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Great War Artillery - France

In the French Army, the dominant maxim became "the artillery conquers and the infantry occupies (l'artillerie conquiert, l'infanterie occupe)." At the outset of the Great War, the French had no light howitzers available and were apparently insistent that their field howitzer would be more powerful than the German light field howitzer. Their 155-mm. Rimailho howitzer was used as the next calibre above the 75, and they relied upon the 75, with reduced charges or the recently developed "plaquet" or disk, to increase the angle of fall and the effectiveness of the 75-mm. gun in attack of intrenched troops. Their production for new howitzers was confined entirely to the 155 howitzers of several types.

The wholesale call-up of 1914 caught up in the military net many skilled workers vital to the war Industries. When the shell shortage became critical in early September 1914, a number of "affectes speciacx" were returned to their work benches.

In 1914 the French Army’s principal artillery piece was the famous 75mm field gun with a hydraulic recoil(less) system. It could fire 12 rounds per minute; its weight was 1870 kg and it required six horses to move it. It fired all types of shells; the direction of fire could be raised/lowered between -11 degrees and +18 degrees. Over 4600 of these guns were supplied to the Army’s 62 regiments, forming 1043 batteries (of which 24 were in North Africa). A gun with its ammunition wagon was served by 14 men: 6 drivers, 6 gunners and a corporal and sergeant.

Because the mobility of their 75mm was thought to be better suited to the type of warfare the French preferred, they lacked heavy guns, considered to be unnecessary in a short war. The French military was extremely successful in adapting to technology during the War. In many respects, the French effort in this regard equalled, and in several instances surpassed, the German. Deficient in heavy artillery at the start of the war, by 1917-1918 the French Army had created a superb heavy artillery arm.

In 1900, the Germans had adopted an artillery organization of 36 light howitzers (105mm) and 108 field pieces (77mm) per corps. The French Artillery Committee likewise established a program for light howitzers comprising calibers between 95mm and 120mm. Unfortunately, however, this program was not executed with conviction, and attention was devoted rather to modifying the 75mm ammunition to provide higher angles of fall. A delay action fuse was devised to give action on ricochet against entrenched personnel and reduced charges were provided for fire against reverse slopes.

In spite of the efforts of many French officers during the ten years prior to 1914, the infatuation for the 75mm remained so great that no steps were taken to carry out the howitzer program. Division and corps artillery entered the war with field guns (75mm) only. In seeking a palliative, the Malandrin nose plates were provided for 75mm projectiles but these were far from successful as a measure for obtaining greater angles of fall.

During the long period of trench warfare that immediately ensued, attention was naturally directed to providing heavy howitzers. Moreover, French industry was equipped to produce the 155mm which was adopted accordingly for both division and corps. Since the war, the influence of trench warfare has remained too strong to allow the removal of this caliber from the division.

In 1914, the doctrine was that the artillery acted only with the infantry in attack. It was not to prepare attacks, but to support them. The theory, based on the idea of a short war, was that the 75 would suffice against open formations and that no heavy artillery was needed, as field works would be rare. It overlooked the protection provided against artillery fire by even the simplest defenses and, also, the disappearance of formed bodies of troops from the battlefield. Shrapnel is certainly capable of destroying troops in such formations, but not when they are scattered and lying down, and still less when they are intrenched in any degree. In this case, shell is needed and plenty of it.

Moreover, certain unexpectedly strong field works were encountered against which the 75 was powerless. Most of these, however, existed only in the imagination of excited troops and no trace has been found of them except in regimental histories. With a proper density of fire, the 75 would have sufficed in many cases to prevent terrible losses.

"Give me a hundred thousand rounds of 75 and I will give you the Mortmare wood," said an artilleryman to his general on one of these tragic days. He was right, but three years were required to convince people of it. Meanwhile, the same Mortmare wood was attacked again and again with a total expenditure of many more than one hundred thousand rounds to no purpose other than the decimation of several magnificent battalions of infantry.

From 1914 to 1917, the idea of destruction was predominant. "The object of the preparation is to destroy all obstacles in the zone of the attack. Artillery of all calibers will take part, destroying wire, flanking defenses, fire and communicating trenches, and enemy batteries." (Instructions for the Attack, 1915.) As stated by Marshal Petain in 1915, the object of preparation is "to so weaken the resistance of the defenders that the attacking troops will find before them a shaken and disconcerted enemy."

The time factor was entirely overlooked. Not until after the disastrous failure of the Nivelle offensive in 1917 was it realized that the long preparation defeated its own ends by making the terrain in front impossible for artillery, by creating craters to shield enemy machine gunners, and by giving the enemy time to bring up his reserves. Strategic surprise was made practically impossible.

In October, 1917, a new set of instructions was issued for the offensive combat of large French units. "Strategic surprise," it stated, "requires that an attack be launched suddenly after a rapid preparation, allowing the enemy insufficient time to bring up his general reserves, to strengthen his defenses, or to withdraw." In March, May, and June, 1918, the Germans gave a masterly demonstration of this principle. Preparations were reduced to a few hours or not used at all. The successful attacks of the 1st French Army on August 8th and September 26th and those of the 10th French Army on July 18th and August 18th are also striking examples.

French Artillery was divided into Field Artillery and Heavy Artillery. Field Artillery comprises materiel smaller than 95 mm. Heavy Artillery comprises materiel larger than 95 mm. Heavy Artillery is divided into Heavy Field Artillery, which is drawn either by horses or tractors, and Artillery of Position or Siege Artillery. Heavy Siege Artillery is designated as follows: 1. Fortress or Coast Artillery. 2. Special Heavy Artillery or High-powered Heavy Artillery (designated as " A.L.G.P. "—Artillerie Lourde a Grande Puissance). The A.L.G.P. was subdivided as follows: (a) Heavy Railway Artillery (designated as "A.L.V.F." Artillerie Lourde sur Voie Ferree). This is used either on standard or narrow-gauge tracks and fires from the truck. This subdivision comprises old fortress, navy, or coast materiel, as follows: 190, 240, 320, 274, 395, 200, 95, 120, and 155 mm. (b) High-powered Artillery which is transported by rail but which is dismounted and placed on a platform mount before firing. This subdivision comprises: 305- and 240-mm. rapid-fire, 340- and 293-mm. Schneider, 400-mm. howitzer and coast guns, 270- and 370-mm Fillioux.

The situation of the French Field Artillery, on July 1, 1918, resulting from the work in accordance with the various programs modified as had been necessary, may be summed up as follows:

Light field artillery. This consisted of:

• division horse-drawn regiments (105 regiments, 3780 cannon);
• horse artillery battalions of the cavalry divisions (6 battalions, 72 cannon);
• 27 portée regiments in the R.G.A. (972 cannon).
• 13 portée regiments [still to be formed];
• 2 horse-drawn regiments of 6 batteries each for the cavalry corps [still to be formed].

The armies had, accordingly, a total of 4824 75-mm. guns. The French did not use the light howitzer during the war. One British critic thus states his view of their failure to adopt this weapon prior to the war: "The French were never able to correct their initial error of judgment under the stress of production of the heavier natures of ordnance, and remained hampered to the end through the lack of a suitable light field howitzer." There were many supporters of light howitzer development in France at the end of the war.

Heavy field artillery Program of May 30, 1916, contemplated the assignment of 2 battalions of 155-mm. howitzers to each division and the assignment of 4 gun battalions, 2 of 105-mm. and 2 of 155-mm. to each army corps. The tractor-drawn heavy field artillery was to constitute a reserve under the Commander-in-Chief. When the R.G.A. was formed, 30 regiments of the 300 series had been created by splitting up the regiments in the 100 series. Each of these 30 regiments was to consist, in theory, of 3 battalions, 1 of 155-mm. guns and 2 of 155-mm. howitzers. The inclusion of these regiments in the R.G.A. was to be only a temporary measure, and upon completion of the program all horse-drawn heavy artillery was to be re-assigned, the howitzer battalions to divisions, the gun battalions to army corps.

During the defensive campaign in the early part of 1918, this scheme was seen to be impracticable. For one thing, the necessity of supplying the American Artillery with its matériel, coupled with a shortage in production, prevented the complete realization of the program. Furthermore, the attack of March 21st clearly showed that it was absolutely necessary to keep the heavy horse-drawn artillery in the general reserves. These two factors led the High Command, in April, 1918, to limit the assignment of heavy artillery to Army Corps and divisions, to those quantities actually existent in those organizations and to retain the 30 regiments of the 300 series in the R.G.A.

These regiments were re-equipped with homogeneous armament as follows:

• 5 regiments of 105-mm. guns, of 3 battalions each, numbered beginning with 450.
• 10 regiments of 155-mm. guns, Schneider, Model 1917, of 3 battalions each, numbered in the 400 series.
• 15 regiments of 155-mm. howitzers of 4 battalions each, numbered in the 300 series.

This re-organization involved the tractor-drawn regiments whose 12 batteries, instead of forming 6 battalions of 2 batteries each, henceforth formed 4 battalions of 3 batteries each. All these regiments were to be provided with modern matériels. However, there was still much to be done before this would be accomplished. There were still 12 105-mm. battalions armed with 120-mm. guns, Model 1878, and all the Army Corps 155-mm. gun regiments were still armed with old model cannon. Some still had temporarily, 155-mm. guns, Schneider, Model 1917, but their cannon were to be transferred to the gun regiments of the R.G.A. [General Reserve of Artillery], some to replace used 145-mm. guns and some to be used instead of the 155-mm. G.P.F's., the manufacture of which was inadequate to simultaneously meet the requirements of the R.G.A. and of the American gun regiments.

The 145-mm. gun wore out very rapidly. By 01 July 1918, it was recognized that it would be necessary to eliminate this armament from a considerable number of batteries and replace it with the 155-mm Schneider gun Model 1917. Moreover, the 155-mm. Schneider gun, Model 1917, had proved to be a little heavy for horse traction. The Armament Department had been asked to build a lighter matériel with a range of only 13 to 14 kilometers. The manufacture of the 155-mm gun, Model 1877–1914, which met these requirements could not, for technical reasons, be resumed and the Department designed a new matériel, easy to manufacture, called the 155-mm gun, Schneider, Model 1918. However, the delivery of these matériels did not begin until June 1919.

It was planned to ultimately form a tractor-drawn regiment of 194-mm. G.P.F.'s and a few battalions of 280-mm. howitzers and 194-mm. G.P.F.'s on caterpillar mounts. Actually these units did not exist before the end of the war.

During the offensive campaign ammunition expenditures exceeded all estimates while production was not what had been hoped for. The production of propellant powder and shell filler explosive was considerably less than requirements, which were 800 tons of shell filler explosive and 570 tons of propellant powder per day while daily production never exceeded 600 tons of explosive and 400 tons of powder. Furthermore, the requirements of steel for the manufacture of shell only, rose to 100,000 tons per month which was nearly half of the total resources. Accordingly when the war ended the situation was very serious.