1830 - The Polish Revolt
The rising of Poland against Nicholas I in 1830 began with the defection of the regular Polish Army, and it was only because such an army, and moreover an exceedingly well-trained army, was available, that Russia had so much trouble in overcoming the insurrection. The Polish Army numbered 35,000 men, and, moreover, since the Poles had furnished a considerable contingent to Napoleon's army, there was further available in the country a considerable number of discharged officers and older discharged soldiers. Hence the strength of the army could be increased forthwith by as many as 20,000 men. Moreover, owing to the number of cadres which were available, it was possible to enlist by degrees a further 45,000 men in so-called territorial regiments. These new formations, as usual, proved to be of very little value, but they were strongly supported by the old troops. They were further supplemented by 8000 men of the volunteer regiments known as Krakusen.
If the Polish Army had been better led, and if it had not been for dissension among those in charge of the administration, Russia would have found in the Poles, whose bravery was conspicuous, an even more dangerous antagonist. The chief deficiency of the newly formed regiments was in respect to their officers' corps. It might have been expected that recourse would have been had for the latter to veteran non-commissioned officers; but in spite of the desperate situation of the nation which was fighting for its existence, this was not done.
The officers' posts were conferred upon the lower aristocracy, the Schlachta, and consequently it frequently happened that quite incompetent men occupied high positions in the army. It has to be added that all these young men, who constituted the bulk of the new officers' corps, belonged to the radical wing of the revolutionary party, and, for all their military incapacity, exhibited an unexampled insolence. These officers did not scruple to criticize openly their superior officers. Such men, who were more lavish with words than with deeds, invariably tended to lower discipline. The Polish Government by no means turned to the best account the excellent military forces which it had at its disposition, and to a certain extent put them in the field in the shape of inferior troops, when there was really no necessity for this.
When the Polish insurrection broke out, the quarters of the Russian Army were very widely dispersed over the vast Empire. Hence it arose that only very inadequate forces could be dispatched for the subjugation of the extensive revolted territory. Only 170,000 men all told were allotted to Field-Marshal Prince Diebitsch. Of these only 130,000 were available in the first instance, and the Polish frontier was crossed on February 5, 1831, with only 100,000 men. Owing to a sudden thaw, it was necessary to abandon the original plan of campaign. Instead of advancing from the Narew-Bug against Warsaw, in the hope of driving considerable contingents of the Poles from the capital, it was necessary to consume a considerable time in effecting a movement to the left, with Brest-Litowsk as base.
When Diebitsch finally advanced towards the Vistula from a due easterly direction, he arrived at the latter with no more than 70,000 men, so that his force was no longer superior to the Polish field army of 60,000 men, supported by the fortified line of the river. The climatic conditions of the seat of war and the traditional incompetence of the Russian commissariat were further instrumental in protracting the war, until finally, on the 7th of September, 1831, after the Russian Army had received substantial reinforcements, Field-Marshal Paskievitsch succeeded in taking Warsaw by storm. A month later the last attempt at armed resistance in the whole country was suppressed.
The immortal band of Polish warriors who enrolled themselves for the fight in 1831, before the walls of old Warsaw, fonght the last and greatest battle which stained the soil of Poland ; and in the presence of their country, their wives, their children, and the spirits of their departed heroes, who hovered over the field of carnage, buried their mangled bodies, broken sabres, shattered spears, and shivered arrows, in one common grave, to repose for ever.
Two small standing armies were appointed in the latter days of Poland-one for Lithuania, and the other for Poland-of about ten thousand men, which were poorly supplied, by the jealousy of the nobility at the annual diets. In consequence of these embarrassments, the Poles never had, after Sobieski, a reliable army.
These forces were generally in poverty and destitution, without pay or discipline, and destitute of equipment. The castles and fortified towns were defended only by their walls, which were crumbling in ruins, and the empty arsenals. Yet, with all these heavy embarrassments, the Polish soldiery frequently saved the republic in the midst of the greatest perils, and several times, by their unconquerable valor, preserved the liberties of Europe from the crushing power of the Ottoman.
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