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18th Century Army

When, in the XVII. century, the whole of Europe was going through a military reorganization, forming large standing armies, excitedly reviving the art of strategy and of tactics and scientifically improving weapons the better to be able to destroy life, Poland did not allow herself to be drawn along in that current, but contented herself with establishing the indispensable garrisons necessary to protect her frontiers and persisted in not maintaining a standing army in times of peace. The nobility fought with vehemence against the establishment of a standing army. They justly saw, that as they had not the spirit of martial conquest, such an army could only lead to a form of absolute power.

The army, from the remotest up to very recent times, was formed from a "general call to arms", the "pospolite ruszenie". Defense was the only employment to which this army could be put and in consequence it could not be used outside national territory. Every citizen-noble was obliged to join this army and take part in the defensive wars, that alone were equitable in the eyes of the people. The middle classes were responsible for the defense of the cities.

A sharp lookout was kept on the accomplishment of this duty. In olden times the defaulters from military service were condemned to death and their property was confiscated, but the law of 1676 proscribed the latter punishment and in pursuance of this law the inheritance of all defaulters was added to the Treasury. It was only for very serious reasons that exemption from military service could be secured, and then only on the authorization of the Diet. The mercenaries, called "foreign troops", played a secondary role to the "general call to arms".

In 1788, however, because of the aggressive attitude of the neighboring powers, a decision was finally reached by the Diet, to raise and keep under arms a standing army of 100,000 men. Kosciuszko, the greatest strategist of contemporary Poland, in a memoire presented to the Diet, advised the organization of "militia", similar to the organization of the American militia, as it was in many ways similar to the Polish "general call to arms". He categorically opposed the formation of a standing army, saying that it would "put the citizens in irons".