Automotive Troops - Cold War
The Soviet procedure for mobilizing civilian vehicles involved the designation of selected civilian motor transport organizations in cities throughout the USSR as organized reserve motor transport units (Avtokolonna = motorcade, motor transport convoy). These units, which reportedly had 350 to 500 trucks each, were under military supervision and were periodically subjected to test exercises. Their personnel were qualified reservists and special efforts were made to maintain their vehicles in good condition. Preliminary analysis indicated that Avtokolonna had been established in large numbers throughout the USSR--about 78 had been identified by 1979, representing some 27,000 to 39,000 vehicles.
The Soviet logistical capability was so limited, especially at the division and army level, that the Soviets could not maintain the offensive momentum that their huge tank force was designed to produce. With the loss of this momentum their forces would become increasingly vulnerable to NATO's superior firepower in tactical aviation and artillery. The limited amount of logistic support at division and army level, and possibly at front level, would seriously hinder the ability to conduct prolonged nonnuclear combat. As the Soviets moved toward acceptance o the need for the capability to fight a sustained conventional action, they increased the amount of combat and service support in their forces.
The evidence available indicated that, until the Czechoslovak crisis, mobilization exercises by divisions were rare and most enlisted reservists apparently had little or no training since discharge. US experience suggested that such soldiers would require intensive refresher training to be qualified for any except the most unskilled-assignments. Soviet divisions, with their low men-to-equipment ratio, required a high proportion of skilled personnel. The typical training regime was long and rigorous but that it contained no more solid military training time than US training. Time is lost to housekeeping and guard details and to the performance of troop labor, both on military and civilian construction jobs and in support of agriculture.
The Soviets saw their military posture as essentially defensive. They and their East European allies maintained sufficient ready forces in the forward area opposite NATO's Central Region to guard against a surprise attack, and rely on rapid mobilization and early movement forward from the western USSR to provide sufficient force to launch a counteroffensive against NATO. This combination of heavy reliance on allied forces and rapid mobilization capability enabled the Soviets to keep their resources in men and equipment in active units low relative to the total force which can be mobilized. Should they decide to initiate an attack on NATO, however, they would probably need to mobilize and move forward the bulk of their reinforcement forces from the western USSR. This would permit organization of the initial attack.
Category II divisions were at half to three-quarters strength in manpower and had all their combat vehicles on hand. Divisions in Category III accounted for about a quarter of their men. Some had all their combat vehicles, some have not. In most cases the vehicles are obsolescent.
By 1979, only the Soviet line divisions in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland and part of those on the Chinese border were kept at or near combat strength. Thirty-four other tank and motorized rifle divisions available for early commitment are located in the western USSR -- in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev military districts -- opposite the NATO Central Region. Of these, about eight were at reduced strength (i.e., probably manned at between 50 and 75 percent of combat strength) andeach was short about 600 general purpose vehicles. These divisions could be filled with reservists and mobilized civilian trucks and made ready for movement in 24 hours. About 26 were at low strength (i.e., probably manned at no more than 50 percent) and each was short between 800 and 1,300 trucks. These divisions could probably be made ready for movement in three to five days.
The Czechoslovak crisis provided the only large-scale test of Soviet mobilization and deployment procedures. About 20 divisions were mobilized, including some 11 of those with low peacetime manning and equipment levels. At least five armies were apparently mobilized--three of them and about ten of the mobilized divisions were used against Czechoslovakia. In all, at least 125,000 Soviet reservists and 20,000 trucks were called up.
The most time-consuming and critical aspect of mobilization is the organization and filling out of the front and army rear services. There is abundant evidence that both the Soviets and the East Europeans rely mainly on mobilization to provide the bulk of the service support organization at front and army level, and these units are the least ready in peacetime. Important elements of the rear services exist only on paper or as portions of the civilian economy. Although low strength divisions can probably be mobilized and deployed in a matter of days, they cannot be sustained in combat more than a few days without extensive logistical support by the front rear services.
The Soviet army divided military trucks into two types: rear and tactical. The first were essentially modernized or ordinary civilian trucks, such as the first Soviet truck - AMO-F-15. The latter were developed on the same chassis, but directly for the army, and their main difference was high cross-country ability. Such, for example, is the YAG series, which eventually became the ancestor of the first Soviet three-axle truck, the YAG-10.
The legendary trucks of the past Ural-375, GAZ-66, UAZ-469 and ZIL-131 were the basis of the designer, from which, by adding various cabins and superstructures, vehicles for various purposes were obtained. The principle of development today remains the same, because in fact Russian military trucks are expanded Soviet developments. True, today the emphasis is not on a wide fleet of vehicles, but on a multi-purpose one.
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