Reserves - Soviet Union
The current reserve system was inherited from the Soviet Union, and was designed for supporting a doctrine that required maintaining a large strategic reserve of troops that could be mobilized in the event of large-scale warfare. It was composed of conscripts and officers who had completed their mandatory service obligation and had been discharged from active service, with rare and infrequent call-ups to test mobilization capabilities.
One consequence of the Soviet Union’s mass mobilization doctrine was the necessity to maintain units and equipment for these mobilized reservists. These units were/are manned by small full-time cadres that would keep the equipment serviceable and maintain enough institutional knowledge to bring the mobilized reserve up to some level of combat readiness before deployment. Many of these “cadre units” were disbanded after the 2009 “New Look” reforms, as there was a belief that resources were being wasted on maintaining a mass mobilization capability to the detriment of bringing active units up to full levels of operational readiness.
The Reserve of the Supreme High Command (reserve, from Latin reservo - save, store), formerly referred to as the "Reserve of the High Command" - formations of the military branches and forces of the branches of the armed forces , individual branches of the military (forces) and special forces of the state, preserved until a certain period of time and intended to strengthen the formations of the existing army and navy.
The reserve of the Supreme High Command included formed and newly formed formations as well as units withdrawn to the reserve from the front line and located in the reserve of the Supreme or High Command. In the USSR Armed Forces , separate associations , formations and units were also created, directly subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The abbreviated name is RVGK and RGK. There is another name in the literature - the Strategic Reserve, the Reserve Troops of the High Command. In modern Russia, the only reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the Airborne Troops. Most of the military units of the Airborne Forces, which are part of the Reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, are also guards.
Reserve troops more generally are a special category of troops kept in peacetime in a smaller staff than field troops. Previously, they were intended exclusively for performing secondary military operations, for serving in the rear of the army and for replacing field units that had entered the theater of war within the state. Today, the desire to increase active combat forces has brought reserve troops closer in purpose to field troops, and if R. troops still constitute a special category in relation to organization, this is only due to the impossibility of maintaining in peacetime all troops with equally highly developed personnel. The Reserve troops, in turn, are subdivided into those with relatively more or less developed cadres; the first are appointed for immediate participation in hostilities, and the second - to strengthen the army later and for service inside the country.
The Soviet Union had the world's most elaborate system of wartime mobilization, although it was not certain that the system would be as impressive in action as it was on paper. Long favored by the political leadership, the military received a large proportion of the human and material resources of the Soviet Union. Guided and controlled by the CPSU, the military's strategic leaders organized, trained, and equipped the Soviet armed forces to capably fulfill their assigned missions. Reserves, together with additional manpower and equipment mobilized in wartime, would substantially augment the considerable strength of the peacetime Soviet military.
In Soviet times, soldiers and officers who served in the service regularly underwent military training. The semiannual turnover of conscripts, one-quarter of total conscript manpower, meant that new inductees were constandy being assimilated into the armed services. This turnover and the two-year service term made it difficult to train and retain specialists to work on sophisticated weapons systems.
Semiannual discharge orders from the minister of defense released troops completing their active duty and automatically enlisted them in the reserves. These troops also had the option of reenlisting as extended service soldiers or applying to become noncommissioned officers. Few did so, however. On returning home, released conscripts had to register as reserves with the voenkomat and report to it changes in their residence, health, education, or family status until their reserve obligation ended at age fifty.
Soldiers retained a reserve obligation until age fifty. For officers, the reserve obligation extended to sixty-five. Thus, Western specialists estimated that over 50 million males were reservists. Local voenkomaty maintained records of residences and other data that would be important in mobilizing the reserves.
Reserves were divided into two categories of three classes based on age and the amount of refresher training they were supposed to receive after mobilization. Reserves were subject to periodic callups for active duty or training in the local garrison. The amount of reserve training actually conducted varied greatly. In 1989 the Soviet Union had about 9 million servicemen who had been discharged from active duty in the preceding five years.
Only 3 million of them would be needed to bring all active Ground Forces divisions to full strength in fewer than three days. Western analysts speculated that large numbers of additional divisions could be created within two to three months using civilian trucks and large stockpiles of older weapons and equipment. Such forces could be employed effectively against NATO's second echelons, as well as against less formidable opponents.
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