Construction Troops [stroi] - Conditions of Service
During the Soviet era about half of the Construction Troops were Central Asians, especially those from rural backgrounds who have little or no knowledge of Russian. This pattern is explained in part by the rarity of fluency in Russian among Central Asians. It was easier to accommodate them in the construction troops.
Duty in Soviet combat units was practically reserved for the "reliable" Slavic nationalities which comprised approximately 80 percent of the Soviet combat forces. The few ethnic minorities who served in combat units were for the most part relegated to support duties. On the other hand, the "unreliable" non-Slavs were the predominant group who served in the combat support functions. For example, non-Slavs, particularly Central Asians, comprised up to 90 percent of the Construction Troops. They were considered second-class soldiers, received little or no military training, and were most often armed with only a pick and shovel for their daily labors. Because the core Russian nationality was only 50 percent of the total Soviet population, the total Slav population together with the Ukrainians and others added up to only about 60 percent of the total.
Because of a growing non-Slav birth rate, the Soviets in 1967 decided to use the military as a cultural melting pot to Russify the non-Slavs. For some purposes, it appeared the Soviets had created two different armies. In other words, the Soviets decided to accept ethnic conflict in certain elements of their Army so long as they were able to maintain control, further the Russification of Soviet society, and avoid the dangers of creating "national" units of all one ethnic type. In the rest of the Army, the more elite combat units, comprised of more reliable Slavs, the Soviets appear to have achieved a remarkable degree of military cohesion. The main point is that for the critical units there was little or no ethnic conflict; their cohesion and control by the Soviet Army appeared to be firm. Widely publicized accounts of violent ethnic conflict, theft of food, ineffectiveness, and chaos bordering on disintegration should be assessed with the above in mind.
Drunkenness and boredom were problems in most Soviet Army units, but effects on cohesion, if any, were not clear. There was some evidence to suggest that the socialization process in Soviet society reduced the effects of boredom and drinking, which in any event were more tightly controlled within the Army. It was commonly perceived in the West that the Soviet Army had an alcoholism problem equivalent to drug problems in Western armies. This was not true. The army had a built-in advantage for its anti-drinking program: Soviet draftees are eighteen and nineteen years old, thus belonging to a population group with a relatively low percentage of heavy drinkers. Soviet Army regulations completely forbade any use of alcohol by draftees at any time, anywhere. Penalties absolutely disproportionate to the deed were meted out if there was any proof at all of consumption like the smelling of alcohol on the breath. They might range from washing the floors to ten days of confinement in a guard-house.
But no punishment, however severe, would ever prevent healthy soldiers from getting an occasional bottle, and their resourcefulness was truly limitless in this undertaking. The geographical location of most of the military units was always at a considerable distance from towns and stores. Garrisons had fences around them and check-points whose primary purpose was to see that alcohol is not smuggled in. Cars and soldiers are searched and bottles are broken right away. The distance from the stores and tight control over the soldier's time made the procurement of alcohol more difficult. Finally, the average soldiers have very little money to spend on alcohol. This was the largest deterrent. A soldier's three roubles eighty copecks monthly salary must cover all his expenses. Although the illicit sale of military property took place all the time, it was neither easy to do nor a mass phenomenon. A soldier with the means to purchase a bottle would always share it with several friends, making it unlikely that any will manage to get drunk. Although the Soviet Army failed in its endeavors to enforce a strict dry law, there was no doubt that the American Army consumed much more alcohol.
Soldiers employed in non-military construction by civil agencies were often seriously neglected by the military chain of command and the "employing" civilian agency. According to the a Pravda report: "Soldiers building a road for the Russian Republic Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways in Udmurtia ... did not have enough tents, clothing or even dishes. Incidentally, these soldiers were not even military construction personnel; most were simply discipline violators who had been pulled together from various services and ordered to build a road, with virtually no training or equipment."
It is no wonder then, that the construction troops gained a reputation for having the worst discipline in the army. Construction units were said to be ridden with crime, desertion, and excessive hazing. This was compounded by the army's use of construction units as dumping grounds for many of their undesirable conscripts, notably those with criminal records and low intelligence. Minorities were overrepresented in the construction troops thus exacerbating racial tensions.
For good reason morale was terrible in the construction battalions, the men were not trained as soldiers, were not treated like soldiers, but were expected to behave like soldiers. According to the General of the Military Procuracy: " the Russian Republic Ministry of Construction in the Urals and Western Siberia has used only 50 percent of its military construction workers for their intended purpose. The rest have worked in all manner of places - as auxiliary workers at a ski factory and a chemical plant, as dishwashers at cafeterias, as janitors and even as nannies in day-care centers. The picture is similar in other places."
Finally, in 1990, the Supreme Soviet recommended that the use of construction troops by civilian ministries be abolished by the end of the year, determining such use to be unconstitutional. The construction troops had an order and spirit which reminded one of prison.
A Gorbachev speech in London April 8, 1989 reported Soviet strength at 4,258,000 (apparently excluding 490,000 construction and railway troops, which were said to not receive military training). Soviet Deployment in the East Asian Theater of War in the mid-1980s may have been about 1,400,000, of which there were 140,000 Construction Troops along with another 100,000 in various Strategic Rear Service Units, including Road and Railroad Troops.
The degree of dependence of the civilian economy on military labor was illustrated by the fact that in 1990 by one account there were some 500 military construction units with over 325,000 soldiers working on civilian construction projects under the orders of twenty ministries and departments.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
