Great War Artillery - Austria
| Feldkanonen und Feldhaubitzen / Field Artillery | ||
|---|---|---|
| Werfer / Throwers | ||
| 9-cm | Minenwerfer | M.14 |
| 14-cm | Minenwerfer | M.15 |
| Mörser / Mortar | ||
| 15-cm | Mörser | M78 u.M.80 |
| 24-cm | Mörser | M98 und M98/7 |
| 30.5 cm | Mörser | M.11. u. M.16. |
| Haubitzen / Howitzers | ||
| 10-cm | Feldhaubitze | M.99 |
| 10-cm | Feldhaubitze | M.14 |
| 15-cm | Feldhaubitze | M.14 |
| 15-cm | Autohaubitze | M.15 |
| 15-cm | Belagerungshaubitze | M.99 |
| 28 cm | Haubitze | M.79 |
| 38-cm | Belagerungshaubitze | |
| 42-cm | Haubitze | |
| Kanonen / Cannon | ||
| 8-cm | Feldkanone | M.5 |
| 8-cm | Feldkanone | M.5/8 |
| 8-cm | Drehbettung | M.5/8 (M5) |
| 8-cm | Lfa-Kanone | M.14 |
| 9-cm | Feldkanone | M.75/96 |
| 10.4-cm | Feldkanone | M.15 |
| 12-cm | Minimalschartenkanone | M.96 |
| 12-cm | Minimalschartenkanone | M.85 und M.80 |
| 12-cm | Belagerungskanone | M.80 |
| 15-cm | Autokanone | M.15/16 |
| 35-cm | Marinekanone | M15 |
| Gebirgskanone / Mountain Artillery | ||
| 7 cm | mountain cannon | M 99 |
| 7,5cm | Gebirgskanone | M.15 |
| 10 cm | Gebirgshaubitzen | M.8 und M.10 |
| Festungsartillerie / Fortress Artillery / heavy artillery | ||
| 6-cm | Kasemattkanone | M.10 |
| 8-cm | Kasemattkanone | M.9 |
| 9-cm | Kanone | M.75 und M.75/96 |
| 10-cm | Panzerhaubitze | M.99 F und M.99 B * |
| 10-cm | Panzerhaubitze | M.5 und M.6 F * |
| 10-cm | Turmhaubitze | M 9 * |
| 12-cm | Minimalschartenkanone | M.80 und M.85 |
| 12-cm | Minimalschartenkanone | M.96 |
| 12/15/18-cm | Kanone | M.61 und M.61/95 |
| 15-cm | Panzerhaubitze | M.94 und M.99 * |
| 15-cm | Turmhaubitze | M.15 |
| 15-cm | Autohaubitze | M.15 |
| 15-cm | L/40-Belagerungskanone | M.15 und M.15/16 |
| 15-cm | Mörser | M.78 |
| 15-cm | Mörser | M.80 |
| 15-cm | Panzermörser | M.80 * |
| 24-cm | Mörser | M.98 und M.98/07 |
| 24-cm | Kanone | M.16 |
| 26-cm | Minenwerfer | M.17 |
| 30.5-cm | Mörser | M.11, M.11/16 und M.16 |
| 38-cm | Belagerungshaubitze | M.16 |
| 35-cm | Marinekanone L/45 | M.15 |
| 42-cm | Haubitze | M 14, M 16 und M 17 |
| * turrets in rotatable armored cupolas | ||
| Küstengeschütze / Coastal guns | ||
| 24cm | Küstenkanone | L/22 |
| 24cm | Armstronkanone | |
Over the period from 1867 to 1918 the Austro-Hungarian artillery experienced major changes both in technical and organizational terms. More than a hundred artillery models were introduced over this period. Proceeding from the muzzle-loader of the ‘Battery of the Dead’ at the Battle of Sadowa in 1866, the artillery was continuously modernized and evolved from the M 1875, M 1880 and M 1899 systems to barrel recoil artillery and finally the massed guns of the Great War.
Starting from the year of destiny in 1866, the artillery mirrored both the technical development of weaponry and the changing tactical principles like no other branch of the service. By comparison, the infantry merely had to witness two upheavals, the introduction of the breech-loader in 1867 and the transition to the repeating rifle between 1885 and 1895. The machine gun only made a decisive appearance as the main weapon of infantry combat during the Great War.
Austro-Hungarian Artillery - Materiel
By 1903 Austria-Hungary was experimenting with new artillery material. The long recoil system had been adopted on principle, but the specific model had not yet been decided upon. Some batteries of guns submitted by Ehrhardt and Skoda were in the hands of the troops. The type of the carriage and whether the caisson should be armored, were two questions being carefully considered. The gun had been determined to be of 75 mm caliber, with long recoil on the carriage, and was provided with shields and hinged portions and the interrupted-screw fermeture. With regard to the carriage, very complete and satisfactory tests had held with telescope-trail carriages of the Ehrhardt-Mannesmann system and with carriages of the Skoda system. Both of the models have been modified and highly improved in the course of the experiments.
In 1914 the following artillery matériel had been experimented upon and Austria was ready to produce in large quantities:
- 75-mm. model 1915 mountain gun, split into six loads for packing
- 10-cm. model 1914 field howitzers;
- 15-cm. model 1914 heavy field howitzers;
- 10.4-cm. model 1915 gun.
The two howitzers and the 10.4-cm. gun were constructed in such a manner that they could easily be used in mountainous districts. Great weight was given to equipping the artillery for mountain warfare. Pieces capable of high-angle fire were most necessary both as to quality and quantity. The mountain gun, it should be noted, was also ballistically a howitzer. The author states that, with the exception of the 10.4 gun, this matériel still ranked among the best in the world, as did also the sights, etc., used therewith.
For the heavy artillery the 30-cm. mortar had been studied between the years 1908 and 1912. This piece was designed for action against reinforced concrete emplacements and it was of such mobility that it could be carried on any roads which had good beds. The 24-cm. mortar, model 1898, was also considered an excellent piece.
In 1916 the infantry was equipped with 37-mm. infantry accompanying guns. As the campaign progressed there appeared a tendency to increase the power of artillery even at the expense of mobility and to this end a 8.35-cm. gun was studied. Construction of this model, however, was suspended on account of the difficulty of providing ammunition for same. In the same year the Austrians started mounting guns and howitzers on motor vehicles.
As regards heavy artillery it may be stated that in the spring of 1915, the 42-cm. howitzer arrived at the front. It had been constructed for the fortress of Pola, but was changed so as to make it a mobile piece. In 1916 the 30-cm. mortar was improved by increasing its range and traverse and in the same year the 24-cm. and 38-cm. guns were put into action, the latter having a range of 30 km. These pieces were transported in a very satisfactory manner by electric tractors with many wheels. With the exception of the 24-cm. gun these supercannon did not repay the efforts made in transporting them except in the matter of morale. The real strength of the artillery lay in its medium calibre and light pieces.
Almost all the new patterns of guns issued in the first two years of the Great War, such as the 10 and 15 cm howitzers, the 10.4 cm field gun or the 7.5 cm mountain gun, had been designed before the war. From the purely technical point of view, they would have ranked among the most modern systems in Europe at the outbreak of war. However, the technical lead was lost by the completely belated initiation of production, which was only possible during the war.
The famous Skoda mortars had shown themselves almost ideal instruments of attack against fortifications, notwithstanding the famous achievements of the Big Berthas, as the 42-centimeter howitzers of the Krupp works were popularly called. To be sure, the Skoda mortars, because of their smaller calibre, were not as effective against the most perfect modern fortifications as the German giant cannon; nevertheless the Austrian officers were fond of their “iron bulldogs,” which rendered them such signal service on the Italian front.
They were full of praise for the effectiveness, the durability, and above all the mobility of this mortar. It can be taken apart and transported on powerful motor wagons. A foundation for it can be erected in a few hours. The Big Bertha could only be moved by rail, which often has to be laid especially for this purpose, and can be used only after the erection of an extensive and firm foundation requiring great labor and precise calculation. The nimble Skoda mortar can be easily transported, placed rapidly in position, and moved from place to place for greater precision and effectiveness. The German General Staff early recognized the great merits of the Skoda mortars, and even before the war put itself in possession of large numbers of them.
As of 1915, the mass production of most new gun models commenced, but high output rates could only be reached in 1916. At the end of 1917, a situation could finally be achieved when there was a certain equality with the enemy artillery on the different fronts. But when the raw materials crisis deteriorated in 1917/18, the continuous production requirements to maintain the artillery and provide the necessary quantities of ammunition were in jeopardy.
As the majority of the modern Austrian guns had been designed using the immediate experiences of the war, there was a major information lead in comparison with the German Artillery Inspection Commission, which only began to initiate the modernization of its artillery in the middle of the war. The Technical Military Committee [TMK] readily passed on its experiences, which were then immediately incorporated in German designs. The artillery collection of the Army History Museum comprises about 550 guns and tubes and is thus one of the most important of its kind. Much of the stock comes from the old imperial arsenal. By incorporating projected material and experimental guns of the Austro-Hungarian Technical and Administrative Military Committee, the collection grew steadily and recorded numerous new acquisitions during the First World War. The total number of existing guns can only be estimated approximately today, but probably will be located at about 1200 barrels.
Austro-Hungarian Artillery - Industrial Base
At the outbreak of the Great War, Austro-Hungarian artillery had to fight with obsolete material, far inferior in quantity and completely inexperienced. It was a catastrophic position in every respect. Austria-Hungary was in the unpleasant situation of possessing only one steel barrel factory (the Skoda Works in Pilsen). The Artillery Arsenal was only capable of manufacturing bronze gun barrels and steel could not be processed. In 1914, only the Skoda Works were in a position to deliver guns immediately after the outbreak of the war. The Artillery Arsenal had to confine itself to supplying bronze barrels and gun equipment for want of suitable facilities.
Even before the war the Imperial and Royal Artillery Arsenal was a large state-owned armory. During the war it experienced a huge expansion. Up to 20,000 workers were employed in eighteen factories not only with the production of new arms but also with the repair and recycling of weapons. The Imperial and Royal Artillery Arsenal, which was run by the military, had a special role to play in the Vienna armaments industry as an artillery factory and armoury. It expanded during the war to become a weapons acquisition facility of unparalleled size. Whereas it employed 2,600 workers before the war, during the war the workforce rose to 20,000, including 14,000 civilians and a considerable number of Landsturm workers. Even at the end of the war, it still employed around 12,000 people.
Artillery ammunition making was the most serious problem during the early part of the war. In the autumn of 1914, and until the spring of 1915, the scarcity of artillery ammunition in Austria was so great that it would have been disastrous except for the fact that all belligerents were suffering from the same evil. During this period an average of only ten rounds per gun per day was allowed. An example is given to show the great consumption of ammunition. In the Battle of the Isonzo, which took place between August 18 and September 6, 1917, 1454 cannon used 1,600,000 rounds, or 33,320 tons of ammunition.
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy produced about 83,000,000 artillery projectiles during the war. To provide explosives for so large a quantity of ammunition it was necessary to employ many makeshifts, for example, the trotyl charges were diluted in sal nitrate of ammonia. Iron shrapnel balls were also used instead of hardened lead ones. However, in 1915, the industrial centers of the Monarchy began to supply large quantities of ammunition, which they continued to do until the end of the war.
During the war, eighteen major factories were making equipment for the army in the Arsenal. To permit this expansion in armaments production the original thirty buildings had to be supplemented by a further 138 new ones as well as 93 wooden barracks. It made field and siege artillery of different calibres, and defence and siege mortars. Artillery made elsewhere was assembled in the Arsenal, and it also served as a repair shop for captured weapons, which were cannibalised to make new ones.
A report at the time described the round-the-clock war machinery: “On the outskirts, behind the brick walls of the Arsenal, the banging and hammering are constant. Damaged artillery, broken machine guns and train wagons and other bent, smashed and blown-up equipment from the major battles in all theatres of war are made fit for service again. Streams of molten bronze hiss and steam through mysterious channels, steam hammers crash down onto hot metal, circular saws screech and chips fly. All kinds of secret work takes place here out of the public eye, and their results – be it a bale with halters for horses, or complicated guns – leave the reinforced gates packed in wool, unrecognisable under the waterproof tarpaulins. An army of well drilled men work under strict conditions in shifts, and a horde of skilled and experienced engineers, artillerymen and other experts supervise, design and optimise. An iron will reigns, a relentless sense of duty, that allows room only for a modicum of rest and relaxation …” (Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 9 January 1916).
Even in the Arsenal, however, the mood of the workers began to change from May 1917 on account of the increasingly precarious food situation. Industrial action was avoided until the major wave of strikes in January 1918, and even then they didn’t last long, thanks to the calming influence of Victor Adler, leader of the Social Democrats. Arms production functioned in principle in the Arsenal until the end of the war. Thereafter a workers’ defence force protected the stocks from looting and theft, and the armoury was taken over by the Volkswehr [people’s militia] in the young republic.
Austro-Hungarian Artillery - Organization
The Austro-Hungarian artillery entered the Great War with 571 batteries, which were manned by 206,000 men, including the men required for regular artillery services. In 1918 there were 1931 batteries.
By 1914 the artillery had had to undergo a total of eight major reorganizations, to which continuous minor ‘adjustments’ and ‘adaptations’ were added. In the Austro-Hungarian Army the Artillery was divided into three categories: Field (including Horse) Artillery; Mountain Artillery; and Fortress Artillery. At the outbreak of the War, field and mountain artillery were employed as divisional troops but they were later assigned to geographical sectors irrespectivc of the Infantry Divisions to which by their numbering they should belong.
For Austria-Hungary, the focus was on the Balkans and Galicia. Austria-Hungary failed there as did the German Reich in the west. Already at the end of 1914 German and Austro-Hungarian troops had to spend everything in order not to be overrun by Russian troops. Italy also declared war on Austria-Hungary in May 1915. Thus, a front was also opened in the southwest, ranging from South Tyrol and the high mountains to the area Gorizia and Trieste.
In 1915 and 1916 the Anstro-Hungarian Field Artillery was completely reorganized ; to each infantry division in the field which was not organized for mountain warfare was allotted a field brigade comprising: a field gun regiment (Feldcanonen Regiment); a field howitzer regiment (Feldhaubitzen Regiment); and a heavy field artillery regiment (Schwerer Feldartillerie Regiment). Each of these regiments had the same number as the Infantry Division to which it belonged.
To the Infantry Divisions, created since the War, Reserve Field Gun Regiments, Reserve Howitzer Regiments and Reserve Heavy Field Artillery Regiments were allotted which bore the same number as the Division. At first these Reserve Field Gun and Reserve Field Howitzer Regiments were reduced to 4 gun and 4 howitzer batteries, but since the middle of 1917 these batteries had been put on a 6 gun basis.
At the outbreak of war there were 10 mountain artillery regiments (Gebirgsartillerie Regiments) numbered serially from 3 to 8, and from 10 to 14. Since the war the number of mountain artillery regiments had risen to 52, and their organization has been modified. There were two series of mountain artillery regiments. The gaps in the pre-war series had been filled up, and 14 additional regiments raised, numbered from 15 to 28. A new series of four mountain artillery regiments weere formed, numbered 201, 202, 203, 204.
The difference between the organization of the Field Artillery and the Mountain Artillery was that while in the Field Artillery gun batteries and howitzer batteries were organized into separate regiments, in the Mountain Artillery regiments, gun and howitzer batteries were combined in the same regiment.
As regards organization it should be noted that in 1916, the field artillery brigades of the regular army and the two Landwehrs, were supplied with uniform matériel. The field artillery regiments were reduced to four batteries and one anti-aircraft battery. The field howitzer regiments were also created and had four batteries, while the heavy field regiments had three batteries, two heavy howitzers and one 10-cm. gun battery. In the autumn of 1916 each infantry division was supplied with sixty-four pieces of artillery; at the same time the mountain and fortress batteries were supplied with new matériel.
In January, 1918, a second reorganization of the field artillery brigades were ordered. The brigade was made to consist of two field artillery regiments, each with two light gun batteries, three light howitzer batteries, and one special battery (anti-aircraft for one light regiment of the brigade and trench mortar for the other). The third regiment of the brigade was a sixbattery heavy field regiment consisting of five heavy howitzer batteries and one 10-cm. gun battery. This reorganization was not completed until the end of the war on account of the tremendous consumption of 15-cm. howitzers, which were used generally for destructive fire.
In 1918 each field artillery brigade was given a group of mountain batteries consisting of two batteries of mountain guns and one of mountain howitzers, and all three mountain batteries were designated as infantry accompanying batteries; thus the number of guns per division was 100, or 10 guns per 1000 rifles.
In February, 1918, there was a reorganization of heavy artillery, which provided for fourteen regiments, three of which were to be used for coast defence. The others were as follows: Two very heavy regiments of 24-cm. guns and 38-cm. howitzers; five motor-drawn heavy regiments consisting of 30-cm. mortars and various howitzers and guns mounted on motor vehicles; and four heavy regiments, horse-drawn, consisting of 15-cm. howitzers and 10-cm. guns. Each regiment consisted of four groups of four batteries and two special batteries of which one was anti-aircraft and the other trench mortar. At the same time all mountain artillery was organized into fourteen mountain artillery regiments, the heavy regiments and the mountain regiments remained under the command of General Headquarters and were used as reserve to reinforce important parts of the front.
Austro-Hungarian Artillery - Training
In the 1890s, Austria began to drop behind Germany and France, not technically, but in terms of quantity, and began to take Russia as a model. But when Russia began to reinforce its artillery towards at the end of the 19th century, Austria-Hungary was no longer in a position to match this development, for reasons of finance and domestic politics. Austria began to accept quantitative inferiority, but to assume that artillery equality was given because of intensive training. Both junior and field-grade officers of the Austro-Hungarian artillery ranked among the best trained artillerymen in Europe.
The Great War was the first series of campaigns in which the Austrian Army took part since general obligatory service was instituted in that country. An important factor in the Austrian Army was the fact that individuals drafted differed among themselves not only in education, but also in national characteristics and languages; this fact made it necessary to employ the drafted men from different regions according to their capabilities, which in turn resulted in a lack of homogeneity in the army, many regiments being in every way superior, or inferior, to others of the same arm.
One of the first troubles which arose, due to the lack of knowledge of artillery by the persons entrusted with same, was the excessive wear and tear on the matériel. This was due in great part to rapidity of fire not warranted by most tactical situations. In 1917 a course of instruction in the use of matériel was started.
As regards accuracy of fire it has been the experience of the Austrian Army that firing, instead of improving during the long war, deteriorated. This was due in large part to the fact that trained artillery officers were no longer in positions requiring them to direct fire and also on account of the fact that fire control during great concentrations is impracticable. Furthermore, the idea which exists in peace times of obtaining the maximum effect in the maximum time and with the minimum expenditure of ammunition does not hold in war time. During the fighting the principal object is to obtain the effect desired, everything else is secondary, which means that nobody has time to attend to it. On the other hand, the influx of fortress artillery officers tended to make field artillery firing more precise.
The High Command had not yet grasped the idea of massing artillery on important parts of the front, taking same from quiet sections to do so. The same trouble existed in the divisions where artillery concentration was rarely ordered. The attack was often launched without waiting for results of artillery preparation and the artillery frequently was without orders to prepare the attack or to help push it through. Of course, some of the blame should be put on the artillery; it was new at this kind of warfare; its methods had to be changed and inefficiency was to be expected. However, in individual cases artillery commanders adopted procedures which were successful.
