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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Missile Technology Transfer From Russia & China to Iran

© Charles P. Vick 2007 All Rights Reserved

April 03, 2007

Disclaimer

The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the authors and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and reverse engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in progress

Background

Between 1991 and 2004 there were varying levels of charges of both nuclear materials, technology and missile technology transfers to Iran and North Korea from Russia . Whether based in reality or not the most publicly discussions events were on the missile technology transfers from Russian to Iran . Not to belittle reality many were real issues but some also had no basis in reality. Only years after the events is it possible to analyze the significance or the lack there of for these charges. It has to be remembered that President Yeltsin had decree that business transactions of conventional weapons system was perfectly all right if it did not involve nuclear weapons systems or their delivery systems. There were the missile technology control regime issues that had to be seriously enforced from the top down that took quite a while to get across to the Russian officials. According to U.S. officials, Russian enterprises have provided high-grade steel, wind tunnel test facilities for flight performance, and special alloys for the missile casing and for foil shielding around guidance systems and above all else education in the rocket related sciences. The US government had concluded that the Russian government at the time had at best turned a blind eye to these none nuclear privateer transactions. This created a kind of “wild west” environment for the developing fledgling munitions and aerospace business community of Russia . That community had already been hurt considerable by the strategic arms treaties and the lack of Western business contracts to sustain those industries and their employees with the collapse of the common Soviet Government employers and its command economy. Many of these industries were during the Soviet era first in line for materials and personnel resources allocations that was now a free for all with few enforced rules.

It has to be remembered that free enterprise as does freedom in a democratic republic has to depend on the individual being responsible for what he or she does and to understand the rules of the road that apply to all. It took many years for this to settle down after the Yeltsin era under the President Putin regime. Once the lesson had sunk in that there was no returning to the former Soviet Union they began to work in earnest to rebuild their society in their way with many Soviet era left over-s some what reinstated within the context of the new reality. Never the less prior to this dramatic shut off of Soviet era technology transfer there were considerable problems with materials and technology transfer including personnel unemployed by the strategic arms treaties of the era.

RussiaSpaceAgency- General Director - Yuri Koptev - Early in 1997 Yuri Koptev was chastise by then President Yeltsin that he had not and could do better at earning more funds and commercial income for the Russian Space Agency. He had been accused of being one of the prime culprits in the Iran technology transfer operation which he denies. In the past years he was part of a delegation that went to Iran ostensibly for cooperation on space projects including commercial projects. Israeli sources at the time maintain that the Russian Space Agency [and its then director, Yuri Koptev] was directly involved in some of the technology transfers transactions. How far this developed is unclear as is also the influence of the then foreign minister Yugeny Primakov in requiring Administrator Koptev to comply with his desires.

Yugeny Primakov – Then Foreign Minister Primakov has denied the Russian government had any involvement in the suggested missile technology transfer to Iran. He has however led several delegations to Iran and his old stomping trouble making grounds of the Middle East although plausible de-nie-ability remained available to him and the government.

The Charges of Missile Technology Transfer

On February 12, 1997 the Los Angeles, Times reported that Iran was getting help for its fledgling long range missile program from the Russians in the form of the SS-4 IRBM missile engine technology from NPO Trud. The initial intelligence had come from Israeli Intelligence who briefed US intelligence agencies in Washington during February 1997. Iran already had the Scud -B, and C missiles as well as the North Korean No-dong-A MRBM. If true it would represent a potential violation of the INF, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 31 nation (MTCR) Missile Technology Control Regime agreement. All of this apparently started in 1994 as Iran began to probe the potential possibilities for such a technology transfer within the former Soviet Union . Iran 's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), the government defense industrial agency in charge of developing and producing ballistic missiles was the primary organization pursuing these technology transfers.

NPO-Trud stood accused of providing design and production related information related to the SS-4 rocket and its RD-214 engines and selling equipment such as its guidance system and the means to produce the SS-4 missile. However this makes no sense at all. Why? This company only developed Kerosene and lox propellant rocket engines NK-9, NK-9V for the strategic rocket programs R-9/SS-8, Sasin ICBM and the GR-1/Scrag FOBS rocket that was not accepted for production or deployed service. Trud also based on these ballistic missile engines developed the N1-L3 Soviet moon rocket engines NK-15, NK-15V, NK-9V/NK-19V, and NK-21 that we know today as the NK-33, NK-43, NK-39 and NK-31 now being offered by Aerojet. The NK-33 and NK-43 engines are to be used by Kistler’s commercial satellite reusable booster and other foreign boosters under consideration. The NK-33 is one of the best rocket engines in the world today truly a crown jewel of Russian rocket engine technology. Although NPO Trud had initially been accused of providing the SS-4's, RD-214 engine to the Iranians, in fact this particular engine was neither developed nor produced by NPO Trud. It is apparent that the source of these reports was unfamiliar with the Russian entities developing and producing these rocket engines. It both brings into question the suggested SS-4 engine technology transfer and the SS-4 missiles design technology greatly weakening the suggested intelligence validity. The simple fact of it is that NPO Trud never ever had anything to do with the SS-4 program period.

It can be stated officially for the Russian Company that there is
“No Foundation for the Claims”, suggested in the public U. S. press.

Why the SS-4 Was Really Never the Issues for TRUD

What has not been said on the SS-4 issue is very revealing. The SS-4 uses Kerosene and Nitric Oxide propellants which Kuznetsov has never had the experience of working with or developing. The actual engine used is the SS-4 first stage is the RD-214 which was developed by NPO Energomash - GDL- Gen. Dir., Gen. Designer, Boris I. Katorgin. In all of this discussion not once has Energomash’s name come up for discussion since they were the designers and developers and producers of the engine. In fact the engines from the SS-4's were to be returned to Energomash for use in civil space boosters when the 149 deployed SS-4's were scrapped into sections in 1991. Only with the recent Washington Post article of December 31, 1997 did Energomash’s name appear. If true it could have had a tremendous impact on the RD-180 rocket engine contracts of Pratt & Whitney for the Atlas-2AR and EELV of Lockheed Martin and Boeing for the RD-170 used on NPO Yuzhnoy’s Zenit 2 and Zenit-3 commercial space boosters. Did the Iranian’s buy the scrapped SS-4's not likely? They had already been stripped of useful components and their warheads. The warheads were separated and sent to appropriate recycling facilities while the engines, guidance systems and other useful components were saved and warehoused. NPO Yuzhoy the Yangel SKB Yuzhnoy Design Bureau and Dedicated Factory located in Dnepropetrovsk the Ukraine originally designed and produced the SS-4. Its production for field deployment was later taken over by NPO Yuzhnoy’s dedicated factory SKB Polyut Production Association - which has not produced the SS-4 in many many years. In both cases neither organization has come up in the discussions on the SS-4. The name Polyus (North Star) is an unknown entity unless it is an Israeli miss spelling of the SKB Polyut Production Association which has been in great economic trouble in recent years and is no longer associated with Yuzhnoy. NPO Yuzhnoy and the Ukraine have already kicked out several Iranian’s and especially Chinese spies seeking rocket engine and SS-18 technology transfer information. The simple fact of it is that Kuznetsov never ever had anything to do with the SS-4 program period.

What If They Are Using the SS-4 and SS-5

Even if the SS-4 and SS-5 are involved where are the second and third stages for these launch vehicles coming from? They are just not pulled out of thin air. It takes many years to develop and adapt such upper stages to these first stages. That kind of development infrastructure apparently has been developed in Iran today. No body is fooling anybody here it has to come from existing Middle East and North Korean No-dong-A, Scud based systems technology as a common heritage. Following the North Korean design philosophy looking at what hardware does exist logically dictates that the SS-4 first stage could be topped with a Scud-B/C for a second stage and perhaps a solid motor third stage based on SAM-2 technology. This was in fact considered in the early ballistic missile program of the Soviet Union but it was abandoned. The SS-5 first stage could use a No-dong-A missile as a second stage that in turn could be topped by a larger solid motor third stage. Unfortunately the performance of these SS-4 and SS-5 combinations with upper stages based on Scud based technology would also suffer like the North Korean designs do but their range performance would be some what greater than the North Korean designs. All suggested public evidence that Iran is using the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles is highly questionable based on the previous discussions.

The sum total of the circumstantial evidence tends to suggest that Iran is not developing the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles but is attempting to develop a derivation on the North Korean Taep’o-dong-1 and Taep’o-dong-2 missiles as a part of its Shahab on going “building block scheme”, space booster, missile development series. Back when these Shahab-5, 6 discussions were taking place it was entirely premature to speculate on evolving designs concepts with out studying the trends and actual technology available as well as that which could be developed.

NPO Trud and the Sanctions Revelations

NPO - Trud - Now the Russian, Samara based Joint Stock Company called, N.D. Kuznetsov Research and Engineering Complex, JSC was accused of accepting a $7,000,000 contract offered by Iran to jointly develop a “Gas Pumping,” gas turbine for a gas pumping station project. In reality the real story is that this discussion with the Iranians took place in 1994 and that Trud was uninterested in the project. The Iranian’s had in fact repeatedly requested that a “Gas Pumping” turbo-pump machinery joint venture project be started. Iran made the contact proposal without giving the specifications. NPO Trud became suspicious when the Iranians refused to provide the specifications for the machinery to be developed that they were asking for under the contract proposal. This also reflected on the Iranians lack of proper management of contact negotiation skills.

This incident did not take place in 1997 as suggested in the Russian and Western press but took place in 1994. Trud now Kuznetsov was and still is more interested in its new commercial Aircraft prop fan turbo jet engines for its large commercial value as well as its renewed NK rocket engine business with the West and the Russian government and Russian contractors. Once Trud got the specifications, the Russian company realized that the Iranian’s had actually tried to get Trud to give the Iranians missile technology in the form of new turbo-pump machinery that were nothing less than rocket engine turbo-pump specifications. What engine if any known it was similar to is unclear from the open sources and official sources. They even provided provisional design drawings of the turbo-machinery. NPO Trud notified the Russian government through its export license request process. Though the turbo-machinery was built it never went to Iran and remains at Samara State Scientific and Production Enterprise N. D. Kuznetsov/ Motorostroitel AO dedicated production facility in Samara. The project was both rejected by NPO Trud and thwarted by the Russian Government through the Federal Security Services (FSB) putting an end to the contract consideration. On this one occasion the Missile Technology Control Regime had worked in Russia. NPO Trud was replaced by a joint stock company in 1994. This is why the U. S. Government brought no sanctions against the Russian Company that replaced NPO Trud.

The critical question that must be addressed is why were the Iranian’s trying to get this new turbo-pump machinery from the Russians and what did it reveal?What was their intended use?

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the TD-2/NKSL-X-2** first stage engine probably uses four No-dong thrust chambers with a new single turbo-pump to create a new first stage engine. This turbo-pump machinery was probably developed jointly by Iran and North Korea and the Peoples Republic of China under technology-sharing arrangements that evolved in the mid-1990s. Before developing this technology with the North Koreans, the Iranian =s evidently attempted to obtain this technology from NPO Trud (a Russian firm) but failed. This is the critical bit of information that potentially links the Teap’o-dong-2 missile program with the Iranian Shahab-5 and 6 missile programs regardless of the lack of public information confirming this apparent reality. Contrary to the Rumsfeld report the No-dong is now known to use one thrust chamber that appears to be a modification of the Isayev S-2.713 engine from the Soviet SS-N-4 SLBM program received during the Gorbachev era.

The Taep’o-dong-2, 2A is not the most optimized design in its performance possibilities. That is the launch vehicles engineering design aspect ratio’s its length to diameter ratio has potentially created in flight structural problems. North Korea has probable had considerable trouble with adapting the structurally heavy No-dong second stage to their new Taep’o-dong-2 first stage. It reflects obvious poor engineering design decisions both in its structural design and imposed performance penalties verses the PRC Chinese DF-4/CSS-3 design. Thus its performance due to structural requirements will suffer accordingly. Whether Iran has adapted the North Korean Taep’o-dong-2 designs for its Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 is unclear at this time. It is strongly suspected that Iran will utilize the Taepo-dong-1 type design for its Shehab-4/Kosar satellite launch vehicle design that could also be deployed as an Iranian derivation of the Taep’o-dong-1 strategic ballistic missile with performance similar to that of the SS-4. Yet this also remains unclear. Indeed Iran has suggested that its Shehab-4 will be the last rocket it will develop even though there is suggested evidence to the contrary.

The first stage of the TD-2 is said to bear a close resemblance to the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 first stage, but is slightly smaller. Other reports suggest that the first stage of the Taep’o-dong-2 is almost identical to the Chinese CSS-2. The diameter of the TD-2's/NKSL-X-2's ** first stage are apparently closer to 2.2 m verses the 2.25 m diameter of the CSS-2 missile. The TD-2/NKSL-X-2** is also slightly shorter in length. This indicates that the TD-2/NKSL-X-2** may have an inferior performance compared to the Russian SS-5 with its 2.4 m body diameter and to a degree the Chinese PRC CSS-2 missiles.

Again in July of 1999, it was suggested that the Iranian Shahab-5 and or Shahab-6 first stage utilizes a Russian SS-5/R-14, NPO Energomash RD-216 closed cycle two engine cluster, and however this report is mis-informed. The SS-5 is substantially larger than the CSS-2. The CSS-2 also uses a totally different less efficient open cycle four thrust chamber engine very different from the RD-216 closed cycle engine. Energomash was later accused of providing“Water Pumping” turbo machinery for Iran as a part of a joint venture but all charges for that were dropped since it apparently did not go through.

Please note repeating some of the previous text circumstantial evidence from the NPO Trud revelations suggest that the TD-2/NKSL-X-2** first stage probably uses four No-dong thrust chambers with a new turbo-pump to create an entirely new first stage open cycle engine which is different from the CSS-2 first stage open cycle engine design.

How Real Is the Russia Technology Transfer to Iran?

Israeli and U.S. sources have claimed that Russia has been providing Iran, Libya, and North Korea technology to benefit their missile development programs. This became an established reality when sanctions were issued again seven Russian entities July 15, 1998 the Russian State owned Pol yus (“North Star”) Scientific Research Institute, the St-Petersburg Baltic State Technical University, INOR Scientific Center, Grafit Research Institute, Glavkosmos, MOSO company and Europalace 2000. Three additional entities had sanctioned issued against them on January 12, 1999, they were the MendeleyevUniversity of Chemical Technology, the NIKIET Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, and Moscow Aviation Institute. Two additional entities Tikhomirov Institute, Komintern plant in Novosibirsk, also had sanctions issued against them in July 1998. These sanctions preventing those entities from purchasing imported U.S. made goods, exporting their products and services to the United States or selling their products and services to the U.S. government and its contractors, cutting off all aid to them for at least two years.

In total 12 Russian entities have had sanctions issued against them for significant material contributions, education and for providing military significant equipment, and or export of goods and services which could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missile deliver to Iran according to the U. S. government.

No Sanctions

Several other organizations did not have sanctions issued against them. They are NPO Trud, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, TsAGI-Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institue, Rosvoorouzhenie the Russian Arms - Export Agency. What follows is a general discussion on some of those organizations that have been accused of these violations.

Among the Russian firms said to be helping Iran were:

Rosvoorouzhenie – The Russia’s State Corporation for the export and import of military technology, armaments and military equipment. It was established by President Yeltsin, edit #1932 on November 25, 1993. On August 20, 1997 it was reorganized into the Federal State Unitary Enterprise or state company Rosvooruzhenie. Initially Rosvooruzheie was headed by Lt. Gen. Viktor Samoylov. In November of 1994 following a story leaked to the press, about Rosvooruzhenie hiding 137 billion rubles of profit from government taxation, Samoilov was replaced by Maj. Gen. Alexandr Kotelkin as its General Director. On August 20, 1997 Kotelkin was removed and replaced by Yevgeniy Qananiev. Rosvoorouzhenie along with the Federal Security Service (FSB) apparently helped recruited university and industry personnel to teach the Iranian missile industry, missile technologies desired by Iran .

The change in the leadership in Rosvooruzhnenie was initally believed to reflect the redistribution of power between close aides of President Boris Yeltsin. Samolylov was a former military adviser of Vladimir Shumeyko, Kotelkin was reportedly supported by Alexandr Korzhakov. In the light of recent years disclosures concerning potential missile technology transfer to Iran certainly does seem to indicate something more has been going on in the leadership of that organization than is being discussed publicly by the Yeltsin government. The shake up in the government’s leadership of the organization almost certainly is a cover up for some events that were discovered to be going on in and through that organization. In any case no sanctions were brought against this organization.

Bauman MSTU - Bauman Moscow State Technical University and its labs - This graduate university is providing a basic graduate university education universally available through out the world. It was essentially closed until recently because they only trained Russians on actual deployed ICBM and space equipment for designer training hands on experience. This is different from what is normally available in the West. Rarely do students train on the actual ballistic missile hardware except in military closed schools. Up until recently this was also the case in Russia. Unless one is a student or on a special tour group access is limited to authorized personnel. That actual hardware of BMSTU is housed out side Moscow at its Orevo facility. Although Bauman had been accused of training Iranian students to build missiles, the charges were dropped. The actual education is nothing more than what anybody else could get for all practical purposes. They are guilty of nothing more than the technology transfer done through the USAF, USN and US Army schools for allied troops. Ultimately it has allowed those allied nations to assimilate the technology and carry it much further to their and our detriment in the long run although there are pro and con arguments on both sides on this issue. This is now why the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) exists and is signed and adhered to by over 31 nations. The mistake the U.S. and Bauman & MAI were making is to train or even to permit education to be given to any of the third world nations that are not a part of the MTCR and the nuclear non-proliferation accords. The policy should be to not allow students from the non-signatory nations to be educated in the signatory nations. This applies to the US and Russia as well as the MTCR signatory nations.

BMSTU - Orevo This training laboratory is located 80 km north of Moscow. It is taught by various professors whom openly admit that Iraq, Syria, Iran and Libya most of the other nations that have Scuds in their possession have been either taught there or at other Russian military rocketry schools during the Soviet era. I myself have seen the latest Russian Rocket troops training at Orevo facility which is no worse that carried out down at RedStone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama and elsewhere in the US.

MAI - Moscow Aviation Institute - This Graduate University is providing a basic graduate university education universally available through out the world like that provided by Bauman MSTU. Unfortunately the US Department of State issued sanctions against MAI for the U. S. Government on January 12, 1999. The duration of the sanctions was for two years. The one publicly identified professor involved is no longer associated with MAI. He was invited to leave.

(For further information see the BMSTU write up)

BalticStateUniversity - Located in St. Petersburg, this school is particularly proficient in solid motor design education. Sanctions were brought against it on July 15, 1998. It stands accused of supporting a solid propellant motor development project for Iran. This institute probably has provided the training for designing tactical and larger size solid motors through the joint missile education center identified as Persepolis. This training could be applied to improving Iranian tactical and strategic ballistic missiles as well as help with the solid propellant third stages that may be used for inserting satellites in Earth orbit or to give a longer range to strategic missiles. This Graduate University is providing a basic graduate university education like Bauman and MAI provide. (For further information see the BMSTU write up)

It is particularly interesting that one major organization MIT - Moscow Institute of Thermal Technologies - the solid motor design bureau located in Moscow which does the actual Russian development of Solid Propellant and Solid Motor projects for Russia’s strategic rockets was not mentioned in this entire threat of sanctions process. This is because they would have been attached to the Baltic State University as a part of its educational staff or graduate advisers in all probability. During the Soviet era the state companies sponsored the students and provided professors of the applied science and technology for the universities and internship hands on trained for those students who would later go to work in their organizations even before completing graduate school.

TsAGI - Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute - TsAGI apparently did received a series of contracts worth $100,000 to $150,000 from Iran through Rosvoorouzhenie to provide wind tunnel models manufacturing, testing of reentry nose cone designs and wind tunnel facility designs and construction as well as software programming development for those facilities operations. This organization has indeed been in considerable economic trouble since the fall of the former Soviet Union but the extent to which they have or have not been involved in this technology transfer is not known say except for the allegation that have appeared in the public press. The Russian government has said that all attempts were thwarted so far as they know since this is a Russian government facility. No sanctions were brought against this entity.

Polyus (North Star) Scientific Research Institute - The U. S. government issued sanctions against Polyus on July 15, 1998. This advanced guidance design bureau is said to have provided advanced navigation and advanced ring laser guidance packages or technology and or production technology to Iran.

How accurate this report is, remains uncertain. This is not the organization that designed and built the SS-4 guidance package which is located in the Ukraine. Polyus is an unknown entity unless it is an Israeli miss spelling of the SKB Polyut Production Association which has been in great economic trouble in recent years. Today it produces the commercially available SL-8 Kosmos booster, some of the Proton block-D/DM shrouds, the RD-170, and RD-171 rocket engines as well as the new transport aircraft AN-70 it is trying to sell to NATO with President Yeltsin’s help. Yuzhnoy’s is no longer directly associated with its Soviet era dedicated factory SKB Polyut Production Association - which has not produced the SS-4 in many, many years. What reality is here is not clear from the public information available.

INOR-Scientific Production Center - Sanctions were brought against this facility July 15, 1998. They are accused of providing samples of as well as selling 620 kilograms of Maraging Steel alloy and Tungsten coated graphite to the Iranians. The steel is used for the ballistic missiles airframes and tank-age while the Tungsten coated graphite is used on the rocket exhaust steering vanes. This deal apparently actually took place but whether it was stopped in time is unclear. They apparently also provided special environmental protective foils to protect Iranian missile guidance packages.

NIIGRAFIT, Grafit Research Institute – The State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite, did provide the ablative asbestos graphite composite board coatings materials and forming manufacturing technology for the new Icononic re-entry vehicle seen deployed and flight test on the Iranian Shahab-3B MRBM. Some of these materials were confiscated in transit to Iran in Austria but some got through buy other means. It is the same re-entry material used on return capsules of the Russian Kosmos RECSATS and Bio-Satellites etc.

Biysk Chemical Combine - This solid propellant motor development test facility should be watched very carefully because of its proximity location to Iran and its economic situation and previous political leanings supporting the communist. However their have been no indications of wrong doing by this organization as yet revealed.

A. M. Isayev OKB - KB Khimmash - The Scientific Institute of Chemical Machine Building - The Scud engine and SLBM engine design bureau located in Korolyov and Sergiy Posad NNW of Zagorsk north of Moscow is the Russian equivalent to the Stennis Spaceflight Center in Mississippi with its huge static test firing facilities. This is also the place where the START treaty SLBM’s are taken for destruction after the gyroscopes and other instruments as well as the engines are removed. The Warhead is removed before shipping to this site. This is also from where the 30, SS-N-18, SLBM gyroscope packages theft took place that was intercepted on its way to Iraq’s hands.

Motorostroitel AO - This company which is involved in almost every jet engine or rocket engine produced in the former Soviet Union with multiple branches could possible have been involved separate from NPO-Trud but this is not implied. It often serves as the dedicated production factory organization during the Soviet era and is thus somehow involved in the engines deliveries for Kuznetsov to the West which were quite legal. In this particular case Motorostroitel of Samara does produce rocket engines for the Soyuz, Vostok and Molniya boosters as well as jet engines along with other industrial products separate from Kuznetsov. It also produces engine parts for Kuznetsov as well as Energomash since the industry has been reorganizing since the 1991 Russian Revolution. There is no evidence that they were ever involved in any technology transfer problems.

Sanctions were issued again seven Russian entities July 15, 1998 the Russian State owned organizations for two years for providing significant material contributions, education and for providing military significant equipment, and or export of goods and services which could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missile delivers to Iran according to the U. S. government. Those organizations were Glavkosmos, MOSO Company, Europalas 2000 .

MOSO Company, Europalas-2000 was identified as having shipped 21-22 tons of maraging stainless steel that could be applied to nuclear materials processing equipment and various solid motors or propellant tanks and airframes of the Scud-B and Scud-C and other missiles. This shipment to Iran was seized by Azerbaijani customs personnel who identified the shippers.

Glavkosmos was suspected of transferring duel use technology applicable to missile and civil technologies.

Three additional entities had sanctioned issued against them on January 12, 1999. The sanctions were issued again seven Russian entities the Russian State owned organizations for two years for providing significant material contributions, education and for providing military significant equipment, and or export of goods and services which could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missile delivers to Iran according to the U. S. government. They were the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, NIKIET Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, Moscow Aviation Institute, Tikhomirov Instrument Building State Research Institute , Komintern plant in Novosibirsk. It subsequently became apparent at the time that both the (MAI) Moscow Aviation Institute was sanctioned for providing education to Iranian students and for free lancer selling of educational services by their professorial staff personnel. Those staff members were subsequently asked to leave those organizations because they were hindering foreign trade beneficial to the Schools.

Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology is a Graduate University providing a basic graduate university education in Chemical engineering technologies like Bauman and MAI provide. (For further information see the BMSTU write up)

NIKIET Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology is directly involved in nuclear power plant design and development.

Tikhomirov Instrument Building State Research Institute makes SAM missile control systems and weapons fire control systems for SAM’s and Aircraft application.

Kominternplant of Novosibirsk makes radio electronic equipment and digital electronic equipment for SAM missile systems .

Iranian diplomat spy expelled out of Russia - A 33 year old Iranian student diplomat named Teymuri was caught as a spy diplomat (free lancer) by Russian internal security personnel and was intern declared persona-non-grata and kicked out of Russia as the investigations was continued on the Russian participants contributors to this espionage. He was caught red handed with free lancer obtained information after being trailed for two weeks by Russian Internal Security personnel. The deals were halted while in progress.

Since the Putin presidential administration has been in office in Russia the level of strategic technology transfer from Russian entities to Iran has been dramatically reduced.

PeoplesRepublic of China -The Peoples Republic of China missile electronic industry has been accused of provide telemetry receiving and sending technology to the Iranian’s even though they deny this. Only recently has it become at least partially clear how this is being applied. The Iranians come to North Korea in a specially equipped Boeing-707 that apparently is filled with Chinese provided telemetry monitoring equipment for satellite and ballistic missiles launches. A Chinese company, Great Wall Industries, is reportedly supplying missile-testing telemetry technology to Iran. Others are known to have provided solid motor technology requested by Iran.

The Iranian North Korean Connection, What are they really talking about? - Certainly the mutual technology transfer cooperation between North Korea and Iran and previously Pakistan is notorious for its extensiveness as these North Korean and Iranian missile pages exhibit. In actuality the actual missile that Iran has received is not the SS-4 but the North Korea, No-dong-A ballistic missile and its follow on derivations and concepts. It is almost as if they are trying to carry on beyond where the North Koreans have evolved. What follows is a discussion of the origin of North Korean Missiles.

The origins of the North Korean strategic ballistic missiles may not be so clear as it has seemed. These are a few cautious thoughts on a few suspicious bits of information that may be related to the origins, configuration and performance of their missiles. To date the best and very praise worthy studies on this subject has been brought out through a series of Jane’s, publications and a major study by David C. Wright and Timur Kadyshev, in Science & Global Security 1994, Vol. 4, pp. 129-160. They reveal that North Korea has the basic Scud-A and B and a derivative homegrown Scud-C, D type as well as the home grown No-dong-1 MRBM and No-dong-2 MRBM. No-dong-1 and No-dong-2 is the standard No-dong-A. In addition they are attempting to develop the two stage Taepo-dong-1 IRBM and the two stage Taepo-dong-2 Limited Range ICBM. All of these programs benefited from North Korean engineers, technicians, and scientist cooperating on the PRC, Chinese canceled DF-61 program of the mid 1970’s.

1. Jane’s defense weekly, 15 Jan. 1994, p.4 "No-dong-1 Details Fuel New Fears in Asia, by Paul Baever, It reveals that the No-Dong-1 is nearly 4 meters longer than the Scud-B making it over 15 meters in length.

2. Jane’s Defense Weekly, 19 March 1994, p.18 by Barbara Star, and contributions by Paul Baever and Joe Bermudez, "North Korea Grasp at the Stages Beyond No-dong-1", This article pointedly notes the close resemblance of the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 first stage to the Taepo-Dong-2 first stage.

3. Jane’s Weapons Systems issue 16, and 18 of about May 1995 suggest that the No-dong-1 and 2 are about 1.3 meters in diameter and are 15.5 meters long with a suggested launch weight mass of 21,000 kg. which essentially confirms the Wright/Kadyshev study and their family details.

4. The Washington Times Bill Gertz, "N Korea Builds New Missile", The Taepo-dong-2 appears to be designed after the Chinese intermediate range missile the CSS-2 which was the first IRBM ever exported except for the SS-4 and SS-5 sent to Cuba in 1962. The exception being the Jupiter IRBM being deployed in Turkey by the US army and the Redstone deployment in Europe as well as the Thor IRBM deployment in England.

5. Jane’s Defense Week, 11 Nov. 96, p.16 "CIA Expects No-dong Deployment Next Year", it discusses its range and other details.

Pakistan – It is apparent that Pakistan transferred extensive nuclear and missile technology to Iran thanks to A. Q. Quan’s network that may include the acquired solid motor technology from China for the Shaheen-I and II series.

The Israeli Intelligence and the Press Connection - Clearly the Israeli intelligence as publicly presented and the quality control of the information gathered and presented by the Israeli intelligence community has left a lot to be desired to say the least. It is also fairly clear that when the Israeli intelligence community became impatient, and unsatisfied with the pace and did not get the response from the White House it demanded, verses its careful for obvious reasons approach to the potential Russian missile technology transfer to Iran issue it then turned to the Western especially US political press. They became very pushy because they did not get their way. In reality based on this quick analysis it seems rather obvious why they did not get their way with the US Government.

Policy Issue - Technology Transfer Problems & Nuclear Issues

The major problem with human technology know-how comes when educating someone with technology in another country. He or she can take that technology back to their home country and, regardless of whether it has the resources; it can choose to develop it. That is the dilemma of bringing high-technology trained people to work or immigrate to work and become experienced here in certain industries because there is nothing preventing them from taking it back to their home country. A vivid example of this is the nuclear power industry in this country and its use of so many foreign nationals and naturalized citizens in the past and its relationship to the newly emerging nations that may be nuclear-armed or potentially could become armed with their own home-grown nuclear weapons. One wonders whether certain industries/technologies should be targeted or has the scope of government control over them expanded for only U. S. citizens, not naturalized or skilled educated foreign nationals.

More emphasis should be placed by government on education and training more American citizens to fill those large gaps in the high-technology fields work force. We always seem to have money to educate foreign nationals but never enough money to truly educate and train American citizens. Why?

Why are we and Russia continuing to educate foreign nationals in any high technology that has a potential security threat in the wrong hands of nations that are not signatories to the MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Non Proliferation Agreements?

Once a nation acquires nuclear weapons it finds it to be a huge burden. It is quickly sobered by the responsibility it places on them when they consider there use and the consequences of that use. Consideration of the downwind " Chernobyl effect", radiation environmental impact makes the use of nuclear weapons a weapon of last resort. There is however the concern with nations run by military regimes in which there is little or no civil counterbalance control of the use of nuclear weapons but even the military becomes reticent o their use. The bottom line to all terrorist nations from the U. S. is if you use your few nuclear weapons on us or our allies and other friendly nations then we will totally cleaning your clock out. If there is a real nuclear threat to the U. S. it is from land based terrorists carrying it into the U. S. and using it. Finally beware of an Iran that is trying to offer an olive branch face for dialogue while she buy’s time to arm herself with strategic weapons to threaten humanity and carry out it’s Islamic agenda.

References:

1. "1st. Secretary M. Gorbachev: considerations for Iranian space mission", "Gorbachev orders study of Soviet - Iranian space mission." Soviet Aerospace, 26, June 1989., p. ?.

2. Gertz, Bill, " Russia disregards pledge to curb Iran missile output", The Washington Times, 22, May 1997, p.A3.

Quotes information from the classified Defense Intelligence Agency report.

3. Gertz, Bill, " Russia , China aid Iran 's missile programs", The Washington Times, 10, Sept. 1997, pp.1 & A11.

A detailed Israeli intelligence report given to the CIA details the cooperation between Iran with the Russians and Chine…. The CIA and DIA were apparently able to substantiate most of the Israeli report on Russia as well as China ’s, Great Wall Industries involvement.

4. Lippman, Thomas W. , " Israel presses U.S. to sanction Russia missile firms aiding Iran ", The Washington Post, 25, Sept. 1997, p. A31.

5. Gertz, Bill, "Hill group seeks sanctions against Russia for aid to Iran ", The Washington Times, 2, Oct.1997, p. A11.

“…Pentagon officials subsequently said US Intelligence agencies had confirmed that Iran is building two missile systems based on the No-dong missile…”

6. Gertz, Bill, "Russians admit to training Iranian missile technicians", The Washington Times, 3, Oct. 1997, p.A17.

“The service (FSB) stopped an Iranian attempting to manufacture “Joints and parts for a liquid fueled missile engine” at NPO Trud. (It can be stated officially for the Russian Company that there is “No Foundation for the Claims,” suggested in the U. S. public press.) The parts were being built by the Russian company “under the guise as equipment for gas-pumping stations” the official said.” Polyus and INOR, metal alloy producer, were also mentioned.

7. Hoffman, Davis, " Russia says it thwarted attempts by Iran to get missile technology", The Washington Post, 3, Oct. 1997, p. A35.

“Thwarted”, an Iranian attempt this year to have parts manufactured for a liquid fuel missile at a Russian factory. The parts were being disguised as gas compressors or pumps. “…All had been detected at an early stages”… “and a stop had been put to them.”

8. Gertz, Bill, " Russia sells Iran missile metals", The Washington Times, 20, Oct. 1997, pp. A1&A11.

“High strength steel and special foil 620 kilograms”, total was supplied to Iran by contract for its ballistic missile. INOR had already thermal treated the alloys so that the Iranian could process the materials for their specific use. These materials are used to shield guidance and instrumentation equipment. In fact the Russian’s made it impossible for the Iranians to utilize the material in the missile program.

9. Verbin, Anatoly, " Russia deports Iranian for trying to buy missile designs", The Washington Times, (Reuters News Agency), 15, Nov. 1997, p. A8.

10. Gertz, Bill, " Russia conspiring with Iran on missiles", The Washington Times, 23, Feb. 1998, pp. A1 &A18.

Indications of FSB duplicity cooperation with BSTU and its director for “providing guidance systems, firing circuits, Pyrotechnics of explosives” and solid propellant motor lectures at the “Persepolis joint missile education center” to the Sanam Industrial Group department 140, which is in charge of the solid propellant missile program for Iran.

11. Gertz, Bill, "Russian Firms facing sanctions", The Washington Times, 17, July 1998, p. A8.

12. Gertz, Bill, " Russia says U.S. put on missile sting", The Washington Times, pp. A1 & A14.

“One official said the Moscow Aviation Institute is continuing to train Iranian missile technicians” (Engineers and designers)

13. Hoffman, David, ' Russia Denounces U. S. Sanctions", The Washington Post, 12, January 1999, pp. A1, 7 A24.

14. Lippman, Thomas W., "Sanctions Imposed on 3 Russian Institutes,” The Washington Post, 13, January 1999, pp. A17, & A20.

(NIKIET) Scientific Research & Design Institute of Power Technology for the reactor design institute; Mendeleyev University of Chemical and Technology Know-how on heavy water production, nuclear graphite production technology, research reactor design; MAI, 28 Iranian students, one missile technician. For hosting Iranian students to train them in missile design technology.

15. Timmerman, Kenneth, "Iran's deadly missile potential", The Washington Times, 16, July 1999, p. A15.

“Iran is also working with North Korea to develop ICBM’s and shorter-range missiles and regularly sends technical teams to attend North Korean missile launches.” A significant increase in activity at, Sharoud , Iran ’s missile test site, suggests Iran will be launching a multi-stage missile.

16. Hudson, Audrey, "Analyst fear U.S. helps Iran develop missiles via Moscow ", 14, July 1999, Space News, p.?.

17. " Iran says missiles are for defense", The Washington Times, 19, July 1999, pp.A13.

18. Mulholland, David, "Iran-Russia ties prompt U.S. missile debate", Defense News, 26, July 1999, pp. 4.

19. Saradzhyan, Simon, "Leaks of rocket expertise to Iran alleged", Simon Saradzhyan, Space News, 24, April 2000, p. 17.

20. Gertz, Bill, "Firms in China, N. Korea hit with State sanctions', Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, 28, June 2001, pp. 1 & A18.

The US State Department issues two year long US Government sanctions against North Korea ’s Changgwang Sinyong Corp. for providing No-dong liquid fuel rocket engines from the No-dong missile program to Iran for its Shahab-3 and follow on programs.

21. Gertz, Bill, “ China agrees to deal with Iran on missiles”, The Washington Times, 19, August 1999 p.?

22. Wehling Fred, “Russian Nuclear and Missile Export To Iran , The Nonproliferation Review/ Winter 1999, PP. 134-143.

 




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