• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Tank Troops

Ground Combat Systems
Tanks
T-60 T-70 IS-2 IS-3 IS-7 KV-1 T-18 T-34 Object 777 T-54 T-55 T-62 T-64 T-72 T-80 T-84 T-90 T-95 T-14 Armata Black Eagle Object 195 Object 490 Object 490B Object 640 Project T-95

Tankers dominanted the Russian Army, just as Ukrainians once dominated in the Soviet Army. Tank generals run everything. Tank generals have always, in general, dominated the armed forces of the Red Army. Now they do not just dominate - they totally dominate. And the chief of the general staff - a tank general, and around him. All districts are headed by tank generals. Kartapolov was also a tank general. They were everywhere. Even the Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces was also a tank general - Surovikin.

The Soviets apparently chose to build what can best be described as an army of tanks. They evidently concluded that tank forces -- in large numbers and with nuclear fire support -- could successfully perform virtually all the normal ground forces offensive or defensive tactical roles. The Soviets appeared to believe that such tank-heavy forces can also meet their requirements for nonnuclear war.

A Tank is a heavily armored vehicle (up to the equivalent of 1,000 mm of armor), mounting a large caliber cannon (90mm or above) in a large, fully enclosed, heavily armored turret. It must have tracks. It has excellent cross-country mobility, armor protection, firepower, and the capability of producing a shock effect on the enemy. A tank is an offensive weapon designed to fire and maneuver and assault through an objective. Remember, all tanks are armored vehicles, but not all armored vehicles are tanks.

Germany is good tank country. Germany is good tank country. The North German Plains is characterized as being relatively flat and open terrain. Rivers and valleys do not canalize cross-country movement as was the situation further south. Such conditions as are present make the area ideally suited to armor operations and provide Warsaw Pact forces with the best terrain to conduct high-speed offensives across Western Europe to the major port facilities along the coast. The meeting engagement was the form of the offensive which best supports the high-speed attack.

The specter of thousands of Soviet tanks rolling westward across the north German plain no longer haunts the United States. During the Cold War, however, it was possible, with perhaps only slight exaggeration, to fear a Soviet breakthrough along the inter-German border. Tens of thousands of Soviet tanks could be envisioned racing West to the Channel and in the process capturing the heart of European industrial capacity. NATO was an alliance that was meant to contain the Soviet Union, to face off against the Warsaw Pact, to face off at a moment's notice against vast swarms Soviet tanks rolling through the Fulda Gap in Division strength.

The "Fulda Gap Syndrome" was the tendency among military planners during the Cold War to build future war scenarios entirely on the assumption that the next war would occur on the European plain, with the Soviet Union launching its primary attack through the Fulda Gap on the former East German border. The Russian 8th Guards Army was on one side of the line, and the Americans on the other side of the line believed that if they won at the Fulda Gap, western Europe and North America would be safe. Soviet tanks will never roll through the Fulda Gap.

Tanks - Cope Cage

Cope Cages refers to a slang term for slat armor, They have indeed been mockingly dubbed by Western analysts as 'emotional support armour' or 'cope cages'. The etymology seems to trace back to the "copium" meme, which is a fictional drug that people huff to deal with losing. The term "cope cage" is a derogatory name for the slat armor that the Russian army welded to the top of some of its tanks before the invasion of Ukraine. The cages were intended to protect against incoming projectile attacks, but they have a reputation for being ineffective. The cages were first identified on November 23, 2021 by a London-based country risk analyst. The cages were a new development for the Russian army, but slat armor has been used in modern warfare for years to defend against RPGs. The cages were added to reassure Russian soldiers before the invasion. The psychological value of armor, even if ineffective, has long been recognized. However, the cages are largely ineffective against modern anti-tank weapons used by the Ukrainians, such as the Javelin and NLAW. The cages are also known as: Bar armor, Cage armor, Standoff armor. Ukraine has also added "cope cages" to its combat vehicles to protect against loitering munition and FPV drone attacks. They have indeed been mockingly dubbed by Western analysts as 'emotional support armour' or 'cope cages' the term "cope cages" became the subject of memes in early 2022 to make fun of the Russian military and its efforts to overtake Ukraine, mostly due to their ineffectiveness against weaponry used by Ukrainian troops such as the Javelin missile. The nickname is also in reference to the Wage Cage and Copium memes. https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/cope-cages">Cope Cages @ Know Your Meme On November 27th, 2021, an image of a Russian tank with slat armor was posted to /r/NonCredibleDefense by Redditor POD-8 who received over 280 likes in 3 months. In the comment section of the post, a since-deleted Redditor commented, "Cope cage?" earning 11 upvotes in three months. The comment is the first known use of the term. On February 26th, 2022, oryxspioenkop posted a TikTok screenshot showing a Russian tank with slat armor after it had fallen off a bridge, captioning the screenshot, "Looks like the ‘cope cage’ doesn’t protect Russian tanks against driving off bridges," A cope cage is a metal screen that's used as improvised armor on the towers of military vehicles. The cages are designed to protect vehicles from drone missiles and armor-piercing rockets. They first appeared on Russian armored vehicles in late 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine. Cope cages are also known as "dog kennels" or "chicken coops" in Hungarian. They have been used since the 1960s and are now a prominent feature at the Army-2023 defense exhibition in Moscow. Cope cages may be effective against High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads. They can tear the warhead apart or force it to detonate early. Ukraine has also added cope cages to its artillery systems to protect them from drone attacks. A British Challenger 2 tank was spotted with a makeshift cope cage covering its turret. Russia has thousands of tanks, MLRS, and armored vehicles that are all susceptible to attack from Ukrainian soldiers brandishing Javelins and other anti-armor weapons. Russia attempted to stay ahead of the issue before the escalation of its war in Ukraine by welding homemade slats to the top of some of its tanks. However, weeks after the war started, it became evident that the unusual additions to Russian tanks dubbed “cope cages” did not seem to reduce Ukrainian munitions’ penetration power. Cope cages, also called slat armor, bar armor, cage armor, and stand-off armor, are a unique defense employed in heavy military vehicles to lessen the damage brought on by high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) weaponry. The first cope cages were spotted on Russian T-80 tanks marching into Crimea in November 2021. At the time, a viral TikTok video showed a Soviet-era T-80 tank trudging through the mud with its turret covered with what looked like a peculiar metal slat roof. However, soon after, the Ukrainian forces started testing Javelins on static targets that were also caged in response. The outcomes did not bode well for the Russian forces in the following months, which saw Ukrainian ATGMs obliterating several Russian tanks, despite the cages installed on them. A retired Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe, the former head of the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, told EurAsian Times, “The use of slat armor or stand-off armor- has been around since at least World War 2. It has proven effective against High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads by either tearing the warhead apart or forcing early detonation and early forming of the molten jet that is used to penetrate the armored vehicle. These warheads are known as “shaped charges.” We’ve seen recent employment of these slat armor systems with the RPG Cages that were emplaced on Strykers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The use of dual tandem warheads in modern anti-tank missiles is a way to penetrate these stand-off armor systems and even “reactive” armor that explodes on contact to dissipate the molten jet. The Javelin is such a system.” After the war started, the Russians also equipped its archaic and frail T-62 tanks with what was then known as “cope cages” before they sent them into battle. However, the utility of these cope cages have also been questioned by Russia’s troops and military experts who contend that it has caused more harm than good for the tank crews. Earlier, Russian tank captain Aleksei Ukhachev told the Moskovsky Komsomolets magazine, “We welded grates on top of our tanks, but we wound up removing them. In the first place, the grates cause problems: the machine gun won’t rotate, antennae get caught up in the grate, the radio burns out, and you have no communications.” The grates, which the tankers called “BBQ grills,” failed to deflect the missiles on the battlefield. Ukhachev continued, saying it was even worse if a crew had to escape a tank with a coping cage on the roof since the metal grate would confine them within the turret. Even though these cope cages are worthless against big air-dropped weapons and anti-tank guided missiles, they might provide some defense against small explosives dropped by commercial drones. [RU = kletka dla vyzhivaniya] By late 2021 new improvements to heavy armored vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces were in evidence. Most of all, observers were interested in the protective structures (lattices, screens) on the turrets of tanks. This is not a response to the Bayraktars and UAVs in particular, but a defense aimed generally against top-attack anti-tank guided missiles that can hit a target “through the roof,” i.e. hit the tank's turret from above (like a Javelin). In June 2021, tank firing took place in the Rostov region at the Kadamovsky training ground, where tanks with the mentioned structures on the turrets were spotted. In the summer of 2021, pictures of Russian tanks with protective structures of various shapes on the tank turrets already appeared on the Internet. However, then users assumed that this equipment would be sent to Syria. Then many jokingly suggested that the protective screens were needed so that the generals who controlled these tanks “kept the sun out of their eyes.” However, the military themselves explained that these are not “sun visors.” The structure itself is installed so that the cumulative stream of ammunition does not reach the tank. Against the backdrop of another serious escalation of the conflict in Donbass, in October 2021 social networks drew attention to the transfer of Russian equipment to the western and southern borders of Russia. As reported by Military Review, a photograph of a military train transporting T-72B tanks, some of which had protective structures installed on the turrets, appeared online. Commentators claim that the armored vehicles were spotted in Krasnodar while the train was passing through the railway station. The image clearly shows that at least two tanks were equipped with the mentioned lattice screens. However, many users called the protective structures “sun canopies,” “anti-javelin protection,” and even “the last word in fencing.” As for the “anti-javelin protection” of the tank turret from damage from ammunition (the weak point of these combat vehicles) attacking the target from above, we can talk not only about countering the American FGM-148 Javelin man-portable anti-tank missile systems (ATGM). The above-mentioned designation includes all such ATGMs, guided missiles (ATGMs) that are able to hit a target in a similar way. In addition, the structure on the tower can be designed to counter attacks from drones, as well as as additional protection against tandem weapons. This is an assumption, since the Russian Ministry of Defense did not give any comments on this matter.

Tanks - Inventory

The Soviet armed forces never throw anything away, and in 1980 by Western estimtes there were 20,000 tanks in storage to feed to the mobilized divisions. These tanks were in addition to the 26,000 tanks now deployed in Europe by the Warsaw Pact. Tha total inventory of Warsaw Pact medium or main battle tanks oriented to the NATO area represents almost a three-to-one superiority over NATO. By 1980, the Warsaw Pact inventory facing NATO includes about 40,000 active medium tanks and an additional number in storage. The total national inventories for NATO, including the United States, comprises 15,800 active medium tanks and some more in storage. These aggregates, of course, do not address availability times or utilitarian factors.

As of 2017, the tank forces of the Ground Troops of the Russian Armed Forces had 3,030 tanks on duty and 10,200 tanks in storage, as well as 250 tanks serving as part of the Coastal Forces of the Russian Navy. Russia thus outnumbered the tank forces of the United States, whose tank fleet totals 2,831 M1 Abrams tanks in service and 3500 - in storage. By 2022 Russia had 2,750 active tanks and 10,000 further tanks in storage. Russia had 2,800 T-55, 2,500 T-62, and 2,000 T-64 obsolete, non-operational tanks in storage.

There were a total of 9 "Weapons and Equipment Storage Bases", 7 of which were in the Far East. They were to be mobilized into motor rifle brigades with reserve personnel in 3-6 months. their tanks (350-ish) would be deployed to the front if badly needed. This will significantly hinder Ru's defence in its Asian part, and it will take 2-3 months to de-mothball and move these tanks. The rest of the "10,000 tanks army" lies in the "Central Armored Tank Storage Bases", where vintage tanks were mothballed in huge amounts. These tanks, like this T-62AM from the 1295th CATSB, basically have no chance of survival in modern warfare.

By mid-April 2022 a 6th (or more) of overall Russian tank strength had been depleted already. Russia appeared to have 6,000 tanks in storage, of which 3,000 were servicable. Accepting 2,500 as the book strength of Russia's active tank force, then their operational numbes were likely closer to 1,500-1,700. Normally, by one estimate it was considered that 25-30% of vehicles as being inactive for different maintenance purposes or because the unit was waiting for new vehicles. In Russia, this was likely higher given the obvious logistical and maintenance issues that the Russian army was exhibiting in the field. Now, this may be because Russia was using vehicles that should still be in the maintenance bays. However, the cavalier attitude towards logistics and maintenance likely means that Russia was closer to a 30-40% of vehicles that were either inoperative or ineffective due to maintenance problems.

Russia still needed to have these tanks manned by competent crews. A country can have a lot of tanks, but if it doesn't have enough crews to man it in short notice, the number of tanks you have in storage won't matter much. Not only that, crews were actually a small part of the manpower requirement to operate a tank, each tank needs support, which required dozens of crews. The support crews were needed to keep the crews fed, the tanks armed and fueled, and if the tank was stuck or damaged - repaired, and if the tank can't be repaired in the field, ehe unit must have a recovery vehicle to tow it away to be repaired in a better equipped facility, and those have to be supported as well. If the crews were injured, they must be extracted and lifted away to relative safety. In a high-intensity conflict, a tank can ran out of fuel and ammunitions in a matter of hours, not days, but hours. Keeping tank crews alive was important because active service tanks were usually manned by experienced crew, losing them means less experienced ones will have to takeover, and they're more likely to suffer losses.

Hundreds of Putin's army tanks were believed to have been destroyed since the invasion of Ukraine began, but there was no easy way to find out the exact number of Russian tanks destroyed. The open-source website Oryx reported on 28 April 2022 that at least 300 tanks from Putin's army had been destroyed, with another 279 damaged, abandoned or captured. However, the portal only counts cases where it had visual evidence, so Russian losses could be much higher. On 25 April 2022, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace estimated that the Russians had already lost up to 600 units of this equipment alone. Although, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the first 63 days of the war, as of 27 April 2022 the invaders lost 939 tanks, 21 of them in the previous day.

The Russian armed forces received several hundred newly produced tanks, mainly T-90M Proryv, for use in the zone of special military operation in Ukraine. By the end of March 2023, the Russian defense industry had delivered several hundred new tanks, recently released from the assembly line, to the combat zone. These were mainly T-90M Proryv tanks, as well as deeply modernized T-72B3M tanks. Russian sources claimed that "in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics, including armament, fire control system, protection, mobility, and situational awareness, these tanks were at least at the level of the most modern foreign vehicles.... At the same time, we can say with confidence that the T-90M and T-72B3M were completely superior in terms of combat characteristics to those tanks that the Ukrainian troops have or will receive in the near future from NATO countries," the source added. In addition, the T-90M and T-72B3M tanks were equipped with additional reactive armor that protects equipment against anti-tank weapons.

Western countries supplied Ukraine with various types of weapon systems, including air defense missiles, multiple launch rocket systems, tanks, self-propelled artillery and anti-aircraft guns since Russia launched its special military operation in Ukraine over a year ago. Moscow had repeatedly warned that arms deliveries do not contribute to a peaceful resolution and further escalate the conflict.

Periodically, the issue of the number of tanks in service was discussed. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation include ground forces, and now also in the composition of the Airborne Forces, there were tanks, and in the composition marines The Navy also had them (as part of the Coastal Forces of the Navy, they were, in fact, these were ordinary motorized rifle brigades, but registered with the Navy due to the geography of their permanent deployment). Along with long-term storage Russia's tank stock was such that it will be enough numerically for Russia, allies, and potential adversaries. But what about the tanks in line parts There were many different estimates, and very often they refer to different estimates of the early 2010s, when formations and parts of the cadre were liquidated, divisions were converted into brigades. But since then the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation gradually completed the formation of brigades, then proceeded to the formation of divisions.

Tank Units - Organization & Equipment

The Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces had as one of his subordinates the Commander of Tank Forces. But in Soviet times tens of thousands of tanks were spread throughout the world, from Cuba to Sakhalin. Every Russian reconnaissance battalion had a tank platoon, every motor-rifle regiment had a tank battalion, every motor-rifle division had a tank regiment, and every Soviet Army had a tank division, every Front had a Tank Army, and each Strategic Direction had a Group of Tank Armies. Decisions on the use of all these tanks in combat were taken by the combat commanders as the situation develops. The Commander of Tank Forces was in no position to play any part in the control of each tank unit, and any such intervention would be a violation of the principle of sole responsibility for the conduct and results of combat operations. The Commander of Tank Forces was forbidden to intervene in combat planning and in questions of the use of tanks in combat.

The responsibilities of the Commander of Tank Forces cover the development of new types of tank and their testing, the supervision of the quality of production of tank factories, ensuring that all tank detachments were supplied with the necessary spare parts and the training of specialists in the Tank Force Academies, in the Tank Higher Schools and in training divisions. He was also responsible for the technical condition of tanks in all the armed forces and acts as the inspector of all tank personnel.

The exact organizational and staffing structures for each unit or formation were secret, but typical OShS were more or less known. The Military Balance guide published by the IISS reports the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in combat strength of 2780 tanks, but the fact that this was inaccurate can be seen from what tanks and how many. For example, the T-90 and T-90A - 350 vehicles, but in fact there are, let's say, much fewer of them in the troops, and the T-90, in addition to a few vehicles in combat training groups of formations and training camps, mainly stand on the central reserve bases (IISS noted this, but the total figure of 550 vehicles was not true). T-72B3 and T-72B3 UBKh - a total of 880 vehicles, in their opinion, although this modernization had been coming from UVZ in large quantities since 2011, in some years it reached 300 vehicles, and 200 were handed over a year, and all in any way they have in the directory up to 1000 at least not enough, although there have long been more than 1000 in fact. However, even a year or two ago, everything was even worse, there both the T-55 and T-62 were in reserve, for example, which have long been removed from service (although, of course, they were still available at reserve bases, from where the same T-62 and T-62M get to Syria).

The American Insitute for the Study of War (ISW) released a report "Russia's Military Posture - Ground Forces Order of Battle". This provides information about the number (for about the second half of last year) and deployment formations of the SV Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This reference book was also inaccurate, for example, in a number of divisions (combined arms - tank and motorized rifle) a fourth combat regiment had already been formed, and they were not indicated, but this, in general, was not so important.

When calculating, it was a basis that in separate motorized rifle brigades there were 41 tanks - 4 companies of 3 platoons of 3 tanks each plus a company tank in each and plus a battalion commander's tank. And in tank battalions of tank regiments of divisions and separate tank brigades - 31 tanks, in tank battalions of motorized rifle regiments of divisions 41 tanks as a basis (although options were possible), although there was information and that they switched to the 42-tank and 32-tank states - another tank in the battalion's control. There were 3 tank battalions in a tank brigade, 1 motorized rifle battalion, vice versa in a motorized rifle brigade, 3 tank and motorized rifle battalions in a tank regiment, and vice versa in a motorized rifle brigade. The motorized rifle division had 3 motorized rifle and tank regiments (in combined arms regiments, artillery and anti-aircraft missile and the rest of the units), the tank division was the opposite.

Of course, there were also so-called heavy ones. Accordingly, there were 41 (42?) tanks in a motorized rifle brigade or regiment, 94 (97?) tanks in a tank brigade, as well as 217 (223?) tanks in a motorized rifle division, and 323 (333) tanks in a tank division. It was clear that the division command also had tanks. Of course, this was in a full-blooded division fully formed, but in reality, somewhere there were 3 regiments, somewhere 3 regiments and a tank battalion, but a regiment was already in the process of formation, and somewhere, maybe even 2 more regiments. But this, of course, was a temporary moment.

So, according to the above report, in the SV Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Coastal troops The Navy now had 12 armies (1 of them tank) and 4 army corps. In the Western Military District (ZVO), of this number, 3 armies (1 GvTA, 20 Guards OA, 6 OA) and 1 corps (11 Guards AK in the Kaliningrad defensive region), part of the joint operational-strategic command "North" ( Northern Fleet) includes 14 AK on Kola Peninsula, in the Southern Military District (SMD) - 3 armies (8 Guards OA, 58 OA, 49 OA) and 1 corps (22 AK in Crimea), in the Central Military District (TsVO) - 2 armies (2 Guards OA, 41 OA), in the Eastern Military District (VVO) - 4 armies (29 OA, 35 OA, 36 OA, 5 OA) and 1 corps (68 AK on Sakhalin and the Kuriles). As part of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 4th Guards Tank and 2nd Guards motorized rifle division, 6th separate tank brigade, 27th guards motorized rifle brigade (various formations and parts of army and corps kits do not count), the total was 675 (695) tanks, provided that the fourth regiments were completed in 4 guards.

In the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army - 144 Guards. motor rifle divisions and 3 motor rifle divisions, as a result, 434 (446) tanks come out, provided that the divisions were completed to the end, but it was known that so far the fourth pair of regiments was only being formed there in both divisions. However, it was possible that 144 Guards. The MRD will have not one tank regiment, but two - a tank regiment was being formed on the basis of a separate tank battalion, and meanwhile, the division already had a 228th tank regiment. That is, the division will be something like 150 motor rifle divisions.

In northern and northwestern parts of the Western Military District it’s much worse with tanks, in 6 OA there were only 2 motorized rifle brigades (138 and 25 omsbr), so there were only 82 (84) tanks per army, and the army is, in general, small. On the other hand, in potential opponents there were only the nano-powers of the Baltic states with three NATO combined battalions inside and Finland. True, apparently, in the RF Armed Forces, when forming divisions, they approach the issue anew in such a way that, obviously, as a result, each army will have at least one motorized division, so some similar decision was not ruled out in the coming years in this case. In the Kaliningrad 11 Guards AK, there were only two motorized rifle brigades (OMSBR), 7 Guards and 79 Guards, in total 82 (84) tanks. Tanks have not yet appeared in the nearby 336th Marine Guards Brigade of the Baltic Fleet, but a company and then a battalion will probably appear in the next couple of years - a similar process was already underway in the Pacific Fleet.

So far, no one was forming any divisions there, but such a decision, as it seems, suggests itself in the future. However, this was only a fairy tale from the podium, and the deed was usually done much more slowly. In total, in the ZVO were 1275 (1305) tanks in the ranks of line formations, although in reality there were still somewhat fewer of them. Adding the 14th AK from the USC "Sever" there, then for now there definitely was a tank battalion in the 200th brigade, perhaps it was or will be in the 80th arctic brigade, there were no tanks in the 61st marine brigades yet, but they will definitely appear soon. So this amounts to 82 (84 tanks).

In CVO, according to the same report, as part of the 2nd Guards. The OA now had 3 motorized rifle brigades, numbered 21, 15 and 30. But they were all different. The 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade from Totskoye seems to be the only one in the RF Armed Forces (perhaps not), formed according to the so-called. "heavy staff" with 2 tank and 2 motorized rifle battalions, it had 82 (84) tanks, but the 15th brigade was a peacekeeping brigade, it seems that there was no tank battalion in it, which was up to 30 brigade, newly formed to replace those seized after the start of the war on Ukraine from this army of units and formations (which became the basis for the formation of 144 motor rifle divisions) - there was no information on its composition, except that in it the reconnaissance battalion, following the Syrian traces, seemed to be put on various vehicles, starting with "Tigrov-M" and ending with "Patriots". Probably, there was still a tank battalion there. In general, conditionally write down 123 (124) tanks for the army. According to the same document, the newly formed 90th Guards Tank Division was part of the 41st OA (earlier there was information that it remained under district subordination, who was right here was unknown), along with the 74th Guards. omsbr, 35 guards. brigade and 55th mountain brigade from Kyzyl in Tuva. The Tuvan "highlanders" don't have tanks, they don't need them, but everyone else had them. It also includes the 201st military base in Tajikistan, which now had three motorized rifle regiments, it seems that there were tanks everywhere. In total, a fairly strong fist comes out in 534 (543) tanks, if everything was correct, of course. In total, 657 (667) vehicles were obtained for the Central Military District.

In VVO, despite 4 armies and a corps, divisions, namely they were the most "rich" in heavy armored vehicles, have not yet been formed, but only so far. Far from all armies themselves can be considered deployed, in a number of them there were 1-2 combined-arms brigades, and with deployed brigades and regiments of an army set. In general, this situation was understandable - China in currently was not an enemy, but a friend and ally, and had more and more potential enemies in Europe, in NATO. In total, in all these 4 armies and 1 corps there were 10 motorized rifle brigades, 1 tank brigade and 18 machine gun and artillery division in the Kuriles (fortified, but tank units there were also in it, where without them), that is, approximately 600 tanks. In addition, in the Pacific Fleet, as part of the 155th Marine Brigade, there were no tanks yet, but they will be soon, a company was now deployed in the 40th Marine Brigade, but it will be reorganized into a battalion, and would be counted.

In Southern military district Now in the 58 OA there were 42 guards. msd, 19 and 136 omsbr, 4 guards military base in South Ossetia. The 42 Evpatoria Division was now fully deployed, but according to researchers from the United States, there was no tank regiment in it or it was being deployed. In total, 340 (350) vehicles were obtained. In 49 OA there were as many as 2 combined-arms brigades, 205 and 34 mountain brigades, in which there were no tanks. Much more interesting was the newly formed 8th Guards. The OA, formed with the clear aim of forcing various broad Cossacks from the territory adjacent to the republics of Donbass to peace, who love to talk about how they "restrain Russian fascism", not forgetting, of course, shouting Nazi slogans and "greeting the Sun" with a characteristic gesture. It had the 150th Idritsko-Berlin Motor Rifle Division, which includes 2 tank and 2 motorized rifle regiments, formed according to, as they say, difficult states.

That is, there were much more tanks and artillery in it, not only the usual MSD, but even than in TD. Assuming (and this was most likely the case) that the states of this division repeat the OShS of the so-called "Ogarkov" heavy motorized rifle divisions, successfully dispersed under Gorbachev, then the tanks there as a result, upon completion of the formation, may be under 400. In those divisions, the battalions had 4 companies each (in the SSB 3 MSR and 1 tr, in the TB vice versa), and all the tank companies were 13 tank companies, and the battalions even in the tank regiments had 40 tanks each. Moreover, at the battalion level there were 122-mm self-propelled guns 2S1 and a lot of other useful things, and in the regiments 152mm 2S3 served as artillery, which in ordinary divisions were in the artillery regiment. Also included in the same army was the 20th Guards. omsbr from Volgograd (if the Americans were not mistaken). In the Crimean 22 AK, there was only one combined-arms brigade with tanks - at number 126 from Perevalnoye, called the brigade coastal defense, but in fact it was motorized rifle, just naval, like everything in the Crimea, subordination. This was another 41 (42 tanks). In total, 860-876 tanks come out in the Southern Military District, if all units were completed, and estimates for 150 divisions more or less coincide with reality.

In total, in all districts, 3475-3530 vehicles were in service. In reality, there were fewer of them, not all connections were completed, on the other hand, training centers and military schools, where there were still more than one hundred tanks not counted, like many other things. And, of course, tanks at storage and repair bases were not taken into account military equipment(BKhIRVT), that is, the bases for the formation of regiments and brigades of the first stage of mobilization (everything else was already formed on the basis of equipment from the central bases of the reserve). These BHiRVT were now being reorganized into the so-called TsOMRs (centers for providing micro-deployment), in fact, this was the same base, but with training and other bases to ensure the activities of reservists of the permanent reserve, which was recently officially legalized, and this was a very good and long overdue decision.

Tanks - Modernization

The Soviet Ground Forces viewed the tank as their primary weapon. In 1989 the Tank Troops had five types of main battle tanks, including the T-54/55, T-62, T-64, T-72, and T-80. The greater part of the total tank inventory of 53,000 consisted of older, although still highly potent, T-54/55 and T-62 tanks.

The technical progress in the art of war made in the early part of the 20th century brought about new kind of combat systems - battle tanks. These fighting vehicles embodied the firepower of artillery, armor protection against enemy's fire, and high mobility during cross-country movement. The combination of all these capabilities made it possible to plan and carry out military operations on a qualitatively new level, and, hence, caused rapid rise in the quantity and quality of tank fleets.

The outcome of the world wars and local conflicts became directly depended on wide use of tank troops - the main striking force of land armies. Nowadays the battle tank was one of the most complex machines. Its design ensures its reliability and operability under extreme conditions, under the influence of climatic, operational and combat factors. This was achieved by strenuous efforts of designers, researchers and manufacturers.

Because ground weapons technology had advanced steadily since World War II, the Soviets replenished their huge tank force constantly with new tank models to keep it from becoming obsolescent. This requirement led to a major research and development program and the construction of an extensive production establishment that had supported a high annual tank production rate - an estimated average of about 3,000 vehicles a year for the last 10 years of the Cold War. This high rate of production enabled the Soviets to keep their tank force opposite NATO equipped largely with modern, highly capable vehicles.

The Soviet planning cycle worked in 5-year increments. The procedure was to tool up a factory and let it run until the tooling starts to wear out, which took 12 to 17 years. The replacement decision was usually at the end of the third 5-year plan after the one during which the factory started production. In some major systems such as tank production, the Soviets simply have three large plants and retool one during each 5-year plan.

Under this system, once a plant was retooled, it continued in uninterrupted production on the same item until its time in the planning sequence rolled around again. Toward the end of the life cycle, these plants turned out obsolete, but still serviceable, equipment that was used primarily for export to the Soviet Union's clients and allies, and maintain a supply and spare-parts base for Soviet units still equipped with the product. A plant at the lower end of its life cycle often had an attached facility to rebuild worn-out equipment.

Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov stated 30 July 2018 that now there was no need to equip the Armed Forces of Russia with a large number of such equipment as Armata or Bumerang, since the latest versions of the T-72 tanks were highly efficient. "Why" flood "with" Armats "or" Boomerangs "all the Armed Forces? We have a tank T-72 is in great demand in the market, it takes everything. Compared with the "Abrams", "Leclercs" and "Leopards" in terms of price, efficiency and quality, it significantly exceeds them," Borisov told reporters.

"Armata and Boomerang are quite expensive models in relation to existing ones. These models are the prospect of armored vehicles," Borisov said. "If the existing equipment, in particular, the upgraded T-72, BMP-4 or BTR-82 tanks were inferior in terms of their capabilities to the likely enemy, we would now be forcing and buying new models," the Deputy Prime Minister said. He added that Russia manages, having a budget of 10 times less than NATO countries, to accomplish the tasks "at the expense of such effective solutions, when we look at the modernization potential of old models."

A prototype of the T-14 Armata tank was unveiled publicly at a military parade in Moscow in 2015. Russian officials said at the time of the presentation that 2,300 of the vehicles would be in use in Russia's armed forces in 2020. They said the first battle-ready units should be sent to the 1st Guards Tank Regiment, which was part of the 2nd Guards of the Motorized Taman Division based in the Moscow region.