1920 - Polish Cavalry
The Polish army was quite unprovided; even by 1920 they had not got greatcoats for the winter, and it was common enough for men to desert, steal some clothes and join again. They had been compelled to help themselves from everyone, and naturally they had done so from the Jews more than from anyone else. The Polish Tommy looked on plunder as part of the routine of military life. They are very fond of being photographed with a glass of wine in one hand next to a table loaded with plundered rouble notes; honest yokel faces, quite unconscious of wrongdoing. Polish soldiers were compelled by necessity to fall into bad habits at the front. All troops, even those with good habits, are difficult to keep in order when away from the front. Polish troops were proportionately difficult to keep in order when away from the front. In both places the Jews suffered more if not exclusively. They suffered still more in Russian Poland at the hands of the gendarmerie, the military police, very underpaid and armed with great powers. The conduct of the gendarmerie was such that in many parts of Poland they exercised a kind of brigandage. The best that can be said of them is that, as brigands, they endured no competition.
The Polish High Command needed large forces of cavalry everywhere to carry out its strategic operations. Commanders at the front were continually calling for more cavalry to meet their local requirements. The numbers of the Polish cavalry were so far below these requirements that the cavalry was continually being moved. Orders for important cavalry movements, as a consequence, were frequently issued by general headquarters too late, and the best opportunities for the employment of cavalry were lost, permitting large forces of Bolsheviks to escape.
The Poles had, at the beginning of the 1920 campaign, seven cavalry brigades. After the serious defeat by Budenny's cavalry in June, the Poles hastily organized new cavalry regiments and partly reorganized the old ones, creating in all thirty regiments. Each brigade consisted normally of three regiments and a group of artillery. Brigades often had two regiments, sometimes four. Two or three batteries constituted the artillery groups. Each regiment consisted of four "saber" squadrons, one machine-gun squadron, and one technical squadron. These squadrons had a prescribed strength of about 150 men. The machine-gun squadrons had eight guns. The technical squadron comprised headquarters orderlies, signalmen, etc. The squadrons usually had much less than 150 men.
There were no permanent divisions. A division was formed by placing two or more brigades together under a division commander, who was given a staff, etc. There were practically no division troops; even the artillery belonged to the brigades. Corps were organized by placing similarly more than one division under a corps commander. Staffs were unorganized and much too large. Auxiliary troops were lacking.
The troops were indifferently trained. Each regimental commander employed in his regiment the regulations he had previously used, Austrian or Russian, as the case might be. Lack of horses, food, clothing, and supplies prevented real training during the winter and early spring. The troopers carried the short carbine, saber, and lance. Officers and non-commissioned officers were armed with the pistol. There were no automatic rifles. The rifle was carried slung across the trooper's back. The machine-guns, of different models, were carried both on horseback and in carts. The terrain was flat or slightly rolling and almost everywhere practicable for small native wagons.
The troops were generally well mounted. The small native horse, with a certain amount of good blood, predominated. In general, the height was well under 15.2, often 14.3, and occasionally less. These small horses are very hardy and have enough blood to gallop well. The Posnanians had large horses. They made a splendid appearance at first, but soon lost flesh. Some officers took their thoroughbreds with them. The care of the horses was good. This was not due to attention to this particular by the officers, but to the individual trooper, who was always foraging for his horse and at every opportunity fed him. Horses did not always receive enough water. Officers paid little attention to this and left it to the initiative of the individual trooper. In practice the horse got what his rider could rustle for him.
Marches were poorly conducted. Most of the marching was done at a walk, which was often too slow. On the other hand, individuals and small groups were continually galloping without reason. The length of marches varied greatly. Sometimes 75 kilometers were made in 24 hours; 30 kilometers was, perhaps, the average length of march. The First Cavalry Division made on the average about 1,000 kilometers per month during June, July, and August, exclusive of patrols and distances covered by small units. Tactical consideration allowing, the march did not usually start until about 8 a.m. A long halt was made at noon, during which girths were loosened. The number of sore backs, considering the conditions, was not large.
The officers did not concern themselves greatly with details, in the matter of caring for their men. In general, the men took care of themselves. Most units had rolling kitchens and received a hot meal from them each evening. In the morning they had coffee and bread. At noon they ate a piece of bread and occasionally some cold meat or sausage which they had left over from the night before. The issue of rations was largely supplemented by foraging.
Discipline in its outward forms was good. In reality there was none. Failure to obey orders, delay or slackness in their execution, was the rule, and more so in the higher grades. March discipline did not exist. Straggling and pillaging were the rule. In this respect the war was similar to that of the Middle Ages. The population suffered and was correspondingly hostile to all troops. The efforts made by the high authorities to protect the population met with no response from subordinate commanders, who openly admitted pillaging and stealing as the only means for the troops to live, since no regular supply system functioned.
With respect to the tactics employed by the Polish cavalry, it may be said to be characterized by the mounted charge. On every occasion they wanted to charge, usually without reconnaissance and without proper utilization of the terrain. This tendency to charge often cost dearly, but on many occasions was remarkably successful. The charge was executed in extended order with the lance. Its effect was almost entirely moral, as the trooper had insufficient instruction in the use of the lance. There were numerous instances of a charge at unbroken infantry and machine-guns over open terrain. So great was the moral effect of the charging cavalry that the enemy fled before them, abandoning excellent positions.
There was practically no dismounted action. The men did not know how to use their carbines. There was much useless firing from horseback, occasionally with real moral results, but never with many casualties. There was no effort to utilize the terrain or to take cover. Large units stood in close order in exposed positions, when near by there was excellent cover. This resulted frequently in direct hits from artillery at short range, which resulted in great confusion and panic.
At the commencement of Budenny's operations the Polish disposition lacked depth. Almost the whole Polish Army was spread out in a long line of companies or platoons, each in a village, with little or no contact with each other and with few reserves. When attacked at any point, the line had little power of resistance. Once through this line, Budenny's cavalry met with little opposition, and immediately occupied themselves with the destruction of communications. They then proceeded to carry out their mission by destroying a railroad center, massacring the population, and robbing. Later on, the Polish General Staff reorganized this system, disposing the units in the rear of the front and maintaining a very thin line of observation, thereby having sufficient troops disposed at intervals in readiness for a counter-attack. Directly the enemy had pierced the weak line of observation with his cavalry masses, the Polish units in rear, by maneuvering, would attack in the flank. This system gave excellent results. Insufficient cavalry usually prevented the Poles from pursuing their advantage.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
