A) However North Korea using plausible deniability issues strongly denied these allegations on January 27, 2007 because of NNPT requirements. It is known that certain sites in Iran may already have been prepared for this nuclear test when they were identified some years ago by ISIS. Iran’s progress in successfully operating its centrifuges cascades to process its over 250 metric tones of uranium hexafluoride into HEU is critical to its nuclear weapons pacing timeline which is now estimated to be one to three years at most. Contrary to published suggestion Iran’s centrifuge cascades appear to be performing better than suggested. (25)

First Critical Development Indicators China’s Nuclear Warhead Design Transfer

In the excessive greed, power politics and religious dogma driven economics of weapons technology trade, barter from China , to Pakistan , and subsequently to North Korea and Iran suggest that Pakistan ’s second nuclear test was perhaps a collaborative effort for North Korea and Pakistan as North Korea ’s first generation nuclear test. (3) The West is no so innocent either. Regardless of what Pakistan ’s leadership says the facts are there to confirm part of this relationship and its implications. The Chinese design 1,290 kilogram first generation plutonium warhead design is confirmed as having been given to Pakistan which perhaps is the basis of the present nuclear device warhead design of North Korea and Iran seen in the North Korean No-dong-A, Pakistani Ghauri-II and Iranian Shahab-3, 3A common missile and re-entry vehicle designs.

Major Indicator with Implications North Korea’s 1 st. Nuclear Test in Pakistan

Circumstantially the fuel’s origin for this first generation test of North Korea seems rather highly probable due to two historic facts here in discussed. Whether the North Korean found a highly advantageous persuasive cooperative environment that persuade Pakistan to test North Korea’s nuclear weapon under unusual circumstances on May 30, 1998 of 12 Kt yield together seems plausible based on the U. S. acquired AFTAC air Samples analysis fuel evidence. The addition of the North Korean defectors information confirming that the nuclear Plutonium fuel transfer was supplied by North Korea into Pakistan but whether it was as a weapons fuel contribution or a weapon remains uncertain but it still does not prove the circumstantial evidence case of North Korea’s first nuclear test kept under the radar as an accomplished fact. (2, 3A. 4, 5, 6) This implies to this analyst that Pakistan was bartered into letting North Korea do its nuclear test in Pakistan for mutual benefit as payment for what it could not otherwise afford. It may very well turn out that the North Korean supplied the fuel or part of the fuel and was in turn thus allowed to observe what Pakistan did with it in all technical detail providing them with years of confidence in their development design though not proven in identified testing.

Second Primary Indicator (3)

The October 9, 2006 test by North Korea of it plutonium based spherical implosion nuclear weapon was no surprise because it marked the end of a development cycle that required a test of the nuclear trigger primer and atomic weapon as two test for the price of one that may have been suppressed with Cadmium rods in the zero test chamber. It was almost certainly more miniaturized and more sophisticated than normally accepted in the West based on the known missile warhead mass figures and dimensions. We know it was capable of a 4 Kt yield because the Chinese were informed of this some 20 minutes prior to the test. The American, French and South Korean scientist seismographs registered it on the order of 3.58-3.7 to as high as 4.0 - 4.2 on the Richter scale. It is known that North Korea built at least four tunnel test sites with two per site with end zero chambers possible with vertical shafts below them. Only one tunnel has been used to date potentially leaving three available for future use. Nuclear test three through five are not now scheduled but some site readying has taken place according to intelligence reported publicly leaving the potential for subsequent tests threats if pressured by the US based on North Korea’s statement. A second test should follow after analyzing the first test results especially if the US does not meet to an acceptable degree North Korea ’s requirement in the Six Party Talks. It was not a gun-type uranium based nuclear test explosion but it was a plutonium based spherical implosion test. North Korea has not fully developed the Uranium base second generation weapon that Iran has taken the lead apparently for the both of them. The point being Iran has the funds while North Korea does not in a western currency realm of thinking. We have to remember that North Korea is based on a command economy that has no real value to Western currency. It is run on self sufficiency and the five year plan via the State controlled allocation of materials resources and personnel with the military first in the receiving line. There is essentially no civil economy or Western capitalist economic zones to support their obviously bankrupt economy.

North Korean Nuclear Test Confirmation

It would appear that the October 9 th 2006 Asian time common 1,158 kilogram plutonium atomic warhead was tested successfully enough because based on the U. S, USAF Constant Phoenix, WC-135W aircraft or a US military UAV sampling operation used by AFTAC [Air Force Technical Applications Center] for the air samples collected of the noble gases Zeon, Krypton and Argon. This would not have been possible if it was not partially successful. Subsequently South Korea separately confirmed similar information from their separate air sampling operations near the border with North Korea . To get strontium-90 and cesium-137 required animal testing already completed.

This is why the DNI was able to announce that it was indeed a nuclear test. The estimate is that it is based on the Block-I common 1,158 kg warhead design for the No-dong-A which is both the missiles design warhead mass packaging specification as well as its design details with a conical design more capable of handling the spherical plutonium implosion nuclear devices spherical design configuration. Clearly North Korea was more concerned with testing its No-dong-A plutonium based weapon before the second generation uranium weapon is ready for testing thanks to mutual cooperation. Like India , North Korea has relied on its nuclear reactors to provide it with plutonium while Pakistan has used enriched Uranium much like Iran is in the advanced state nearing completion with testing expected to follow once the program has matured to that state.

 Nuclear Weapons Program Status

This test showed the apparent status of the North Korean and Iran developments plainly for all to see not everybody’s guest-estimates. Several analysis wishful thinking have failed to take into account the potential thermo-nuclear trigger primer test as well as the probability of the North Korean using cadmium rods to suppress the explosion much like was done for the atmospheric nuclear rocket test out west years ago in the U.S. (3) That would greatly reduce the strength of the expected 4 KT run away chair reaction test that the PRC was told about. I just think they suppressed the test which is not that difficult once they new that it worked to about 500 - 550 tons TNT or ½ Kiloton based on American, French and South Korean scientists estimates verses its 4 KT capability. It was inevitable that the sub atomic particles would permeate and leak into the Atmosphere no matter what they did. There is however more revealed by this single North Korean test because the Block-I plutonium based implosion nuclear weapon is essentially perfected and ready for deployment as the standardized nuclear weapon. It also tells us that the Second generation Block-II Uranium based gun type weapon is not ready for testing but is getting close to being perfected once the fuel becomes available via Iran or North Korea. Remembering that the Mark-1 “Little Boy” was 4,037.04 kg with a 15 Kt yield while the Mark-3A “Fat Man” was 4,898.88 kg with a 22 Kt yield gives some perspective on the North Korean development. 1 Kt = 1,000 Tons TNT.

The Institute for Science and International Security ( ISIS ) suggested prior to North Korea ’s partially successful nuclear test of October 9, 2006 that North Korea in Mid 2006 had approximately 43-61 kilograms unprocessed Plutonium of which 20-53 kilograms was processed for nuclear weapons use. They suggest that only 4-13 estimated weapons are available to North Korea per ISIS , Dr. David Albright and Paul Brannan and others suggesting 7-12 weapons. That is with a loss of 8-23 kilograms from the manufacturing processing some of which is recoverable. ISIS further suggests projecting the North Korean production of Plutonium into mid 2008 would give them 53-76 kilograms of which 40-68 kilograms would be of nuclear weapons quality or approximately 8-17 weapons coming from that amount of nuclear weapons fuel with a loss of 8-13 kilograms in processing. (7) The North Korean extensive stocks of nuclear weapons (HEU) Highly Enriched Uranium remains undocumented. It is further suggested that North Korea did not declare to the IAEA perhaps somewhat less than 10 kilograms of plutonium because of processing losses prior to 1992-1994. (7) Diplomatically it may never be documented but control of the Plutonium program may be possible through the six party process.Each weapon is assumed to utilize 4.0 - 5.0 kilograms for the nuclear weapons which is dependent on the purity of the fuel and beryllium neutron reflector. (7) But there is more undocumented fuel from the 1990 – 1992 yet to be accounted for.

ISIS Estimated Plutonium Available to North Korea (7)

Mass Range - Mid-2006
43 – 61 kg Unprocessed Plutonium material
20 – 53 kg Processed material with losses = 4.0 – 5.0 kg Critical Mass*
23 – 08 kg Losses in processing
This equal the equivalent of potentially 4-13 nuclear weapons
 
Mass Range - Mid 2008
53 – 76 kg Unprocessed Plutonium material
40 – 68 kg Processed material with losses = 4.0 – 5.0 kg Critical Mass*
13 – 08 kg Losses in processing
This equals the equivalent of potentially 8-17 nuclear weapons

* The critical mass depends on the purity of the Plutonium and the purity of the Beryllium neutron reflector and the technological level of the nuclear organization. The higher the critical mass indicates a less developed nuclear technological level.

ISIS Estimated Plutonium Available to North Korea Post its Nuclear Test (7A)
 
Mass Range - Mid-2007
51.5-69 kg Pretest unprocessed Plutonium material
46-64 kg Unprocessed Plutonium material
33-55 kg Processed material with losses in processing = 6-13 nuclear weapons
28-50 kg Processed material with losses post nuclear test = 4.0 – 5.0 kg Critical Mass*
04-05 kg One weapon test used material
This equal the equivalent of potentially 5-12 nuclear weapons

* The critical mass depends on the purity of the Plutonium and the purity of the Beryllium neutron reflector and the technological level of the nuclear organization. The higher the critical mass indicates a less developed nuclear technological level.

Other research by Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, 1995) m ay indicate that the critical mass for plutonium may be some what lower depending on the Plutonium and beryllium neutron reflectors purity as well as the technological level of the nuclear organization carrying out the development. It must be assumed that North Korea is somewhat higher than a low technological nuclear device level but is probably as sophisticated as could be expected with the experience brought to the program including nine documented Russian nuclear scientists and the A. Q. Khan Network contribution which would place it well below the mid-range in its technological capability. The information on the October 9, 2006 North Korean nuclear test suggests that some reanalysis may be required. It suggests that the critical mass may actually be somewhat higher than suggested so far. That is a critical mass of 5.0 – 5.7 - 6 kilograms for plutonium and 12 -- 15 -- 18 kilograms for HEU Highly Enriched Uranium. Being on the conservative side and recognizing that North Korea is not an advanced nuclear technology State suggest to this analyst that 5 kilograms if not more critical mass seems more realistic. This has lead to the following critical questions which are here in answered to the extent possible with some reservation on this close approximation estimation:

HEU

A. How much enriched uranium HEU does it take to make 4Kt yield nuclear device which was not used that Iran is perhaps developing? [3.2 - 6.8 - 10.63 kg of perhaps 12.5 -15 - 18 kg totals (8) depending on technological level

 B. How much enriched uranium HEU does it take to achieve critical mass in a nuclear device? [3.2 -6.8 - 10.63 kg of perhaps 12.5 kg (8) depending on the technological level with the higher masses being less developed]

 Plutonium

 C. How much Plutonium does it take to make 4Kt yield nuclear device that was used? [1.4 – 2.10 – 3.83 kg of perhaps 5-5.7-6 kg (8)] depends on the technical level

D. How much plutonium is left for North Korea after this single test? [98 -116 kg or 15 -21 potential nuclear devices before processing losses]

 E. How much plutonium does it take to achieve critical mass in a nuclear device? [2.10 - 3.83 of perhaps 5 – 6 kg (8)] but added processing losses equal 8-13 kg.

F. How big was its detonation & how big could it have been? [550 – 4,000 tons]

The nuclear test on October 9, 2006 at 1:35 GMT / 9:35 EST was estimated at 3.58-3.7 on the Richter arbitrary log scale or equivalent to 550-800 tons of TNT. Not knowing the precise known critical mass figures leaves this analysis as a close estimate to reality only. The minimum critical mass of 3.2 – 6.8 - 10.63 kilograms (8) of perhaps 12.5 kilograms total for a more modern device based on a uranium gun-type system design verses about 2.10 - 3.83 kilograms (8) of 5 kilograms depending on the purity of the beryllium for a plutonium implosion based system for an atomic nuclear device which may be a part of the total nuclear device package. There are also manufacturing processing losses added to that total of 8-13 kilograms. Initially intelligence years ago credit the North Koreans with having enough fuel for three nuclear devices but that went down to two nuclear devices by June of 1998 but then slowly over the years rose to 30 kilograms. In the recent past after inspections and fuel rod processing it is known that North Korea had on the order of 40-42 kilograms of Plutonium enough for 7 nuclear devices or about 5.7143 (5.71 kg)– 6.00 kg per device though these figures are high due to manufacturing losses some of which can be recovered. In 2006 after a re-review look ISIS had suggested an estimate that they had enough plutonium for 4-13 nuclear devices which equals about 43 – 61 kg unprocessed Plutonium material or 40 – 68 kg processed material with losses of 23 – 8 kilograms for 4.0 – 5.0 kg Critical Mass. (7, 8) The recent test perhaps used about 5.0 - 6.0 kilograms of the total left to the North Koreans. That is enough for 12 nuclear devices several of which have apparently been built for test or weapons use. However, there is more to this which suggests that these answers are well short of the total Plutonium available to North Korea as will follow.

On or about October 24, 2008 it became known that China was told that North Korea had extracted 30.8 kilograms Plutonium from its Yongbyon nuclear processing complex two kilograms of which were used for the October 9, 2006, 4 Kt nuclear test attempt leaving about 28.8 kilohrams distributed to it other nuclear weapons utilization. That could be interpreted to indicate that North Korea has between 7 and 14 possible nuclear devices for nuclear weapons with some processing losses or left over materials. This falls with the ball park of the above estimates or on the lower conservative side of the above analysis. How accurate this is is open to interpretation.

The Former U. S. S. R’s Considerable Nuclear Materials, Personnel and Warhead Technology Transfer Contribution to this North Korean Effort?

On November 5, 1992 the Russian, Security Ministry personnel stopped 64 Russian missile specialists 40 of which were missile specialist from Miass while the remaining 10-20 were nuclear specialists at Moscow 's Sheremetyevo-2 airport where they were preparing to leave on a flight to North Korea . Yet again on December 8, 1992 , 36 nuclear specialists were stopped by the Russian Security Ministry personnel. Subsequently a North Korean Major General was declared persona-non grate by the Yeltsin government and the personnel were confined outside Moscow for several days to months. Ultimately at least 9 nuclear specialists made it to North Korea via China and are believed to have remained there. It turned out that these technical missile personnel were from the Miass, V. P. Makayev OKB, the submarine-launched ballistic missile design bureau of the former Soviet Union . It is difficult to assess the full extent of collaboration and technology transfer between the Makayev bureau to North Korea during this Gorbachev era, although such a large, senior delegation almost certainly meant that an earlier contact in 1985-1987 had already been substantially completed with certain critical documentation exchanged on nuclear issues as a part of an agreement. The subsequent post 1991 revolution collapse of part of the Soviet/Russian nuclear warhead development production industry certainly contributed to the exodus of these highly educated experienced personnel to seek more stable employment with a country they had been cooperating with for some period of time that had the most available best offer at that time. This effort was the end product of the cooperation so carefully nurtured by North Korea from 1985-1987 through 1992 collecting perhaps as many as 160 missile specialists and nuclear scientists including their families with facilities to house 300 personnel developed in North Korea based on FBIS reports from 1992-1996. Within those are nine senior nuclear scientists and seventeen senior missile specialists that remain in North Korea . This new group like other senior specialist’s was acquired with the offer of the equivalent of $1,200.00 - $1,500.00 - $3,000.00 - $4,000.00/month pay over their mere $6.00 - $15.00/month equivalent Ruble pay if any pay at all since they were nearly unemployed due to the cancelled liquid propulsion SLBM programs brought on by strategic disarmament treaties. The policy at the time was not to provide nuclear weapons design but the North Koreans got at least nine nuclear scientists which could have seriously impacted that area of the technology transfer besides the in excess of seventeen to twenty rocket scientists. (9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)

In the early 1990’s in the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet Union nuclear industry system, the Russians had at least 150 Tons of bomb-grade Pu-239 insecurely stored and available to smuggling, mostly by the phony, huge Russian corporation called “Nordex” that operated world-wide from a base in Vienna, Austria. The Russians were peddling the only thing they had in which they ever had done well and had no real inventory of: nuclear materials and weapons. (9)

10. FBIS-SOV-92-072, 14 April 1992 , p.4 / FBIS-LD1004233392 - Moscow Radioactive Material Leaks “ Are Taking Place ” Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2000 GMT April 10, 1992

[ Moscow , Kommersant Daily, Moscow ,

And from Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2000 GMT April 10, 1992 [From the "Novosti" newscast] we have the following “…Radioactive substances are usually exported in freight trains containing scrap metal. For example, 56 kilograms of plutonium was taken to the DPRK over the past two months in this way.”

11. FBIS -Hidden Motives in Brain Drain Claim Cited, PM0204141992 Moscow KOM\SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1, April 1992, p. 3

From THE KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA DOSSIER: of April 1, 1992 we have this “According to data from Pentagon experts, the manufacture of the most elementary nuclear charge needs about 25 kg of uranium enriched to 90 percent, although if you wanted you could get away with 40 kg enriched to 80 percent. A plutonium device requires about five kg of material.

Since 1975 Soviet external trade organizations have delivered enriched nuclear fuel for facilities in Libya, Iran, Vietnam, India, Argentina, and North Korea. Uranium enriched to 80 percent has been delivered for research reactors in Libya , Iran , and North Korea .”

12. Arrival of Russian Nuclear Specialists Thwarted

SK2012025892, Seoul KBS-l Radio Network in Korean, 0200 GMT 20 Dec 92

[Report by ASSOCIATED PRESS and YONHAP from London ]

[Text] According to the British SUNDAY TIMES, Russian security authorities on 8 December prevented the departure of an airplane heading from Moscow to North Korea with 36 Russian nuclear weapon specialists aboard. This paper quoted a Russian security authorities' source who said that all 36 nuclear weapon specialists were arrested. This paper reported that the Russian authorities’ action was a dramatic measure to frustrate North Korea 's ambition to development nuclear weapons.

The SUNDAY TIMES also reported that North Korean authorities hired these Russian scientists, who had worked for a Russian nuclear weapons research institute, at monthly salaries ranging from $1,500 to $3,000, to assist North Korean nuclear development.

13. Missile Technicians Held In Moscow

UW02183593 KBS-1 Radio Network ( Seoul ), 21 December 1992 ; in JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993 , p.6. / SK2212001392, Seoul KBS-I Radio Network in Korean, 2200 GMT, 21 Dec 92

[ASSOCIATED PRESS and YONHAP from Moscow ]

[Text] Russia ’s Security Ministry said yesterday that it has recently banned 64 missile technicians from departing the country.

(Kandahrov) -spokesman of the Security Ministry said in an interview with the ASSOCIATED PRESS that security personnel hauled in scientists who were trying to depart the country from the Moscow Airport on 15 October and 5 November and released them after holding them temporarily.

Prior to this, THE SUNDAY TIMES of the United Kingdom reported on 20 December that Russian security personnel took 36 nuclear experts employed by North Korea after banning an airplane carrying them from taking off on 8 December and that some of the nuclear experts are being questioned now.

14. Yonhap, Seoul, 21 December 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-246, 22 December 1992, p. 16 /FBIS-SK2112124492 Seoul YONHAP in English 1231 GMT 21 Dec 92, Yonhap Dec. 21, 1992 of South Korea [Text] Moscow, Dec. 21,, (YONHAP)—. This indicates that alt least 10 of the 64 from October were nuclear scientists.

The South Korean Embassy here in Moscow is contacting Russian authorities to find out the truth behind at least two groups of Russian nuclear physicists seeking to fly to North Korea in the past two months.

A senior embassy official said Monday that in addition to the 36 Russian nuclear scientists prevented from leaving Russia for North Korea recently as reported by THE SUNDAY TIMES of Great Britain, about 10 nuclear physicists were caught trying to fly to Pyongyang last October.

15. FBIS reports from 1992-1996 on North Korean missile and nuclear activities, FBIS-SOV-94-079, p. 15, PM2504085794 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Investigation, by Sergey Pluzhnikov, Sergey Sokolov & Mikhail Morozov, “Will Kim Il-song Explode Our Atom Bomb?” in Russian April 22-25, 1994, p.5. This specific report mentions the ZYB the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 derivation developed into what we know as the No-dong-B/Mirim/Shahab-4.

["KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation"article by Sergey Pluzhnikov, Sergey Sokolov, and Mikhail Morozov "prepared from materials from more than 100 open Western and Russian publications": "Will Kirn Il-song Explode Our Atom Bomb?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]….An unprecedented scandal, connected with the improvement of missiles and of the DPRK nuclear program as a whole, erupted in October 1992. Security Ministry staffers detained 36 Russian scientists at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. They had been intending to fly to Pyongyang along with their families. [there were a total of 64 persons stopped according to reports at the time CPVick]

It later came to light that prominent representatives of the Russian military-industrial complex had wanted to get jobs in the DPRK and had already drawn up contracts: Professor Arkadiy Bakhmutov, specialist in rocket engine building and winner of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Prize; Doctor of Sciences Valeriy Strakhov, department head at the Scientific Research Institute of Special Machine Building in Bochkovo; Yuriy Bessarabov, one of the creators of the Zyb [SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 that evolved to the No-dong-B/Shahab-4 CPVick] rocket and a Komsomol Prize winner; and other specialists in the sphere of rocket building. The organizer of this work landing force on the Russian side was Anatoliy Rubtsov, a specialist in the sphere of solid state physics well known in the circles of scientists working for the military-industrial complex. The organizer on the DPRK side was Major General Nam Chae-uk, who was declared persona non grata by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Security.

Anatoliy Rubtsov told journalists that a plan had existed to send 200 Russian scientists to the DPRK to create the scientific base of North Korean rocket building. "I did not initiate it," Rubtsov maintained. "In August 1992 Stepanov, chief of the Russian Federation Industry Ministry Machine Building administration, visited North Korea and signed a general agreement in this regard. It was proposed that I form a group. But South Korea promised Russia aid of $1 billion, and the Russian Government abruptly changed the state policy and agreed to restrictions in relations with the DPRK." At the same time Rubtsov said that the North Koreans had "approached" him back in April 1991, when he was lecturing in Beijing : "I was made a suitable offer of permanent work, and I accepted it. I was elected a member of the North Korean Academy of Sciences and appointed director of a scientific research institute. My younger sister passed dollars to someone at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in exchange obtained from the First Consular Section clean passports for 200 people to travel abroad. The money had been passed to me by a representative of the North Korean Embassy in Moscow , and my receipt was sent to Pyongyang ."

Almost all the scientists detained at Sheremetyevo-2 told journalists the same thing: "It is all the same to us for which political purposes our knowledge might be used; we only wanted to carry on doing our favorite thing."

According to data in some respectable publications, more than 20 Russian scientists nonetheless managed to get work in the DPRK (mainly through China ). They live there under aliases, make $3,000-4,000 a month, and want for nothing. According to press allegations, however, some of our scientists no longer need to risk and negotiate border checkpoints in order to work on the North Korean nuclear program. They sit at home and send their calculations to Pyongyang by computer mail, which it is not yet possible to monitor…….

16. PM2306201794 Moscow IZVEST1YA in Russian 24 Jun 94 First Edition p 4, Article by Yevgeniy Albats: "Back in 1990 the USSR , KGB Reported That the DPRK Had Completed the Development of a Nuclear Device"]

[Text]….. The Atomic Energy Ministry's view was fully confirmed by DPRK ambassador in Moscow Mr. Son Song-pil, who honored the State Duma International Affairs Committee with his presence: "We do not have the technical potential to produce nuclear weapons," he said.

Finally, Russian intelligence, as IZVEST1YA wrote recently, also denies that Pyongyang has the technology and capacity to produce nuclear weapons. This is amusing. Amusing because four years ago it said precisely the opposite, the words coming from' Vladimir Kryuchkov, USSR KGB chairman at the time.

The document that is cited below is a memorandum from Kryuchkov (No. 363-K) to the USSR leadership dated 22 February 1990 and headed "On the question of the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK." Here is the full text:

"The KGB has been informed by a reliable source that research and development work is actively continuing in the DPRK on nuclear weapons. The North Korean leaders, in particular. Kirn Chong-il, who is personally supervising the aforementioned research, are seeking military superiority over South Korea and are also pursuing the goal of joining the states that possess these weapons.

" According to available data, the development of the first nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon, in Pyongan-pukto Province. There are no plans for testing it at the moment in order to conceal from the world public and international monitoring organizations the fact that nuclear weapons are being produced in the DPRK.

"The KGB is taking extra steps to check the data.

"This is for your information.

"KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov."

17. PM2701172194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1, 4 , Moscow IZVESTIYA 27 Jan 94 we have;

(Sergey Agafonov report: " A Total of 160 Russian, Nuclear Scientists and Missilemen Helped North Korea To Create a Nuclear Bomb . The Japanese Have Learned This from a Secret Report by the Russian General Staff"]

[Text] Tokyo —The Japanese weekly SHUKAN BUNSHUN carries a detailed account of a secret report off

"North Korean nuclear affairs prepared by the Russian General Staff and an interview with an unnamed official involved in compiling that report, referred to in a note as "a leader.

…. Almost 160 Russian nuclear scientists and missile men have passed through North Korean laboratories and specialized centers since then. At present nine (9) Russian nuclear scientists and 17 highly qualified missile specialists are working in North Korea . This is outside the framework of bilateral cooperation and is unofficial, as it were—according to the "leader's" comments, many of our scientists have changed their names, and some have taken DPRK citizenship. Only it is not this that is important but the fact that the project, to create the Korean Nodong-1 intermediate-range missile was successfully completed with the assistance of Russian, brains, and North Korea has accumulated a sufficient stock of enriched nuclear raw materials with the help of Russian scientists and technologies and now possesses approximately 10-12 kg of uranium-235 and 20 kg of plutonium-239. Citing the Testimonies of four Russian specialists who recently returned from the DPRK after working in Korean nuclear complexes, the report maintains that Pyongyang already possesses one or two nuclear warheads and by the end the year will roll several more off the conveyor belt.

18. http://www.mercurynews.conVmld/mercurynews/l5116346.htm?template=contentModule., Missiles Are Pivotal to North Korea's Military Strategy, By Daniel Sneider, July 25, 2006, PP. 1-2.

Taking this into account by adding 56 kilograms from Russia, if one is to believe it to the basically documented totals, leaves 99-117 kilograms unprocessed Plutonium or 76-109 kilograms after Plutonium processing left to the North Koreans minus the recent test used about 5 kilograms to equals 94 – 112 kilograms of unprocessed or 71 -104 processed potential weapons fuel minus what was used for the Pakistani/North Korean test on May 30, 1998 of perhaps 5 - 5.7 - 6 kilograms plus the 10 kilograms undocumented 1990-1992 devices 98 -116 kilograms unprocessed or 76 – 109 kilograms processed divided by 5 gives a total of 15-21 potential nuclear weapons available to North Korea. But other analysis suggests that it is even more than this as noted in the following: (19) http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm and on the plutonium quantities (20) http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-plutonium.htm and the uranium based quantities (21) http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-uranium.htm. North Korea in fact declared it had 90 grams of Plutonium when the IAEA inspected its reactors but the IAEA never accounted for the 1990-1994 nuclear devices and associated fuel which came from some place before the 90 grams figure. This is assumed to be 10 kgs for two nuclear devices.

The issue is how much one can depend on the open sources information from Russia and North Korea. Russia open sources have consistently proven to be 80% reliably correct without much detail leaving very little lying. The North Koreans however are exceptionally contriving with everything they do full of deception as an operational way of life. Certainly what ever North Korea reveals to us is what they want us to see but what else is there that is intentionally left to mystery on the unknown factors in the strategic question. Realizing this it must be assumed that the initial batch of prototype nuclear devices built in the early 1990’s (1990-1994) by North Korea utilized this undocumented plutonium and other partially documented plutonium sources that has not been fully accounted for. Soon they are expected to remove more plutonium from the reactor spent fuel rods to be removed before the end of 2007 or early 2008. This could perhaps add 10-12 kilograms to their present plutonium totals with 8-13 kilograms lost in processing. By early in 2008 they could end up with as much as 108 -126 kilograms unprocessed or 86 – 119 kilograms processed leaves enough for about 17 – 23 or more missiles carrying nuclear weapons. Realizing that the purity of 80-90% for the plutonium is uncertain along with the processing and recovered losses North Korea probably does have on the order of 17 – 20 nuclear weapons available in 2008 to constitute a credible nuclear deterrent.

 Second Intentional Back-Up Complimentary Program of Cooperation

The suggested common second generation Block-II gun type highly enriched uranium based warhead RV of 650 kilograms is constructed of re-entry material and aluminum magnesium structural materials weighing about one third the total mass of perhaps 217 kg. With instruments such as the neutron produces and other trigger instrument, explosives and separation timing devices etc, leaving about 108 kg. With a nuclear device constructed of weapons fissile material having a mass of approximately 325 kg. This is far above the minimum critical mass of 3.2 - 6.8 – 10.63 kilograms (8) of perhaps 12.5 kilograms total for a modern uranium based system verses about 5.0 – 6.0 kilograms for a plutonium based system for an atomic nuclear device which may be a part of the total nuclear warhead package of 650 kilograms. (8) The current indicated mass of 650 kilograms is based on the Soviet era heritage SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 capability for both the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B which appear to have the same nuclear warhead prototype RV design.

However, there is clearly a second complimentary uranium based program, behind the developed Plutonium based program, in advanced development in Iran for Iran and North Korea that was successfully developed in Pakistan . Iran has said it intends to share and sell its enriched uranium with its world customers - which may include its client terrorist agents. The assumed 650 kilogram second generation Nuclear weapon common design Block-II seen in the guise of the Iranian Shahab-3B and Iranian, North Korean, No-dong-B “baby bottle-neck” nose cone design is the critical dividing line between the programs because the RV is apparently designed to be capable of handling the Plutonium and uranium based nuclear devices. However this newer “baby bottle-neck” nose cone RV design is better designed to accommodate the uranium based gun type nuclear device program as well as to with stand the longer range IRBM and ICBM high velocity re-entry thermal and dynamic ballistic flight environment. The same new RV that is apparently deployed on the Shahab-3B is also apparently deployed on the No-Dong-B/Shahab-4. The No-Dong-B/Shahab-4 has never been paraded publicly by either country indicating the importance of this mutually deployed weapon system similar to the way the former Soviet Union initially with held its main systems public display and even when paraded were covered in transport silo sleeves. Europe had begged Iran to not deploy its Shahab-4 missile but in January or February 2006 they did just that with 16 missiles of 18 received from North Korea in December 2005. One Shahab-4/No-dong-B/Mirim was flight test on January 17, 2003 out of Iran traversing some 3,000 kilometers but it was set at an angle to traverse 4,000 kilometers. See the following details. 22. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2006/cpvick-no-dong-b_2006.htm

Nuclear Warhead Mass by Generation of Development  

Generation Mass Range Kg.  
1 st Gen. 1,158-850 *
2 nd Gen. 900 – 750 (650)
3 rd. Gen. 750 -- 500
4 th Gen. 500 -- 400
5 th. Gen. 450 – 200 (300-240-200)

*This is based on the 1 st generation nuclear warheads of Pakistan.

COMMON HERITAGE NUCLEAR WARHEAD DATA BREAKDOWN ESTIMATE (23)

* - Known Masses* RV, kg Missile Yield Kt, Richter Scale Yield/Weight Ratio Kt/Kg/Kt, Estimate, fuel type RV kg heat shield Instruments Explosives kg Nuk. Dev. kg  
PRC China 1,290* DF-2 (12Kt) 25-35Kt .00365 Plutonium 430 215 645
Origin Design-A 1,550* Tower 22Kt .00320 Plutonium 517 258 775
             
Pakistan Copy Design-1

760*

Ghauri-II 181* Haft-?

up to 12 Kt, ?

  ? , ?

.0054 Uranium HEU  

? Uranium HEU

254

  60

125  

30

380

  91

  850* SHE-1 ?25-36 Kt?, ? ? Uranium HEU 284 141 425
Copy Design-I 1,050* SHE-II up to 40 Kt, 5.0 .0039 Uranium HEU 350 175 525
             
Iran ’s Common Design-I 1,158* SH-3A, ND-A 4 Kt? TBD .00385 Pu/Uranium

HEU?

388 190 580
             
North Korean <1,290? ND-A 4 Kt/550t .00365 Plutonium 388 190 580 >  
Common Design-I [1,050- 1,158?] ND-A 3.58-3.7-4.2 Suppressed & or Primer TN test? .00385 Plutonium 388 190 580  
             
NorthKorean/Iran Common Design-II 650* SH-3B, ND-B /SH-4 4Kt/550t? TBD 3.58-3.7-4.2 Suppressed & or TN Primer test? .0063 Uranium HEU 217 108 325

Note: At least one third of the payload mass is utilized for the re-entry heat shield leaving about half of the mass for the nuclear weapons device itself built of fissile material. G-II= Ghauri-II, SHE-1= Shaheen-I, SHE-II= Shaheen-II, SH- =Shahab-3, 3A, 3B, ND-A= No-dong-A , ND -B = No-dong-B, HEU high energy uranium, TN=thermonuclear

References:

1. Nuclear Weapons Data Book Vol.1, Cochran, Arkin & Hoeing, Ballinger publishing co. 1984 NRDC inc.

2. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/tests.htm

3. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke-test.htm

4. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-test.htm

5. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/nuke.htm

6. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/missile.htm

7. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/td-2-flighttest.htm

8. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/missile-development.htm

9. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-b.htm

No-dong-A, Ghauri-II, Shahab-3, 3A Class Missile Performance

Range Payload
   
1,350 km* 1,158 kg*
1,400km ,987 kg
1,500 km* ,760 kg
1,540 km ,650 kg
1,560 km ,590.27 kg* (1,165 km* lofted trajectory)
1,580 km ,557.33 kg* (1,100 km* lofted trajectory)
1,600 km ,550 kg
1,780 km ,240 kg
2,000 km ,0 kg
2,300 km ,0 kg
   

* -Known real data points from Iran and Pakistan .

Shahab-3, 3A & 3B Payload to Range Graph
The No-dong-B and Shahab-3B second generation Block-II warhead evolution is compared with the No-dong-A’s warhead with common conical shape is the Block-I warhead design.
This payload to range graph shows the performance of the No-dong-B as compared to the No-dong-A, Ghauri-II, Shahab-3, 3A, and the Shahab-3B. The critical point being is that the Shahab-3 series demonstrated performance is well below that of the No-dong-B’s demonstrated capability.
This illustration shows the common Chinese heritage of the Pakistan and North Korean/Iranian Block-I warhead reentry vehicles. The No-dong-A reflects the Block-1 evolution while the Iranian/North Korean No-dong-B/Shahab-3B evolution is the new Block-II design heritage.
This graphic Yield-to Weight ratio verses Yield and Weight compares the re-entry vehicle mass to the nuclear weapons yield verses the yield to mass ratio. It shows that the North Korean nuclear warhead fits the 4 Kt yield to the mass of the known Block-I re–entry vehicles RV of on the order of 1,050-1,158 kilograms. Although there are reverse assessment uncertainties the information does fit the required parameters. The chart actually forces the known masses to the known yield capacity but does not mean that that is the case but taking the known data tends say the North Koreans have married the nuclear Warhead to the missile system far ahead of expectations. A glimpse of what can be expected from the Block-II 650 kilogram warhead is also illustrated but its yield is yet to be determined. The ratio of the yield to mass is an estimate based on the known yield and warhead mass data. The graphic is adapted from and modeled on the Nuclear Weapons Data Book Vol.1, US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, Cochran, Arkin & Hoeing, Ballinger publishing co. 1984 NRDC Inc, Figure 2.15, p. 36.

Warheads Design Block-I & II  

Missile body diameter
No-dong-A- 1.32-1.35 meters (4.33-4.4 feet) body diameter
No-dong-B - 1.5 meters (4.92 feet) body diameter
Block-I for No-dong-A, Shahab-3,3A, Ghauri-II
Warhead "cone" design conventional high yield explosive or nuclear implosion weapon
Diameter = 1.32-1.35 base diameter (4.33-4.4 feet)
Length = approximately 3.2 meters (10.5 feet)
Known mass – 760- 1,158 kg (1,675.8 – 2,553 pounds)
Block-III – derivation on Block-I for Ghauri II --550-600 kg (1,213 -1,323 pounds)
Block-II for Shahab-3B & No-dong-B/Shahab-4
Tri-Icononic warhead design conventional high yield explosive or nuclear gun-type weapon
Diameter = approximately 1.07 meters (3.5 feet), missile diameter 1.32-1.35 & 1.5 meters
Length = approximately < 2.74 meters (<9 feet)
Mass approximation 650 kg (1,433.25 pounds)

The Background to the Missile-Borne Nuclear Weapons Status Issues

Although North Korea & Iran may only now possess the capability for a third generation nuclear weapon, (based on the U. S., and Soviet evolutionary experience standards though it is in fact a second generation for the North Koreans, Iran and Pakistani’s) of 650 kilograms thanks to possible weapons technology transfer, sharing from Russia, China, Pakistan and or Iran. Both the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B appear to have the same nuclear warhead prototype RV design. Believing the RV is a nuclear warhead prototype and proving it are two very different worlds. The design of the No-dong-B and Shahab-3B, RV certainly indicates the expected standardized nuclear warhead design. It also indicates that they have mastered the technology for reducing the size of the nuclear device with in the RV’s airframe but that does not prove that it is a nuclear warhead. Proving the RV’s potential nuclear lethality is no an easy task requiring radiation sensing as well as atmospheric sampling of the emitted gaseous vapors. The question is why develop such a RV but for a nuclear warhead as all previous nations have done that possess nuclear technology for weapons nuclear fuel production?

Up to the summer of 2002, the common theory among analyst was that Iran will develop its nuclear weapons program right up to the threshold of actually having an operational weapon. That potentially delusional conceptual wish may no longer apply as of August through October 2004 and may in fact have never applied in reality based on the circumstantial evidence here in explored. Generally speaking, no country makes such a huge investment and infrastructure builds up to the point of having nuclear weapons without actually completing the process. The parallel missile and re-entry vehicle development programs along with the two parallel nuclear fuel programs also manifest this very harsh reality.

The late 2003 earlier 2004 observation of the, No-dong-B/Mirim/Shahab-4, Re-entry Vehicle (RV) with its “top of a baby bottle-neck” nose cone design description which allowed the U. S intelligence community to recognize the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 origin of the new missile system. This along with the subsequent appearance of the Iranian Shahab-3B with its “baby bottle-neck” nose cone design reflected a commonality not immediately anticipated unless the degree of intimacy of the collaboration between the these countries is taken into account. The facts that both countries had their RV’s designs described separately in the same way profoundly suggest that their tested, operational nuclear weapon systems are one and the same. When applying the known Shahab-3B, RV design to the No-dong-B it was found that it fitted with the known propulsion performance design constraints of the rocket stage. Circumstantially this result can not be ignored much less dismissed.

The North Korean’s certainly got from the former Soviet Union , Russia the plan form for the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 missile from MIASS and greatly improved it but also got the plan form for the re-entry vehicle but not necessarily the warhead device type total details. There are definite differences in the present RV from older design SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 reflecting the more advanced RV designs of the Soviets/Russians that the sanctioned Grafit Research Institute, Icononic re-entry vehicle of Moscow were involved in. Developing the conventional none nuclear proximity fused firecracker warhead with the provided RV is easy verse the nuclear gun type much less the plutonium implosion type nuclear warhead which is a whole different ball of wax to sculpt. MIASS was not privy to the nuclear device design except for the interface, mass & cabling design requirements of the RV. That was ultimately handled by a separate local district Soviet/Russian nuclear industry organization except for the on site nuclear organization nuclear scientists with only the RV/missile interface requirements were being provided to and by MIASS. The policy at the time was not to provide nuclear weapons design but the North Koreans got at least nine nuclear scientists from the MIASS region which could have seriously impacted that area of the technology transfer besides the in excess of seventeen to twenty rocket scientists from MIASS.

Caution

Yet at the same time, the question could and should be asked, did the North Korean displayed the No-dong-B’s for the US benefit and for that case now the Iranians? They were not paraded, which had been predicted which would have allowed for a much close examination of their realness. Nor have there been any identified flight test of the No-dong-B through the end of 2005 although they could be convinced that no flight test are required because of its design heritage and ground testing success. Also were the six Iranian deployed Shahab-3B’s real or are they both a deception for our benefit? Are the No-dong-B’s real and are the Shahab-3B’s fakes? No, they were all too real to ignore.

What they have said verses what they have built as compared with what they have done with what they have built or might build and why becomes a very dangerous fraught with pitfalls process of analysis; one that is not an exact science that is so critical to these National Security issues. That completely changed on January 17, 2006 when No-dong-B was flight tested. Circumstantial evidence may indicate that Iran has in fact already deployed its sixteen No-dong-B. This also applies to the Taep’o-dong-2C/3 program and launch site developments activities seen since 2000. Past experience has taught us that they are real national resources investment (which would not be made unless they were real) but not necessarily in production deployed systems. What does one believes while your mind is being played with is truly a subjective analytical decision based on one’s experience and rules of analysis methodology. Certainly what we have seen in Iran and North Korea is what they intended for us to see but to what end is the subject of analysis.

Already Perfected and Tested Atomic and Thermo-nuclear Weapons Technology?

According to John Pike of globalsecurity.org, “In the autumn of 1998 a report leaked from Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory indicated that air samples acquired from the Kharan Desert test by US intelligence, UAV or the USAF, AFTAC Constant Phoenix WC-135W aircraft contained traces of plutonium. Pakistan, at the time of the tests, had not had time to develop a warhead from the minimal quantities of plutonium generated by the research reactor at PINSTECH. The most plausible explanation was that North Korea had participated in a joint test of an atomic weapon.” (24)

Could it potentially have been one of North Korea ’s then existing plutonium nuclear devices that needed testing?

This implies that much like the Israel ’s known nuclear artillery test off South Africa at Prince Edward Island , and this presumed joint test for North Korea in Pakistan may have been to test the trigger to the thermo-nuclear weapon design to be certain of its functionality. At the same time, this would have tested the Atomic weapon device, which is used to start thermo-nuclear fusion. Further this implies that North Korea , Pakistan and Iran require little or no further nuclear testing because their new weapon is already proven as a second generation 650 kg nuclear warhead. However the difference as previously explained is whether it was plutonium or enriched uranium based weapon. It was in this case a plutonium weapon in this case so the 1,158-1,050 kilogram warhead applies not the 650 kilogram gun-type warhead utilizing enriched uranium.

Nuclear Warhead Details

By the Iranian leadership own words, “deliberate deceptive” agenda of not discussing or admitting what their State intentions are they are deceptively buying time to build up their already tested nuclear arsenal. Whether Iran has in fact already deployed its first six nuclear warheads of twenty and twenty six initially expected is problematical but strongly expected by some time in the very near future three years.

Pike went on further to state, “It is noteworthy that the second small test at Wazir Khan Khosa, in the Kharan Desert was at such a great distance from the first larger test at Ras Koh. In contrast, India conducted multiple tests in close proximity. This creates the appearance that there were aspects of the Wazir Khan Khosa test that needed to be hidden from the staff that was conducting the Ras Koh test. It is also of note that Pakistan publicized the Ras Koh test by releasing a video/film of that test, but did not release any publicity concerning the Wazir Khan Khosa test.” (3) The addition of the North Korean defectors information confirming that the nuclear Plutonium fuel transfer was supplied by North Korea into Pakistan but whether it was as a weapons fuel contribution or a weapon remains uncertain but it still does not prove the circumstantial evidence case of North Korea’s first nuclear test kept under the radar as an accomplished fact. (2, 3A, 4, 5, 6)

It has been repeatedly confirmed that China’s clandestinely delivered complete design details to Pakistan of its fourth nuclear test device, flown on a CSS-1/DF-2 Medium Range Ballistic Missile born warhead of 1,290 kilograms total mass with a 12 Kt yield. This potentially provided the basis for the Pakistan ’s nuke. This is further sobered with the realization that Pakistan , and perhaps Iran and Syria may in fact have received processed uranium sold to them via Pakistan A. Q. Khan sales operations from the original supplier North Korea or Pakistan which was received by Libya . Although this material was not weapons grade in quality it could be converted to weapons grade uranium oxide. Iran has recently started this task and Pakistan has always used enriched uranium they processed within their own facilities.

If what we see in Iran are in fact the total Iranian nuclear industry infrastructure, and that that is all they have, then their threat to place the infrastructure underground if the world destroyed it is conceivable if they still existed. Then if the present talks with Europe collapse as they did in the summer of 2006, then after a few months of working with completion of facilities as well as a few months refining the centrifuges to get the finished enriched uranium oxide, Iran could then be expected to deploy uranium nuclear weapons in late 2007 early 2008 at best. In fact Iran in October 2006 had started a new ten fold larger production highly refined centrifuge cascade system. In all cases the intelligence appears to be several years behind what is actually going on in Iran . The Missile and RV programs have outpaced the warhead fuel program but not the warhead nuclear device design program which is in hand and has been for some years now.

The wild card is the rumor milled deception and plausible denial issues surrounding Pakistan ’s A. Q. Khan and North Korea ’s nuclear trafficking activities. If North Korea is being supplied or is supplying through Pakistan to Iran or from Iran as planned and perhaps Syria did get supplied and are continuing to get supplied with processed uranium then Iran could be very close to deploying nuclear weapons in late 2006-2008, if they have not already done so. Certainly the rapid progress in the missile, and RV-warhead program would seem to be mirroring that serious progress parallel potentiality. The worst case scenario is that they in fact have deployed six or more nuclear tipped Shahab-3B or No-dong-B missiles in 2006-2008. If however Iran still needs to work out the centrifuges, uranium hexafluoride enrichment processing over several months to get the weapons grade uranium oxide material processing correct then Iran could finish with deployment of its first missile born nuclear weapons by some time in 2008. That is, if North Korea did indeed provide it’s otherwise not limited supply of processed uranium and is continuing to provide Iran the processed nuclear materials, then the implications are far more ominous. Iran to a large degree has mastered the nuclear fuel enrichment process which has been conveyed to North Korea . It would appear that Iran could very soon become the enriched uranium supplier for the North Koreans and the Islamic, third world instead of the other way around. S there remains considerable uncertainty on the uranium based fuel cycle status for Iran and North Korea at Present.

Equally troubling is the circumstantial actions of China that has made Iran and Pakistan its near abroad quick pro quo ally for its own agenda. However, the most troubling issue is the extent of the scope of the collaboration between North Korea , Pakistan , China and Iran . Are the development and test facilities infrastructure in Pakistan and Iran in fact for both North Korea and those countries benefit? Are any of the facilities dedicated to North Korea ’s benefit? There are definite facilities dedicated to Saudis Arabia benefit in Pakistan for instance. Could the relationship be that extensive? Based on the probable nuclear test for North Korea that took place in Pakistan certainly would seen to indicate that this is the case or at one point was the case with Iran about to replace that. The missile programs would then seem to be an even more certain mirroring of that reality and that the facilities and testing that has taken place in Pakistan and Iran is for the mutual benefit of North Korea .

This returns us to the issue of why Israel felt compelled to do testing of its nuclear weapons after they had it deployed for over 12 years or so which in turn brings up the question of why North Korea felt compelled to test its nuclear weapon. Did the tests give them the answer on the atomic bomb functionality but also the thermo-nuclear weapon functionality in a “two tests for the price of one” deal? Circumstantial evidence would seem to indicate that it did in part but their second test of October 9, 2006 was apparently compelling to actually knowing proof of functionality. There is no doubt that Iran , Pakistan and North Korea have the design for the nuclear weapons at this point and that they have the nuclear materials processing facilities operational. Pakistan ’s second nuclear materials enrichment facility appears to be not for Pakistan use but some other countries but who or whom and why?

Common North Korean, Iranian Re-entry Vehicle Design Heritage Trends

Although No-dong-A of Iran and Pakistan carried the conical Chinese heritage nuclear warhead re-entry vehicle (RV) design received from China by technology transfer to Pakistan it was not the RV design of choice for accuracy. This is why we see the second generation Shahab-3B, RV is so significant besides the long range nuclear suggestion. The late 2003 earlier 2004 observation of the No-dong-B, Re-entry Vehicle (RV) with its “top of a baby bottle-neck” nose cone design description which allowed the U. S intelligence community to recognize the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 origin of the new IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system. This along with the subsequent appearance of the Iranian Shahab-3B with its “baby bottle-neck” nose cone design reflected a commonality not immediately anticipated. The facts that both countries had their RV’s designs described separately in the same way profoundly suggest that their tested, operational nuclear weapon system is one and the same. When applying the known Shahab-3B, RV design to the No-dong-B it was found that it fitted with the known propulsion performance design constraints of the rocket stage. Circumstantially this result can not be ignored much less dismissed.

A Question for the Intelligence Community

The question is if Iran stopped the nuclear weapons design development work in 2003 but North Korea continued with a development testing in October 2006, May 2009 so did North Korea do the Nuclear weapon design development job for both Iran and North Korea's use with Iran's contribution in technology and funds for both? Certainly the level of cooperation seen in the missile programs would seem to circumstantially strongly support this suggestion of full circle weapons technology transfer. We must assume that North Korean and Iran does have the nuclear warhead technology with the remaining North Korean 39 kilograms "weaponizied" fuel with the rest of the fuel from the spent fuel rods in processing to be weaponizied and deployed as a weapons of last resort. That is Iran's provokes many more questions to consider now as Iran must have the nuclear weapons technology in hand by now with the 650 kg warhead test perhaps being readied for both in the perhaps not to distant future. In reference to the untested NK/Iranian 650kg gun device/RV if there was not a need to test such a device in 1945, then there must surely be a reasonable assumption that such an (untested) device would work today.

Strategic Capability

This three stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3, Shahab-6 class launch vehicle test launch characteristics presumably exhibited that it has the capability to travel between 8,000 and 12,000 kilometers with a 650 kilogram nuclear payload. If the payload was in the 240 kilogram range its capability would be somewhat short of 15,000 kilometer range but that is not expected for some years to go. North Korea as well as Iran is presumed to have both 1,050-1,158 kilogram and 650 kilogram first and second generation nuclear weapons designs one of which whose design apparently circumstantially may have been tested in Pakistan ’s second nuclear test. If there are any questions as to the viability of the mass reduced size of these first and second generation nuclear weapons technology one only needs to remind ones self that all of these technologies were transferred initially from China to A. Q. Khan of Pakistan who perfected them for Pakistan who in turn transferred the design secrets of the technology for the production of these weapons to the North Korean and Iran years ago. It is also apparent that the nine nuclear scientists that went to North Korea also transferred considerable knowledge to North Korea which Iran and Pakistan may also have benefited. See the following two references;

(3), http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-test.htm. The first Cold War lessons have taught us strategically speaking that to think that this is the probable reality.

External Threat Possibility

really see no realistic reason for North Korea to attack Japan or South Korea as it would be sure and certain of total destruction based on known treaty defense agreements that Japan and South Korea have with the US. Literally North Korea's clock would be cleaned out permanently if they tried this madness in spite of the unacceptable losses in the region. One gets the impression that as long as North Korea is isolated similar to the “Cold War” operations and the world does not encroach on its territory that it will remain relatively peaceful with it growing arsenal. Its cooperation with Iran, which can to a degree, be restricted, until the regime collapses of it own version. Iran is a definite threat spreading to the Middle Eastern region that will have to be dealt with shortly less it becomes a larger threat to all concerned. I see no possibilities of an attack except under a military regime over through gone mad which is highly unlikely. The North Korean asymmetrical policies doing exactly the opposite of what the rest of the world desires is gaining them nothing. The worst we can expect is an atmospheric test by a missile born warhead which they have already threatened to load on their missiles. This potential threat would be confined within the No-dong-A performance limits for now of 1,350 kilometers with a 1,158 kilogram warhead. It is the over all balance of terror in the region that is very imbalanced that makes this such a danger. China is also part and partial to that growing problem. China is indeed very culpable for its quick pro quo allied North Korea activities if not directly responsible in any number of cases.

Iranian Support

I can not get away from the suspicion that the North Koreans were in fact also testing for Iran. The Iranian’s must be quite happy because this was theirs also so far as this analyst is concerned even though they were providing essentially only the financing to underpin the North Korean effort. Yes I think the Iranians were there because to assume otherwise is unrealistic. Once Iran gets the Russian Iranian built nuclear reactors at Bushehr on line they probably could get plutonium from the spent fuel rods to use in the plutonium based nuclear device for their first or second generation nuclear weapon. Russia has however secured from the Iranian’s an agreement to return all spent fuel rods to Russia for processing. That is fine for now but once Iran supplies its own fuel rods all bets are off. The probability of Iran actually being able to get usable quantities of plutonium from the Bushehr plants for weapons production is small and an inefficient way for the task. That is unless the uranium based weapon is not perfected sooner which is highly likely. At this point we must assume that both North Korea and Iran now know that their common nuclear weapon design works constitute a major threat escalation.

Conclusions

Countries do not produce missiles to travel over thousands of kilometers to deliver mere “Fire Cracker” conventional high energy explosive warhead weapons unless they are intended to carry primarily nuclear, or chemical, biological weapons. The advances in the missile launch vehicle and re-entry vehicle program do mirror the advances in the parallel nuclear weapons program of the larger total weapons program. Generally speaking no country makes the investment up to the threshold of actually having nuclear weapons without completing the process. Taking the known data tends this analysis say that North Koreans has come very close to if they have not in fact successfully married the nuclear warhead to the missile system far ahead of expectations because they were designed that way from the first by the documented foreign technology transfer that have taken place. That is North Korea and Iran has successfully married their nuclear devices, warhead designs to their existing and future missile systems with deployment to follow as the nuclear fuel becomes available or have already done so with existing nuclear fuel supplies. The missile systems and re-entry vehicles (RV’s) are a pace ahead of the nuclear device fuel development programs for the RV’s.

References:

1 . http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/missile-development.htm

2 . Iran Seeks New Technology From N. korea , Middle East Newsline, London , January 21, 2007 http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2007/january/01_21_1.html

2A. Con Coughlin, N. Korea helping Iran with Nuclear Testing, Telegraph.co.uk January 24, 2007 . http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/24/wiran24.xml

3. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-test.htm.

3A. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test, The New York Times Section-A, February 27, 2004, Page 10

4. http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030127fa_fact, Hersh, Seymour M., The Cold Test, The New Yorker, Issue of 2003-01-27, Posted 2003-01-20

5. Cho Gapucye 趙 甲済 , Seoul, Moriyama Akiko, Mainichi News (Japan), South Korean journal "monthly Korea" Chinese character, monthly Korea 月刊 朝鮮 , September issue released on August 18, 2006

6. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15340211/, “ Who is North Korea ’s ‘Mr. Bomb?’”, Associated Press, Seoul , South Korea , 10-20-06 , pp. 103

7. David Albright and Paul Brannan, The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006, ISIS , June 26, 2006, pp. 1-11.

7A. David Albright and Paul Brannan, The North Korean Plutonium Stock February 2007, ISIS , February 20, 2007, pp. 1-14

8. Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, 1995). This is a series of graphs of the Yield in Kilotons as compared to the Fissile Fuel Mass in kilograms requirements for both Plutonium (Pu) figure-1 and enriched Uranium (HEU) figure-2 nuclear devices also see table-1. The various lines display the high, medium and low performance depending on the purity quality of the fissile fuel development for the nuclear devices. It is assumed that North Korea utilizes medium to low level purity quality fissile fuel for its nuclear weapons devices though it may be some what higher than the mid level quality in reality.

9. Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, One point Safe, Anchor Books, Doubleday, NY, NY, 1997, pp. 105-181, pp. 114-116, 147-148, 175, 107, 121, and chapter 2 etc.

10. FBIS-SOV-92-072, 14 April 1992 , p.4 / FBIS-LD1004233392 - Moscow Radioactive Material Leaks “ Are Taking Place ” Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2000 GMT April 10, 1992

11. FBIS -Hidden Motives in Brain Drain Claim Cited, PM0204141992 Moscow KOM\SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1, April 1992, p. 3

12. Arrival of Russian Nuclear Specialists Thwarted ,SK2012025892, Seoul KBS-l Radio Network in Korean, 0200 GMT 20 Dec 92 , [Report by ASSOCIATED PRESS and YONHAP from London ]

13. Missile Technicians Held In Moscow , UW02183593 KBS-1 Radio Network ( Seoul ), 21 December 1992 ; in JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993 , p.6. / SK2212001392, Seoul KBS-I Radio Network in Korean, 2200 GMT, 21 Dec 92 , [ASSOCIATED PRESS and YONHAP from Moscow ]

14. Yonhap, Seoul, 21 December 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-246, 22 December 1992, p. 16 /FBIS-SK2112124492 Seoul YONHAP in English 1231 GMT 21 Dec 92, Yonhap Dec. 21, 1992 of South Korea [Text] Moscow, Dec. 21,, (YONHAP)—. Indicates that alt least 10 of the 64 from October were nuclear scientists.

15. FBIS reports from 1992-1996 on North Korean missile and nuclear activities, FBIS-SOV-94-079, p. 15, PM2504085794 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Investigation, by Sergey Pluzhnikov, Sergey Sokolov & Mikhail Morozov, “Will Kim Il-song Explode Our Atom Bomb?” in Russian April 22-25, 1994, p.5. This specific report mentions the ZYB the SS-N-6/SS-NX-13 derivation developed into what we know as the No-dong-B/Mirim/Shahab-4.

16. PM2306201794 Moscow IZVEST1YA in Russian 24 Jun 94 First Edition p 4, Article by Yevgeniy Albats: "Back in 1990 the USSR , KGB Reported That the DPRK Had Completed the Development of a Nuclear Device"]

17. PM2701172194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1, 4 , Moscow IZVESTIYA 27 Jan 94 we have; (Sergey Agafonov report: " A Total of 160 Russian, Nuclear Scientists and Missilemen Helped North Korea To Create a Nuclear Bomb. The Japanese Have Learned This from a Secret Report by the Russian General Staff"]

18. http://www.mercurynews.conVmld/mercurynews/l5116346.htm?template=contentModule ., Missiles Are Pivotal to North Korea's Military Strategy, By Daniel Sneider, July 25, 2006, PP. 1-2.

19. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm

20. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-plutonium.htm The plutonium quanities

21. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-uranium.htm The uranium based quantities

22. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2006/cpvick-no-dong-b_2006.htm

23. What was the mass of the Chinese missile born nuclear warhead given to Pakistan 1,290 kg? http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/tests.htm

24. Venter, Al J., Iran’s Nuclear Options: Tehran’s Quest for the Atom Bomb, Casemate Publishers and Book Distributors of Philadelphia, LLC, Dec. 2004, 480 pages.

25. Iran’s Nuclear Program’s Status and Uncertainties – Prepared testimony by David Albright, President Institute for Science and International Security ( ISIS ) before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Asia, March 15, 2007.



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