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HAMAS Relations with Russia

It is no longer possible to view any measures taken by Russia in the Middle East in isolation from the war in Ukraine and Moscow’s military relations with Tehran. Moscow believed that the current major confrontation, with fears of its expansion in scope and transformation, as Putin warned, into a “regional war,” constitutes a favorable opportunity to strengthen Russian moves in terms of crystallizing the features of a new international order, which it called for.

Representatives of various Palestinian movements met in Moscow from February 29 through March 1-2 to overcome internal divisions. The Russian side provided its platform for the meeting of delegates from the factions that make up the Palestine Liberation Organization, including Fatah, as well as participants from Hamas and Islamic Jihad, with emissaries of more than 10 organizations attending the talks.

The Palestinian factions issued a joint statement 01 March 2024 after the meeting in which they affirmed their agreement on the urgent tasks before the Palestinian people and their unity of action to achieve them. Palestinian factions meeting in Moscow have expressed gratitude to Russia for its support of the Palestinian cause, as stated in a joint statement published in the Telegram channel of the Palestinian movement Hamas.

"The Palestinian factions gathered in the city of Moscow express their gratitude and appreciation to the Russian leadership for organizing their meetings and for its stance in support of the Palestinian cause," the statement read. The Palestinians highlighted the "positive and constructive" atmosphere at the meeting and expressed their readiness to continue dialogue to achieve "comprehensive national unity encompassing all Palestinian forces and factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

The statement also outlined the factions' unity of action to oppose Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as attempts to forcibly displace Palestinians from their lands. It emphasized the urgent tasks facing the Palestinian people, including "confronting the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, which is carried out with US support, assistance, and participation."

The official representative of the Palestinian Hamas movement in Lebanon, Ahmed Abdel Hadi, said 02 March 2024 that the meeting of 10 Palestinian organizations, which was held in Moscow recently, has an effective impact on strengthening national unity and uniting the Palestinians. The movement's representative explained in a press statement that the Russian efforts come at a dramatic moment for Palestine.

He stressed: “We are grateful to Russia for its effective efforts that help overcome division and political unification of Palestinian organizations to achieve national goals,” noting that “the unified program that was adopted in Moscow will contribute to the struggle of the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation, to end the war in the Gaza Strip and lift the siege.” stifling economic.”

He added that the Hamas movement hopes that the positive approach and the spirit of unity will prevail in relations between Palestinians and lead to the formation of a national unity government. The politician pointed out that all components of the Palestinian people are in need of dialogue and unity.

Russia has constantly stressed the necessity and importance of reconciliation and unity, and Moscow hosted a round of dialogue between Palestinian factions in a new effort to achieve progress in the Palestinian reconciliation file, which had been faltering for 17 years.

Deputy Head of the Political Bureau of Hamas, Musa Abu Marzouk, affirmed the movement’s insistence that Russia play a major role, vis-à-vis the United States and Israel, in ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Abu Marzouk said in an interview with the "Novosti" agency, "The movement demands that Russia be a major player in confronting the United States and Israel and that it receive the support of a number of countries that will support it, and we will try to achieve this goal, to create balance in the solution negotiations."

He also affirmed Hamas' readiness to continue negotiations with Israel through mediators, noting that the movement's priority is the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, the arrival of humanitarian aid, and the liberation of hostages and prisoners on both sides. The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed Russia's readiness to continue contributing to efforts for a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Early on in Hamas’s existence, Russia was willing to break with the iron grip of the Quartet and defend Hamas from the ‘terrorist’ label. Hamas officials and delegates have gone to Moscow on a number of occasions, the latest being in early 2024. At these meetings, Hamas has been treated as a regular political party and a representative of the Palestinians, which has afforded the movement and its leaders meetings with high-ranking officials in Russia, such as Sergey Lavrov.

Yet, the two-headed eagle of Russia stands at a crossroads still. While Ukraine has fallen out of the news cycle, the war is slowing down and there have been some signals of a peace treaty in the near future. Putin–and Russia–understand that the Ukrainian regime are puppets of the imperialists tasked with bringing down the Eurasian superpower, yet this analysis is not extended to Israel. Why is this? Is it that a great many “Israeli” citizens are of Russian origin? Is it because Putin, like the double-headed eagle of Russia’s standard, is balancing his role as the post-Soviet liberal statesman and his role as the Eurasianist Hercules whose sword hovers over the Gordian Knot of NATO imperialism? This delicate balancing act will have to come to an end, especially with the carnage wrought by Israel and the USA in Gaza today.

Moscow benefited from distracting attention from the war in Ukraine, and from the Western confusion regarding the distribution of effort in supplying Israel and Ukraine with weapons, intelligence information, and major financial budgets. In other words, some Western societies, especially in Europe, may begin to ask questions about the feasibility of continuing to support Ukraine with weapons and money, and this is demonstrated by the failure of the European Union to reach an agreement on the issue recently. Although it is difficult to imagine Israel accepting Russian mediation in the ongoing war, this does not prevent Moscow from accumulating benefits due to the Al-Aqsa Flood situation.

The focus of the entire world was on Israel and the Gaza Strip, which gives Russia greater freedom to act, says expert Nikolai Kozanov, who cites as an example Moscow's ability to abandon the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with relative calm, as the Duma adopted a law in this regard. In addition, Russia got the opportunity to revitalize its diplomacy and open up more actively to international parties and international community organizations, which means undermining attempts to isolate it. This appeared in Moscow’s increasing activity in the UN Security Council, and in communications with various parties.

On 30 December 2008, Anna Azari, the Israeli ambassador to Russia, denied the validity of the information that Hamas is using Russian-made weapons to bomb Israeli cities. In an interview with the Echo of Moscow radio station, Azari confirmed that there is no evidence that Russia is supplying weapons to Hamas, adding that the movement uses copies of weapons similar to Russian weapons.

Various Russian weapons are used by Hamas fighters, such as the Kornet missile. In 2011, Israel accused Russia of supplying Hamas with this anti-tank system. The same report says: “The presence of older anti-armor guided missile (ATGM) systems such as Fagot and Konkurs does not seem new at all. But in addition to the original Russian anti-tank systems, Hamas also uses Iranian copies of Russian weapons, as well as North Korean anti-tank missiles.” .

“In addition to portable anti-tank weapons, Hamas militants use man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS),” the IDF report says. The first appearance of these weapons was in 2012, according to Israeli army records. At that time, it was suspected that Soviet Strela-2 anti-aircraft missiles had found their way into the Gaza Strip, in addition to the newer Russian Igla system, the Chinese QW system, and its Iranian version Misagh-1, along with the North Korean HT-16PGJ system, which was previously spotted in Syria.

Spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, stated 14 October 2023 "Currently, speculation and rumors are being spread in Western countries regarding the current phase of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in attempts to accuse the Russian Federation of involvement in supplying the armed formations affiliated with the Hamas movement with weapons and ammunition. There are even hints - almost fictional - about the alleged establishment “with Russian assistance” of a factory for the production of small arms, light weapons and ammunition in the Gaza Strip....

" ... the constant search conducted by NATO countries and their partners and everyone in their orbit around the world to obtain Soviet/Russian weapons and ammunition, as well as their overwhelming desire to support the combat capabilities of the armed formations of the Kiev regime by any means, through the supply of the most advanced models of equipment. Western military, all this unambiguously points to the irresponsible methods of these countries and their double standards in matters of export control systems in the field of supply of military products between countries."

Russia had not officially announced support for Hamas' positions. The 26 October 2023 visit of the Hamas movement delegation, headed by Musa Abu Marzouk, a member of the Political Bureau, to the Russian capital, Moscow, indicated Moscow’s ability to play a future role in mediation in the conflict between Tel Aviv and the movement. However, the visit seems to raise more questions than it gives answers about the possibilities for the development of the Russian position towards The ongoing conflict in the region.

Why did Moscow decide to host Hamas at this time? Note that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov was in constant contact with the movement’s leadership, and a few days ago held extensive talks with its officials in Qatar, meaning that there was no Russian need to make a political show of this kind.

The answer may lie in the fact that the Kremlin decided to go an additional step towards demonstrating that its positions are distinct from Western discourse, and in continuing to emphasize that Moscow’s policies can constitute a “realistic alternative” when Western policies are convinced that they have “failed to manage the battle and achieve their declared goals,” especially undermining Hamas".

It is important to note that the Russian statement announced regarding the visit stopped mainly at the Russian effort to persuade Hamas to release “all civilian prisoners” of different nationalities, not just the Russian hostages, but how would European societies react if Vladimir Putin succeeds in returning some of the detainees? Civilians of different nationalities?

Israeli anger over the visit reached the point of demanding that Moscow “expel” the visiting delegation, which prompted the Kremlin to try to mitigate the impact of the event by confirming that the Hamas delegation held talks in the Russian Foreign Ministry, and that “there are no plans to receive its leadership at the presidential institution.”

Immediately after the visit, Israeli questions appeared, clearly expressed by the Israeli ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Ben Zvi, regarding Russia’s failure to quickly inform Tel Aviv of the course of the visit and what resulted from it. This demonstrated declared Israeli anger at the Russian position, and, on the other hand, revealed a hidden reliance on the ability to Moscow is putting pressure on Hamas.

This matter found a response by activating talk about possible mediation efforts, which emerged through indications from Russian diplomats and analysts that Bogdanov may soon go to Israel carrying “some ideas” that crystallized during the talks with Hamas, or perhaps specific proposals on the part of the movement.

If this happens, Moscow would enter directly into the efforts currently led by Qatar and Egypt, not only in the context of efforts to release the hostages, but also in a broader field related to a complete deal to reduce the pace of the current conflict.

Many in Russia and Israel doubt Moscow’s ability currently to play a mediation role, especially against the backdrop of the worsening confrontation with the West, and the widening gap between Moscow and Tel Aviv, against the backdrop of Israel’s positions on the Ukrainian war, but this does not prevent from the Russian point of view working on this path that “It enhances Russian influence, and constitutes an additional indicator of the failure of the policy of isolating Moscow.”

However, this approach did not diminish the dissatisfaction of the West, which saw the arrangement of the surprise visit as an additional indication of Moscow’s alignment with the camp of “terrorists” against whom Israel is waging a comprehensive war . However, the history of the relationship between Russia and Hamas is far beyond this visit.

Unlike the United States and the European Union, Moscow did not include the Hamas movement on the “terrorist list,” but rather maintained stable channels of communication with it at all stages of the Palestinian crisis, and during the previous confrontations that took place between the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip and Israel.

In its dealings with the Hamas movement, Moscow began on the basis that maintaining channels of dialogue with all parties to regional crises constitutes “an element of strength, and gives it greater ability to play mediation roles and enhance its presence in various files.”

This applies to the relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah group, which Moscow does not consider a terrorist organization either, and with the Houthis in Yemen, who have a permanent representative office in Russia, as well as with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is included on the “terrorism list.” Russian, but its representatives freely visit Moscow and wander among the offices of Russian officials. The same matter also applied earlier to Moscow's dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Naturally, what can be considered an “ element of contention ” with the West on the one hand, and Moscow’s desire to show that its positions are distinct from the United States and the European community in determining the patterns of relationship with the players in the hot regional issues, enter here.