Putin Line
Since December 2022, the Russian army had been building large fortifications all along the front line. Satellite imagery shows that its troops, which invaded Ukraine in February 2022, were digging in at strategic points in the occupied territories and preparing for a counteroffensive. According to British intelligence, no installations this big had been constructed anywhere in the world for decades. After analyzing thousands of new satellite images, the Reuters news agency also reported that new bulwarks had appeared in the Russian border regions, as well as in southern and eastern Ukraine: trenches, road blocks, and ditches stretching for hundreds of kilometers.
Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, believes Russia has learned from Ukraine's successful counteroffensive last year. "After the Kharkiv offensive, Russia kind of realized that defeat was possible — they could lose territory. I think that was a realization that Ukraine can do offensive operations," he told Reuters.
The fortifications primarily consist of trenches, deep enough for a person to stand in. They were reinforced in front with sandbags or rocks to protect the Russian infantry from bullets, shrapnel and artillery fire. Brady Africk, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington who examined satellite images, said there were now many emplacements like these along key roads and outside strategic cities.
The images also show that the Russians aim to block the path of Ukrainian heavy equipment using various obstacles such as Czech hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and concrete blocks similar to the "dragon's teeth" deployed during World War Two. Observers reported that the Russians were also laying mines.
The places where Russian military command constructed the biggest fortifications were clearly where it thinks Ukraine was most likely to attack. Accordingly, Russian front-line positions were concentrated in the southeastern part of the Zaporizhzhia region, in eastern Ukraine, and around the isthmus connecting annexed Crimea with the rest of Ukraine. Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian Army, notes that the Russian military clearly suspects southern Ukraine in particular, and especially the region around Zaporizhzhia, will be the focus of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. "These are serious fortifications, constructed in the space of six months," says Oleh Zhdanov, a Ukrainian military expert and colonel in the reserves. However, he stressed that the installations were dotted about piecemeal, and that the road network east of Melitopol, for example, was hardly blocked at all.
Niklas Masuhr of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich suspects that the Russians have built these fortifications not so much to try to keep Ukrainian forces out along the whole of the front line but rather as a delaying tactic, and to "make Ukraine pay more in lives and time" during the counteroffensive. "The fortifications add a degree of predictability and structure to future operations," Masuhr explains. "This mitigates Russian weaknesses, since [the Ukrainian Armed Forces] tend to be better at improvisation and fluid military situations." However, he also comments that tying the Russian forces to the fortified areas means they also become more predictable, as their positions can be identified in advance.
Rob Lee from the Foreign Policy Research Institute notes that concentrating their own troops on a specific section could give the Ukrainians an advantage and allow them to push deep into Russian-occupied territory. This in turn could destroy other lines of fortifications and lead to a bigger breakthrough, he said.
The outcome of the counteroffensive did not depend solely on the Russian fortifications in the occupied parts of Ukraine, though observers argue they may very well obstruct a major Ukrainian army breakthrough. "No matter how you dig in or fortify, the most important moment in defense depends on the soldier's will to defend and on his emotional and psychological state," according to Zhdanov, who recalls that during the occupation of Kherson, the Russian military built fortifications three lines deep along the city limits for almost half a year. The Ukrainian army liberated the city nevertheless.
Top US general General Mark Milley said on 18 May 2023 "the Russians have had several months to put in a very complex defense in depth, the linear defense in depth. It's not quite connected trench lines like World War I, but it's not dissimilar from that, either -- lots of complex minefields, dragons' teeth, barbed wire, trenches, et cetera. They've got a very extensive security zone in depth, and then they've got at least two, perhaps even three main defensive belts.... the troops that were manning those Russian lines were poorly trained, poorly equipped. Their sustainment and logistics was not high. Their morale was low. And now, recently, because of the Prigozhin mutiny, the command-and-control apparatus at the strategic level was certainly confusing at best and probably challenging in many, many other ways.
"At the operational, tactical level, they've had significant casualties among their officer corps. But in addition to that, the recent events of Prigozhin has also led to, and you're reporting it in the media, about various folks being replaced. So the Russian situation was not very good, even though they've been fighting a fight because of the minefields. "
A fairly detailed online map of Russian anti-tank fortifications, which were located both around the northern borders and in the occupied territories, appeared in google-maps in February 2023. There were also fortifications there, which the Russians began to build around Chernihiv region in Bryansk region, in particular, near the border near Semenivska and Novgorod-Siverska communities. Fortifications were located at a certain distance from the border itself - 7-10 km. Territorially, these were Starodubsky and Poharsky districts.
By February 2023 the fortifications that the Bryansk mobilized made near the border with Chernihiv Oblast at a distance of 7 km looked fragile. Even the local governor came to assess the level of efforts. It should be noted that even in the comments, local contributors simply ridiculed the quality of the Bryansk fortifications. Bryansk governor Oleksandr Bogomaz, in turn, justifies himself: the construction and equipment of defensive structures was carried out not only on the line of battle, but also in the near rear. This "most important work," said the head, was carried out on the Bryansk section of the border. These works required 12,000 cubic meters of lumber."
The Deputy Governor of Bryansk Oblast, Nikolai Simonenko, was arrested on 29 March 2023 in Bryansk. And he, in particular, oversaw the construction of a "protective line" on the border with Ukraine. Officially, they were completed back in February, which the Bryansk media and Governor Bogomaz reported on in notes and posts. In fact, there was no strong defensive line, there were only point works on digging trenches, installing anti-tank obstacles and concrete caps under firing points. In late February and early March, two more deputy governors were detained in Bryansk: Elena Egorova and Tatyana Kuleshova. Together with Simonenko, they became the main suspects in the case of embezzlement of funds allocated for the construction of fortifications. Money for the already "built" line of defense was allocated a second time, possibly in larger amounts.
In 2009, Deputy Bryansk Governor Nikolai Simonenko, who belonged to Bryansk Governor Nikolai Denin’s close circle, was arrested. According to investigators, the official was involved in a fraud scheme under which more than 140 million rubles worth of state land and property had been sold for 9 million rubles to Snezhka-the very same enterprise, founded by Nikolai Denin’s daughter and his sister-in-law, that the governor had been running until 2003.
Russian courts found that a journalist had defamed a Deputy Governor of the Bryansk Region in his reporting of a land fraud case and had awarded damages against the journalist. In mid-2012, Oleg Dmitriyevich Fedchenko, editor of the weekly newspaper, Bryanskiye Budni, wrote about two men, Maksim Kosenkov and Ruslan Pogulyayev, had been charged with obtaining land by fraud. Simonenko brought an action for defamation against Fedchenko. On November 27, 2012, the Bryansk Regional Court allowed the claim against Fedchenko, ordered him to publish a retraction within fifteen days of the judgment’s entry into force, and awarded Simonenko damages of RUB 5,000 (approximately 125 euros). The European Court of Human Rights took into account the fact that the story was written by a journalist, it concerned a public official who had to tolerate a greater degree of criticism, and related to a matter of public concern for the local community. The Court awarded Fedchenko EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damages.
The Verstka publication wrote 07 August 2024 that in the Kursk region, on the territories bordering Ukraine, the necessary fortifications, for which the authorities allocated more than 3 billion rubles, were probably not built. The construction was carried out by "Kursk Region Development Corporation" and its subcontractors.
The Capital Construction Department of the Kursk Region previously concluded two contracts for the construction of fortification structures for 3.2 billion rubles with a deadline of July 5, 2023. The procurement was won by the Kursk Region Development Corporation, which, as follows from the documents, could conclude subcontracting agreements with other companies. One of these subcontractors was the company "KTK Service". As "Verstka" found out, in May 2024, nine builders of the defensive line in the Kursk region, with the support of the prosecutor's office, filed lawsuits against "KTK Service" due to wage arrears. As follows from the court decisions on the builders' claims, "KTK Service" signed a contract with the "Kursk Region Development Corporation" and received an advance payment of 179 million rubles. The company hired workers with whom it refused to sign employment contracts and insisted that the builders register as "self-employed" and pay taxes on their income themselves.
the company was supposed to complete the work in February 2023, but did not do so. In September 2023, the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Kursk opened a criminal case against KTK Service on the fact of theft (Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code) and laundering of funds obtained by criminal means (clause "b" of Part 4 of Article 174.1).
As Verstka found out, KTK Service began bankruptcy proceedings on June 26, 2024, and the problems began in March, when the observation procedure was introduced. The director and owner of the company were two local businessmen who were also involved in the housing and utilities sector, including in Kursk. There were no pillboxes or fortifications on the border with Sumy Oblast at least in March-May 2024, a contract soldier who was in Kursk Oblast at that time told Verstka. According to him, there were fortifications much further east — from the village of Krasnaya Yaruga in Belgorod Oblast.
RBC-Ukraine, citing the Center for National Resistance , reported that the construction of fortifications was being simulated in the Kursk region on the border with Ukraine. Aerial reconnaissance materials indicated that "almost all strongholds were without personnel or equipment, and most were already overgrown with bushes." The publication also reported "instances of theft from defensive structures."
In Kursk, a court placed former deputy general director of the same JSC "Kursk Region Development Corporation" Igor Grabin in pretrial detention. He was suspected of embezzling 173 million rubles during the construction of fortifications in the Kursk region, the court's press service reported 09 December 2024. According to the prosecutor's office , in 2023 and 2024, Grabin signed contracts with the state for the construction of fortifications near the border with Ukraine. At the same time, as indicated in the documents, the work had already been completed by another construction company and paid for. Grabin was accused of abuse of office and could face up to 10 years in prison. Earlier, based on the materials of the prosecutor's inspection into the spending of budget funds, a case of fraud on an especially large scale was opened.
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