Polish-Bolshevik Cavalry Operations
The Conditions in the Polish-Bolshevik campaigns - the great distances, lack of roads, insufficiency of railroads, and slight density of troops - presented few points of resemblance with the warfare of the Western Front during the Great War. They resembled the Great War in the enormous length of front, but differed from it in the density of the line. They differ from wars of the past in that the weapons used were those developed by the World War and also in the fact that even in the theaters of principal operations the troops were deployed on a wide front. Cavalry played an important role. Twice, at least, it played a decisive one. It had a great, perhaps decisive, influence on the entire campaign.
The terrain and climate were admirably suited to cavalry operations. East of the Bug, on the whole front of over a thousand kilometers, there were only two macadamized roads. Both of these roads ran perpendicularly to the front-one through Rovno to Kiev, the other from Brest-Litovsk to Bobrusk. The other roads were unsurfaced and varied according to the nature of the soil. In places they ran through deep sand that was unpassable at all seasons for motor vehicles. In other places, in dry weather, the roads were usually practicable; but the many streams, some very wide, with marshy banks, were serious obstacles for motor vehicles. The bridges were of wood, too light for heavy trucks. Most of them had been burned many times during the previous six years and replaced by temporary bridges or not at all. Several times during the operations slight rains immobilized all motor transport for days.
The country is generally flat or slightly rolling, except in the extreme south. There were many forests. In the south, before the war, the country was well cultivated. By 1920 there were everywhere large waste stretches. The population east of the Bug was sparse, except in the southern sector. The peasantry lived usually in villages. The buildings were of logs, with thatched roofs. There were few isolated farms. In the center of the towns there are brick buildings with thick walls, clustered about a solidly built church. These towns formed strong points and were continually used as such. The railway facilities were poor. These were rendered worse by the destruction of many large bridges which required months to rebuild, the inadequacy of railway material, and the use of different gauges.
The population varied greatly in character. Everywhere east of the Bug, clear to the Dnieper, the town population was partly Polish. Poles were scattered in patches among the country population. The great landowners were mostly Polish. They had left the country during the first Bolshevik occupation, 1918-1919. Their administrators, head farmers, house servants, and other dependents, who were generally Poles, had, however, remained. In the southeast the majority of the peasantry was Ukrainian, and the state of civilization was about that of the French peasantry before the Revolution. They were, however, much more warlike and willing to fight. In the north the peasantry was White Russian, with an admixture of many Poles, and in the extreme north some Lithuanians. The White Russian peasantry was very apathetic. In all towns a great part of the population was Jewish.
The Poles, wherever found or of whatever social condition, were intensely patriotic. Their devotion could be relied upon, and their knowledge of local conditions was of great value to the Polish armies. The attitude of the peasantry, except the Poles, may in general be characterized by saying that they were tired of war and were unfriendly to whichever army was in occupation. The Jews were at first very unfriendly to the Poles, and many of the younger ones were Bolsheviks. After the experience of a few weeks of Bolshevik occupation they became much more amicable to the Poles.
During the preliminary peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks the Polish High Command prepared a big stroke, to be launched in the event these negotiations failed. With the breaking off of these negotiations the preparations were rapidly completed. Heretofore the operations against the Bolsheviks had been conducted on a comparatively small scale, and consisted of a series of local actions' which resulted in pushing the Bolshevik lines eastward. This time, profiting by the political situation in the Ukraine, a large-scale operation was planned with the intention of dealing a crushing blow. It was not merely planned to push back the Bolsheviks, but to cut off and eliminate as a fighting force a large part of their southern army, by placing forces in their rear and across their main lines of retreat. The advance was made at the end of April and was completely successful. By the end of May the country south of the Pripet was cleared of Bolshevik forces and Kiev was captured. During this operation, which can be considered as the first phase of the 1920 campaign, the cavalry played a decisive part.
The Polish morale was now high. Every man felt that he could beat half a dozen Bolsheviks. Polish losses had been insignificant. Then came Budenny. With daring and dash this astonishing leader threw his cavalry divisions against the Polish line, felt for its weak points, found them, and broke through. The Polish cavalry, greatly outnumbered, was neutralized, and the whole Polish force, almost without a fight, was thrown into confusion. It retreated, panicstricken, from position to position, out of each of which in turn Budenny, by rapid movements, outflanked them. This second phase ended with the Poles in full rout westward and Rovno evacuated to the enemy.
By these reverses the Polish High Command was impressed with the immediate necessity for additional cavalry units, and by the end of July there had been hurriedly got together a cavalry corps of two small divisions and a brigade. This force took the field against Budenny in the hope of capturing him and his whole force. They failed to accomplish this; but Budenny was beaten, the morale of the Poles was greatly improved, and the terror which the mere name of Budenny inspired disappeared. The field of active operations now shifted to the north, and a large part of the cavalry corps was transferred to the new front. Budenny did not follow, but advanced on Lemberg instead. Though there was little to oppose him, he advanced but slowly. About August 20 he was within 25 miles of the city, with his patrols well to the northwest and southwest of it. He received orders to proceed northward and attack the northern flank of the Polish armies, which were moving northeastward into the Bolshevik rear. Though several times repeated, the order was not obeyed for several days, Budenny insisting upon continuing toward Lemberg. Apparently the prospect of looting the city appealed to him more strongly than the importance of saving the main Bolshevik armies from defeat. Finally Budenny moved, but too late. In a series of actions near Zamosc, in early September, he displayed much energy, but was completely defeated and since ceased to be a factor on the Polish front.
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