2005 - President Viktor Yushchenko
The Kuchma political crisis was complicated by the successful efforts of a coalition of centrist and left-wing deputies to oust reform-oriented Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko led the center-right bloc Our Ukraine, which held just over 100 out of the 450 seats in the parliament. Yushchenko, a former chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, pushed through a number of economic reforms during his time in office. A real economic breakthrough occurred in 2000, when the new government under Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko carried out momentous market reforms, slashing subsidies to oligarchs and leveling the playing field.
The so-called oligarch factions in parliament stepped up their bid to get rid of Prime Minister Yushchenko. The oligarch factions, which are largely pro-presidential, eyed 10 April 2001, the scheduled date of the government's annual report to parliament, as the day they would initiate a vote of no-confidence in Yushchenko if the prime minister didn't agree to form a coalition government with the acting parliamentary majority.
After the government of the reform-oriented Prime Minister Yushchenko fell to a no confidence vote in April of 2001, many observers feared that political forces in the Rada were arrayed in such a way as to make approval of a new reform-minded Prime Minister impossible. In May 2001, the Rada confirmed the head of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Anatoliy Kinakh, as Yushchenko's successor. Immediately upon assuming office on 29 May 2001, Prime Minister Kinakh declared his intention not only to maintain the reforms of the Yushchenko era, but to accelerate them. Under the leadership of Anatoly Kinakh, the Ukrainian government pushed through tax and land reforms. Within just a few months, President Kuchma and Prime Minister Kinakh successfully lobbied the Rada to pass key reform legislation.
Although behind in the polls for much of the race, Yanukovych benefited from a high profile as Prime Minister (e.g. he attended the Olympics rather than Kuchma) and, according to the OSCE's reports, from media reporting heavily tilted in his favour. President Putin of Russia also gave Yanukovych his public support, including in Kyiv on the eve of the first round of the elections (31 October) during the anniversary of Ukraine's liberation during WWII. Yushchenko's campaign was affected by sudden severe illness which European scientists confirmed was due to the poison dioxin.
The OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe observer mission concluded that the first round of the elections did not meet European standards for free and fair democratic elections. Despite these handicaps, and an unexplained delay in the announcement of the results, Yushchenko narrowly beat PM Yanukovych by 39.87% to 39.32%. Socialist leader Moroz, who had come third with 7%, publicly backed Yushchenko for the run-off between the two leading candidates scheduled for 21 November.
Although opinion and exit polls showed Yushchenko with a clear lead (7-15%), the results tallied by the Central Election Commission on 22 November gave Yanukovych a lead of 49.4% to 46.7% over Yushchenko. The OSCE issued a statement the same day saying that the election was not free and fair and the EU's Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels issued a statement condemning the standards of the election and agreed to summon Ukraine's Ambassadors. Large-scale opposition demonstrations began in Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine to protest at the result. Despite the widespread condemnation of the elections, on 24 November the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovych the winner. But the next day the Supreme Court banned the official publication of the results while it heard the opposition's complaints.
Viktor Yushchenko was the first Ukrainian leader to rise to power through mass protests – this happened after the Western-backed ‘Orange Revolution’, which shook the country in November 2004. Yushchenko had initially lost the presidential election, but his supporters set up a tent city in central Kiev and blocked the government district. Foreign NGOs played a significant role in these events. The direct orchestrators of that color revolution included the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and its affiliates, the Soros Foundation, the International Republican Institute, the Eurasia Foundation, and several other foreign entities.
NGOs that directly supported Yushchenko and were involved in monitoring elections in Ukraine were foreign funded. In 2003, the International Renaissance Foundation, financed by Hungarian tycoon George Soros, spent nearly $1.5 million on projects related to the presidential election. Some of them successfully conducted exit polls and effectively presented to the public the idea that the victory of then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich had been the result of widespread election fraud.
Those who seized the government district in the capital were demanding the annulment of the election results. In response, the authorities accused the protesters of attempting a coup. With neither side willing to compromise, Yanukovich ultimately agreed to a third round of voting, which resulted in Yushchenko’s victory. Ukrainian society was divided in two, and Yushchenko’s policy laid the groundwork for a significant political crisis and the eventual war.
With tension rising, the EU sent its High Representative Javier Solana to Kyiv. Together with the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania, Solana met all parties in an attempt to broker a solution to the growing crisis. Opposition pressure on the government to overturn the fraudulent election result continued to grow, with large-scale demonstrations (reaching over 500,000 people in Kyiv), a blockade of government offices, and a vote by parliament on 27 November 2024 to invalidate the election. Support for Yanukovych fell further when he seemed to imply that he would support secession of some of the eastern regions of Ukraine if he did not become President.
On 1 December 2024 a political agreement was reached between Yushchenko, Yanukovych and Kuchma at talks facilitated by HR Solana and the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania. This led to a decision on 3 December by the Supreme Court invalidating the second round of the elections and calling for a re-run on 26 December.
Agreement was reached on 8 December 2004 to the re-run of the elections together with a package of constitutional reforms to transfer some of the powers of the President to the Prime Minister and Parliament. Yushchenko won the re-run election by an eight-point margin over Yanukovych. Yushchenko was inaugurated President on 23 January 2005.
While Yanukovich had supported a neutral course for Ukraine, Yushchenko advocated an “independent” and “European” path that would inevitably distance Ukraine from Russia. Even during his campaign, he openly expressed pro-Western views. Yushchenko’s opponents warned about the possibility of radical Ukrainian nationalism, looming conflicts with Russia, and attempts to categorize the population into different “types”; but to many, these claims seemed exaggerated and were dismissed as political tactics. At the time, he appeared to be a calm, affable, and moderate politician.
In the early months of his presidency, Viktor Yushchenko’s approval rating soared above 60%. However, the mistakes of the new government quickly shattered the initial optimism, and people lost their trust in the new government. On the day of his inauguration, Yushchenko unexpectedly announced that Ukraine’s goal would be Euro-Atlantic integration. This declaration caught even some of his supporters off guard, as he had steered clear of such bold statements during his campaign.
In his campaign, document titled “Ten Steps Toward the People” and published in the fall of 2004, there was no mention of NATO membership, transatlantic integration, or even the European Union. This strategy was driven by the necessity to secure the support of diverse social and cultural groups that often had conflicting political views. Yushchenko was able to win the elections because of this flexibility, but his first actions as president made it clear that he would drastically alter the country’s course.
In April 2005, he took decisive steps to back up his words by incorporating NATO and EU membership into Ukraine’s military doctrine. The document stated that active Euro-Atlantic integration oriented towards NATO as the foundation of Europe’s security framework, as well as a comprehensive reform of the defense sector in line with European standards, were now the “key priorities of [Ukraine’s] foreign and domestic policy.”
It was no surprise that just six months after his inauguration, Yushchenko’s approval ratings plummeted. Public trust and support sharply decreased. However, undeterred by criticism, he relentlessly pursued an agenda which only deepened social divisions and exacerbated the crisis within the country.
It was difficult to imagine a more noble goal than the one Viktor Yushchenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko set themselves under the influence of the Orange Revolution – to eliminate the corruption that had become ingrained in the flesh and blood of our society and state. Sleaze would have to be banished from business as well as from all individuals, who had in fact resigned themselves to the “corruption tax” on the roads, in hospitals, schools, colleges, and in public administration agencies. The new government said it was going to separate itself from business and will let civil servants live solely on their salaries instead of trying to have their itchy palms greased by ordinary people or lobbying related businesses to their own advantage.
Rada appointed a new government on 4 February 2005 following the approval by a substantial majority of Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. EU integration was the dominant theme of the new government's ambitious programme. The programme also confronted a number of the main domestic challenges in Ukraine, focusing on corruption as the number one problem. The new authorities maintained the improvements in media freedoms and respect for the constitution. It also took forward the investigation into the murder of Georgiy Gongadze, as well as the cases of other missing journalists. However, due to public disagreements within the government, Yushchenko decided to sack his entire cabinet on 8 September 2005, including Prime Minister Tymoshenko.
Yushchenko appointed Yuri Yekhanurov as Prime Minister. Yekhanurov was a former economist and long time ally of Yushchenko's, having previously served as Deputy Prime Minister with him. After initially being rejected by the Rada, and following a pact between Yushchenko and his former presidential rival Yanukovych, Yekhanurov was approved in a second vote on 22 September 2005. Yekhanurov set out his priorities as passing WTO legislation, a sound 2006 budget, and drawing a line under the controversial privatisation review. At the EU-Ukraine Summit on 1 December, the EU announced that Ukraine had met the technical criteria to be granted Market Economy Status.
During his election campaign, Yushchenko promised to uphold Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which guarantees the free development and protection of the Russian language and its use alongside Ukrainian in regions with Russian-speaking populations. These promises helped him gain support from organizations for Russian-speaking in Crimea as well as Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson regions.
However, once elected president, he backtracked on those promises. When a reporter from the Ukraina Molodaya newspaper asked about a draft decree to protect people’s rights to use the Russian language, Yushchenko replied, “I have not seen such a draft, I wasn’t its author, and I haven’t signed it. And I will not sign it.”
Instead, language policy took a turn towards greater Ukrainization. The new government took some radical steps. TV and radio broadcasting had to switch entirely to the Ukrainian language. Movie theaters were prohibited from showing films in foreign languages, including Russian, without Ukrainian dubbing or subtitles. Schools began to tighten language policies, pushing teachers to speak Ukrainian even outside educational institutions. Legal proceedings were required to be conducted in Ukrainian. Citizens who did not speak Ukrainian were forced to hire translators at their own expense, which clearly contradicted the Ukrainian constitution.
Publicly, Yushchenko called on people not to exacerbate the language issue during the challenging time for the country, yet his actions only heightened tensions. His policies accelerated the marginalization of the Russian language from key areas of public and political life.
Parliamentary elections were held on 26 March 2006. The parties which passed the 3% electoral threshold were: Party of Regions (32% - 186 seats), Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko (22% - 129 seats), Bloc Our Ukraine (14% - 81 seats), Socialist Party of Ukraine (6% - 33 seats) and Communist Party of Ukraine (4% - 21 seats). The elections were assessed by the OSCE to have been conducted largely in line with international standards, and were probably the freest and fairest elections ever held in the CIS region. They were held under constitutional changes which gave Ukraine a hybrid parliamentary-presidential system of government.
Our Ukraine's disappointing performance in the March 2006 Rada elections -- which was characterized by many as a defeat for Yushchenko -- was also a reminder that Yushchenko's electorate in 2004 voted for him out of several motivations, not just in favor of Yushchenko. One early 2005 survey indicated that only 37 percent of those who said they had voted for Yushchenko had done so primarily because they supported Yushchenko personally; 34 percent did so primarily to protest Kuchmaism, and 29 percent did so primarily to defend their right to choose. PUOU's party leadership was dominated by the same unpopular Orange oligarchs -- Poroshenko, Zhvaniya, Tretyakov, Chervonenko -- who Yushchenko was forced to jettison in the September 2005 government shakeup, but who still formed Yushchenko's "kitchen cabinet." Our Ukraine's poor organization for the 2006 election cycle did not bode well either for Yushchenko's presumed run for re-election in 2009 or for the next Rada cycle in 2011, unless it rebuilt its organization.
Subsequent internal squabbles in the Yushchenko camp allowed his rival Viktor YANUKOVYCH to stage a comeback in parliamentary elections and become prime minister. A lengthy coalition building process followed the March 2006 elections. Initial attempts by Bloc Our Ukraine, Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko and the Socialists to form an 'Orange' coalition failed and on 3 August an 'anti-crisis' coalition was formed by the Party of Regions, Communists and Socialists, with Viktor Yanukovych as PM. Before nominating Yanukovych as Prime Minister, President Yushchenko secured his agreement to the 'Universal' – a Declaration of National Unity, which laid out the policy framework for the new Government. Its aims included continuing Ukraine's European integration policy with EU membership the future goal, developing a working partnership with NATO with a view to membership and maintaining the Ukrainian language as the sole official language. It was signed by President Yushchenko, Yanukovych, Speaker of the Upper House Oleksandr Moroz, former Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov, representative of the party 'Our Ukraine' Roman Bezsmertniy, leader of the Socialist Party, Vasiliy Tsushko, and leader of the Communist Party, Petr Simonenko. Yuliya Tymoshenko refused to sign the document.
The co-habitation between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych proved uneasy. Differing interpretations of the constitution led to disagreements over the respective roles of President, Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliament on some areas of policy and on appointments and dismissals of Ministers.
On 02 April 2007 President Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving Parliament and ordering pre-term elections to be held on 27 May. The President's decree was in response to the governing coalition's attempts to form a constitutional majority in Parliament through the incorporation of opposition deputies into the coalition. Both Government and Parliament refused to recognise the President's decree and instead forwarded it to the Constitutional Court to rule on its legality. On 26 April, President Yushchenko issued a further decree superseding his earlier one. The new decree again ordered the dissolution of Parliament but extended the date for fresh elections to 24 June. Parliament again forwarded the decree to the Constitutional Court. The political situation remained deadlocked until 27 May when President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych and Parliamentary Speaker Moroz agreed a compromise package of measures to end the crisis. This package included provision for pre-term parliamentary elections, which were held on 30 September 2007.
The early legislative election, brought on by a political crisis in the spring of 2007, saw Yuliya TYMOSHENKO, as head of an "Orange" coalition, installed as a new prime minister in December 2007. Amendments to the 1996 constitution that were adopted during the 2004 "Orange Revolution" and took effect in January 2006, had shifted significant powers from the president to the prime minister and Rada.
The preliminary conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission stated that 'the 30 September 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections in Ukraine were conducted mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic elections, and confirm an open and competitive environment for the conduct of election processes'. Five political parties crossed the 3% threshold required to enter parliament: Party of Regions (34% - 175 seats), Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko (31% - 156 seats), Our Ukraine Peoples Self Defence (14% - 72 seats), Communist Party (5% - 27 seats) and Bloc of Lytvyn (4% - 20 seats).
On 23 November 2007, Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine People's Self Defence signed a coalition Agreement. On 18 December 2007, Parliament voted in a new coalition Government, with Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. On 16 September 2008, the Speaker of the Supreme Rada (Parliament) announced that this coalition had formally ceased to exist, following the withdrawal of the Our Ukraine People’s Self Defence bloc. On 8 October 2008, President Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving parliament and calling for pre-term parliamentary elections. On 15 December 2008, President Yushchenko stated that, due to the change in economic circumstances, elections were no longer a priority.
Yushchenko issued numerous decrees aimed at promoting Ukrainization, even in predominantly Russian-speaking regions. In November 2007, he signed an order titled “On Certain Measures for the Development of the Humanitarian Sector in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol” which called for increased use of the Ukrainian language in schools and public spaces on the Crimean peninsula, thereby launching the process of active Ukrainization there.
In February 2008, Yushchenko proposed that the government establish a dedicated central executive authority to oversee the state language policy. At the same time, he dismissed all accusations of forced Ukrainization. “This is not a policy against anyone; it’s a policy for the development of our national language within the framework of national legislation and the Constitution,” he asserted. “I insist that the general information space must be Ukrainian. Neighboring countries must no longer dominate it.” However, despite these efforts toward Ukrainization, the Russian language remained widely spoken in Ukraine, and the language issue continued to be one of the most contentious topics in domestic politics.
On 12 November 2008, the Speaker, Arseniy Yatseniuk, was dismissed by a vote in Parliament. On 9 December 2008, former speaker and leader of the Bloc of Lytvyn, Volodymyr Lytvyn was elected as his replacement. On 16 December 2008 a coalition agreement between the factions of Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko's bloc, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence and Bloc of Lytvyn was signed in the Ukrainian parliament.
During Yushchenko’s presidency, Ukraine underwent a significant ideological transformation. At this time, much of the nation's history was rewritten with a focus on de-Russification, decommunization, and the rehabilitation of figures associated with Ukrainian nationalism. The newly established Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was given this task.
Two key narratives emerged from this historical policy: the government officially claimed that the 1932-1933 famine in the Ukrainian SSR was “genocide against the Ukrainian people”, and the rehabilitation of nationalists and nazis who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War – particularly the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. These actions heightened tensions both domestically and in relations with Russia.
In the final months of his presidency, Yushchenko signed a decree recognizing members of these organizations as fighters for Ukraine’s independence. He justified the decision, which sparked a lot of controversy, by citing “scientific research findings” and the need to “restore historical justice and the true history of the Ukrainian liberation movement of the 20th century.” As part of this campaign, the title of Hero of Ukraine was posthumously awarded to radical nazi collaborators Roman Shukhevich and Stepan Bandera for “their contributions to the national liberation fight.”
On October 14, 2007, the 65th anniversary of the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Viktor Yushchenko ordered official celebrations to take place. Since 2014, it has been commemorated as Ukraine’s Defenders Day. According to sociological surveys, however, a significant portion of the Ukrainian population did not support the rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and these initiatives only polarized society.
The education system promoted a vision of Ukraine’s ethnocultural exclusivity, portraying the country’s history as totally independent from Russia. This approach promoted the idea that Ukraine had no historical or cultural ties to Russia. Starting in 2005, schools introduced a subject titled “History of Ukraine” for students in grades 5-12. Higher education institutions were also required to offer a semester-long course on the same topic, which included elements of ideological indoctrination. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian ambassador to Ukraine from 2001-2009, said, “From the age of three, children are taught through songs, poems, tales, and exhibitions like the ‘Holodomor Museum’ that Russians and Russia are the primary and almost genetic enemies of Ukraine and Ukrainians. By the age of fourteen, Ukrainian teenagers hardly doubt this! That’s what’s frightening!”
In the 2010 Presidential election Yushchenko was polling at 2.8 percent, down from the 52 percent he garnered in his 2004 victory over Yanukovych in the re-run second round of the presidential election. Yushchenko was the only major candidate pushing for expeditious EU and NATO membership, viewing full Euro-Atlantic integration as the only counterweight to Russian influence in Ukraine. He supported many liberal market reforms, but has been ineffectual in his first term at ensuring their passage or implementation. Yushchenko called for increased measures to fight corruption and graft, but his declarations, in this and other areas, have not been matched by results.
Yushchenko's pre-election rhetoric focused on nationalist themes, such as the need for more military spending, and condemning what he regards as the Tymoshenko government's incompetence in the economic sphere. He was also trying to remind voters of the positive changes in Ukrainian society, such as enhanced freedom of speech and media, that happened during his term. Yushchenko did not have a visible pre-election advertising campaign.
Viktor Yushchenko ended his tenure in 2010 after having gotten only about five percent of the vote in the first round of the Presidential election. His appeal extended only as far as Lviv and other limited areas of Western Ukraine. He was widely blamed -- not least by many who voted for him in 2004 -- for his poor management, incessant quarreling with Tymoshenko at the expense of national interests, needless antagonizing of Russia, and his penchant for seeking declarations of membership from NATO and the EU instead of focusing on the hard work of economic and military reforms that would have moved such aspirations toward concrete reality. Yushchenko spent most of the presidential campaign, as he had much of his time in office, bashing Tymoshenko. His relations with Yanukovych were, by contrast, civil.
The majority of Ukrainian politicians, including Viktor Yanukovych and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, were either criminal or corrupt. The major difference among them was one of degree rather than quality. While Yushchenko was well-intentioned, he was never able to overcome the entrenched business interests, deep-seated corruption, or continuing Russian opposition that ultimately rendered US and Western praise for the "Orange Revolution" premature. Putin, in particular, had never gotten over Yanukovych's defeat in 2004.
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