1938-1943 - 3rd Five-Year Plan - Aviation
At the beginning of 1940, when the Soviet Union only began to test new prototype planes, several groups of Soviet specialists traveled to Germany. These trips to Germany, replenishing Soviet understanding of the German aviation and aircraft industry, led to important conclusions. It became clear taking all the plants known to the Soviets, in Germany itself and in the countries occupied by it or dependent on it, it could be assumed that the Nazis had a much larger powerful aviation industry and are able to further increase the production of aviation equipment.
M.V. Keldysh solved the problem of flutter. VIAM solved the problem of corrosion protection of metal structures, developed aircraft armor. CIAM actively participated in the testing and testing of aircraft engines and fuels. TsAGI in its wind tunnels blew models of new aircraft, right up to its natural size.
The institutes, together with the experimental design bureaus, worked as unified teams for the construction of new aircraft. To the design bureau A.N. Tupolev, S.V. Ilyushin, PN, Polikarpov were joined by new design bureaus and groups in which combat vehicles were developed. Young engineers A.I. Mikoyan and M.I. Gurevich, S.A. Lavochkin with V.P. Gorbunov and M.I. Gudkov, A.S. Yakovlev, M.M. Pashinin, V.P. Yatsenko, V.K. Tairov and others competed with each other and with more experienced designers for the right to launch their aircraft into series production.
In early 1940, Alexandr Sergeevich Yakovlev unexpectedly was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of the aviation industry for new technology, and on 27 March 1940 the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and SNK, as the head of department of experimental aircraft. At the same time he continued to combine work at the new location with the duties of chief designer.
Yakovlev, who came to the post of Deputy People's Commissar, tried with all his might leave it. Yakovlev had many ill-wishers. But the issues of mass production were taken up by absolutely different people: Petr Vasilievich Dementiev and Pavel Andreevich Voronin. People who have made a lot for the development of the aviation industry. Could Yakovlev "kill" the aircraft at the design stage? At once. Moreover, it was his duty. And spawned a bunch of ill-wishers.
Alexander Sergeevich Moskalev was the author of 35 designs and modifications of aircraft, the ancestor of the swept form of the delta wing. The creator of unique aircraft SAM-5, SAM-7, SAM-10, SAM-13. He built 23 aircraft, but not one was built serially. In his memoirs, Moskalev directly blamed Yakovlev that he did not put his SAM-13 into practice. The plane was really unique, it was created according to the "pull-push" scheme, with two engines. He had very good flight characteristics. Pashinin, Florov, Borovkov, Yatsenko, Bisnovat - they all built airplanes. And they tried to compete with Yakovlev, Lavochkin, Mikoyan. But, for example, the plane Bisnovata SK-1, which flew 100 km / h faster than the Yak-1, could not carry weapons at all.
By October 1941, the army of the Wehrmacht approached Moscow, the city supplying components for aircraft factories. An urgent evacuation of all airlines from the western and central regions of the European part of the USSR was required. Kuybyshev, Kazan, Chkalov, Ufa, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Tbilisi, Tashkent and other cities have become places of new locations for aviation enterprises. In total, about 85% of the country's aviation industry enterprises were relocated.
Across the country, evacuation affected more than one and a half thousand enterprises and 10 million people. World history did not know anything like it. They are amazed by the organization and endurance shown by the workers of the aviation enterprises, withdrawing from their homes, their courage and resilience in overcoming the obstacles that arose with the commissioning of factories in the uninhabited regions.
On November 9, 1941, the State Defense Committee approved the schedules for the restoration and start-up of evacuated factories and production plans. The task was set, not only to restore the release of aircraft, but also significantly increase their quantity and quality.
The final assessment of the Soviet air force in the period 1942-1943 was given by the German command, was as follows: "The process of restoring the Red Army air force, which began in the autumn of 1941 after the crushing blows of the German troops, steadily increased over the following years. Taking into account that 1942 was marked by complete air superiority of the aircraft of the Luftwaffe, the situation changed radically by the end of 1943. By this time, the Russians had learned to benefit from their significant numerical advantage and in many specific cases of dominance in the airspace over the fields of some major battles ... Almost unlimited resources in personnel, materiel and fuel allowed the Red Army Air Force to concentrate a large number of bombers and attack aircraft with a strong fighter escort over their advancing ground forces. While the Soviet Air Force became increasingly aggressive, the Luftwaffe, on the contrary, was forced to go on the defensive. Compared to 1941, the situation has changed radically."
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