Russo-German Relations
Analysts explain the affinity of the residents of the East German lands for populist slogans by the absence of democratic traditions and the lack of political education after the unification of the FRG and the GDR. Sympathy for Russia and rejection of the United States are also traditional in the eastern lands. For example, polls show that about 80% of the residents of Saxony support rapprochement with Moscow.
Germany was widely seen as Russia's closest ally in Western Europe. Germany depended on Russia for a large portion of its gas and oil supplies and was one of Russia's biggest trading partners. In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Germany led the international aid effort for the former Soviet Union and for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Aid to Russia was paramount for policy makers in Bonn for a variety of reasons, including the desire to expedite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Germany and the wish to enhance Germany's security by promoting democracy and a market economy in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union's successor states.
Merkel came from the former East Germany, which was part of the former Soviet bloc, and speaks Russian. Putin spent several years in East Germany as a KGB agent and speaks German. But observers say that despite the common experience behind the Iron Curtain, the two leaders have not developed a close personal relationship. This forces the German leader to tread carefully when dealing with Mr. Putin, who was known to resent criticism.
Putin said at a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 18 May 2018 that he would stand up to any attempts by US President Donald Trump to block a Russian-German gas pipeline project. Berlin and Moscow had been at loggerheads since Russia's annexation of Crimea four years ago, but they share a common interest in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which would allow the EU to import more natural gas from Russia. Russia's Gazprom and five European companies, with German backing, plan to build the North Stream 2 gas pipeline on the Baltic seabed to connect Russia directly with Germany, bypassing eastern Europe and limiting the flows via Ukraine. The pipeline will double Russia's gas export capacity to Germany but threatens to cost Ukraine valuable revenues.
Ties frayed in August 2008, when Russian troops swept into Georgia after the Tbilisi government tried to reclaim control of the pro-Russian breakaway territory of South Ossetia.
By 2010 Berlin remained uncertain of how it could help the US. improve relations with Russia beyond reiterating time and again to Russian counterparts that Moscow should accept the US reset policy. Moving beyond this message, German officials encourage the U.S. to continue engagement with human rights activists, focus on economic engagement, offer protocol tokens of goodwill, and redirect some aspects of the Russian proposals (the EST and the proposal delvered in the NRC) to CFE negotiations.
The Russian society as a whole (economically, politically, and culturally) had entered a period of stagnation similar to the Brezhnev years. Widespread agreement existed across the German policy community that the West only can hope to help Russia out of this quandary through economic engagement with the long-term goal that encouraging good governance, the rule of law, and so forth eventually will lead to broader developments. The German policy community overall appeared pessimistic regarding Russia's domestic trajectory.
Berlin had become increasingly frustrated with the lack of a positive Russian response to Washington's overtures. While referring to it as emotional blackmail, Bundestag members stressed their belief that if Moscow saw it was viewed as an equal in DC, cooperation likely would improve.
The MFA and other government organs questioned how "special" or "strategic" the German-Russian partnership really was. Some Bundestag members openly mocked the idea, and argued that the relationship was predominately economic. However, the West needs Russia on key policy issues (Iran, CFE, Afghanistan, etc.), so although Russia was worse off domestically, Germany needed Moscow, according to many Bundestag members, the Chancellery, and MFA functional and regional offices.
The more traditional approach to Russia remains strongly represented in the new MFA policy planning staff covering Russia, who stress how special Russia was and how special the Berlin-Moscow connection is. Although this camp appeared to be in the minority, the policy planning staff normally had direct access to the highest levels of the ministry.
Negative Russian actions on human rights and frustration with developing the relationship beyond economic ties caused officials to engage in a sober assessment of the relationship. The conclusion appeared to be that while Germany had a good rolodex of Russian contacts, Berlin had little ability to influence policy, and therefore lacked a truly strategic partnership in anything outside of trade and investment. Moreover, the traditional and more pessimistic or realistic approach under debate in official circles -- while interesting -- had little real impact on overall policy but rather influence tactics. Both approaches recognize that cooperation with Russia was necessary on numerous fronts but disagreed on whether the West should pre-coordinate.
While recognizing that the Russian-proposed European Security Treaty (EST) and the related proposal in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) are a joint assault to divide and weaken the West in the OSCE and NATO, Germany was reluctant to disregard either proposal for fear of alienating Russia further from European security structures. Both Russian proposals represented an attempt to come to terms with the past 20 years, and freeze the current dynamics in Europe, specifically by preventing further NATO enlargement and ensuring that whatever NATO does will not impinge on Russian security.
The German government hoped that the Alliance and OSCE will engage with Russia on the key issues within the framework of existing albeit often not functioning agreements (such as CFE). Rather than creating new arrangements, Germany would attempt to make full use of existing agreements, according to the Chancellery Division Head for the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Schulz.
Germany agreed that the main forum for discussing the EST should remain the OSCE but saw value in discussing the two proposals in other forums. However, they were scratching their heads on how to keep Russia engaged in the Corfu Process given the intense Russian dislike for the OSCE. Moreover, Berlin questioned Moscow's interest in advancing cooperation in either multilateral forum following the Russian antics leading up to the NATO Foreign Ministerial and at the OSCE Ministerial.
President Medvedev has encouraged German businesses to invest in Russian companies that had until recently been off-limits to foreigners. Germany was Russia's main economic partner, and the two countries enjoy close diplomatic relations.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and German Chancellor Angela Merkel met July 14, 2010 in Russia, where they oversaw the signing of billions of dollars worth of business deals between the two countries. The two leaders held their talks in Russia's Ural mountain city of Yekaterinburg. In one of the deals, German engineering company Siemens will provide wind turbines and more than 200 regional trains for Russia as the country pushes to modernize its economy. The railway deal alone was said to be worth $2.8 billion.
German ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who served as Germany’s head from 1998 to 2005, slammed Angela Merkel’s policy towards Russia, saying he understood Moscow’s foreign policy concerns and saw no reason to fear a possible Russian threat in Eastern Europe. Schroeder, the chancellor of Germany from 1998-2005, fully recognized Russia's concerns, which are linked to the growing isolation of the country. “The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist with the end of the Soviet Union, while NATO not only survived, but also has extensively expanded to the East,” he said in an interview to Der Spiegel 28 March 2015.
Schroeder said he knows “no one, not even in Russia, who would be so mad as to just consider placing in question the territorial integrity of Poland or the Baltic states,” he said, seeking to lessen the fears of Russia’s Eastern European neighbors.
The Social Democrat also criticized the attitude of Chancellor Angela Merkel towards Russia. He pointed out that Berlin shouldn’t let the EU Commission “have talks about the EU-association only with Ukraine, and not with Russia,” also stressing that “Ukrainian culture is split itself.”
Schroeder insisted that the attempt of the international isolation of Russia was “wrong,” as responsibility for the Ukraine crisis was “on all parties.” He said that “in this conflict, mistakes have been made by all the sides, and they have led to a spiral of threats, sanctions and the resort to force.” However, he said that Crimea joining Russia last year was a “violation of the international law.” Still, commenting on the expulsion of Russia from the G8 group in 2014, he said that “during a crisis talks are absolutely necessary.”
Schroeder had previously been excoriated for speaking out in favor of Moscow and against the German government's positions, not least because of his 250,000 euro salary as board chairman for a pipeline joint venture with Russian gas monopoly Gazprom. "Schroeder is spreading the Kremlin's propaganda and everyone should understand that he's now a paid spokesman for Russia," Manuel Sarrazin, who sits on the European affairs committee of the German parliament for the opposition Greens, said in March 2014.
Germany should work to mend relations with Russia rather than taunt it by placing troops in Eastern Europe near its borders, especially in light of Germany’s history as Russia’s invader, former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said in a June 2016 news interview. Speaking to Süddeutschen Zeitung, Schroder warned NATO that its policies could lead to a new arms race with Russia, saying that they “will help neither to mitigate conflicts with Russia nor restore good relations.” The former chancellor ridiculed the idea that Russia “may be nurturing a plan to invade NATO-countries,” stressing that the notion was completely out of touch with the real state of affairs.
“I think that the fact that Bundeswehr [the German armed forces] will take part in [NATO’s] military build-up is a mistake in the face of our [Russian-German] history,” he said. “Seventy-five years after German troops attacked the Soviet Union, they are going to be placed at Russia’s borders again. What kind of response can this bring? Looks like NATO isn’t thinking about that.”
Sharply criticizing NATO war games in Eastern Europe, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told Bild am Sonntag newspaper 18 June 2016 that inflaming the standoff with Russia would endanger European security and increase risk of reviving an “old confrontation.” Rather than inflaming the situation further “through saber-rattling and warmongering,” there ought to be more space for dialogue and cooperation with Moscow, Steinmeier said.
“I am convinced that every serious and honest politician is well aware that Russia will never invade any NATO member. We have no such plans,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated.
The policy of “saber rattling” should not continue, Erwin Sellering, the prime minister of the German state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, told Germany’s weekly Welt am Sonntag newspaper 09 Octobe 2016, as he called for lifting anti-Russian sanctions.
“The tit-for-tat sanctions have brought nothing. They should be lifted as soon as possible,” Sellering, who represents the Social Democrats, told Welt am Sonntag, adding that Russia and Western countries should “move closer” again.
His words were partly echoed by Thorsten Schaefer-Guembel, vice chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which now forms the ruling coalition with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). “The SPD should now breathe new life into the policy of détente right now, in the times of crisis,” he said, stressing that Germany should “hold all negotiation channels open” and rely on diplomacy and bringing “change through rapprochement,” particularly in its relations with Russia. He called Russia “an important actor, without which the resolution of many global issues, including [bringing] peace to Syria, is impossible,” although he also stressed that Russia was a “difficult” partner.
Peter Tauber, CDU’s secretary general, told Welt am Sonntag that he was concerned by “growing anti-US sentiment” in German society, accusing Germans of having a “double morality,” meaning they tolerate Russia’s actions in Syria and Ukraine, but would allegedly never tolerate anything of the kind done by the US, in his view. Roderich Kiesewetter, another CDU politician, has directly attacked the Social Democrats. “I see with concern that more and more SPD [politicians] take a stand in favor of [Germany] taking equal distance from Washington and Moscow,” he said, adding that “Russia aims at split off Western countries and especially Europe.”
By October 2016 it was not yet clear who would be the SPD's candidate forthe 2017 general election, but a fundamental policy decision had already been made: The center-left Social Democrats intended to distance themselves from Merkel's Russia policies and to invoke their tradition as a party of peace. They did so from age-old conviction, but also from of tactical considerations. Large segments of the German population, particularly in the eastern part of the country, felt closer to Russia than to the United States. And many -- in western Germany too -- feared a new Cold War. Invoking the peaceful policies of Willy Brandt and détente between east and west continues to engender uninterrupted support. The party supports lifting the sanctions imposed in 2014 after the Russian annexation of Crimea and Moscow's support of separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Surveys regularly show that more than half, and sometimes up to two-thirds, of Germans believe that sanctions on Russia should be loosened or lifted completely. Sympathies for Putin are likewise astoundingly high. The NATO dual strategy of deterrence and dialogue, by contrast, was unpopular. According to a survey conducted by the pollsters at Forsa, 63 percent of respondents believed that NATO should limit itself solely to dialogue.
Although the German government was clearly oriented toward the West, Germany often played the mediator with Russia, and business interests also encourage tight connections. Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks excellent German — thanks in part to the five years he spent in Dresden as a KGB agent from 1985 to 1990.
Germany and Russia do some €41 billion ($50 billion) in business with one another, and trade between the two countries rose by nearly a quarter in 2017. The East Committee, which encompasses more than 400 German companies and five major business associations, boasts that Eastern Europe was a more important export market for Germany than either the US or China.
Immediately after losing the 2005 German election to Angela Merkel, Schröder began working for the Nord Stream consortium, a subsidiary of Russian energy giant Gazprom, which runs a gas pipeline between Russia and Germany in the Baltic Sea. It was the first of many lucrative posts Schröder has held for Russian conglomerates, earning him the title "Putin's most important oligarch" from the Wall Street Journal. Gerhard Schröder and Putin have pursued one of the most conspicuous bromances of the past 20 years of European politics. They've spent Christmas together in Moscow, shared laughs on the beach in Sochi and laid a wreath at the grave of German philosopher Immanuel Kant in Kaliningrad.
After health reasons forced Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chairman and Brandenburg State Premier Matthias Platzeck to retire in 2013, Platzeck became the head of the German-Russian Forum. The forum's explicit aim was to improve relations between the two countries — Germany's Bild newspaper has accused Platzeck of doing "paid or unpaid" lobbying work for Kremlin. The 62-year-old has criticized German sanctions on Russia and on one occasion even said that Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine should be "regulated ex post facto by international law."
Among political parties, Russia has a reliable ally in the Left Party, the successor to the successor of the old Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Communist East Germany. It regularly defends Russia on issues like sanctions in response to Crimea, the civil war in Syria and the expulsion of Russian diplomats in the wake of the Skripal poisonings. For instance, on March 28, security spokesman Matthias Höhn called for an end to the "paranoia toward Russia" – a typical Left Party statement.
Some members of the left wing of the Social Democrats, the junior partners in the governing coalition, share some of these views. SPD Deputy Parliamentary Leader Rolf Mützenich, for instance, also criticized the expulsion of the Russian diplomats as premature. By contrast, the Greens are stringent critics of Putin's Russia.
The Kremlin had allies among the far-right populist AfD. In February a party delegation visited Crimea and called for an end to sanctions against Russia. Deputy AfD Parliamentary Leader Leif-Erik Holm also called upon the government to bolster its support for the plannedsecond Nord Stream gas pipeline. In the run-up to Germany's 2017 national election, there were fears that Russia could interfere in the vote on behalf of the AfD, as it was alleged to have done the year before for Donald Trump in the US presidential election. But there has been no evidence of any massive Russian manipulation.
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