Russia - Foreign Relations
It is no secret that after the collapse of colonial empires, all metropolises had an inevitable nostalgia for lost greatness - the so-called post-imperial syndrome. Modern Russia, the main successor to the Soviet superpower, is nostalgic for its former greatness and lost influence. Russia is now experiencing a deferred post-imperial syndrome, despite its small share in the world economy, and still has a strong expansionist charge and an undisclosed ambition of global geopolitical influence.
"Trying to rally around itself on an anti-Western platform the former colonial and oppressed peoples of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, involving them in the struggle against the countries of the "golden billion" that has been "pushing its world domination" "and dominating the world for decades, Russia today claims to be the leader of the 'global majority'."
Valery N. Garbuzov Russia needs knowledge, not myths
"By illegally annexing Crimea, waging an undeclared war in eastern Ukraine, and occupying large swaths of Georgia’s and Moldova’s territory, Putin’s Russia has torn up the international rule book and firmly established itself as a revisionist power, undermining the basis for cooperation on European security.... Putin defines Russia’s interests in opposition to the West and isn’t interested in compromising on the issues of concern to us. His hostility is driven, first and foremost, by domestic politics. Moscow fears the encroachment of Western ideas and values and their potential to contaminate Russia itself and ultimately undermine the regime."Trump’s ‘grand bargain’ with Russia is an illusion By Alexander Vershbow - 21 June 2018
"Russia continues to be accused of meddling in the U.S. elections and a host of other Western countries. Moscow has annexed Crimea from Ukraine, pushed into the Middle East and seemingly pushed the U.S. out of Syria. Its mercenaries have been spotted as far out as Venezuela, and it is moving into Africa. Why, then, are we suddenly seeing three conflicts - in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Nagorno-Karabakh - raging on its periphery, with Russia seemingly doing little to resolve them? ... Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and interfered militarily in Ukraine to prop up the pro-Russian separatist states of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Moscow has come to be regarded as aggressively imposing itself on the world. Its foreign policy escapades since then - the 2016 interference in U.S. elections, its military backing of Syria's Bashar Assad, its unsuccessful coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016, and its support of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela - all fall within that narrative. ... Putin's foreign policy has been about "ticking boxes," of having various agencies, both public and private, establish a presence in foreign countries either to disrupt or influence, but without a coherent strategy for an actual end...." according to Anna Arutunyan
The only priority that mattered in 2025 was concluding the Ukraine conflict on favorable terms. Unlike in Syria, where Russia can pull back if needed, Ukraine represented an existential challenge. It was a conflict that Moscow cannot afford to lose. The conflict there was seen as central to Russia’s long-term security and global standing. In a world increasingly defined by pragmatic, limited engagements, the ability to step back, recalibrate, and reengage may matter more than symbolic gestures of great-power status.
An important feature of the new world is the decline of ‘soft power’ as it was understood at the end of the last century. This is because non-violent influence had proven its effectiveness. And now everyone is taking steps to neutralise it. Hence the plethora of laws designed to prevent foreign influence. This is combined with widespread efforts to strengthen cultural and value identity, both within the Western community (consolidation on radical-liberal grounds) and outside it. One thing is clear: overcoming Western monetary and financial hegemony and promoting development which doesn’t rely on Western institutions is a priority.
Victory in “hybrid warfare” is not complete and unconditional, but viscous and ambiguous, implying the continuation of the conflict by various means, not necessarily directly military. Conflicts are permanent because they pass from one level to another, but they do not end.
In today’s fluid world order, securing long-term gains through military success alone is nearly impossible. Agility and the ability to recalibrate quickly are essential. The US learned this the hard way in the 2000s and 2010s. Russia faced a similar dilemma in 2024. With limited resources and competing priorities, Russia must rethink its Middle East strategy. If a withdrawal from the key base in Tartus becomes unavoidable, Moscow must ensure that it happens smoothly, leveraging its established ties with all regional players – from Israel and Türkiye to the Gulf states and even Syria’s new rulers. In February 2022, the line was drawn. Russia made a choice in favour of geopolitics and openly opposed the West. To what extent this decision was conscious and calculated, and to what extent it was catalysed by circumstances or even external provocation, we will be able to judge some time in the future. But a further combination of the two vectors has become impossible, and the ceiling of the “rebound” from the Soviet collapse (an increasing role within the liberal international order) had been reached.
The Ukraine conflict marked a turning point for Russia’s international position. The period of compensatory recovery (in stock market terms, it can be called a ‘rebound’), which had been the main feature of the previous two decades, was over. After the extremely difficult 1990s, when it was necessary just to stay among the leading players, since the beginning of the century there has been an increase in opportunities and status as a result of joining the global (Western-centred) system.
For the first time in a long time, the West has completely disappeared from Russian politics. Official relations have been reduced to an exchange of accusations or threats and the gradual denunciation of a legal framework built up over decades. Unofficial relations are not much broader, focusing on the management of remaining but rapidly diminishing shared economic interests. In none of the likely scenarios is there any prospect of restoring relations even remotely resembling those of the past. The split is deep and enduring. The best option is to anchor the confrontation institutionally, to prevent it from turning into a direct clash and to move towards peaceful coexistence. The question of Russia’s integration into the Western-centred system is no longer on the agenda. Not only because of the deterioration of our relations, but also because the whole system itself is changing irreversibly.
Migration policy will play an almost decisive role in building relations with neighbouring countries. A well-functioning system of attracting people for permanent residence and work, based on clear criteria and as free from corruption as possible, is of fundamental importance for both newcomers and Russians. A rigid but fair migration model will strengthen the civilisational fabric, while its absence will undermine it. More generally, in a world where the mobility of people is increasing for various reasons (climate, inequality, etc.), the ability to regulate migration flows will be the most important condition for sustainability and development. It will also be an instrument of foreign policy.
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