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Russia without Ukraine is a country; |
Ukraine Politics
President | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Name | From | To | Party |
| Leonid M. Kravchuk | 01 Dec 1991 | 19 Jul 1994 | Social Democratic Party |
| Leonid Kuchma | 19 Jul 1994 | 23 Jan 2005 | People's Democratic Party |
| Viktor Yushchenko | 23 Jan 2005 | 25 Feb 2010 | Our Ukraine |
| Viktor Yanukovich | 25 Feb 2010 | 22 Feb 2014 | Party of Regions |
| Oleksandr Turchynov | 23 Feb 2014 | 07 Jun 2014 | Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc |
| Petro Poroshenko | 07 Jun 2014 | 20 May 2019 | Poroshenko Bloc |
| Volodymyr Zelenskiy | 20 May 2019 | Jun 2024 | Servant of the People |
Prime Minister | |||
| Name | From | To | Party |
| Vitold Fokin | 23 Oct 1990 | 02 Oct 1992 | KPU/Non-party |
| Leonid Kuchma | 13 Oct 1992 | 22 Sep 1993 | Non-party |
| Yukhim Zvyahilsky | 22 Sep 1993 | 16 Jun 1994 | Non-party |
| Vitalii Masol | 16 Jun 1994 | 01 Mar 1995 | Non-party |
| Yevhen Marchuk | 01 Mar 1995 | 28 May 1996 | Non-party |
| Pavlo Lazarenko | 28 May 1996 | 02 Jul 1997 | Hormada |
| Valerii Pustovoitenko | 16 Jul 1997 | 22 Dec 1999 | NDP |
| Viktor Yushchenko | 22 Dec 1999 | 29 May 2001 | Non-party |
| Anatolii Kinakh | 29 May 2001 | 21 Nov 2002 | PPPU |
| Viktor Yanukovich | 21 Nov 2002 | 05 Jan 2005 | Party of Regions |
| Mykola Azarov | 07 Dec 2004 | 24 Jan 2005 | Party of Regions |
| Yuliya Tymoshenko | 24 Jan 2005 | 08 Sep 2005 | Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc + VOB |
| Yurii Yekhanurov | 08 Sep 2005 | 04 Aug 2006 | NU |
| Viktor Yanukovich | 04 Aug 2006 | 18 Dec 2007 | Party of Regions |
| Yuliya Tymoshenko | 18 Dec 2007 | 11 Mar 2010 | Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc + VOB |
| Mykola Azarov | 11 Mar 2010 | 28 Jan 2014 | Party of Regions |
| Sergei Arbuzov | 05 Feb 2014 | Mar 2014 | Party of Regions |
| Arseniy Yatsenyuk | Mar 2014 | 30 Mar 2016 | VOB |
| Volodymyr Groysman | 30 Mar 2016 | 22 May 2019 | |
| Oleksiy Honcharuk | 29 Aug 2019 | 20?? | Servant of the People |
| excludes brief acting PMs | |||
Ukraine is a republic with a semi-presidential political system composed of three branches of government: a unicameral legislature; an executive led by a directly elected president who is head of state and commander in chief; and a prime minister, who is chosen through a legislative majority and as head of government leads the Cabinet of Ministers; and a judiciary. In 2019, voters elected Volodymyr Zelenskyy president in an election considered free and fair by international and domestic observers. In 2019, the country also held early parliamentary elections that observers considered free and fair.
On February 24, the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, launched an unlawful and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, resulting in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities committed by members of Russia’s forces. Through the end of the year, Russia’s forces continued to conduct hostilities, including launching missile and drone strikes throughout Ukraine, hitting critical infrastructure, including power, water, and heating facilities.
There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees in the government-controlled area of Ukraine. There were significant human rights issues involving Ukrainian government officials, although not comparable to the scope of Russia’s abuses, which included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh or life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the media, violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; refoulement of refugees to a country despite risks they would face torture or persecution; serious acts of government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting persons with disabilities, members of ethnic minority groups, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but the government did not always observe these requirements. The OHCHR claimed the Security Service of Ukraine may have violated the due process rights of many of the more than 1,000 individuals it reportedly arrested between February 24 and May 15 on suspicion of supporting Russia’s forces.
The NGO Association of Ukrainian Monitors on Human Rights in Law Enforcement continued to report a widespread practice of unrecorded detention, in particular the unrecorded presence in police stations of persons “invited” for “voluntary talks” with police and noted several allegations of physical mistreatment that took place during a period of unrecorded detention. Authorities occasionally held suspects incommunicado, in some cases for several weeks.
In Ukrainian government-controlled territory, the HRMMU continued to receive allegations the Security Service of Ukraine detained and abused individuals in both official and unofficial places of detention to obtain information and pressure suspects to confess or cooperate. The HRMMU reported 34 cases in 2022 of government law enforcement bodies allegedly torturing and abusing detainees who were suspected of collaborating with Russia’s forces or causing their disappearance. Ukrainian law enforcement bodies denied allegations of torture or brutal interrogations of detainees in liberated areas; they stated they were conducting stabilization measures to determine whether populations collaborated with Russia. Ukrainian law enforcement insist they extend due process to those whom they are screening in full compliance with applicable international human rights obligations and commitments.
In Ukrainian government-controlled territory, the OHCHR documented the pervasive use of extrajudicial punishment of individuals believed to have looted, stolen, or otherwise exploited the chaotic security situation following Russia’s invasion. In most cases, civilians carried out the extrajudicial punishments, which included tying individuals to trees or electricity poles in public areas, stripping them, and sometimes beating them. Public officials in some regions encouraged the extrajudicial punishments, and some National Police officers and members of the Territorial Defense Forces reportedly took part in the abuse.
The Ministry of Reintegration reported that Russia’s forces forcibly transported an estimated tens of thousands of children from Ukraine to Russia, with differing degrees of consent or knowledge from their legal guardians. The exact number of children involved was unknown and estimates widely vary. On December 14, Ombudsperson Dmytro Lubinets stated that Ukraine reported more than 12,000 Ukrainian children were in Russia, of which approximately 8,600 were forcibly deported. A report by Yale’s Conflict Observatory identified at least 6,000 children forcibly relocated by Russia. According to the human rights NGO Coalition Ukraine 5 A M, Russia has potentially deported as many as 260,000 to 700,000 Ukrainian children, although it is unclear how much of this population were moved through filtration operations or separated from their families.
According to the NGO Zmina, in some cases parents of the affected children initially gave permission for their children to be evacuated to so-called summer camps, ostensibly for their safety. Other deportations included children with disabilities or those living in institutions, orphanages, or other areas of fighting. Some children were then put up for adoption to Russian parents. Others were not able to leave camps once enrolled. Most camps involved an element of re-education and indoctrination into Russian language, culture, and history.
The government banned, blocked, or sanctioned media outlets and individual journalists deemed a threat to national security or who expressed positions authorities believed undermined the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Other practices continued to affect media freedom, including self-censorship.
With few exceptions, individuals in areas under Ukrainian government control could generally criticize the government publicly and privately and discuss matters of public interest without fear of official reprisal. The law criminalizes the display of communist and Nazi symbols as well as the manufacture or promotion of the St. George’s ribbon, a symbol associated with Russia’s forces in the Donbas region and Russian irredentism. The law prohibits statements that threaten the country’s territorial integrity, promote war, instigate racial or religious conflict, or support Russia’s aggression against the country, and the government prosecuted individuals under these laws.
The NGO Freedom House rated the country’s press as “partly free.” Independent media and internet news sites were active and expressed a wide range of views, but the government took some actions to restrict media and freedom of expression, reportedly to counter Russian disinformation and address other wartime security concerns.
In the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion and concurrent increase in disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks, authorities took measures to prohibit, regulate, and occasionally censor information alleged to be a national security threat, particularly content emanating from Russia and promoting pro-Russia lines or disinformation. Authorities also sanctioned media figures and outlets, as well as banned websites, and prevented media outlets and websites whose messages were deemed to be counter to national security interests from advertising on Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion, at least 215 broadcasters as well as online and print media (national, regional, and local) ceased their activities completely or partially due to the difficulties of operating under hostilities and occupation. These were mainly regional media from Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, Khmelnytskyy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Donetsk, Mykolayiv, Sumy, Luhansk, and Chernihiv Oblasts.
Legislative steps were taken in order to combat alternative points of view in the country. On March 19, 2022, the President of Ukraine put into effect the decision of the National Security and Defense Council "On the implementation of a unified information policy under martial law", according to which all national TV channels must be united on a single information platform for strategic communication - a round-the-clock marathon "United News".
On August 30, 2022, the Verkhovna Rada supported in the first reading the controversial draft law “On Media”, which is designed to become a tool in the struggle of the authorities against objectionable representatives of the press. This document, in particular, provides for a ban on the publication of “materials containing popularization or propaganda of the authorities of the aggressor state”, as well as “inaccurate materials” (the criteria for determining such materials are very vague). On December 16, 2022, this document was finally adopted by the Verkhovna Rada.
Broadcast media consolidated around government-led programming since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In late February 2022, six television stations (1+1, Ukraina 24, Inter, ICTV, public broadcaster National Public Broadcasting Company (UA:PBC), and a government outlet, Rada) started producing around-the-clock coverage in Ukrainian to convey to the public a unified wartime message. In March, the National Security and Defense Council under martial law issued an order to unify the country’s information stream, calling on all national television channels to air a single 24-hour stream of programming. Each of the six stations producing content had several hours to fill daily; the outlets produced their own content but coordinated with one another to avoid programming the same commentators.
Media watchdogs expressed concerns the single television broadcast could eventually facilitate government control over broadcasting. Ukrainska Pravda reported there was mutual agreement to limit which politicians appeared on air and to feature some commentators and public figures less actively. Television stations considered to be affiliated with opposition parties, including Channel 5, Pryamyi, and Espreso, were not formally invited to participate in the unified broadcast, although the three channels voluntarily aired the 24-hour programming by the other channels at times.
The largest and most successful privately-owned media continued to be owned by oligarchs, especially television stations. At least one media holding, however, was transferred to a journalist-owned holding company, following the 2021 passage of a “deoligarchization” law intended to reduce the political and public influence of the country’s wealthiest business figures. Media professionals asserted they were denied access to government proceedings by state officials following reporting on sensitive issues.
UA:PBC was created to provide an independent, publicly funded alternative to oligarch-controlled television channels. Local UA:PBC branches claimed senior representatives from the Office of the President and other government bodies lobbied the broadcaster’s supervisory board to support favored candidates for key leadership positions.
There were instances in which the government practiced censorship, restricted content, and penalized individuals and media outlets for reportedly having pro-Russia views and disseminating disinformation from Russia, through imposing financial sanctions, banning websites, and blocking television channels. Throughout the conflict, both independent and state-owned media periodically engaged in self-censorship when reporting stories that might be deemed insufficiently patriotic by the public or used by Russia for propaganda purposes.
In Parliament, several deputies from the Servant of the People party registered a bill on amending the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes regarding the establishment of responsibility for actions against the foundations of Ukraine's national security. The document caused a great resonance in Ukraine and has already been dubbed "the law on criminal liability for criticism of the authorities." Its main author, Servant of the People MP Georgy Mazurashu, proposed punishing fake social media accounts (the so-called "bot farms") that are used to spread disinformation.
On 19 April 2023, MP Georgiy Mazurashu submitted a draft law to the Rada proposing to write out a separate provision in the Criminal Code, which establishes liability for the use of accounts on the Internet in order to disseminate false information or to influence decision-making, the commission or non-commission of actions by state bodies or even individuals. or legal entities.
According to the text of the draft, for the creation, acquisition, use or sale of accounts that contain knowingly false information about the user, in information (automated) electronic, communication, information systems, through which false information is disseminated (including on behalf of other persons, whose involvement in the published information has not been established), or there is interference in the activities of individuals and legal entities, if such actions are committed to the detriment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, defense capability, national, state, economic and information security of Ukraine, in the absence of signs of treason, - faces a fine of 1 to 3 thousand tax-free minimums or correctional labor up to 2 years.
The Security Service of Ukraine reported that over the past year, 45 bot farms with a total capacity of 4 million bots have stopped working. Until now, in the fight against bot farms, law enforcement agencies have used Article 361-2 of the Criminal Code - unauthorized sale or dissemination of information with limited access. The maximum sanction under this article was up to 5 years in prison. One of the most high-profile cases in this direction was the liquidation of a bot farm in August last year. According to the SBU, this bot farm was created to discredit the leadership of Ukraine and undermine the socio-political situation. The attackers massively spread misinformation via the Internet, including about the activities of the country's top military-political leadership. "In particular, because of the bots, they spread fake news about the situation from the fronts and carried out other informational sabotage," the SBU said.
But if the project is adopted, then under the pretext of fighting "bot farms" any comments on social networks that the authorities deem inadmissible may result in criminal liability. The mildest sanction - a fine of 750 to 1000 tax-free minimums or corrective labor up to 1 year - will be applied for an attempt to influence or interfere in the actions of individuals and legal entities, if such actions "help increase the level of social tension." Note that this particular rule already applies not only to fake accounts, but to all accounts on the Internet. According to the text of the draft, this is called "the use of accounts, including those that contain knowingly false information about the user."
In July 2022, a provision of a 2019 law promoting the use of the Ukrainian language went into effect. All entities registered in the country must use Ukrainian language on their social media or websites or face a fine.
The constitution provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly. Mass gatherings, however, were restricted during the year due to the imposition of martial law. Even prior to the introduction of martial law in February, authorities had wide discretion under a Soviet-era directive to grant or refuse permission for assemblies on grounds of protecting public order and safety. Organizers were required to inform authorities in advance of demonstrations.
The country last held parliamentary elections in 2019. A joint international election observation mission by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament assessed that “fundamental rights and freedoms were overall respected, and the campaign was competitive, despite numerous malpractices, particularly in the majoritarian races.” The administration of the election was regarded as generally competent and effective, despite the short time available to prepare the elections.
In sharp contrast, the campaign was marked by widespread vote buying, misuse of incumbency, and the practice of exploiting all possible legislative loopholes, skewing equality of opportunity for contestants. Intertwined business and political interests dictated media coverage of elections and allowed for the misuse of political finance, including at the local level, according to international observers.
In May 2022, a law allowing the government to ban political parties came into force. As of December, 12 political parties were banned due to persistent collaboration with the Russian Federation. On September 15, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of the pro-Russia Opposition Platform – For Life political party, the only pro-Russia party represented in parliament, banning its activities in Ukraine. Its parliamentary faction was dissolved in May and former members of the faction formed a new parliamentary deputy group, Platform for Life and Peace.
The country last held a presidential election in two rounds in 2019. The joint international election observation mission assessed the election “was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned out in high numbers. In the pre-electoral period, the law was often not implemented in good faith by many stakeholders, which negatively impacted trust in the election administration, enforcement of campaign finance rules, and the effectiveness of election dispute resolution.”
Martial law states that the president maintains his position if his powers expire during martial law. Scheduled presidential or regular elections may be held only after the termination of martial law. In case of the early termination of the president’s term, the speaker of the parliament would assume those authorities. Likewise, parliamentarians would remain in their seats should their powers expire during martial law.
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption, but authorities did not always effectively implement the law, and many officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. During the year the nation’s priorities shifted to the war and martial law stifled transparency. On 03 March 2022, parliament suspended the requirement of asset disclosures for public officials during the period of martial law, to prevent Russia financially targeting Ukrainian leaders. The suspension undermined the system of monitoring and control over incomes, expenditures, and assets of public officials. Anticorruption institutions reported a hampered capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption cases due to budget cuts and a decrease in staff as personnel voluntarily mobilized to the frontlines.
While the number of reports of government corruption was low according to the National Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), observers noted corruption remained common at all levels in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. From January 1 to August 3, NABU launched 238 investigations that resulted in 27 indictments against 80 individuals. Accused individuals included public officials, heads of state-owned enterprises, and a judge. The Prosecutor General’s Office stated six judges were convicted during the first seven months of the year of soliciting bribes and received various sentences of three to seven years in prison. NABU and the Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office continued to conduct investigations and prosecutions, despite the wartime context and hurdles.
Human rights groups claimed another threat to the anticorruption infrastructure came from the Constitutional Court, where they alleged antireform interests unduly influenced judges. In January 2021, the State Bureau of Investigations informed the Head of the Constitutional Court Oleksandr Tupytskyy that he was being charged with fraud and witness tampering. In March 2021, Tupytsky left the country for Austria. In July 2021, the Supreme Court overturned President Zelenskyy’s decree to remove Tupytskyy from office. The following month, the Podolskyy District Court ruled to arrest Tupytskyy in absentia, allowing Tupytskyy’s extradition from Austria. On 27 May 2022, the State Bureau of Investigations stated that Tupytskyy was added to the international wanted list.
The Russian government controlled the level of violence in eastern Ukraine, intensifying it when it suited its political interests. Russia continued to arm, train, lead, and fight alongside forces in the "DPR" and the "LPR." Russia-led forces throughout the conflict methodically obstructed, harassed, and intimidated international monitors, who did not have the access necessary to record systematically cease-fire violations or abuses committed by Russia-led forces. As of 30 June 2021, OHCHR reported that since the start of the conflict, fighting had killed at least 13,200 to 13,400 individuals, including civilians, government armed forces, and members of armed groups. The HRMMU reported that at least 3,393 of these were civilian deaths.
In government-controlled territory, the HRMMU continued to receive allegations that the Security Service detained and abused individuals in both official and unofficial places of detention to obtain information and pressure suspects to confess or cooperate. The HRMMU did not report any cases of conflict-related torture in government-controlled territory, but it suspected such cases were underreported because victims often remained in detention or were afraid to report abuse due to fear of retaliation or lack of trust in the justice system.
The constitution and law provide for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media, but authorities did not always respect these rights. The government banned, blocked, or sanctioned media outlets and individual journalists deemed a threat to national security or who expressed positions that authorities believed undermined the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Other problematic practices continued to affect media freedom, including self-censorship, so-called jeansa payments (publishing unsubstantiated or biased news articles for a fee), and slanted news coverage by media outlets whose owners had pro-Russia political views, close ties to the government, or business or political interests to protect.
The NGO Freedom House rated the country's press as "partly free." Independent media and internet news sites were active and expressed a wide range of views, but the government took some actions that restricted media and freedom of expression.
On 02 February 2021, President Zelenskyy signed a decree imposing sanctions on Taras Kozak, a member of parliament from the Opposition Platform-For Life party, and eight companies, including three media outlets owned by Kozak (ZIK, 112, and NewsOne) that were forced to close on February 2, in accordance with the presidential decree citing national security grounds due to their affiliation with pro-Russia parliamentarian Viktor Medvedchuk. Medvedchuk had been under international sanctions since 2014 for violating Ukraine's sovereignty and these sanctions remained in effect.
On 21 August 2021, President Zelenskyy approved an NSDC decision to sanction several individuals, businesses, and media entities on what authorities deemed national security grounds for "spreading pro-Russian propaganda." To carry out the decision, the Security Service of Ukraine ordered Ukrainian internet providers to block access to sanctioned news outlets, including, among other sites widely considered to have a pro-Russia editorial slant, Strana.ua, Sharij.net, Vedomosti, and Moskovsky Komsomolets.
There were instances in which the government practiced censorship, restricted content, and penalized individuals and media outlets for reportedly having pro-Russia views and disseminating Russian disinformation through imposing financial sanctions, banning websites, and blocking television channels.Both independent and state-owned media periodically engaged in self-censorship when reporting stories that might expose their media owners or political allies to criticism or might be perceived by the public as insufficiently patriotic or provide information that could be used for Russian propaganda.
In the context of the continuing Russia-led armed conflict in the Donbas region and Russian disinformation and cyber campaigns, authorities took measures to prohibit, regulate, and occasionally censor information deemed a national security threat, particularly those emanating from Russia and promoting pro-Russia lines or disinformation. Authorities also sanctioned media figures and outlets, as well as banned websites, and prevented advertising of media outlets and websites whose messages were deemed to be counter to national security interests.
Citing the continuing armed conflict with Russian-led forces, the government continued the practice of banning specific works by Russian actors, film directors, and singers, as well as imposing sanctions on pro-Russia journalists. According to the State Film Agency, as of mid-September approximately 815 films and television shows had been banned on national security grounds since 2014. The government maintained a ban on the operations of 1,848 legal entities, approximately 840 companies and 4,046 persons who allegedly posed a threat to the country's national security.
The Peacemaker website, operates in the country without hindrance. It publishes illegally collected personal data of Ukrainian and foreign citizens referred to as "separatists" or "enemies of Ukraine", including reporters, politicians, cultural figures and even Russian diplomats. This Internet resource is actively used by the Ukrainian special services, as well as by radical nationalist structures to exert psychological pressure on those whom they accuse of "separatism and treason." To date, more than 240 thousand people have been included in the Peacemaker database, of which about 75 thousand are Russians.
Power is increasingly concentrated in President Zelensky's office. Zelenskiy said more changes to the government are coming in an effort to strengthen the it and deliver the results that the country needs. "That is why there will be a number of personnel changes in the cabinet of ministers and the office of the president," he said on September 3, indicating that the changes would be coming in the fall. Zelenskiy said on September 4 that "we need new energy, and these steps relate to strengthening our state in various areas." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba submitted his resignation 04 September 2024, a day after several other high-ranking officials also quit, including Oleksandr Kamyshin, Minister of Strategic Industries, Denys Maliuska, Justice Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers Iryna Vereshchuk and Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna, Environment Minister Ruslan Strilets and Vitaliy Koval, head of Ukraine’s state property fund. Parliament speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk informed the public of Kuleba's resignation, as well as those a day earlier of two deputy prime ministers and three cabinet ministers as part of what could be the biggest cabinet overhaul since Russia's full-scale invasion began 36 months ago.
According to Arkady Moshes, Program Director of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ukraine's internal political problems have been known for a long time. "The changes were expected, even if I didn't know how to make a list of people. I myself expected Prime Minister Denys Šmyhal to resign and I believe that it will happen at some point ... This is a strong indication that the Ukrainian state and government are not working as well as they should. Many ministers are tired of not having the power to influence things anymore."
According to Moshes, during the Russian war of aggression, the decision-making power in Ukraine has started to focus more and more strongly on the presidential office instead of the government. The presidential office is headed by Andri Jermak, a long-time friend of President Volodymyr Zelensky . His position has improved significantly during martial law. "Jermak may even have more power than the president. Several experts feel that he cannot be outdone in any decision. From the point of view of the implementation of democracy, the situation is problematic, because Jermak has not been elected to the position in democratic elections."
Moshes does not take a position on whether the turmoil in the government took place at the initiative of President Zelensky or under pressure. At the same time, however, he sees that personnel changes can also be useful for the president. " Zelenskyi certainly wants to gain more power in the government by changing the people in leadership positions who are numb to the situation. It may be necessary to replace certain persons in order to make the ministries work more efficiently and responsibly."
Konstantin Skorkin of CEIP was rather harsh in his assessment of the reshuffle. “In the absence of elections, reshuffling within the government has become almost the only opportunity for the president to demonstrate at least some kind of changes in power and to uplift the spirit of the Ukrainian society. However, in reality, these reshuffles work towards even greater centralization and monopolization of power,” he wrote. “The lack of new faces and breakthrough ideas in the president's team is being compensated for by a reshuffling of powers,” he added. The Economist believes Zelenskyy has culled the cabinet because his popularity has been fading. This U.K. newspaper reported that the reshuffle in fact signals a “further consolidation of power around Zelenskyy’s influential chief of staff Andriy Yermak.” Yevhan Mahda, a Ukrainian political analyst, concurred with this assessment in his interview with NYT. The reshuffle could see “an increase of Yermak’s influence,” he warned.
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